Derecho de la Unión Europea

El Derecho de la Unión Europea es un sistema de normas que se aplican en los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea (UE). Desde la fundación de la Comunidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la UE ha desarrollado el objetivo de "promover la paz, sus valores y el bienestar de sus pueblos". ^[4] La UE tiene instituciones políticas, políticas sociales y económicas que trascienden los Estados nacionales con el propósito de la cooperación y el desarrollo humano . ^[5] Según su Tribunal de Justicia , la UE representa "un nuevo orden jurídico de derecho internacional ". ^[6]

Los fundamentos jurídicos de la UE son el Tratado de la Unión Europea y el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea , acordados actualmente por unanimidad por los gobiernos de 27 estados miembros. Los nuevos miembros pueden unirse si aceptan seguir las reglas de la unión, y los estados existentes pueden abandonarla de acuerdo con sus "propios requisitos constitucionales". ^[7] Los ciudadanos tienen derecho a participar a través del Parlamento , y sus respectivos gobiernos estatales a través del Consejo en la elaboración de la legislación que elabora la UE. La Comisión tiene derecho a proponer nuevas leyes ( derecho de iniciativa ), el Consejo de la Unión Europea representa a los gobiernos electos de los estados miembros, el Parlamento es elegido por los ciudadanos europeos y el Tribunal de Justicia tiene por objeto defender el estado de derecho y los derechos humanos . ^[8] Como ha dicho el Tribunal de Justicia, la UE "no es simplemente una unión económica", sino que tiene por objeto "garantizar el progreso social y buscar la mejora constante de las condiciones de vida y de trabajo de sus pueblos". ^[9]

Wikisource tiene el texto original relacionado con este artículo:

Versión consolidada del Tratado de la Unión Europea

Versión consolidada del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea

Historia

Los ideales democráticos de integración para las naciones internacionales y europeas son tan antiguos como el estado nacional moderno . ^[11] ^[12] Los conceptos antiguos de unidad europea eran generalmente antidemocráticos y se basaban en la dominación, como el Imperio de Alejandro Magno , el Imperio Romano o la Iglesia Católica controlada por el Papa en Roma. En el Renacimiento , el comercio medieval floreció en organizaciones como la Liga Hanseática , que se extendía desde ciudades inglesas como Boston y Londres , hasta Frankfurt , Estocolmo y Riga . Estos comerciantes desarrollaron la lex mercatoria , difundiendo normas básicas de buena fe y trato justo a través de sus negocios. En 1517, la Reforma Protestante desencadenó cien años de crisis e inestabilidad. Martín Lutero clavó una lista de demandas en la puerta de la iglesia de Wittenberg , el rey Enrique VIII declaró una separación unilateral de Roma con el Acta de Supremacía de 1534 y los conflictos estallaron en todo el Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico hasta que la Paz de Augsburgo de 1555 garantizó a cada principado el derecho a su religión elegida ( cuius regio, eius religio ). Este inestable asentamiento se deshizo en la Guerra de los Treinta Años (1618-1648), matando a alrededor de una cuarta parte de la población de Europa central. El Tratado de Westfalia de 1648 , que trajo la paz de acuerdo con un sistema de derecho internacional inspirado por Hugo Grocio , es generalmente reconocido como el comienzo del sistema de estado-nación. Incluso entonces, la Guerra Civil Inglesa estalló y solo terminó con la Revolución Gloriosa de 1688, cuando el Parlamento invitó a Guillermo y María de Hannover al trono y aprobó la Declaración de Derechos de 1689 . En 1693, William Penn , un cuáquero de Londres que fundó Pensilvania en América del Norte, argumentó que para evitar las guerras en curso en Europa se necesitaba un "dique o parlamento europeo". ^[13]

El diplomático francés, Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre , que trabajó en la negociación del Tratado de Utrech al final de la Guerra de Sucesión Española, propuso, a través de la " Unión Perpetua ", "una paz duradera en Europa", ^[14] un proyecto retomado por Jean-Jacques Rousseau , ^[15] e Immanuel Kant después de él. ^[16] Después de las Guerras Napoleónicas y las Revoluciones de 1848 en el siglo XIX, Victor Hugo en el Congreso Internacional de la Paz en 1849 imaginó un día en el que habría "Estados Unidos de América y Estados Unidos de Europa cara a cara, extendiéndose el uno al otro a través de los mares". ^[17] La Primera Guerra Mundial devastó la sociedad y la economía de Europa, y el Tratado de Versalles no logró establecer un sistema internacional viable en la Liga de las Naciones , ninguna integración europea e impuso términos punitivos de pagos de reparación para los países perdedores. ^[18] Después de otro colapso económico y el ascenso del fascismo que condujo a una Segunda Guerra Mundial, la sociedad civil europea estaba decidida a crear una unión duradera para garantizar la paz mundial a través de la integración económica, social y política.

Para "preservar a las generaciones venideras del flagelo de la guerra, que en dos ocasiones... trajo a la humanidad un dolor indecible", ^[19] se aprobó la Carta de las Naciones Unidas en 1945, y la Conferencia de Bretton Woods estableció un nuevo sistema integrado de banca , finanzas y comercio mundiales . Además, el Consejo de Europa , formado por el Tratado de Londres de 1949 , adoptó una Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos , supervisada por un nuevo tribunal transnacional en Estrasburgo en 1950. Ya en 1946, Winston Churchill , que había sido derrotado como Primer Ministro del Reino Unido en 1945 , había pedido unos " Estados Unidos de Europa ", aunque esto no significaba que el Reino Unido cortaría sus vínculos con la Commonwealth . En 1950, el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores francés, Robert Schuman, propuso que, a partir de la integración de la producción de carbón y acero francesa y alemana, debería existir "una organización abierta a la participación de los demás países de Europa", donde la "solidaridad en la producción" haría que la guerra "no sólo fuera impensable, sino materialmente imposible". ^[20] El Tratado de París de 1951 creó la primera Comunidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero (CECA), firmada por Francia, Alemania Occidental, Bélgica, los Países Bajos, Luxemburgo e Italia, con Jean Monnet como su presidente. Su teoría era simplemente que la guerra sería imposiblemente costosa si la propiedad y la producción de la economía de cada país se mezclaban. Estableció una Asamblea (ahora el Parlamento Europeo ) para representar al pueblo, un Consejo de Ministros para los estados miembros, una Comisión como ejecutivo y un Tribunal de Justicia para interpretar la ley. En el Este, la Unión Soviética había instalado gobiernos dictatoriales, controlando Alemania Oriental y el resto de Europa Oriental. Aunque Stalin murió en 1953 y el nuevo secretario general Nikita Khrushchev lo había denunciado en 1956, ^[21]los tanques soviéticos aplastaron la revolución democrática húngara de 1956 y reprimieron todo otro intento de su pueblo de ganar la democracia y los derechos humanos.

En Occidente, la decisión de crear la primera Comunidad Económica Europea se tomó mediante el Tratado de Roma de 1957. Compartía la Asamblea y el Tribunal con la Comunidad del Carbón y del Acero, pero creó órganos paralelos para el Consejo y la Comisión. Basándose en el Informe Spaak de 1956, pretendía derribar todas las barreras al comercio en un mercado común de bienes, servicios, trabajo y capital, y evitar la distorsión de la competencia y regular áreas de interés común como la agricultura, la energía y el transporte. ^[22] Se firmó un tratado independiente para una Comunidad Europea de la Energía Atómica para gestionar la producción nuclear. En 1961, el Reino Unido, Dinamarca, Irlanda y Noruega solicitaron su adhesión, pero fueron vetados en 1963 por el francés Charles de Gaulle . España también solicitó su ingreso y fue rechazada porque todavía estaba dirigida por la dictadura de Franco . El mismo año, el Tribunal de Justicia proclamó que la Comunidad constituía un "nuevo orden jurídico de derecho internacional". ^[6] El Tratado de Fusión finalmente colocó a la CECA y al Euratom dentro de la CEE. Poco después, De Gaulle boicoteó la comisión, que creía que estaba llevando el supranacionalismo demasiado lejos. El compromiso de Luxemburgo en 1966 acordó que Francia (u otros países) podrían vetar cuestiones de "interés nacional muy importante", en particular relacionadas con la Política Agrícola Común , en lugar de tomar decisiones por " mayoría cualificada ". Pero después de los acontecimientos de mayo de 1968 en Francia y la renuncia de De Gaulle, el camino quedó libre para que el Reino Unido, Irlanda y Dinamarca se unieran en 1973. Noruega había rechazado unirse en un referéndum de 1972 , mientras que el Reino Unido confirmó su membresía en un referéndum de 1975. ^[23 ]

Aparte de la propia Comunidad Económica Europea, el continente europeo experimentó una profunda transición hacia la democracia. Los dictadores de Grecia y Portugal fueron depuestos en 1974, y el dictador de España murió en 1975, lo que permitió su adhesión en 1981 y 1986. En 1979, el Parlamento Europeo celebró sus primeras elecciones directas, lo que reflejaba un creciente consenso sobre que la CEE debía ser menos una unión de estados miembros y más una unión de pueblos. El Acta Única Europea de 1986 aumentó el número de cuestiones de tratados en las que se utilizaría la votación por mayoría cualificada (en lugar del consenso) para legislar, como una forma de acelerar la integración comercial. El Acuerdo de Schengen de 1985 (que inicialmente no firmaron Italia, el Reino Unido, Irlanda, Dinamarca o Grecia) permitió el movimiento de personas sin ningún control fronterizo. Mientras tanto, en 1987, el presidente de la Unión Soviética Mijail Gorbachov anunció políticas de "transparencia" y "reestructuración" ( glasnost y perestroika ). Esto reveló las profundidades de la corrupción y el despilfarro. En abril de 1989, la República Popular de Polonia legalizó la organización Solidaridad, que obtuvo el 99% de los escaños parlamentarios disponibles en las elecciones de junio. Estas elecciones, en las que los candidatos anticomunistas obtuvieron una victoria sorprendente, inauguraron una serie de revoluciones anticomunistas pacíficas en Europa central y oriental que finalmente culminaron en la caída del comunismo. En noviembre de 1989, los manifestantes en Berlín comenzaron a derribar el Muro de Berlín , que se convirtió en un símbolo de la caída de la Cortina de Hierro , y la mayor parte de Europa del Este declaró su independencia y se dispuso a celebrar elecciones democráticas en 1991.

El Tratado de Maastricht rebautizó a la CEE como " Unión Europea " y amplió sus poderes para incluir un capítulo social , establecer un Mecanismo Europeo de Tipos de Cambio y limitar el gasto público. El Reino Unido inicialmente optó por no participar en las disposiciones sociales y luego en la unión monetaria después de la crisis de la libra esterlina de 1992 ("Miércoles Negro"), donde los especuladores apostaron contra la moneda británica . Suecia, Finlandia y Austria se unieron en 1995, pero Noruega nuevamente decidió no hacerlo después de su referéndum de 1994 , y en su lugar siguió siendo parte del Área Europea de Libre Comercio (AELC) y, por lo tanto, del Espacio Económico Europeo (EEE), cumpliendo con la mayor parte de la legislación de la UE pero sin ningún derecho de voto. En el Tratado de Ámsterdam , con un nuevo gobierno laborista , el Reino Unido se unió al capítulo social. Una UE recién confiada buscó entonces expandirse. Primero, el Tratado de Niza hizo que el peso del voto fuera más proporcional a la población. Segundo, la moneda del euro entró en circulación en 2002. Tercero vino la adhesión de Malta, Chipre, Eslovenia, Polonia, la República Checa, Eslovaquia, Hungría, Letonia, Estonia y Lituania. En cuarto lugar, en 2005 se propuso un Tratado por el que se establecía una Constitución para Europa . Esta propuesta de "constitución" era en gran medida simbólica, pero fue rechazada en referendos en Francia y los Países Bajos . La mayoría de sus disposiciones técnicas se insertaron en el Tratado de Lisboa , sin los símbolos emotivos del federalismo ni la palabra "constitución". Ese mismo año se adhirieron Bulgaria y Rumania.

Durante la crisis de las hipotecas de alto riesgo y la crisis financiera de 2007-2008 , los bancos europeos que invertían en derivados se vieron sometidos a una fuerte presión. Los gobiernos británico, francés, alemán y otros se vieron obligados a convertir algunos bancos en bancos de propiedad estatal parcial o total. Algunos gobiernos, en cambio, garantizaron las deudas de sus bancos. A su vez, la crisis de la deuda europea se desarrolló cuando la inversión internacional se retiró y Grecia, España, Portugal e Irlanda vieron cómo los mercados internacionales de bonos cobraban tasas de interés insosteniblemente altas sobre la deuda gubernamental. Los gobiernos de la eurozona y el personal del Banco Central Europeo creyeron que era necesario salvar a sus bancos asumiendo la deuda griega e imponiendo medidas de " austeridad " y " ajuste estructural " a los estados deudores. Esto exacerbó aún más la contracción de las economías. En 2011 se firmaron dos nuevos tratados, el Pacto Fiscal Europeo y el Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad entre los diecinueve estados de la eurozona . En 2013, Croacia ingresó a la unión. Sin embargo, se desencadenó una nueva crisis después de que el gobierno conservador del Reino Unido decidiera celebrar un referéndum en 2016, y los partidarios del "brexit" obtuvieron el 51,89 por ciento de los votos con una participación del 72,2 por ciento. ^{[24] Este referéndum no fue políticamente concluyente dado el sistema de}soberanía parlamentaria del Reino Unido , sin acuerdo después de las elecciones de 2017, hasta que las elecciones generales del Reino Unido de 2019 trajeron una mayoría conservadora con un compromiso manifiesto de impulsar el Brexit. El Reino Unido abandonó la membresía de la UE en febrero de 2020, con consecuencias económicas, territoriales y sociales inciertas.

Derecho constitucional

Aunque la Unión Europea no tiene una constitución codificada , ^[28] como todo cuerpo político tiene leyes que "constituyen" su estructura básica de gobernanza. ^[29] Las principales fuentes constitucionales de la UE son el Tratado de la Unión Europea y el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea , que han sido acordados o adheridos entre los gobiernos de los 27 estados miembros. Los Tratados establecen las instituciones de la UE, enumeran sus poderes y responsabilidades y explican las áreas en las que la UE puede legislar con Directivas o Reglamentos . La Comisión Europea tiene el derecho de proponer nuevas leyes, formalmente llamado derecho de iniciativa legislativa . ^[30] Durante el procedimiento legislativo ordinario , el Consejo (que son ministros de los gobiernos de los estados miembros) y el Parlamento Europeo (elegido por los ciudadanos) pueden hacer enmiendas y deben dar su consentimiento para que las leyes se aprueben. ^[31]

La Comisión supervisa los departamentos y las distintas agencias que ejecutan o hacen cumplir la legislación de la UE. El " Consejo Europeo " (en lugar del Consejo de la Unión Europea , formado por diferentes ministros de gobierno) está compuesto por los primeros ministros o presidentes ejecutivos de los estados miembros. Nombra a los comisarios y al consejo del Banco Central Europeo . El Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea es el órgano judicial supremo que interpreta el derecho de la UE y lo desarrolla a través de precedentes. El Tribunal puede revisar la legalidad de las acciones de las instituciones de la UE, de conformidad con los Tratados. También puede decidir sobre las reclamaciones por incumplimiento de las leyes de la UE presentadas por los estados miembros y los ciudadanos.

Tratados

El Tratado de la Unión Europea (TUE) y el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE) son las dos principales fuentes del derecho de la UE. El TUE, que representa los acuerdos entre todos los Estados miembros, se centra más en los principios de la democracia y los derechos humanos y resume las instituciones , mientras que el TFUE amplía todos los principios y campos de política en los que la UE puede legislar. En principio, los tratados de la UE son como cualquier otro acuerdo internacional, que normalmente se interpretará de acuerdo con los principios codificados por la Convención de Viena de 1969. [ ^32] Puede modificarse por acuerdo unánime en cualquier momento, pero el propio TUE, en el artículo 48, establece un procedimiento de enmienda mediante propuestas a través del Consejo y una Convención de representantes de los Parlamentos nacionales. ^[33] Según el artículo 5(2) del TUE, el "principio de atribución" dice que la UE no puede hacer nada excepto las cosas para las que tiene autoridad expresa. Los límites de su competencia están regidos por el Tribunal de Justicia y los tribunales y los Parlamentos de los Estados miembros. ^[34]

A medida que la Unión Europea ha crecido de 6 a 27 estados miembros, el artículo 49 del TUE establece un procedimiento claro para la adhesión de miembros. La Unión Europea solo está abierta a un estado "europeo" que respete los principios de " dignidad humana , libertad , democracia, igualdad , estado de derecho y respeto de los derechos humanos, incluidos los derechos de las personas pertenecientes a minorías ". Por lo tanto, no pueden postularse países cuyo territorio esté totalmente fuera del continente europeo. ^[35] Tampoco puede postularse ningún país sin instituciones políticas plenamente democráticas que aseguren que prevalezcan los estándares de " pluralismo , no discriminación, tolerancia , justicia, solidaridad e igualdad entre mujeres y hombres". ^[36] El artículo 50 dice que cualquier estado miembro puede retirarse de acuerdo "con sus propios requisitos constitucionales", mediante acuerdos negociados "para su retirada, teniendo en cuenta el marco de su futura relación con la Unión". Esto indica que la UE no tiene derecho a exigir una retirada, y que los estados miembros deben seguir los procedimientos constitucionales, por ejemplo, a través del Parlamento o un documento constitucional codificado. ^[7] Una vez que se activa el artículo 50, hay un límite de tiempo de dos años para completar las negociaciones, un procedimiento que dejaría a un miembro secesionista sin ningún poder de negociación en las negociaciones, porque los costos de no tener un tratado comercial serían proporcionalmente mayores para el estado individual que para el bloque restante de la UE. ^[37]

El artículo 7 permite suspender a los Estados miembros por un "riesgo claro de violación grave" de los valores del artículo 2 (por ejemplo, democracia, igualdad, derechos humanos) con un voto de cuatro quintos del Consejo de la Unión Europea y el consentimiento del Parlamento . ^[38] Dentro del marco de los tratados, los subgrupos de Estados miembros pueden establecer reglas adicionales que solo se aplican a aquellos Estados miembros que las desean. Por ejemplo, los Acuerdos de Schengen de 1985 y 1990 permiten a las personas moverse sin ningún pasaporte o control de identidad en cualquier lugar de la UE, pero no se aplicaron al Reino Unido o Irlanda. Durante la crisis de la deuda europea , el Tratado por el que se establece el Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad de 2012 y el Tratado de Estabilidad, Coordinación y Gobernanza de 2012 (el "Pacto Fiscal") se adoptaron solo para los Estados miembros que tenían el euro (es decir, no Dinamarca, Suecia, el Reino Unido, Polonia, República Checa, Hungría, Rumania o Bulgaria). Entre otras cosas, se exigía el compromiso de equilibrar el presupuesto público y limitar los déficit estructurales al 0,5% del PIB, con multas en caso de incumplimiento. La competencia para aplicar estas normas sigue estando en manos del Tribunal de Justicia. ^[39]

Instituciones ejecutivas

La Comisión Europea es el principal órgano ejecutivo de la Unión Europea . ^[40] El artículo 17(1) del Tratado de la Unión Europea establece que la Comisión debe "promover el interés general de la Unión", mientras que el artículo 17(3) añade que los Comisarios deben ser "completamente independientes" y no "recibir instrucciones de ningún Gobierno". Según el artículo 17(2), "los actos legislativos de la Unión sólo podrán adoptarse sobre la base de una propuesta de la Comisión, salvo que los Tratados dispongan otra cosa". Esto significa que la Comisión tiene el monopolio de la iniciativa del procedimiento legislativo, aunque el Consejo o el Parlamento son los " catalizadores de facto de muchas iniciativas legislativas". ^[41]

La presidenta de la comisión (a partir de 2021 Ursula von der Leyen ) establece la agenda de su trabajo. ^[43] Las decisiones se toman por mayoría simple de votos, ^[44] a menudo mediante un "procedimiento escrito" de circulación de la propuesta y adopción si no hay objeciones. ^[^{cita requerida}^] En respuesta al rechazo inicial de Irlanda al Tratado de Lisboa , se acordó mantener el sistema de un comisario de cada uno de los Estados miembros, incluidos el presidente y el alto representante de Política Exterior y de Seguridad (actualmente Josep Borrell ) ^[45] El comisario presidente es elegido por el Parlamento Europeo por mayoría absoluta de sus miembros, tras las elecciones parlamentarias cada cinco años, sobre la base de una propuesta del Consejo Europeo. Este último debe tener en cuenta los resultados de las elecciones europeas, en las que los partidos políticos europeos anuncian el nombre de su candidato para este puesto. Así, en 2014, Juncker, el candidato del Partido Popular Europeo que obtuvo la mayor cantidad de escaños en el Parlamento, fue propuesto y elegido.^[update]

Los demás comisarios son designados por acuerdo entre el presidente electo y cada gobierno nacional, y luego, como bloque, están sujetos a una votación por mayoría cualificada del consejo para su aprobación, y a la aprobación por mayoría del Parlamento. ^[46] El Parlamento sólo puede aprobar o rechazar a toda la comisión, no a comisarios individuales, sino que lleva a cabo audiencias públicas con cada uno de ellos antes de su votación, lo que en la práctica a menudo desencadena cambios en nombramientos o carteras individuales. El artículo 248 del TFUE dice que el presidente puede reorganizar a los comisarios, aunque esto es poco común, sin la aprobación del Estado miembro. Una propuesta de que los comisarios sean elegidos del Parlamento electo, no fue adoptada en el Tratado de Lisboa , aunque en la práctica varios invariablemente lo son, renunciando a su asiento para servir. Los comisarios tienen varios privilegios, como estar exentos de impuestos de los estados miembros (pero no de los impuestos de la UE), ^[47] y tener inmunidad de enjuiciamiento por realizar actos oficiales. ^[48] En ocasiones se ha comprobado que algunos comisarios han abusado de sus funciones, en particular desde que la Comisión Santer fue censurada por el Parlamento en 1999 y finalmente dimitió debido a acusaciones de corrupción. Esto dio lugar a un caso principal, Comisión contra Edith Cresson^[49], en el que el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea sostuvo que un comisario que le había dado un trabajo a su dentista, para el que claramente no estaba cualificado, de hecho no había infringido ninguna ley. En contraste con el enfoque estrictamente legalista del TJUE, un Comité de Expertos Independientes concluyó que se había desarrollado una cultura en la que pocos comisarios tenían «el más mínimo sentido de la responsabilidad». ^[50] Esto condujo a la creación de la Oficina Europea de Lucha contra el Fraude . En 2012, investigó al comisario maltés de Sanidad, John Dalli , que dimitió rápidamente tras las acusaciones de que había recibido un soborno de 60 millones de euros en relación con una Directiva sobre productos del tabaco . ^{[ cita requerida ]}

Más allá de la Comisión, el Banco Central Europeo tiene una relativa autonomía ejecutiva en la conducción de la política monetaria con el fin de gestionar el euro . ^[51] Tiene un consejo de seis personas nombradas por el Consejo Europeo , por recomendación del Consejo . El presidente del Consejo y un comisario pueden asistir a las reuniones del BCE, pero no tienen derecho a voto.

Legislatura

Mientras que la Comisión tiene el monopolio de la iniciativa legislativa, el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo de la Unión Europea tienen poderes de enmienda y veto durante el proceso legislativo. ^[53] Según los artículos 9 y 10 del Tratado de la Unión Europea , la UE observa "el principio de igualdad de sus ciudadanos" y se supone que se basa en la "democracia representativa". En la práctica, la igualdad y la democracia aún están en desarrollo porque los representantes elegidos en el Parlamento no pueden iniciar legislación contra los deseos de la Comisión, ^[54] los ciudadanos de los países más pequeños tienen mayor peso de voto en el Parlamento que los ciudadanos de los países más grandes, ^[55] y se requieren "mayorías cualificadas" o consenso del Consejo para legislar. ^[56] Este " déficit democrático " ha alentado numerosas propuestas de reforma y generalmente se percibe como un vestigio de los días anteriores de la integración liderada por los Estados miembros. Con el tiempo, el Parlamento gradualmente asumió más voz: de ser una asamblea no elegida, a sus primeras elecciones directas en 1979, a tener cada vez más derechos en el proceso legislativo. ^[57] Por tanto, los derechos de los ciudadanos son limitados en comparación con los sistemas democráticos de todos los Estados miembros europeos: en virtud del artículo 11 del TUE, los ciudadanos y las asociaciones tienen derecho a hacer públicas sus opiniones y a presentar una iniciativa que la Comisión debe tener en cuenta si ha recibido al menos un millón de firmas. El artículo 227 del TFUE contiene otro derecho de los ciudadanos a presentar peticiones al Parlamento sobre cuestiones que les afecten. ^[58]

Las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo tienen lugar cada cinco años y las votaciones para los miembros del Parlamento Europeo (MEP) en los estados miembros deben organizarse por representación proporcional o por un voto único transferible . ^[59] Hay 750 eurodiputados y su número es "degresivamente proporcional" según el tamaño del estado miembro. ^[60] Esto significa que, aunque se supone que el consejo es el organismo que representa a los estados miembros, en el Parlamento los ciudadanos de los estados miembros más pequeños tienen más voz que los ciudadanos de los estados miembros más grandes. ^[61] Los eurodiputados se dividen, como lo hacen en los parlamentos nacionales, según las líneas de los partidos políticos: el conservador Partido Popular Europeo es actualmente el más grande y el Partido de los Socialistas Europeos lidera la oposición. Los partidos no reciben fondos públicos de la UE, ya que el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo en Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v Parlamento Europeo que esto era completamente una cuestión que debía ser regulada por los estados miembros. ^[62] Los poderes del Parlamento incluyen solicitar investigaciones sobre mala administración o nombrar un Defensor del Pueblo en espera de cualquier procedimiento judicial. ^[63] Puede exigir a la Comisión que responda a preguntas y, por una mayoría de dos tercios, puede censurar a toda la Comisión (como ocurrió con la Comisión Santer en 1999). ^[64] En algunos casos, el Parlamento tiene derechos explícitos de consulta, que la Comisión debe respetar realmente. ^[65] Sin embargo, su participación en el proceso legislativo sigue siendo limitada porque ningún miembro puede realmente aprobar leyes sin la Comisión y el Consejo, lo que significa que el poder ("kratia") no está en manos de representantes directamente elegidos del pueblo ("demos"): en la UE todavía no es cierto que "la administración esté en manos de la mayoría y no de unos pocos". ^[66]

El segundo órgano legislativo principal es el Consejo de la Unión Europea, que está compuesto por diferentes ministros de los estados miembros. Los jefes de gobierno de los estados miembros también convocan un " Consejo Europeo " (un órgano distinto) que el artículo 15 del TUE define como el que proporciona "el impulso necesario para su desarrollo y definirá las orientaciones y prioridades políticas generales". Se reúne cada seis meses y su presidente (actualmente el ex primer ministro belga Charles Michel ) tiene por objeto "impulsar su trabajo", ^[67] pero no ejerce por sí mismo "funciones legislativas". ^[68] El Consejo hace esto: en efecto, se trata de los gobiernos de los estados miembros, pero habrá un ministro diferente en cada reunión, dependiendo del tema discutido (por ejemplo, para cuestiones ambientales, los ministros de medio ambiente de los estados miembros asisten y votan; para asuntos exteriores, los ministros de asuntos exteriores, etc.). El ministro debe tener la autoridad para representar y vincular a los estados miembros en las decisiones. ^[69] Cuando se lleva a cabo la votación, se pondera inversamente al tamaño del estado miembro, por lo que los estados miembros más pequeños no están dominados por los estados miembros más grandes. ^[70] En total, hay 352 votaciones, pero para la mayoría de los actos debe haber una mayoría cualificada , si no consenso. El artículo 16(4) del TUE y el artículo 238(3) del TFUE definen esto como al menos el 55 por ciento de los miembros del Consejo (no votos) que representen al 65 por ciento de la población de la UE: actualmente esto significa alrededor del 74 por ciento, o 260 de los 352 votos. Esto es crítico durante el proceso legislativo. ^[71]

Para elaborar una nueva legislación, el artículo 294 del TFUE define el " procedimiento legislativo ordinario " que se aplica a la mayoría de los actos de la UE. ^[73] La esencia es que hay tres lecturas, empezando por una propuesta de la Comisión, donde el Parlamento debe votar por una mayoría de todos los diputados al Parlamento Europeo (no sólo los presentes) para bloquear o sugerir cambios, y el Consejo debe votar por mayoría cualificada para aprobar los cambios, pero por unanimidad para bloquear la enmienda de la Comisión. ^[74] Cuando las diferentes instituciones no pueden ponerse de acuerdo en ninguna etapa, se convoca un " Comité de Conciliación ", que representa a los diputados al Parlamento Europeo, los ministros y la Comisión para tratar de llegar a un acuerdo sobre un texto conjunto: si esto funciona, se enviará de nuevo al Parlamento y al Consejo para su aprobación por mayoría absoluta y cualificada. Esto significa que la legislación puede ser bloqueada por una mayoría en el Parlamento, una minoría en el Consejo y una mayoría en la Comisión: es más difícil cambiar la legislación de la UE que mantenerla igual. Existe un procedimiento diferente para los presupuestos. ^[75] Para la "cooperación reforzada" entre un subconjunto de al menos Estados miembros, el Consejo debe dar la autorización. ^[76] La Comisión debería informar a los gobiernos de los Estados miembros antes de que cualquier propuesta inicie el procedimiento legislativo. ^[77] La UE en su conjunto sólo puede actuar dentro del marco de sus competencias, que le confieren los Tratados. Los artículos 4 y 5 del TUE establecen que los poderes siguen correspondiendo a los Estados miembros, a menos que se les hayan conferido, aunque existe un debate sobre la cuestión Kompetenz-Kompetenz : quién tiene en última instancia la "competencia" para definir la "competencia" de la UE. Muchos tribunales de los Estados miembros creen que son ellos los que deciden, otros parlamentos de los Estados miembros creen que son ellos los que deciden, mientras que dentro de la UE, el Tribunal de Justicia cree que tiene la última palabra.

Judicial

El poder judicial de la UE ha desempeñado un papel importante en el desarrollo del derecho de la UE. Interpreta los tratados y ha acelerado la integración económica y política. ^[78] Hoy en día, el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea (TJUE) es el principal órgano judicial, dentro del cual hay un Tribunal de Justicia superior que se ocupa de los casos que contienen más importancia pública, y un Tribunal General que se ocupa de cuestiones de detalle pero sin importancia general, y luego un Tribunal de Cuentas separado . Según el artículo 19(2) del Tratado de la Unión Europea, hay un juez de cada estado miembro en el Tribunal de Justicia y el Tribunal General (27 en cada uno en la actualidad ^[79] ). Los jueces deben "poseer las cualificaciones requeridas para el nombramiento a los más altos cargos judiciales" (o para el Tribunal General, la "capacidad requerida para el nombramiento a altos cargos judiciales"). ^[80] Un presidente es elegido por los jueces por tres años. Aunque el artículo 19(3) del TUE dice que el Tribunal de Justicia es el tribunal supremo para interpretar cuestiones de derecho de la UE, en la práctica, la mayor parte del derecho de la UE es aplicado por tribunales de los Estados miembros (por ejemplo, el Tribunal de Apelación inglés, el Bundesgerichtshof alemán , el Cour du travail belga , etc.). ^[81] Los tribunales de los Estados miembros pueden remitir cuestiones al TJUE para una decisión prejudicial . El deber del TJUE es "garantizar que en la interpretación y aplicación de los Tratados se respete el derecho", aunque de manera realista tiene la capacidad de ampliar y desarrollar el derecho de acuerdo con los principios que desarrolla de manera coherente con los valores democráticos. Algunos ejemplos de sentencias históricas y frecuentemente controvertidas incluyen Van Gend en Loos (que sostiene que el derecho de la UE creó un nuevo orden jurídico y los ciudadanos podían demandar por los derechos del tratado), ^[82] Mangold v Helm (que establece la igualdad como principio general del derecho de la UE ), ^[83] y Kadi v Commission (que confirma que el derecho internacional tenía que ajustarse a los principios básicos del derecho de la UE). ^[84] Hasta 2016, existía el Tribunal de la Función Pública de la Unión Europea , que se ocupaba de las cuestiones relacionadas con el personal de las instituciones de la UE.

El Estatuto del Tribunal y el TFUE exigen que los jueces sean nombrados únicamente si no tienen una ocupación política, con independencia "fuera de toda duda". ^[85] Son seleccionados para períodos renovables de seis años por "común acuerdo" de los gobiernos, con el asesoramiento de siete jueces de la UE o de los Estados miembros que el Consejo y el Parlamento seleccionan. ^[86] El Reglamento de Procedimiento del Tribunal de Justicia , artículo 11, dice que el tribunal suele estar organizado en salas de 3 o 5 jueces cada una. Una "gran sala" de 15 jueces más antiguos se reúne para tratar cuestiones de "dificultad o importancia", o aquellas solicitadas por los Estados miembros. ^[87] El presidente y el vicepresidente del tribunal son elegidos por otros jueces por períodos renovables de 3 años mediante votación secreta. Los jueces solo pueden ser destituidos si todos los demás jueces y los abogados generales están de acuerdo por unanimidad. Los abogados generales son nombrados por el tribunal para presentar alegatos razonados sobre los casos, especialmente los que implican nuevos puntos de derecho. A diferencia de los jueces del Tribunal, escriben opiniones por sí mismos, en lugar de hacerlo colectivamente, y a menudo con un dominio de la prosa y la razón, y aunque no son vinculantes, a menudo se siguen en la práctica. ^[88] Además, cada juez tiene secretarios o referentes que investigan y escriben. A diferencia del Reino Unido, donde los jueces siempre escriben sus propias opiniones, los referentes a menudo ayudan a redactar las sentencias en el Tribunal de Justicia. La Dirección de Traducción del Tribunal traducirá cada sentencia definitiva a los 24 idiomas oficiales de la Unión Europea . Los tres tipos principales de sentencias que dicta el Tribunal de Justicia son (1) resoluciones preliminares, solicitadas por los tribunales de los Estados miembros, ^[89] (2) acciones de ejecución, interpuestas por la Comisión o los Estados miembros contra la UE, un Estado miembro o cualquier otra parte que supuestamente viole el derecho de la UE, ^[90] y (3) otras acciones directas, en las que la UE o el Estado miembro participan como parte en la disputa, y emite resoluciones finales. ^[91] El Reglamento de Procedimiento de la Corte de Justicia, inspirado en el de la Corte Internacional de Justicia , comienza con la presentación de casos escritos a la corte, seguida de una breve audiencia oral. En cada caso se designa a un juez para que gestione activamente la audiencia (llamado relator ) y redacte la sentencia (probablemente con la ayuda de referendarios) .). El tribunal siempre delibera y vota antes de redactar y publicar el dictamen final. Los asuntos del Tribunal General pueden ser objeto de recurso de casación ante el Tribunal de Justicia. Si bien no existe un procedimiento formal de recurso ante el Tribunal de Justicia, en la práctica sus acciones están sujetas al escrutinio tanto de los tribunales supremos de los Estados miembros como del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos , incluso si el equilibrio de poder final no está resuelto.

Conflicto de leyes

Desde su fundación, la UE ha operado entre una pluralidad cada vez mayor de sistemas jurídicos de los Estados miembros y en proceso de globalización . ^[92] Esto ha significado que tanto el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como los tribunales supremos de los Estados han tenido que desarrollar principios para resolver los conflictos de leyes entre diferentes sistemas. Dentro de la propia UE, la opinión del Tribunal de Justicia es que si el derecho de la Unión entra en conflicto con una disposición del derecho estatal, entonces el derecho de la Unión tiene primacía . En el primer caso importante en 1964, Costa v ENEL , un abogado milanés y ex accionista de una empresa energética, llamado Sr. Costa, se negó a pagar su factura de electricidad a Enel , como protesta contra la nacionalización de las corporaciones energéticas italianas. ^[93] Sostuvo que la ley de nacionalización italiana entraba en conflicto con el Tratado de Roma , ^[94] y solicitó que se presentara una remisión tanto al Tribunal Constitucional italiano como al Tribunal de Justicia con arreglo al artículo 267 del TFUE. ^[95] El Tribunal Constitucional italiano dictaminó que, dado que la ley de nacionalización era de 1962 y el tratado estaba en vigor desde 1958, Costa no tenía derecho a presentar una reclamación. Por el contrario, el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que, en última instancia, el Tratado de Roma no impedía en modo alguno la nacionalización de la energía y, en cualquier caso, con arreglo a las disposiciones del Tratado, solo la Comisión podría haber presentado una reclamación, no el Sr. Costa. Sin embargo, en principio, el Sr. Costa tenía derecho a alegar que el Tratado entraba en conflicto con el derecho nacional, y el tribunal tendría el deber de considerar su reclamación de presentar una remisión si no hubiera recurso contra su decisión. El Tribunal de Justicia, repitiendo su opinión en Van Gend en Loos , ^[96] dijo que los Estados miembros "han limitado sus derechos soberanos, aunque dentro de ámbitos limitados, y han creado así un cuerpo de leyes que vincula tanto a sus nacionales como a ellos mismos" ^[97] sobre la "base de la reciprocidad". ^[97] El derecho de la UE no "quedaría anulado por disposiciones jurídicas nacionales, independientemente de su forma... sin que se pusiera en tela de juicio la base jurídica de la propia comunidad". Esto significaba que cualquier "acto unilateral posterior" del Estado miembro sería inaplicable. ^[98] De manera similar, en Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA , una empresa, Simmenthal SpA, afirmó que una tasa de inspección de salud pública en virtud de una ley italiana de 1970 para importar carne de vacuno de Francia a Italia era contraria a dos ReglamentosDe 1964 a 1968. "De conformidad con el principio de la primacía del Derecho comunitario", dijo el Tribunal de Justicia, las "medidas directamente aplicables de las instituciones" (como los Reglamentos del caso) "hacen automáticamente inaplicable cualquier disposición contraria del Derecho nacional vigente". Esto era necesario para evitar una "denegación correspondiente" de las "obligaciones del Tratado asumidas incondicional e irrevocablemente por los Estados miembros", que podría "poner en peligro los fundamentos mismos de la" UE. ^[99] Pero a pesar de las opiniones del Tribunal de Justicia, los tribunales nacionales de los Estados miembros no han aceptado el mismo análisis. ^{[ cita requerida ]}

En términos generales, si bien todos los Estados miembros reconocen que el derecho de la UE prima sobre el derecho nacional cuando así se ha acordado en los Tratados, no aceptan que el Tribunal de Justicia tenga la última palabra sobre cuestiones constitucionales fundamentales que afectan a la democracia y los derechos humanos. En el Reino Unido, el principio básico es que el Parlamento, como expresión soberana de la legitimidad democrática, puede decidir si desea legislar expresamente contra el derecho de la UE. ^[100] Sin embargo, esto sólo ocurriría en el caso de un deseo expreso del pueblo de retirarse de la UE. En el caso R (Factortame Ltd) contra el Secretario de Estado de Transporte se sostuvo que "cualquier limitación de su soberanía que el Parlamento aceptó cuando promulgó la Ley de las Comunidades Europeas de 1972 fue completamente voluntaria" y, por lo tanto, "siempre ha quedado claro" que los tribunales del Reino Unido tienen el deber de "anular cualquier norma de derecho nacional que se considere en conflicto con cualquier norma de derecho comunitario directamente ejecutable". ^[101] En 2014, el Tribunal Supremo del Reino Unido señaló que en R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport , ^[102] aunque la constitución del Reino Unido no está codificada, podría haber "principios fundamentales" de derecho consuetudinario, y el Parlamento "no contempló ni autorizó la derogación" de esos principios cuando promulgó la Ley de Comunidades Europeas de 1972. La opinión del Tribunal Constitucional alemán a partir de las decisiones Solange I y Solange II es que si la UE no cumple con sus derechos y principios constitucionales básicos (en particular la democracia, el estado de derecho y los principios del estado social ^[103] ), entonces no puede anular la ley alemana. ^[104] Sin embargo, como dicen los apodos de las sentencias, "mientras" la UE trabaje por la democratización de sus instituciones y tenga un marco que proteja los derechos humanos fundamentales, no revisaría la legislación de la UE para comprobar su compatibilidad con los principios constitucionales alemanes. ^[105] La mayoría de los demás Estados miembros han expresado reservas similares. Esto sugiere que la legitimidad de la UE se basa en la autoridad última de los Estados miembros, su compromiso fáctico con los derechos humanos y la voluntad democrática del pueblo. ^{[ cita requerida ]}

A diferencia de los Estados miembros, se debate la relación entre el derecho de la UE y el derecho internacional, en particular en relación con el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y las Naciones Unidas. Todos los Estados miembros individuales de la UE son parte de ambas organizaciones a través de tratados internacionales. El artículo 6(2) del Tratado de la Unión Europea exige que la UE se adhiera al CEDH, pero "no afectará a las competencias de la Unión tal como se definen en los Tratados". Esto se consideró necesario antes del Tratado de Lisboa para garantizar que la UE brindara una protección adecuada a los derechos humanos, supervisados por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos externo en Estrasburgo . Sin embargo, en el Dictamen 2/13 , después de una solicitud de la Comisión para que revisara su plan de adhesión, el Tribunal de Justicia (en Luxemburgo ) presentó cinco razones principales por las que consideró que el acuerdo de adhesión en su forma actual era incompatible con los tratados. ^[107] La mayoría de los comentaristas consideraron que el razonamiento era un intento apenas velado del Tribunal de Justicia de aferrarse a su propio poder, ^[108] pero ha significado que la Comisión está redactando de nuevo un nuevo acuerdo de adhesión. En virtud de los artículos 3(5), 21, 34 y 42 del TUE, la UE también debe respetar los principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas . Después de los ataques del 11 de septiembre al World Trade Center en la ciudad de Nueva York , el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU adoptó una resolución para congelar los activos de los presuntos terroristas, vinculados a Osama bin Laden . Esto incluía a un ciudadano saudí , el Sr. Kadi. Suecia congeló sus activos de conformidad con un Reglamento de la UE, que dio efecto a la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU . En Kadi v. Comisión , el Sr. Kadi afirmó que no había pruebas de que estuviera relacionado con el terrorismo y que no había tenido un juicio justo : un derecho humano fundamental. ^[109] La opinión del Fiscal General Maduro recordó a Aharon Barak , del Tribunal Supremo de Israel , que "es cuando rugen los cañones que especialmente necesitamos las leyes". El Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que incluso los miembros de la ONU no pueden contravenir "los principios que forman parte del propio ordenamiento jurídico comunitario". ^[110] En efecto, la UE ha desarrollado una norma según la cual, dentro de los límites de ciertos principios de ius cogens , otros tribunales pueden tener primacía. El contenido de esos principios básicos sigue abierto al diálogo judicial permanente entre los tribunales superiores de la Unión. ^{[ cita requerida ]}

Derecho administrativo

Mientras que el derecho constitucional se ocupa de la estructura de gobernanza de la Unión Europea , el derecho administrativo obliga a las instituciones de la UE y a los gobiernos de los estados miembros a cumplir la ley. Tanto los estados miembros como la Comisión tienen un derecho legal general o "legitimación" ( locus standi ) para presentar demandas contra las instituciones de la UE y otros estados miembros por incumplimiento de los tratados. Desde la fundación de la UE, el Tribunal de Justicia también sostuvo que los Tratados permitían a los ciudadanos o corporaciones presentar demandas contra las instituciones de la UE y de los estados miembros por violación de los Tratados y Reglamentos , si se interpretaban correctamente como creadores de derechos y obligaciones. Sin embargo, en virtud de las Directivas , se dijo en 1986 que los ciudadanos o corporaciones no podían presentar demandas contra otras partes no estatales. ^[112] Esto significaba que los tribunales de los estados miembros no estaban obligados a aplicar una ley de la Unión cuando una ley estatal entraba en conflicto, aunque el gobierno del estado miembro podía ser demandado, si imponía una obligación a otro ciudadano o corporación. Estas reglas sobre el " efecto directo " limitan el alcance en el que los tribunales de los estados miembros están obligados a administrar el derecho de la UE. Todas las acciones de las instituciones de la UE pueden ser objeto de revisión judicial y juzgadas según criterios de proporcionalidad , en particular cuando se trata de principios generales del derecho o de derechos fundamentales. El remedio para un demandante cuando se ha producido una infracción de la ley suele ser una indemnización pecuniaria, pero los tribunales también pueden exigir el cumplimiento específico o conceder una orden judicial para garantizar que la ley sea lo más eficaz posible. ^[113]

Efecto directo

Aunque se acepta generalmente que el derecho de la UE tiene primacía, no todas las leyes de la UE otorgan a los ciudadanos legitimidad para presentar reclamaciones: es decir, no todas las leyes de la UE tienen " efecto directo ". ^[114] En Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen^[115] se sostuvo que las disposiciones de los Tratados (y los Reglamentos de la UE ) son directamente efectivas, si son (1) claras e inequívocas (2) incondicionales, y (3) no requieren que las autoridades de la UE o nacionales tomen medidas adicionales para implementarlas. Van Gend en Loos , una empresa postal, afirmó que lo que ahora es el artículo 30 del TFUE impedía a las autoridades aduaneras holandesas cobrar aranceles, ^[116] cuando importó plásticos de urea-formaldehído de Alemania a los Países Bajos. Después de que un tribunal holandés hiciera una referencia, el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que aunque los Tratados no conferían "expresamente" un derecho a los ciudadanos o empresas a presentar reclamaciones, podían hacerlo. Históricamente, los tratados internacionales sólo permitían a los Estados presentar demandas legales para su aplicación, pero el Tribunal de Justicia proclamó que "la Comunidad constituye un nuevo orden jurídico de derecho internacional". Como el artículo 30 establecía clara, incondicional e inmediatamente que no se podían imponer restricciones cuantitativas al comercio sin una buena justificación, Van Gend en Loos podía recuperar el dinero que había pagado por el arancel. Los reglamentos de la UE son lo mismo que las disposiciones del Tratado en este sentido, porque, como establece el artículo 288 del TFUE, son "directamente aplicables en todos los Estados miembros". Los Estados miembros tienen la obligación de no reproducir los reglamentos en su propia legislación, para evitar confusiones. Por ejemplo, en el caso Comisión contra Italia, el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que Italia había incumplido una obligación en virtud de los Tratados, tanto por no aplicar un plan para pagar a los agricultores una prima por sacrificar vacas (para reducir la sobreproducción lechera) como por reproducir las normas en un decreto con diversos añadidos. El Tribunal de Justicia ha sostenido que los «reglamentos» «entran en vigor únicamente en virtud de su publicación» y su aplicación puede tener el efecto de «poner en peligro su aplicación simultánea y uniforme en el conjunto de la Unión». ^[117] Por otra parte, algunos reglamentos pueden exigir expresamente medidas de aplicación, en cuyo caso deben respetarse esas normas específicas. ^[118]

Aunque los Tratados y Reglamentos tendrán efecto directo (si son claros, incondicionales e inmediatos), las Directivas no suelen dar a los ciudadanos (a diferencia de los Estados miembros) legitimidad para demandar a otros ciudadanos. En teoría, esto se debe a que el artículo 288 del TFUE dice que las Directivas están dirigidas a los Estados miembros y normalmente "dejan a las autoridades nacionales la elección de la forma y los métodos" para implementarlas. En parte, esto refleja que las directivas a menudo crean estándares mínimos, ^[120] dejando que los Estados miembros apliquen estándares más altos. Por ejemplo, la Directiva sobre el tiempo de trabajo requiere que cada trabajador tenga al menos 4 semanas de vacaciones pagadas cada año, pero la mayoría de los Estados miembros requieren más de 28 días en la legislación nacional. ^[121] Sin embargo, en la posición actual adoptada por el Tribunal de Justicia, los ciudadanos tienen legitimidad para presentar reclamos basados en leyes nacionales que implementan Directivas, pero no en las Directivas mismas. ^[122] Las Directivas no tienen el llamado efecto directo "horizontal" (es decir, entre partes no estatales). ^[123] Esta visión fue inmediatamente controvertida y a principios de los años 1990 tres Abogados Generales argumentaron de manera convincente que las Directivas deberían crear derechos y deberes para todos los ciudadanos. ^[124] El Tribunal de Justicia se negó, pero hay cinco grandes excepciones.

En primer lugar, si no se cumple el plazo de aplicación de una Directiva, el Estado miembro no puede hacer cumplir las leyes contrarias, y un ciudadano puede invocar la Directiva en tal acción (el llamado efecto directo "vertical"). Así, en el caso Pubblico Ministero v Ratti, debido a que el gobierno italiano no había aplicado una Directiva 73/173/CEE sobre envasado y etiquetado de disolventes antes de la fecha límite, no podía hacer cumplir una ley nacional contraria de 1963 contra el negocio de disolventes y barnices del Sr. Ratti . ^[125] Un Estado miembro no podía "invocar, frente a particulares, su propio incumplimiento de las obligaciones que implica la Directiva". ^[126] En segundo lugar, un ciudadano o una empresa también pueden invocar una Directiva como defensa en una disputa con otro ciudadano o empresa (no sólo una autoridad pública) que esté intentando hacer cumplir una ley nacional que entre en conflicto con una Directiva. Así, en el caso CIA Security contra Signalson y Securitel, el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que una empresa llamada CIA Security podía defenderse de las acusaciones de sus competidores de que no había cumplido un decreto belga de 1991 sobre sistemas de alarma , sobre la base de que no había sido notificada a la Comisión como lo exige una Directiva. ^[127] En tercer lugar, si una Directiva expresa un "principio general" del Derecho de la UE, puede invocarse entre partes privadas no estatales antes de su fecha límite de implementación. Esto se desprende del caso Kücükdeveci contra Swedex GmbH & Co KG , donde el Código Civil alemán, artículo 622, establecía que los años trabajados por personas menores de 25 años no computarían para el aumento del preaviso legal antes del despido. La Sra. Kücükdeveci trabajó durante 10 años, desde los 18 a los 28 años, para Swedex GmbH & Co KG antes de su despido. Afirmó que la ley que no computaba sus años antes de los 25 años era una discriminación ilegal por edad según la Directiva marco sobre igualdad en el empleo . El Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que la Directiva podía ser invocada por ella porque la igualdad era también un principio general del Derecho de la UE . ^[128] En cuarto lugar, si el demandado es una emanación del Estado, incluso si no es el gobierno central, aún puede estar vinculado por las Directivas. En Foster v British Gas plc el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que la Sra. Foster tenía derecho a presentar una demanda por discriminación sexual contra su empleador, British Gas plc , que obligaba a las mujeres a jubilarse a los 60 años y a los hombres a los 65, si (1) en virtud de una medida estatal, (2) prestaba un servicio público y (3) tenía poderes especiales. ^[129] Esto también podría ser cierto si la empresa esprivatizada , ya que estaba en manos de una compañía de agua que era responsable del suministro básico de agua. ^[130]

En quinto lugar, los tribunales nacionales tienen el deber de interpretar la legislación nacional "en la medida de lo posible a la luz de la redacción y el propósito de la directiva". ^[131] Los libros de texto (aunque no el propio Tribunal) a menudo llamaban a esto " efecto indirecto ". En Marleasing SA v La Comercial SA, el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que un tribunal español tenía que interpretar sus disposiciones generales del Código Civil , sobre contratos carentes de causa o que defraudaran a los acreedores, para ajustarse al artículo 11 de la Primera Directiva de Derecho de Sociedades , ^[132] que exigía que las constituciones sólo se anularan por una lista fija de motivos. ^[133] El Tribunal de Justicia reconoció rápidamente que el deber de interpretación no puede contradecir palabras sencillas en una ley nacional. Pero, si un Estado miembro no ha aplicado una Directiva, un ciudadano puede no poder presentar demandas contra otras partes no estatales. En su lugar, debe demandar al propio Estado miembro por no aplicar la ley. ^[134] En resumen, la posición del Tribunal de Justicia sobre el efecto directo significa que los gobiernos y los contribuyentes deben soportar el costo de las partes privadas, en su mayoría corporaciones, por negarse a cumplir la ley.

Referencias y remedios

Los litigios suelen iniciarse y resolverse en los tribunales de los Estados miembros, que interpretan y aplican el derecho de la UE y conceden compensaciones y restituciones (para reparar pérdidas o despojar ganancias), medidas cautelares y cumplimiento específico (obligar a alguien a dejar de hacer algo o a hacerlo). Sin embargo, si la posición en el derecho de la UE parece poco clara, los tribunales de los Estados miembros pueden remitir cuestiones al Tribunal de Justicia para que éste emita una " decisión prejudicial " sobre la interpretación adecuada del derecho de la UE. El artículo 267 del TFUE dice que el tribunal "podrá" remitir el asunto "si lo considera" necesario para poder dictar sentencia", y "someterá el asunto al Tribunal" si no hay posibilidad de apelación y reparación ulteriores. Cualquier "tribunal de un Estado miembro" puede remitir el asunto. Esto se interpreta de forma amplia. Obviamente, incluye organismos como el Tribunal Supremo del Reino Unido , un Tribunal Superior o un Tribunal Laboral . En Vaassen v Beambtenfonds Mijnbedrijf^[135], el Tribunal de Justicia también sostuvo que un tribunal de arbitraje de pensiones de trabajadores mineros podía hacer una remisión. Por el contrario, y curiosamente, en el caso Miles v European Schools^[136] el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que una Comisión de Reclamaciones de las Escuelas Europeas, creada en virtud del acuerdo internacional Convenio sobre las Escuelas Europeas, no podía remitir un asunto porque, aunque era un tribunal, no era "de un Estado miembro" (aunque todos los Estados miembros habían firmado dicho Convenio).

Por otra parte, los juzgados y tribunales tienen teóricamente el deber de remitir cuestiones. En el Reino Unido, por ejemplo, Lord Denning MR consideró apropiado remitir si el resultado de un caso dependía de una respuesta correcta, ^[138] y las Normas de Procedimiento Civil facultan al Tribunal Superior a remitir en cualquier etapa del procedimiento. ^[139] La opinión del Tribunal de Justicia en el caso principal, CILFIT v Ministry of Health es que un tribunal nacional no tiene el deber de remitir si la ley es un acte clair (una norma clara), o "tan obvia que no deja lugar a ninguna duda razonable sobre la manera en que se debe resolver la cuestión planteada". ^[140] En Kenny Roland Lyckeskog el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que el deber de remitir existía para el Tribunal de Apelación sueco, el hovrätt , ya que el Tribunal Supremo de Suecia ( Högsta domstol ) tenía que dar permiso para que las apelaciones continuaran. ^[141] La dificultad práctica es que los jueces difieren en sus opiniones sobre si la ley es clara o no. En un caso significativo, Three Rivers DC v Governor of the Bank of England^[142] la Cámara de los Lores del Reino Unido se sintió segura de que estaba claro bajo la Primera Directiva Bancaria que los depositantes no tenían derechos directos para demandar al Banco de Inglaterra por supuesto incumplimiento de llevar a cabo una regulación prudencial adecuada. Sus Señorías destacaron que si bien podría existir cierta incertidumbre, los costos de la demora en hacer una referencia superaban los beneficios de la certeza total. Por el contrario, en ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis , una mayoría de la Corte Suprema aparentemente se sintió capaz de declarar que la ley bajo la Directiva sobre cláusulas abusivas en los contratos de consumo era acte clair , y se negó a hacer una referencia, a pesar de que un Lord de la Ley de alto rango emitió un disenso poderosamente razonado. ^[143] Sin embargo, además de una renuencia a hacer referencias, ha crecido un escepticismo general entre los altos poderes judiciales de los estados miembros sobre el modo de razonamiento utilizado por el Tribunal de Justicia . El Tribunal Supremo del Reino Unido, en el caso R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, dedicó gran parte de su sentencia a criticar, en su opinión, un modo de razonamiento "teleológico" impredecible que podría reducir la confianza en el mantenimiento de un diálogo dentro de un sistema judicial plural y transnacional. ^[102] Añadió que no podía interpretar la Ley de las Comunidades Europeas de 1972.para acortar los principios básicos y la comprensión del funcionamiento constitucional, lo que implica en efecto que podría negarse a seguir sentencias irrazonables del Tribunal de Justicia sobre cuestiones importantes. De manera similar, el Tribunal Constitucional alemán, en el caso Outright Monetary Transactions, planteó una cuestión prejudicial sobre si el plan del Banco Central Europeo de comprar bonos gubernamentales griegos y de otros países en mercados secundarios, a pesar de la prohibición del Tratado de comprarlos directamente, era ilegal. ^[144] En una medida muy inusual, los dos jueces de mayor antigüedad disintieron en cuanto a que el plan del BCE pudiera ser legal, mientras que la mayoría guió de cerca al Tribunal de Justicia sobre el modo apropiado de razonamiento.

Si se hacen referencias, el Tribunal de Justicia emitirá una decisión prejudicial, para que el tribunal del estado miembro concluya el caso y otorgue una reparación. El derecho a un recurso efectivo es un principio general del derecho de la UE, consagrado en el artículo 47 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales . La mayoría de las veces, los reglamentos y directivas establecerán las reparaciones pertinentes que se concederán, o se interpretarán a partir de la legislación de acuerdo con las prácticas del estado miembro. ^[145] También podría ser que el gobierno sea responsable de no implementar correctamente una directiva o reglamento y, por lo tanto, deba pagar daños y perjuicios. En Francovich v. Italia , el gobierno italiano no había creado un fondo de seguro para que los empleados reclamaran los salarios impagos si sus empleadores se habían declarado insolventes, como lo exigía la Directiva de protección de la insolvencia . ^[146] Por lo tanto, a Francovich, el ex empleado de una empresa veneciana en quiebra, se le permitió reclamar 6 millones de liras al gobierno italiano en concepto de daños y perjuicios por su pérdida. El Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que si una Directiva confería derechos identificables a individuos y existe un nexo causal entre la violación de la UE por parte de un estado miembro y la pérdida de un demandante, se deben pagar daños y perjuicios. El hecho de que la ley incompatible sea una ley del Parlamento no es una defensa. ^[147] Por lo tanto, en Factortame era irrelevante que el Parlamento hubiera legislado para exigir una cuota de propiedad británica de buques pesqueros en la legislación primaria. De manera similar, en el caso Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Germany el gobierno alemán era responsable ante una empresa cervecera francesa por daños y perjuicios por prohibir sus importaciones, que no cumplían con la legendaria ley de pureza de la cerveza . No era decisivo que el Parlamento alemán no hubiera actuado de manera deliberada o negligente. ^[148] Era simplemente necesario que hubiera (1) una norma destinada a conferir derechos, (2) que una infracción fuera suficientemente grave y (3) que hubiera un nexo causal entre la infracción y el daño. El Tribunal de Justicia recomendó que una infracción se considere "suficientemente grave" ponderando una serie de factores, como si fue voluntaria o persistente. ^[149] En Köbler v Republik Österreich, el Tribunal de Justicia agregó que la responsabilidad de los Estados miembros también podría derivar de los jueces que no implementan adecuadamente la ley. ^[150] Por otra parte, también está claro que las instituciones de la UE, como la Comisión, pueden ser responsables según los mismos principios por el incumplimiento de la ley. ^[151] La única institución cuyas decisiones parecen incapaces de generar una demanda por daños y perjuicios es el propio Tribunal de Justicia.

Revisión judicial

Además de las decisiones prejudiciales sobre la correcta interpretación del derecho de la UE, una función esencial del Tribunal de Justicia es el control judicial de los actos de la propia UE. En virtud del artículo 263(1) del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE), el Tribunal puede controlar la legalidad de cualquier "acto" legislativo o de otro tipo de la UE en relación con los Tratados o los principios generales, como los de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea . Esto incluye la legislación y la mayoría de los demás actos que tienen consecuencias jurídicas para las personas. Por ejemplo, en el caso Société anonyme Cimenteries CBR Cementsbedrijven NV contra la Comisión^[152], la Comisión tomó la decisión de retirar una garantía a una empresa cementera holandesa de que estaría exenta de multas en virtud de la legislación sobre competencia por acuerdos verticales. La empresa cementera impugnó la decisión y la Comisión argumentó que no se trataba realmente de un "acto" y, por lo tanto, no podía impugnarse. El Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que se podía impugnar y que se trataba de un acto porque "privaba [a la empresa cementera] de las ventajas de una situación jurídica... y la exponía a un grave riesgo financiero". ^[153] De manera similar, en el caso Deutsche Post/Comisión, la Comisión exigió información sobre la ayuda estatal concedida por Alemania a Deutsche Post en un plazo de 20 días. Cuando ambos países impugnaron esta petición, la Comisión alegó que la exigencia de información no podía ser un acto, puesto que no existía sanción alguna. El Tribunal de Justicia no estuvo de acuerdo y sostuvo que podía procederse a una revisión judicial porque la solicitud producía "efectos jurídicos vinculantes", puesto que la información facilitada o no podía servir de prueba para una decisión final. ^[154] Por el contrario, en el caso IBM/Comisión^[155] el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que una carta de la Comisión a IBM en la que se le comunicaba que demandaría a IBM por abuso de posición dominante contrario a la competencia no era un acto revisable, sino simplemente una declaración preliminar de intención de actuar. En cualquier caso, si un acto revisable de una institución de la UE no se considera compatible con la ley, en virtud del artículo 264, será declarado nulo.

Sin embargo, sólo un número limitado de personas pueden presentar demandas de revisión judicial. De conformidad con el artículo 263(2) del TFUE, un Estado miembro, el Parlamento, el Consejo o la Comisión tienen derecho automático a solicitar una revisión judicial. Pero de conformidad con el artículo 263(4), una "persona física o jurídica" debe tener un "interés directo e individual" en el acto reglamentario. El interés "directo" significa que alguien se ve afectado por un acto de la UE sin "la interposición de una voluntad autónoma entre la decisión y su efecto", por ejemplo por parte de un organismo gubernamental nacional. ^[157] En Piraiki-Patraiki contra Comisión , un grupo de empresas textiles griegas, que exportaban productos de algodón a Francia, impugnó una decisión de la Comisión que permitía a Francia limitar las exportaciones. La Comisión argumentó que los exportadores no estaban directamente afectados, porque Francia podría decidir no limitar las exportaciones, pero el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que esta posibilidad era "completamente teórica". ^[158] Se podía presentar una impugnación. En cambio, en el caso Municipio de Differdange contra Comisión^[159], un municipio quiso impugnar la decisión de la Comisión de ayudar a las empresas siderúrgicas que redujeron su producción: esto probablemente reduciría su recaudación de impuestos. Pero el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que, como Luxemburgo tenía discreción y su decisión de reducir la capacidad no era inevitable, el municipio no tenía una implicación "directa" (su queja se dirigió al gobierno de Luxemburgo). La implicación "individual" requiere que alguien se vea afectado específicamente, no como miembro de un grupo. En el caso Plaumann & Co contra Comisión^[156], el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que un importador de clementinas no se vio afectado individualmente cuando la Comisión denegó a Alemania el permiso para suspender los derechos de aduana de importación. Esto hizo que fuera más caro para el Sr. Plaumann importar clementinas, pero era igualmente caro para todos los demás. Esta decisión restringió en gran medida el número de personas que podían solicitar una revisión judicial. En el caso Unión de Pequeños Agricultores , el Abogado General Jacobs propuso una prueba más amplia que permitiera a cualquier persona presentar una reclamación si había un "efecto adverso sustancial" sobre los intereses del demandante. ^[160] En este caso, un grupo de productores españoles de aceite de oliva impugnó el Reglamento nº 1638/98 del Consejo, que suprimía las subvenciones. Como los reglamentos no se aplican en el derecho nacional, sino que tienen efecto directo, argumentaron que el requisito de la afectación individual les negaría una protección judicial efectiva. El Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que las acciones directas seguían sin estar permitidas: si esto no era satisfactorio, los Estados miembros tendrían que modificar los tratados. ^[161] Sin embargo, no se necesita la afectación individual, según el artículo 263(4),Si un acto no es legislación, sino simplemente un "acto reglamentario".En el asunto Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami contra Parlamento y Consejo, el Tribunal de Justicia afirmó que un reglamento no se considera un "acto reglamentario" en el sentido del Tratado: sólo está destinado a actos de menor importancia. En este caso, un grupo canadiense que representaba a los inuit quiso impugnar un reglamento sobre productos derivados de las focas , pero no se le permitió. Tendrían que demostrar una afectación directa e individual como es habitual.^[162] Por tanto, sin una modificación del Tratado, el Derecho administrativo de la UE sigue siendo uno de los más restrictivos de Europa.^[163]

Derechos humanos y principios

Aunque el acceso a la revisión judicial está restringido para las cuestiones de derecho ordinarias, el Tribunal de Justicia ha desarrollado gradualmente un enfoque más abierto a la defensa de los derechos humanos. Los derechos humanos también se han vuelto esenciales en la correcta interpretación y construcción de todo el derecho de la UE. Si hay dos o más interpretaciones plausibles de una norma, debe elegirse la que sea más coherente con los derechos humanos. El Tratado de Lisboa de 2007 hizo que los derechos sustentaran la competencia del Tribunal de Justicia y requirió la adhesión de la UE al Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos , supervisado por el Tribunal externo de Estrasburgo . ^[164] Inicialmente, reflejando su naturaleza económica primitiva, los tratados no hacían referencia a los derechos. Sin embargo, en 1969, particularmente después de la preocupación de Alemania, el Tribunal de Justicia declaró en Stauder v City of Ulm que los "derechos humanos fundamentales" estaban "consagrados en los principios generales del derecho comunitario". Esto significaba que el Sr. Stauder, que recibía mantequilla subvencionada en virtud de un programa de bienestar de la UE únicamente mostrando un cupón con su nombre y dirección, tenía derecho a alegar que esto violaba su dignidad: tenía derecho a no tener que pasar por la humillación de demostrar su identidad para obtener comida. Si bien esos "principios generales" no estaban escritos en el derecho de la UE, y el tribunal simplemente declaró su existencia, esto coincide con la opinión filosófica mayoritaria de que las reglas "legales", o el derecho positivo , existen necesariamente por razones que la sociedad que las creó desea: estas dan lugar a principios, que informan el propósito de la ley. ^[165] Además, el Tribunal de Justicia ha aclarado que su reconocimiento de derechos estaba "inspirado" en las propias "tradiciones constitucionales" de los Estados miembros, ^[166] y en los tratados internacionales. ^[167] Entre estos derechos se incluyen los que se encuentran en las constituciones de los Estados miembros, las declaraciones de derechos, las leyes fundamentales del Parlamento, los casos judiciales emblemáticos, el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos , la Carta Social Europea de 1961 , la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos de 1948 o las Convenciones de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo . La propia UE debe adherirse al CEDH , aunque en el Dictamen 2/13 el Tribunal de Justicia se retrasó, debido a las dificultades percibidas para mantener un equilibrio adecuado de competencias. ^[168]

Muchos de los derechos más importantes fueron codificados en la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea en 2000. Si bien el Reino Unido ha optado por no aplicar directamente la Carta, esto tiene poca relevancia práctica ya que la Carta simplemente refleja principios preexistentes y el Tribunal de Justicia utiliza la Carta para interpretar toda la legislación de la UE. Por ejemplo, en Test-Achats ASBL v Conseil des ministres , el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que el artículo 5(2) de la Directiva sobre igualdad de trato en bienes y servicios de 2004 , que pretendía permitir una excepción a la igualdad de trato, de modo que a hombres y mujeres se les pudieran cobrar diferentes tarifas de seguro de automóvil, era ilegal. ^[170] Contravenía el principio de igualdad de los artículos 21 y 23 de la CDFUE de 2000 , y debía considerarse ineficaz después de un período de transición. Por el contrario, en el caso Deutsches Weintor eG contra Land Rheinland-Pfalz, los productores de vino alegaron que una orden para dejar de comercializar sus marcas como "fácilmente digeribles" ( bekömmlich ) por parte del regulador estatal de alimentos (actuando con arreglo al derecho de la UE ^[171] ) contravenía su derecho a la libertad profesional y empresarial conforme a los artículos 15 y 16 de la CDFUE de 2000. ^[169] El Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que, de hecho, el derecho a la salud de los consumidores en el artículo 35 también debe tenerse en cuenta y se le debe dar mayor peso, en particular dados los efectos del alcohol sobre la salud. Sin embargo, algunos derechos de la Carta no están expresados con suficiente claridad como para ser considerados directamente vinculantes. En el caso AMS contra Union locale des syndicats CGT, un sindicato francés afirmó que el Código de Trabajo francés no debería excluir a los trabajadores eventuales del cómputo del derecho a crear un comité de empresa al que una entidad empleadora debe informar y consultar. ^[172] Dijeron que esto contravenía la Directiva sobre información y consulta a los trabajadores y también el artículo 27 de la CDFUE. El Tribunal de Justicia estuvo de acuerdo en que el Código de Trabajo francés era incompatible con la Directiva, pero sostuvo que el artículo 27 estaba expresado de manera demasiado general como para crear derechos directos. Desde este punto de vista, era necesaria una legislación para hacer concretos y jurídicamente exigibles los principios abstractos de derechos humanos.

Además de los derechos humanos, el Tribunal de Justicia ha reconocido al menos otros cinco "principios generales" del Derecho de la UE. Las categorías de principios generales no son cerradas y pueden evolucionar en función de las expectativas sociales de los ciudadanos europeos.

La seguridad jurídica exige que las sentencias sean prospectivas, abiertas y claras.
La toma de decisiones debe ser " proporcional " a un objetivo legítimo cuando se revisa cualquier acto discrecional de un gobierno o de un organismo poderoso; por ejemplo, si un gobierno desea cambiar una ley laboral de manera neutral, pero esto podría tener un impacto negativo desproporcionado en las mujeres en lugar de los hombres, el gobierno debe demostrar un objetivo legítimo y que sus medidas son (1) apropiadas o adecuadas para lograrlo, (2) no hacen más de lo necesario y (3) razonables para equilibrar los derechos en conflicto de las diferentes partes. ^[173]
La igualdad se considera un principio fundamental: esto es particularmente importante para los derechos laborales, los derechos políticos y el acceso a servicios públicos o privados. ^[174]
Derecho a un juicio justo.
Privilegio profesional entre abogados y clientes.

Libre circulación y comercio

Aunque el concepto de " economía social de mercado " recién se incluyó en la legislación de la UE con el Tratado de Lisboa de 2007 , ^[176] la libre circulación y el comercio fueron fundamentales para el desarrollo europeo desde el Tratado de Roma en 1957. ^[177]^[178] La teoría estándar de la ventaja comparativa dice que dos países pueden beneficiarse del comercio incluso si uno de ellos tiene una economía menos productiva en todos los aspectos. ^[179] Al igual que la Asociación de Libre Comercio de América del Norte o la Organización Mundial del Comercio , la legislación de la UE rompe las barreras al comercio al crear derechos a la libre circulación de bienes, servicios, mano de obra y capital . Esto tiene como objetivo reducir los precios al consumidor y elevar los niveles de vida. Los primeros teóricos argumentaron que una zona de libre comercio daría paso a una unión aduanera , que condujo a un mercado común , luego a una unión monetaria , luego a una unión de política monetaria y fiscal y, finalmente, a una unión completa característica de un estado federal . ^[180] Pero en Europa esas etapas fueron mixtas, y no está claro si el " final del juego " debería ser el mismo que el de un estado. El libre comercio , sin derechos que aseguren un comercio justo , puede beneficiar a algunos grupos dentro de los países (particularmente a las grandes empresas) más que a otros, y pone en desventaja a las personas que carecen de poder de negociación en un mercado en expansión, particularmente a los trabajadores , consumidores, pequeñas empresas , industrias en desarrollo y comunidades. ^[181] Por esta razón, la Unión Europea se ha convertido "no simplemente en una unión económica", sino que crea derechos sociales vinculantes para las personas para "garantizar el progreso social y buscar la mejora constante de las condiciones de vida y de trabajo de sus pueblos". ^[182] Los artículos 28 a 37 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea establecen el principio de libre circulación de bienes en la UE, mientras que los artículos 45 a 66 requieren la libre circulación de personas , servicios y capital. Se pensaba que estas "cuatro libertades" estaban inhibidas por barreras físicas (por ejemplo, aduanas), barreras técnicas (por ejemplo, diferentes leyes sobre seguridad, consumo o normas ambientales) y barreras fiscales (por ejemplo, diferentes tasas del Impuesto al Valor Agregado ). ^[183] La libre circulación y el comercio no están destinados a ser una licencia para obtener ganancias comerciales sin restricciones. ^[184] Cada vez más, los Tratados y el Tribunal de JusticiaEl objetivo es garantizar que el libre comercio sirva a valores superiores, como la salud pública, la protección del consumidor, los derechos laborales , la competencia leal y la mejora del medio ambiente.

Bienes

La libre circulación de mercancías dentro de la Unión Europea se logra mediante una unión aduanera y el principio de no discriminación. ^[185]^[186] La UE gestiona las importaciones de estados no miembros, los aranceles entre estados miembros están prohibidos y las importaciones circulan libremente. ^[187] Además, en virtud del artículo 34 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea , " Quedan prohibidas entre los Estados miembros las restricciones cuantitativas a la importación y todas las medidas de efecto equivalente ". En Procureur du Roi v Dassonville^[188] el Tribunal de Justicia sostuvo que esta regla significaba que todas las "normas comerciales" que son "promulgadas por los Estados miembros" que podrían obstaculizar el comercio "directa o indirectamente, real o potencialmente" estarían sujetas al artículo 34. ^[189] Esto significaba que una ley belga que exigiera que las importaciones de whisky escocés tuvieran un certificado de origen era poco probable que fuera legal. Discriminaba a los importadores paralelos como el Sr. Dassonville, que no podían obtener certificados de las autoridades en Francia, donde compraban el whisky escocés . Esta "prueba amplia", ^[190] para determinar qué podría ser potencialmente una restricción ilegal al comercio, se aplica igualmente a las acciones de organismos cuasi gubernamentales, como la antigua empresa " Buy Irish " que tenía funcionarios designados por el gobierno. ^[191] También significa que los estados pueden ser responsables de actores privados. Por ejemplo, en la causa Comisión contra Francia, los vigilantes agrícolas franceses saboteaban continuamente los envíos de fresas españolas e incluso las importaciones de tomates belgas. Francia fue responsable de estos obstáculos al comercio porque las autoridades "se abstuvieron manifiesta y persistentemente" de impedir el sabotaje. ^[192]

Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property". In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11.^[193] More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria^[194] the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the 'fundamental pillars of a democratic society', against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced,^[195] and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.^[196]

In *Schmidberger v Austria*, protests blocked trucks for goods through the Austrian Alps on the Brenner Autobahn. The Court of Justice recognised fundamental rights take priority over free trade.^[197]

Often rules apply to all goods neutrally, but may have a greater practical effect on imports than domestic products. For such "indirect" discriminatory (or "indistinctly applicable") measures the Court of Justice has developed more justifications: either those in article 36, or additional "mandatory" or "overriding" requirements such as consumer protection, improving labour standards,^[198] protecting the environment,^[199] press diversity,^[200] fairness in commerce,^[201] and more: the categories are not closed.^[202] In the noted case Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopol für Branntwein,^[203] the Court of Justice found that a German law requiring all spirits and liqueurs (not just imported ones) to have a minimum alcohol content of 25 per cent was contrary to TFEU article 34, because it had a greater negative effect on imports. German liqueurs were over 25 per cent alcohol, but Cassis de Dijon, which Rewe-Zentrale AG wished to import from France, only had 15 to 20 per cent alcohol. The Court of Justice rejected the German government's arguments that the measure proportionately protected public health under TFEU article 36,^[204] because stronger beverages were available and adequate labelling would be enough for consumers to understand what they bought.^[205] This rule primarily applies to requirements about a product's content or packaging. In Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v De Smedt PVBA^[206] the Court of Justice found that a Belgian law requiring all margarine to be in cube shaped packages infringed article 34, and was not justified by the pursuit of consumer protection. The argument that Belgians would believe it was butter if it was not cube shaped was disproportionate: it would "considerably exceed the requirements of the object in view" and labelling would protect consumers "just as effectively".^[207]

In a 2003 case, Commission v Italy^[208] Italian law required that cocoa products that included other vegetable fats could not be labelled as "chocolate". It had to be "chocolate substitute". All Italian chocolate was made from cocoa butter alone, but British, Danish and Irish manufacturers used other vegetable fats. They claimed the law infringed article 34. The Court of Justice held that a low content of vegetable fat did not justify a "chocolate substitute" label. This was derogatory in the consumers' eyes. A 'neutral and objective statement' was enough to protect consumers. If member states place considerable obstacles on the use of a product, this can also infringe article 34. So, in a 2009 case, Commission v Italy, the Court of Justice held that an Italian law prohibiting motorcycles or mopeds pulling trailers infringed article 34.^[209] Again, the law applied neutrally to everyone, but disproportionately affected importers, because Italian companies did not make trailers. This was not a product requirement, but the Court reasoned that the prohibition would deter people from buying it: it would have "a considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers" that "affects the access of that product to the market".^[210] It would require justification under article 36, or as a mandatory requirement.

In contrast to product requirements or other laws that hinder market access, the Court of Justice developed a presumption that "selling arrangements" would be presumed to not fall into TFEU article 34, if they applied equally to all sellers, and affected them in the same manner in fact. In Keck and Mithouard^[211] two importers claimed that their prosecution under a French competition law, which prevented them selling Picon beer under wholesale price, was unlawful. The aim of the law was to prevent cut throat competition, not to hinder trade.^[212] The Court of Justice held, as "in law and in fact" it was an equally applicable "selling arrangement" (not something that alters a product's content^[213]) it was outside the scope of article 34, and so did not need to be justified. Selling arrangements can be held to have an unequal effect "in fact" particularly where traders from another member state are seeking to break into the market, but there are restrictions on advertising and marketing. In Konsumentombudsmannen v De Agostini^[214] the Court of Justice reviewed Swedish bans on advertising to children under age 12, and misleading commercials for skin care products. While the bans have remained (justifiable under article 36 or as a mandatory requirement) the Court emphasised that complete marketing bans could be disproportionate if advertising were "the only effective form of promotion enabling [a trader] to penetrate" the market. In Konsumentombudsmannen v Gourmet AB^[215] the Court suggested that a total ban for advertising alcohol on the radio, TV and in magazines could fall within article 34 where advertising was the only way for sellers to overcome consumers' "traditional social practices and to local habits and customs" to buy their products, but again the national courts would decide whether it was justified under article 36 to protect public health. Under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the EU harmonised restrictions on restrictions on marketing and advertising, to forbid conduct that distorts average consumer behaviour, is misleading or aggressive, and sets out a list of examples that count as unfair.^[216] Increasingly, states have to give mutual recognition to each other's standards of regulation, while the EU has attempted to harmonise minimum ideals of best practice. The attempt to raise standards is hoped to avoid a regulatory "race to the bottom", while allowing consumers access to goods from around the continent.

Workers

Since its foundation, the Treaties sought to enable people to pursue their life goals in any country through free movement.^[217]^[218] Reflecting the economic nature of the project, the European Community originally focused upon free movement of workers: as a "factor of production".^[219]^{[better source needed]} However, from the 1970s, this focus shifted towards developing a more "social" Europe.^[9] Free movement was increasingly based on "citizenship", so that people had rights to empower them to become economically and socially active, rather than economic activity being a precondition for rights. This means the basic "worker" rights in TFEU article 45 function as a specific expression of the general rights of citizens in TFEU articles 18 to 21. According to the Court of Justice, a "worker" is anybody who is economically active, which includes everyone in an employment relationship, "under the direction of another person" for "remuneration".^[220] A job, however, need not be paid in money for someone to be protected as a worker. For example, in Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, a German man claimed the right to residence in the Netherlands, while he volunteered plumbing and household duties in the Bhagwan community, which provided for everyone's material needs irrespective of their contributions.^[221] The Court of Justice held that Mr Steymann was entitled to stay, so long as there was at least an "indirect quid pro quo" for the work he did. Having "worker" status means protection against all forms of discrimination by governments, and employers, in access to employment, tax, and social security rights. By contrast a citizen, who is "any person having the nationality of a Member State" (TFEU article 20(1)), has rights to seek work, vote in local and European elections, but more restricted rights to claim social security.^[222] In practice, free movement has become politically contentious as nationalist political parties have manipulated fears about immigrants taking away people's jobs and benefits (paradoxically at the same time). Nevertheless, practically "all available research finds little impact" of "labour mobility on wages and employment of local workers".^[223]

The Free Movement of Workers Regulation articles 1 to 7 set out the main provisions on equal treatment of workers. First, articles 1 to 4 generally require that workers can take up employment, conclude contracts, and not suffer discrimination compared to nationals of the member state.^[225] In a famous case, the Belgian Football Association v Bosman, a Belgian footballer named Jean-Marc Bosman claimed that he should be able to transfer from R.F.C. de Liège to USL Dunkerque when his contract finished, regardless of whether Dunkerque could afford to pay Liège the habitual transfer fees.^[226] The Court of Justice held "the transfer rules constitute[d] an obstacle to free movement" and were unlawful unless they could be justified in the public interest, but this was unlikely. In Groener v Minister for Education^[227] the Court of Justice accepted that a requirement to speak Gaelic to teach in a Dublin design college could be justified as part of the public policy of promoting the Irish language, but only if the measure was not disproportionate. By contrast in Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA^[228] a bank in Bolzano, Italy, was not allowed to require Mr Angonese to have a bilingual certificate that could only be obtained in Bolzano. The Court of Justice, giving "horizontal" direct effect to TFEU article 45, reasoned that people from other countries would have little chance of acquiring the certificate, and because it was "impossible to submit proof of the required linguistic knowledge by any other means", the measure was disproportionate. Second, article 7(2) requires equal treatment in respect of tax. In Finanzamt Köln Altstadt v Schumacker^[229] the Court of Justice held that it contravened TFEU art 45 to deny tax benefits (e.g. for married couples, and social insurance expense deductions) to a man who worked in Germany, but was resident in Belgium when other German residents got the benefits. By contrast in Weigel v Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg the Court of Justice rejected Mr Weigel's claim that a re-registration charge upon bringing his car to Austria violated his right to free movement. Although the tax was "likely to have a negative bearing on the decision of migrant workers to exercise their right to freedom of movement", because the charge applied equally to Austrians, in absence of EU legislation on the matter it had to be regarded as justified.^[230] Third, people must receive equal treatment regarding "social advantages", although the Court has approved residential qualifying periods. In Hendrix v Employee Insurance Institute the Court of Justice held that a Dutch national was not entitled to continue receiving incapacity benefits when he moved to Belgium, because the benefit was "closely linked to the socio-economic situation" of the Netherlands.^[231] Conversely, in Geven v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen the Court of Justice held that a Dutch woman living in the Netherlands, but working between 3 and 14 hours a week in Germany, did not have a right to receive German child benefits,^[232] even though the wife of a man who worked full-time in Germany but was resident in Austria could.^[233] The general justifications for limiting free movement in TFEU article 45(3) are "public policy, public security or public health",^[234] and there is also a general exception in article 45(4) for "employment in the public service".

Citizens

Beyond the right of free movement to work, the EU has increasingly sought to guarantee rights of citizens, and rights simply be being a human being.^[235] But although the Court of Justice stated that 'Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States',^[236] political debate remains on who should have access to public services and welfare systems funded by taxation.^[237] As of now, Union citizenship is criticised for being not inclusive enough and having failed to establish a truly borderless space of social solidarity.^[238] In 2008, just 8 million people from 500 million EU citizens (1.7 per cent) had in fact exercised rights of free movement, the vast majority workers.^[239] According to TFEU article 20, citizenship of the EU derives from nationality of a member state. Article 21 confers general rights to free movement in the EU and to reside freely within limits set by legislation. This applies for citizens and their immediate family members.^[240] This triggers four main groups of rights: (1) to enter, depart and return, without undue restrictions, (2) to reside, without becoming an unreasonable burden on social assistance, (3) to vote in local and European elections, and (4) the right to equal treatment with nationals of the host state, but for social assistance only after 3 months of residence.

First, the Citizens Rights Directive 2004 article 4 says every citizen has the right to depart a member state with a valid passport. This has historical importance for central and eastern Europe, when the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall denied its citizens the freedom to leave.^[241] Article 5 gives every citizen a right of entry, subject to national border controls. Schengen Area countries (not the UK and Ireland) abolished the need to show documents, and police searches at borders, altogether. These reflect the general principle of free movement in TFEU article 21. Second, article 6 allows every citizen to stay three months in another member state, whether economically active or not. Article 7 allows stays over three months with evidence of "sufficient resources... not to become a burden on the social assistance system". Articles 16 and 17 give a right to permanent residence after 5 years without conditions. Third, TEU article 10(3) requires the right to vote in the local constituencies for the European Parliament wherever a citizen lives.

Fourth, and more debated, article 24 requires that the longer an EU citizen stays in a host state, the more rights they have to access public and welfare services, on the basis of equal treatment. This reflects general principles of equal treatment and citizenship in TFEU articles 18 and 20. In a simple case, in Sala v Freistaat Bayern the Court of Justice held that a Spanish lady who had lived in Germany for 25 years and had a baby was entitled to child support, without the need for a residence permit, because Germans did not need one.^[242] In Trojani v Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles, a French man who lived in Belgium for two years was entitled to the "minimex" allowance from the state for a minimum living wage.^[243] In Grzelczyk v Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve^[244] a French student, who had lived in Belgium for three years, was entitled to receive the "minimex" income support for his fourth year of study. Similarly, in R (Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing the Court of Justice held that it was lawful to require a French UCL economics student lived in the UK for three years before receiving a student loan, but not that he had to have additional "settled status".^[245] Similarly, in Commission v Austria, Austria was not entitled to restrict its university places to Austrian students to avoid "structural, staffing and financial problems" if (mainly German) foreign students applied, unless it proved there was an actual problem.^[246] However, in Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, the Court of Justice held that the German government was entitled to deny child support to a Romanian mother who had lived in Germany for three years, but had never worked. Because she lived in Germany for over 3 months, but under five years, she had to show evidence of "sufficient resources", since the Court reasoned the right to equal treatment in article 24 within that time depended on lawful residence under article 7.^[247]

Establishment and services

As well as creating rights for "workers" who generally lack bargaining power in the market,^[248] the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union also protects the "freedom of establishment" in article 49, and "freedom to provide services" in article 56.^[249]^[250] In Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano^[251] the Court of Justice held that to be "established" means to participate in economic life "on a stable and continuous basis", while providing "services" meant pursuing activity more "on a temporary basis". This meant that a lawyer from Stuttgart, who had set up chambers in Milan and was censured by the Milan Bar Council for not having registered, should claim for breach of establishment freedom, rather than service freedom. However, the requirements to be registered in Milan before being able to practice would be allowed if they were non-discriminatory, "justified by imperative requirements in the general interest" and proportionately applied.^[252] All people or entities that engage in economic activity, particularly the self-employed, or "undertakings" such as companies or firms, have a right to set up an enterprise without unjustified restrictions.^[253] The Court of Justice has held that both a member state government and a private party can hinder freedom of establishment,^[254] so article 49 has both "vertical" and "horizontal" direct effect. In Reyners v Belgium^[255] the Court of Justice held that a refusal to admit a lawyer to the Belgian bar because he lacked Belgian nationality was unjustified. TFEU article 49 says states are exempt from infringing others' freedom of establishment when they exercise "official authority". But regulation of an advocate's work (as opposed to a court's) was not official.^[256] By contrast in Commission v Italy the Court of Justice held that a requirement for lawyers in Italy to comply with maximum tariffs unless there was an agreement with a client was not a restriction.^[257] The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held the commission had not proven that this had any object or effect of limiting practitioners from entering the market.^[258] Therefore, there was no prima facie infringement freedom of establishment that needed to be justified.

In regard to companies, the Court of Justice held in R (Daily Mail and General Trust plc) v HM Treasury that member states could restrict a company moving its seat of business, without infringing TFEU article 49.^[261] This meant the Daily Mail newspaper's parent company could not evade tax by shifting its residence to the Netherlands without first settling its tax bills in the UK. The UK did not need to justify its action, as rules on company seats were not yet harmonised. By contrast, in Centros Ltd v Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen the Court of Justice found that a UK limited company operating in Denmark could not be required to comply with Denmark's minimum share capital rules. UK law only required £1 of capital to start a company, while Denmark's legislature took the view companies should only be started up if they had 200,000 Danish krone (around €27,000) to protect creditors if the company failed and went insolvent. The Court of Justice held that Denmark's minimum capital law infringed Centros Ltd's freedom of establishment and could not be justified, because a company in the UK could admittedly provide services in Denmark without being established there, and there were less restrictive means of achieving the aim of creditor protection.^[262] This approach was criticised as potentially opening the EU to unjustified regulatory competition, and a race to the bottom in legal standards, like the US state of Delaware, which is argued to attract companies with the worst standards of accountability, and unreasonably low corporate tax.^[263] Appearing to meet the concern, in Überseering BV v Nordic Construction GmbH the Court of Justice held that a German court could not deny a Dutch building company the right to enforce a contract in Germany, simply because it was not validly incorporated in Germany. Restrictions on freedom of establishment could be justified by creditor protection, labour rights to participate in work, or the public interest in collecting taxes. But in this case denial of capacity went too far: it was an "outright negation" of the right of establishment.^[264] Setting a further limit, in Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt the Court of Justice held that because corporations are created by law, they must be subject to any rules for formation that a state of incorporation wishes to impose. This meant the Hungarian authorities could prevent a company from shifting its central administration to Italy, while it still operated and was incorporated in Hungary.^[265] Thus, the court draws a distinction between the right of establishment for foreign companies (where restrictions must be justified), and the right of the state to determine conditions for companies incorporated in its territory,^[266] although it is not entirely clear why.^[267]

The "freedom to provide services" under TFEU article 56 applies to people who give services "for remuneration", especially commercial or professional activity.^[268] For example, in Van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid a Dutch lawyer moved to Belgium while advising a client in a social security case, and was told he could not continue because Dutch law said only people established in the Netherlands could give legal advice.^[269] The Court of Justice held that the freedom to provide services applied, it was directly effective, and the rule was probably unjustified: having an address in the member state would be enough to pursue the legitimate aim of good administration of justice.^[270] The Court of Justice has held that secondary education falls outside the scope of article 56 because usually the state funds it,^[271] but higher education does not.^[272] Health care generally counts as a service. In Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds Mrs Geraets-Smits claimed she should be reimbursed by Dutch social insurance for costs of receiving treatment in Germany.^[273] The Dutch health authorities regarded the treatment unnecessary, so she argued this restricted the freedom (of the German health clinic) to provide services. Several governments submitted that hospital services should not be regarded as economic, and should not fall within article 56. But the Court of Justice held health was a "service" even though the government (rather than the service recipient) paid for the service.^[274] National authorities could be justified in refusing to reimburse patients for medical services abroad if the health care received at home was without undue delay, and it followed "international medical science" on which treatments counted as normal and necessary.^[275] The Court requires that the individual circumstances of a patient justify waiting lists, and this is also true in the context of the UK's National Health Service.^[276] Aside from public services, another sensitive field of services are those classified as illegal. Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht held that the Netherlands' regulation of cannabis consumption, including the prohibitions by some municipalities on tourists (but not Dutch nationals) going to coffee shops,^[277] fell outside article 56 altogether. The Court of Justice reasoned that narcotic drugs were controlled in all member states, and so this differed from other cases where prostitution or other quasi-legal activity was subject to restriction.

If an activity does fall within article 56, a restriction can be justified under article 52, or by overriding requirements developed by the Court of Justice. In Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën^[278] a business that sold commodities futures (with Merrill Lynch and another banking firms) attempted to challenge a Dutch law that prohibiting cold calling customers. The Court of Justice held the Dutch prohibition pursued a legitimate aim to prevent "undesirable developments in securities trading" including protecting the consumer from aggressive sales tactics, thus maintaining confidence in the Dutch markets. In Omega Spielhallen GmbH v Bonn^[279] a "laserdrome" business was banned by the Bonn council. It bought fake laser gun services from a UK firm called Pulsar Ltd, but residents had protested against "playing at killing" entertainment. The Court of Justice held that the German constitutional value of human dignity, which underpinned the ban, did count as a justified restriction on freedom to provide services. In Liga Portuguesa de Futebol v Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa the Court of Justice also held that the state monopoly on gambling, and a penalty for a Gibraltar firm that had sold internet gambling services, was justified to prevent fraud and gambling where people's views were highly divergent.^[280] The ban was proportionate as this was an appropriate and necessary way to tackle the serious problems of fraud that arise over the internet. In the Services Directive a group of justifications were codified in article 16, which the case law has developed.^[281]

Capital

Free movement of capital was traditionally seen as the fourth freedom, after goods, workers and persons, services and establishment. The original Treaty of Rome required that restrictions on free capital flows only be removed to the extent necessary for the common market. From the Treaty of Maastricht, now in TFEU article 63, "all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited".^[283] This means capital controls of various kinds are prohibited, including limits on buying currency, limits on buying company shares or financial assets, or government approval requirements for foreign investment. By contrast, taxation of capital, including corporate tax, capital gains tax and Financial transaction tax are not affected so long as they do not discriminate by nationality. According to the Capital Movement Directive 1988, Annex I, 13 categories of capital which must move free are covered.^[284] In Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren the Court of Justice held that for investments in companies, the capital rules, rather than freedom of establishment rules, were engaged if an investment did not enable a "definite influence" through shareholder voting or other rights by the investor.^[285] That case held a Dutch Wealth Tax Act 1964 unjustifiably exempted Dutch investments, but not Mr Baars' investments in an Irish company, from the tax: the wealth tax, or exemptions, had to be applied equally. On the other hand, TFEU article 65(1) does not prevent taxes that distinguish taxpayers based on their residence or the location of an investment (as taxes commonly focus on a person's actual source of profit) or any measures to prevent tax evasion.^[286] Apart from tax cases, largely following from cases originating in the UK,^[287] a series of cases held that government owned golden shares were unlawful. In Commission v Germany the Commission claimed the 1960 German Volkswagen Act violated article 63, in that §2(1) restricted any party having voting rights exceeding 20% of the company, and §4(3) allowed a minority of 20% of shares held by the Lower Saxony government to block any decisions. Although this was not an impediment to actual purchase of shares, or receipt of dividends by any shareholder, the Court of Justice's Grand Chamber agreed that it was disproportionate for the government's stated aim of protecting workers or minority shareholders.^[288] Similarly, in Commission v Portugal the Court of Justice held that Portugal infringed free movement of capital by retaining golden shares in Portugal Telecom that enabled disproportionate voting rights, by creating a "deterrent effect on portfolio investments" and reducing "the attractiveness of an investment".^[289] This suggested the Court's preference that a government, if it sought public ownership or control, should nationalise in full the desired proportion of a company in line with TFEU article 345.^[290]

The final stage of completely free movement of capital was thought to require a single currency and monetary policy, eliminating the transaction costs and fluctuations of currency exchange between member states but not between member states and third countries (TFEU article 63). Following a Report of the Delors Commission in 1988,^[291] the Treaty of Maastricht made economic and monetary union an objective, first by completing the internal market, second by creating a European System of Central Banks to coordinate common monetary policy, and third by locking exchange rates and introducing a single currency, the euro. Today, 19 member states have adopted the euro, while 9 member states have either determined to opt-out or their accession has been delayed, particularly since the European debt crisis. According to TFEU articles 119 and 127, the objective of the European Central Bank and other central banks ought to be price stability. This has been criticised for apparently being superior to the objective of full employment in the Treaty on European Union article 3.^[292]

Social and market regulations

While the European Economic Community originally focused on free movement, and dismantling barriers to trade, more EU law today concerns regulation of the "social market economy".^[295] In 1976 the Court of Justice said in Defrenne v Sabena the goal was "not merely an economic union", but to "ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples".^[296] On this view, stakeholders in each member state might not have the capacity to take advantage of expanding trade in a globalising economy. Groups with greater bargaining power can exploit weaker legal rights in other member states. For example, a corporation could shift production to member states with a lower minimum wage, to increase shareholder profit, even if production costs more and workers are paid less. This would mean an aggregate loss of social wealth, and a "race to the bottom" in human development. To make globalisation fair, the EU establishes a minimum floor of rights for the stakeholders in enterprise: for consumers, workers, investors, shareholders, creditors, and the public. Each field of law is vast, so EU law is designed to be subsidiary to comprehensive rules in each member state. Member states may go beyond the harmonised minimum, acting as "laboratories of democracy".^[297]

EU law makes basic standards of "exit" (where markets operate), rights (enforceable in court), and "voice" (especially through votes) in enterprise.^[298] Rules of competition law balance the interests of different groups, generally to favour consumers, for the larger purpose in the Treaty on European Union article 3(3) of a "highly competitive social market economy".^[299] The EU is bound by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 345 to "in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership".^[290] This means the EU is bound to be neutral to member state's choice to take enterprises into public ownership, or to privatise them. While there have been academic proposals for a European Civil Code, and projects to frame non-binding principles of contract and tort, harmonisation has only occurred for conflict of laws and intellectual property.

Consumer protection

Protection of European consumers has been a central part of developing the EU internal market. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 169 enables the EU to follow the ordinary legislative procedure to protect consumers "health, safety and economic interests" and promote rights to "information, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests".^[300] All member states may grant higher protection, and a "high level of consumer protection" is regarded as a fundamental right.^[301] Beyond these general principles, and outside specific sectors, there are four main Directives: the Product Liability Directive 1985, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 1993, Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005 and the Consumer Rights Directive 2011, requiring information and cancellation rights for consumers. As a whole, the law is designed to ensure that consumers in the EU are entitled to the same minimum rights wherever they shop, and largely follows inspiration from theories of consumer protection developed in California and the Consumer Bill of Rights proclaimed by John F. Kennedy in 1962. The Court of Justice has continually affirmed that the need for more consumer rights (than in commercial contracts) both because consumers tend to lack information, and they have less bargaining power.^[302]

The Product Liability Directive 1985 was the first consumer protection measure. It creates strict enterprise liability for all producers and retailers for any harm to consumers from products, as a way to promote basic standards of health and safety.^[303] Any producer, or supplier if the ultimate producer is insolvent, of a product is strictly liable to compensate a consumer for any damage caused by a defective product.^[304] A "defect" is anything which falls below what a consumer is entitled to expect, and this essentially means that products should be safe for their purpose. A narrow defensive is available if a producer can show that a defect could not be known by any scientific method, thought this has never been successfully invoked, because it is generally thought a profit making enterprise should not be able to externalise the risks of its activities.

The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 1993 was the second main measure.^[305] Under article 3(1) a term is unfair, and not binding, if it is not "individually negotiated| and "if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer". The Court of Justice has continually affirmed that the Directive, as recital 16 states, "is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge".^[306] Terms which are very skewed, are to be conclusively regarded as contrary to "good faith" and therefore unfair.^[307] For example, in RWE AG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV clauses in gas supply contracts enabling corporation, RWE, to unilaterally vary prices were advised by the Court of Justice to be not sufficiently transparent, and therefore unfair.^[308] In Brusse v Jahani BV^[309] the Court of Justice advised that clauses in a tenancy contract requiring tenants pay €25 per day were likely unfair, and would have to be entirely void without replacement, if they were not substituted with more precise mandatory terms in national legislation. In Aziz v Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya, following the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the European Court of Justice advised that even terms regarding repossession of homes in Spain had to be assessed for fairness by national courts.^[310] In Kušionová v SMART Capital a.s., the Court of Justice held that consumer law was to be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights, including the right to housing, if a home could be repossessed.^[311] Because consumer law operates through Directives, national courts have the final say on applying the general principles set out by the Court of Justice's case law.

Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC
Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU
Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC
Late Payments Directive 2011/7/EU

Labour rights

While free movement of workers was central to the first European Economic Community agreement, the development of European labour law has been a gradual process. Originally, the Ohlin Report of 1956 recommended that labour standards did not need to be harmonised, although a general principle of anti-discrimination between men and women was included in the early Treaties. Increasingly, the absence of labour rights was seen as inadequate given the capacity for a "race to the bottom" in international trade if corporations can shift jobs and production to countries with low wages. Today, the EU is required under TFEU article 147 to contribute to a "high level of employment by encouraging cooperation between Member States".^[312] This has not resulted in legislation, which usually requires taxation and fiscal stimulus for significant change, while the European Central Bank's monetary policy has been acutely controversial during the European debt crisis. Under article 153(1), the EU is able to use the ordinary legislation procedure on a list of labour law fields. This notably excludes wage regulation and collective bargaining.^[313] Generally, four main fields of EU regulation of labour rights touch (1) individual labour rights, (2) anti-discrimination regulations, (3) rights to information, consultation, and participation at work, and (4) rights to job security. In virtually all cases, the EU follows the principle that member states can always create rights more beneficial to workers. This is because the fundamental principle of labour law is that employees' unequal bargaining power justifies substitution of rules in property and contract with positive social rights so that people may earn a living to fully participate in a democratic society.^[314] The EU's competences generally follow principles codified in the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989,^[315] introduced in the "social chapter" of the Treaty of Maastricht. Initially the UK had opted-out, because of opposition by the Conservative Party, but was acceded to when the Labour Party won the 1997 general election in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The first group of Directives create a range of individual rights in EU employment relationships. The Employment Information Directive 1991 requires that every employee (however defined by member state law) has the right to a written statement of their employment contract. While there is no wage regulation, the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive 2003 requires that pension benefits are protected through a national insurance fund, that information is provided to beneficiaries, and minimum standards of governance are observed.^[319] Most member states go far beyond these requirements, particularly by requiring a vote for employees in who manages their money.^[320] Reflecting basic standards in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ILO Conventions,^[321] the Working Time Directive 2003 requires a minimum of 4 weeks (totalling 28 days) paid holidays each year,^[322] a minimum of 20-minute paid rest breaks for 6-hour work shifts, limits on night work or time spent on dangerous work,^[323] and a maximum 48-hour working week unless a worker individually consents.^[324] The Parental Leave Directive 2010 creates a bare minimum of 4 months of unpaid leave for parents (mothers, fathers, or legal guardians) to care for children before they turn 8 years old, and the Pregnant Workers Directive 1992 creates a right for mothers to a minimum of 14 weeks' paid leave to care for children.^[325] Finally, the Safety and Health at Work Directive 1989 requires basic requirements to prevent and insure against workplace risks, with employee consultation and participation,^[326] and this is complemented by specialised Directives, ranging from work equipment to dangerous industries.^[327] In almost all cases, all member states go significantly beyond this minimum. The objective of transnational regulation is therefore to progressively raise the minimum floor in line with economic development. Second, equality was affirmed by the Court of Justice in Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG^[328] to be a general principle of EU law. Further to this, the Part-time Work Directive 1997, Fixed-term Work Directive 1999 and Temporary Agency Work Directive 2008 generally require that people who do not have ordinary full-time, permanent contracts are treated no less favourably than their colleagues. However, the scope of the protected worker is left to member state law, and the TAWD 2008 only applies to "basic working conditions" (mostly pay, working hours and participation rights) and enabled member states to have a qualifying period. The Race Equality Directive 2000, Equality Framework Directive 2000 and Equal Treatment Directive 2006 prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, disability, religion or belief, age, race and gender. As well as "direct discrimination", there is a prohibition on "indirect discrimination" where employers apply a neutral rule to everybody, but this has a disproportionate impact on the protected group. The rules are not consolidated, and on gender pay potentially limited in not enabling a hypothetical comparator, or comparators in outsourced business. Equality rules do not yet apply to child care rights, which only give women substantial time off, and consequently hinder equality in men and women caring for children after birth, and pursuing their careers.

Third, the EU is formally not enabled to legislate on collective bargaining, although the EU, with all member states, is bound by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on freedom of association.^[329] In Wilson and Palmer v United Kingdom^[330] the Court held that any detriment for membership of a trade union was incompatible with article 11, and in Demir and Baykara v Turkey^[331] the Court held "the right to bargain collectively with the employer has, in principle, become one of the essential elements" of article 11.^[332] This approach, which includes affirmation of the fundamental right to strike in all democratic member states,^[333] has been seen as lying in tension with some of the Court of Justice's previous case law, notably ITWF v Viking Line ABP^[334] and Laval Un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet.^[335] These controversial decisions, quickly disapproved by legislative measures,^[336] suggested the fundamental right of workers to take collective action was subordinate to business freedom to establish and provide services. More positively, the Information and Consultation Directive 2002 requires that workplaces with over 20 or 50 staff have the right to set up elected work councils with a range of binding rights, the European Works Council Directive 2009 enables work councils transnationally, and the Employee Involvement Directive 2001 requires representation of workers on company boards in some European Companies. If a company transforms from a member state corporation to incorporate under the European Company Regulation 2001, employees are entitled to no less favourable representation than under the member state's existing board participation laws. This is practically important as a majority of EU member states require employee representation on company boards. Fourth, minimum job security rights are provided by three Directives. The Collective Redundancies Directive 1998 specifies that minimum periods of notice and consultation occur if more than a set number of jobs in a workplace are at risk. The Transfers of Undertakings Directive 2001 require that staff retain all contractual rights, unless there is an independent economic, technical or organisational reason, if their workplace is sold from one company to another. Last, the Insolvency Protection Directive 2008 requires that employees' wage claims are protected in case their employer falls insolvent. This last Directive gave rise to Francovich v Italy, where the Court of Justice affirmed that member states which fail to implement the minimum standards in EU Directives are liable to pay compensation to employees who should have rights under them.^[337]

Companies and investment

Like labour regulation, European company law is not a complete system and there is no such thing as a self-standing European corporation. Instead, a series of Directives require minimum standards, usually protecting investors, to be implemented in national corporate laws. The largest in Europe remain member state incorporations, such as the UK "plc", the German "AG" or the French "SA". There is however, a "European Company" (or Societas Europaea, abbreviated to "SE") created by the Statute for a European Company Regulation 2001.^[338] This sets out basic provisions on the method of registration (e.g. by merger or reincorporation of an existing company) but then states that wherever the SE has its registered office, the law of that member state supplements the rules of the Statute.^[339] The Employee Involvement Directive 2001also adds that, when an SE is incorporated, employees have the default right to retain all existing representation on the board of directors that they have, unless the negotiate by collective agreement a different or better plan than is provided for in existing member state law.^[340] Other than this, most important standards in a typical company law are left to member state law, so long as they comply with further minimum requirements in the company law directives. Duties owed by the board of directors to the company and its stakeholders,^[341] or the right to bring derivative claims to vindicate constitutional rights, are not generally regulated by EU law. Nor are rights of pre-emption to buy shares, nor rights of any party regarding claims by tort, contract or piercing the corporate veil to hold directors and shareholders accountable.^[342] However, Directives do require minimum rights on company formation, capital maintenance, accounting and audit, market regulation, board neutrality in a takeover bid,^[343] rules on mergers, and management of cross-border insolvency.^[344] The omission of minimum standards is important since the Court of Justice held in Centros that freedom of establishment requires companies operate in any member state they choose.^[345] This has been argued to risk a "race to the bottom" in standards, although the Court of Justice soon affirmed in Inspire Art that companies must still comply with proportionate requirements that are in the "public interest".^[346]

Among the most important governance standards are rights vote for who is on the board of directors for investors of labour and capital. A Draft Fifth Company Law Directive proposed in 1972, which would have required EU-wide rights for employees to vote for boards stalled mainly because it attempted to require two-tier board structures,^[348] although most EU member states have codetermination today with unified boards. The Shareholder Rights Directive 2007 requires shareholders be able to make proposals, ask questions at meetings, vote by proxy and vote through intermediaries. This has become increasingly important as most company shares are held by institutional investors (primarily asset managers or banks, depending on the member state) who are holding "other people's money".^[347] A large proportion of this money comes from employees and other people saving for retirement, but who do not have an effective voice. Unlike Switzerland after a 2013 people's initiative, or the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act 2010 in relation to brokers,^[349] the EU has not yet prevented intermediaries casting votes without express instructions of beneficiaries. This concentrates power into a small number of financial institutions, and creates the potential for conflicts of interest where financial institutions sell retirement, banking or products to companies in which they cast votes with other people's money. A series of rights for ultimate investors exist in the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive 2003. This requires duties of disclosure in how a retirement fund is run, funding and insurance to guard against insolvency,^[350] but not yet that voting rights are only cast on the instructions of investors. By contrast, the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive 2009 does suggest that investors in a mutual fund or ("collective investment scheme") should control the voting rights.^[351] The UCITS Directive 2009 is primarily concerned with creating a "passport". If a firm complies with rules on authorisation, and governance of the management and investment companies in an overall fund structure, it can sell its shares in a collective investment scheme across the EU. This forms a broader package of Directives on securities and financial market regulation, much of which has been shaped by experience in the financial crisis of 2007–2008.^[352] Additional rules on remuneration practices, separating depositary bodies in firms from management and investment companies, and more penalties for violations were inserted in 2014.^[353] These measures are meant to decrease the risk to investors that an investment goes insolvent. The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004 applies to other businesses selling financial instruments. It requires similar authorisation procedures to have a "passport" to sell in any EU country, and transparency of financial contracts through duties to disclose material information about products being sold, including disclosure of potential conflicts of interest with clients.^[354] The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 2011 applies to firms with massive quantities of capital, over €100 million, essentially hedge funds and private equity firms.^[355] Similarly, it requires authorisation to sell products EU wide, and then basic transparency requirements on products being sold, requirements in remuneration policies for fund managers that are perceived to reduce "risk" or make pay "performance" related. They do not, however, require limits to pay. There are general prohibitions on conflicts of interest, and specialised prohibitions on asset stripping.^[356] The Solvency II Directive 2009 is directed particularly at insurance firms, requiring minimum capital and best practices in valuation of assets, again to avoid insolvency.^[357] The Capital Requirements Directives contain analogous rules, with a similar goals, for banks. To administer the new rules, the European System of Financial Supervision was established in 2011, and consists of three main branches: the European Securities and Markets Authority in Paris, the European Banking Authority in London and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority in Frankfurt.

Competition law

Competition law aims "to prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers", especially by limiting big business power.^[359] It covers all types of enterprise or "undertaking" regardless of legal form, or "every entity engaged in an economic activity",^[360] but not non-profit organisations based on the principle of solidarity,^[361] or bodies carrying out a regulatory function. Employees and trade unions are not undertakings, and are outside the scope of competition law,^[362] and so are solo self-employed workers,^[363] because on long-standing consensus in international law labour is not a commodity, and workers have structurally unequal bargaining power compared to business and employers.^[364] A legal professional body setting regulatory standards was held to be outside competition law,^[365] and so were the rules of the International Olympic Committee and the International Swimming Federation in prohibiting drugs, because although drugs might increase "competition", the "integrity and objectivity of competitive sport" was more important.^[366] EU competition law only regulates activities where trade between member states is affected to an "appreciable" degree,^[367] but member states may have higher standards that comply with social objectives.^[368] The four most important sets of rules relate to monopolies and enterprises with a dominant position, mergers and takeovers, cartels or collusive practices, and state aid.

First, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits "abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position". A "dominant position" is presumed to exist with over a 50% market share,^[369] and may exist with a 39.7% market share.^[370] There may also be dominance through control of data, or by a group of undertakings acting collectively,^[371] and a corporate group will be treated as a "single economic unit" for the purpose of calculating market share.^[372] The prohibited categories of "abuse" are unlimited,^[373] but article 102 explicitly spells out the bans on (a) "unfair purchase or selling prices", (b) "limiting production", (c) "applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions", and (d) imposing unconnected "supplementary obligations" to contracts. In a leading case on (a) unfair prices, United Brands Co v Commission held that, although a banana company had a dominant position in its product and geographic markets (because bananas were not easily substituted with other fruit, and its relevant market share was 40 to 45%), prices 7% higher than rivals were not enough to be an abuse.^[374] By contrast prices 25% higher than a company's estimated costs were found to be unfair.^[375] Unfair pricing also includes predatory pricing, where a company cuts its own selling prices to bankrupt a competitor: there is a presumption of abuse if a company prices "below average variable costs", namely "those which vary depending on the quantities produced".^[376] There is no requirement to show losses might be recouped.^[377] A leading case on (b) limiting production is AstraZeneca plc v Commission, where a drug company was fined €60 million for misleading public authorities to secure a longer patent for a medicine it called Losec, so limiting public use.^[378] In 2022, in Google LLC v Commission the General Court upheld a €4.125 billion fine against Google for the "obstruction of development and distribution of competing Android operating systems" by paying manufacturers to not install any version other than Google's own.^[379] Refusal to supply goods or services may also be abusive, as in Commercial Solvents Corporation v Commission where the subsidiary of CSC stopped selling an ingredient for a drug to combat tuberculosis to a competitor after it itself entered the drug market.^[380] Similarly in Microsoft Corp v Commission, Microsoft was fined €497 million for, among other things, refusing to give Sun Microsystems and other competitors information needed to build servers after Microsoft itself entered the server market.^[381]

Under the third type of abuse, (c) unlawful discrimination, in British Airways plc v Commission it was held that British Airways abused its dominant position by giving some travel agents extra payment to promote its tickets over others. This made "market entry very difficult" and frustrated the ability of "co-contractors to choose between various sources of supply or commercial partners".^[382] Under (d) examples of the abuse of imposing supplementary obligations include the Microsoft Corp v Commission case, where Microsoft bundled a pre-installed media player into Windows OS sales, which had the effect of damaging competitor businesses such as RealPlayer.^[383] By contrast, in Intel Corp v Commission, Intel was fined €1.06 billion by the commission for giving rebates on x86 computer processors if manufacturers bought over 80% of their chips only from Intel. This had the effect of "tying customers to the undertaking in a dominant position". However the fine was annulled on the ground that the commission had not adequately proven an anti-competitive effect,^[384] so in 2023 the Commission imposed a smaller €376 million fine. Second, the Merger Regulation 2004 applies to "concentrations" (any merger or acquisition), that generally have a value of at least €100 million turnover in the EU if it "would significantly impede effective competition" by creating or strengthening a dominant position.^[385] While mergers between direct ("horizontal") competitors are carefully scrutinised upon mandatory notification to the commission, vertical or conglomerate mergers are often allowed where a competitor is not removed.^[386] This has led to increasingly large business groups, with ever greater power.^[387]

Third, Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits cartels or collusive practices, including competitors engaging in (a) price fixing, (b) limiting production, (c) sharing markets, (d) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, and (e) making contracts subject to unconnected obligations. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements between undertakings are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere. For example, in Parker ITR Srl v Commission eleven corporations that manufactured marine hoses for offshore oil rigs were fined €131 million for rigging bids and sharing markets worldwide - they would designate a "bid champion" in each case to raise prices.^[388] Secret cartels are often hard to prove, so the courts allow competition regulators to establish collusion where there is no other plausible explanation for price rises.^[389] Some agreements among businesses, however, can be highly beneficial. For instance, in a decision on the Conseil Européen de la Construction d'Appareils Domestiques, the Commission held an agreement among washing machine makers to phase out production of low-efficiency machines was lawful, especially since it would lead to "reduced pollution from electricity generation".^[390] Fourth, TFEU article 106(1) requires that the state may not grant special or exclusive rights for undertakings that distort competition, and states that (2) competition law applies to services of general economic interest, unless it obstructs their tasks in law or fact (e.g. in providing public services). Under TFEU art 107(1) no state aid that distorts competition is allowed, but aid is allowed (2) for individual consumers, without discrimination, and (3) for economic development, particularly to tackle underemployment. The Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU, on government procurement in the EU sets standards for open tenders when outsourcing public services to private companies.

Commerce and intellectual property

While EU law has not yet developed a civil code for contracts, torts, unjust enrichment, real or personal property, or commerce in general,^[391] European legal scholars have drafted common principles, including Principles of European Contract Law and Principles of European Tort Law that are common to member states. In absence of harmonisation, there is a comprehensive system of conflicts of laws to settle the jurisdiction of courts, and the applicable law, for most commercial disputes. The Brussels I Regulation 2012 determines the jurisdiction of courts depending upon where a person is domiciled or has operations.^[392] The applicable law for consensual obligations is then determined by the Rome I Regulation, where article 3 states the principle that a choice of law can be made expressly in a contract, unless this affects provisions that cannot be derogated from, such as employment, consumer, tenancy or other rights.^[393] The Rome II Regulation determines applicable law in the case of non-consensual obligations, such as torts and unjust enrichment. Under article 4 the general rule is that the law applies where "the damage occurred", although under article 7 in the case of "environmental damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result" there is a choice to bring an action under the law of the tortfeasor.^[394]

Unlike other property forms, intellectual property rights are comprehensively regulated by a series of directives on copyrights, patents and trademarks. The Copyright Term Directive 2006 article 1 states the principle that copyrights last for 70 years after the death of the author.^[395] The Copyright and Information Society Directive 2001 was passed to regulate copyright over the internet, and the effect of article 5 is that internet service providers are not liable for data they transmit even if it infringes copyright. However under article 6, member states must give "adequate legal protection" for copyrights.^[396] The Resale Rights Directive creates a right to royalties for authors where works are resold. The Enforcement Directive requires member states have effective remedies and legal processes. Under the European Patent Convention, which is separate from the EU, the general patent term is 20 years from the date that a patent (of an invention) is filed with an official register, and the development of an EU patent attempts to harmonise standards around these norms. The Trade Marks Directive enables a common system of trade mark registration so that, with exceptions, a registered trade mark applies across all EU member states.^[397]

Public regulation

A major part of EU law, and most of the EU's budget, concerns public regulation of enterprise and public services. A basic norm of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, in article 345, is that the "Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership", meaning the EU remains neutral between private or public ownership, but that it can require common standards. In the cases of education and health, member states generally organise public services and the EU requires free movement. There is a unified European Central Bank that funds private banks, and adopts a common monetary policy for price stability, employment and sustainability. The EU's policies on energy, agriculture and forestry, transport and buildings are crucial to end climate damage and shift completely to clean energy that does not heat the planet. Among these, 33% of the entire EU budget is spent on agricultural subsidies to farm corporations and owners. The EU also has an increasing number of policies to raise standards for communications, the internet, data protection, and online media. It has limited involvement in the military and security, but a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Education and health

Education and health are provided mainly by member states, but shaped by common minimum standards in EU law. In the case of education, the European Social Charter, like the Universal Declaration, the International Bill of Human Rights, say that "everyone" has the right to education, and that primary, secondary and higher education should be made "free",^[400] for instance "by reducing or abolishing any fees or charges" and "granting financial assistance".^[401] While the history of education was confined to a wealth elite,^[402] today most member states have tuition free university. There are no common rules for university finance or governance, although there is a right to free movement and universities have voluntarily harmonised standards. In 1987, the Erasmus Programme was created to fund students to study in other countries, and with a budget of €30 billion from 2021 to 2027. From 1999, the Bologna Declaration and Process led to the creation of the European Higher Education Area where member state universities adopted a common degree structure (bachelor, master, and doctoral degree) with a goal to have similar expectations in learning outcomes.^[403] Member states may not impose different fees on students from other member states or limit their numbers,^[404] and this appears to have worked even without a system for countries to reimburse one another if costs differ widely.^[405] However, if member states have grants or student loans, R (Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing held there may be a minimum residency requirement, such as three years.^[406] Most of the world's best universities enable majority staff, and significant alumni or student voice in university governance. For instance, the French Education Code requires that universities have a board of management with 24 to 36 members, and 8 to 16 elected by professors, 4 to 6 by non-academic staff, 4 to 6 by students, and 8 external members,^[407] and have an academic council elected by staff with powers to set important rules, such as on training or examinations.^[408] Secondary, primary, and pre-school are generally free from fees. More successful school systems tend to be well-funded and public, and do not have barriers to children based on wealth, such as private fees for school.^[409] Most schools enable staff and parents to vote for representatives on their children's school governing bodies.

As in education, there is a universal human right to 'health and well-being' including 'medical care and necessary social services',^[410] although human rights law does not say what the best system of health governance is. Among EU member states there are two main traditions of health care provision, based on public service or insurance. First, healthcare may be seen as a public service free at the point of use, with hospitals largely owned by the public health service and doctors publicly funded (the "Beveridge model".^[411]) This is the system, for example, in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece or Ireland. Second, healthcare can be provided through insurance, where hospitals and doctors are separately owned and run from the service provider (the "Bismarck model"). There is a large spectrum between systems based mainly on public insurance and usually creating public option hospitals or requiring no profit (such as France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, the Czech Republic or Estonia) and those that allow substantial private and profit-making insurance and hospital or doctor provision (the Netherlands and Germany^[412]). In all cases, health is universal, and subsidised or free wherever people cannot afford insurance premiums, unlike the notorious case of the United States which still does not have universal healthcare. The healthcare outcomes vary greatly between different systems, so that while there is generally higher life expectancy with more investment, healthcare tends to have worse outcomes and costs more where there is more private business or profit. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 56 there is the right to receive services, with rules codified into the Patients' Rights Directive 2011. Article 4 requires that people are treated, article 5 requires reimbursement of costs by the person's country of origin, article 6 requires national contact points to connect healthcare providers or insurers and patient organisations, but under article 8 member states may require prior authorisation for people to travel abroad for treatment where the costs are high or planning is needed.^[413] A European Health Insurance Card is also available for free to receive health across the EU.^[414] This system was developed after R (Watts) v Bedford Primary Care Trust, where in 2003 Mrs Watts travelled from the UK to France, paid £3900 for a hip replacement operation, and claimed she should be reimbursed. The UK's National Health Service waiting lists were 4 to 6 months at the time. The Court of Justice's Grand Chamber held that health care counted as a 'service' under TFEU article 56, and that in principle there was a right to receive those services abroad. However, high demand could justify waiting lists in a national health system, but individual circumstances of the patient had to be assessed. For non-EU nationals, the European Court of Human Rights held in N v United Kingdom that it was not inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to ECHR article 3 to deport someone to a country where there were unlikely to live longer than two years without treatment. There is no duty 'through provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction' to avoid 'too great a burden on the Contracting States.'^[415] However, if someone's death would be imminent the European Court of Human Rights has held that a decision to remove would violate ECHR article 3.^[416]

Banking, monetary and fiscal policy

Banking, monetary and fiscal policy is overseen by the European Central Bank, member states, and the EU Commission. This is vital for European society as it affects the human rights to full employment, to fair wages, housing, and to an adequate standard of living.^[417] When the Eurozone and common currency of the euro was established, there was no political agreement to develop a full EU fiscal policy (i.e. tax and spending), so that governments would pool money and lend to countries in trouble, because it was thought that wealthier member states should not have to subsidise poorer member states. However, there was planned to be a common central bank, which would aim to have common interest rates. The ECB, based in Frankfurt, controls monetary policy that underpins the euro. Member states also have central banks (such as the Bundesbank, Banque de France, Banco de España), and these 19 Eurozone member state central banks have a duty to act compatibly with ECB policy.^[418] The ECB has an executive board with a president, vice president and four other members, all appointed by the European Council by qualified majority, after consulting the European Parliament, and the Governing Council of the ECB.^[419] The Governing Council is made up of the ECB executive board and member state central banks using the euro, they have 8 year terms, and can be removed only for gross misconduct.^[420]

The European Central Bank's 'primary objective... shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to that objective, it shall support the general economic policies in the Union', such as 'balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.'^[423] There are three main powers to achieve these goals. First, the ECB can require other banks to hold reserves proportionate to their type of lending.^[424] Second, it may lend money to other banks, or conduct 'credit operations'. Third it may 'operate in the financial markets by buying and selling' securities.^[425] For example, in Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag a German politician claimed that the ECB's purchase of Greek government debt on secondary markets violated TFEU article 123, which prohibits directly lending money to member state governments. The Court of Justice rejected that the ECB had engaged in 'economic policy' (i.e. fiscal transfers) rather than monetary policy decisions, which it was allowed to do.^[426] So far the ECB has failed to use these powers to eliminate investment in fossil fuels, despite the inflation that gas, oil and coal cause given their price volality in international markets.

Beyond the central bank, the Credit Institutions Directive 2013 requires authorisation and prudence provisions in other banks in all EU member states.^[427] Under the Basel III programme, created by an international banker group, banks must hold more money in reserves based on the risk-profile that it holds, as determined by the member state regulator. More risky assets require more reserves, and the Capital Requirements Regulation 2013 codifies these standards, for instance by mandating that proportionally less in reserves is needed if more government debt is held, but more if mortgage-backed securities are held.^[428] To guard against the risk of bank runs, the Deposit Guarantee Directive 2014 creates an EU wide minimum guarantee of €100,000 for bank deposits, so that if anyone's bank goes insolvent, the state will pay the deposit up to this amount.^[429] There are not yet rules requiring higher reserving and accounting practices for climate risk and of gas, oil or coal reserves become worthless as Europe replaces fossil fuels with renewable energy.

European nations by GDP (PPP) per capita in 2019. The EU has not yet updated its GDP measures to discount for harmful goods and services that create greenhouse gas emissions, pollution or ill health.^[430]

The budget of the European Union is set in 7 year cycles, and in 2022 around €170bn was spent, of which nearly one-third was agricultural policy, including regional development.^[431] EU member state government expenditures are far higher as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product, but are constrained by the Fiscal Compact, which requires no more than a 3% budget deficit compared to GDP in any given year, and aiming for surpluses or balanced budgets.^[432] As a result of the Eurozone crisis, a Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism created a fund to assist countries with severe fiscal problems.^[433] The results of the "strict conditionality" attached to loans (or so called structural adjustment) that required privatisation, cuts to welfare, and wages in Greece, Spain, Portugal or Ireland was particularly negative. The EU's main metric for economic performance has been GDP, which adds up market exchange values in firm accounts and government expenditures according to the Gross National Income Regulation 2019,^[434] even though this fails to discount polluting and harmful economic activities such as energy and industry that damages the climate, the environment and human health. The EU's budget mainly comes from contributions of around 0.7% of GDP per member state, as well as a share of EU value added tax and customs duties. The EU does not yet have a more comprehensive system for preventing tax evasion, or for fair taxation of multinational or financial corporations.^[435]

Electricity and energy

Like the world, the EU's greatest task is to replace fossil fuels with clean energy as fast as technology allows since protection of "life",^[436] and "improvement of the quality of the environment" are fundamental rights,^[437] and the highest policy goals of the EU.^[438] In international law, there is also 'the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources' such as clean air,^[439] and the right to 'the benefits of scientific progress', such as clean energy.^[440] The EU's overall target is to reduce toxic greenhouse gas emissions by 50-55% by 2030, and be carbon neutral or negative by 2050,^[441] and 32% renewable energy by 2030,^[442] though a 45% target by 2030 was proposed by the commission and backed by Parliament in 2022.^[443] Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine it aims to eliminate Russian fossil fuel imports as fast as possible.^[444] However laws such as the Hydrocarbons Directive 1994 still enable gas and oil extraction. It requires that licences are awarded based on technical and financial capability, methods, price, and previous conduct, that applicants are treated equally by objective and non-discriminatory criteria, and advertisements for tenders must be public.^[445] It has not yet required that existing licensees pay for the pollution and climate damage they have caused, nor sought to end extraction of gas and oil.

A growing number of cases seek to enforce liability on gas, oil and coal polluters.^[447] In Friends of the Earth v Royal Dutch Shell plc, the Hague District Court held that Shell was bound by the tort provisions of the Dutch Civil Code, Book 6, section 162(2), interpreted in light of the Paris Agreement 2015 article 2(1) and ECHR articles 2 and 8 (rights to life and home),^[448] to immediately start cutting all of its emissions by 45% by 2030, whether generated directly by its corporate group (scope 1), indirectly from its purchases (scope 2), or indirectly from its value chain or the purchase and use of its products (scope 3). It emphasised the 'serious and irreversible consequences of dangerous climate change in the Netherlands... pose a threat to the human rights of Dutch residents'.^[449] After this loss, Shell dropped "Royal Dutch" from its name, and moved its headquarters to London.^[450] In Lliuya v RWE AG Mr Lliuya, who lives in Huaraz, Peru has claimed that RWE AG should pay 0.47% of the costs of flood defences against a melting mountain glacier that increases the size of Lake Palcacocha, because RWE is responsible for 0.47% of historic global greenhouse gas emissions. The Higher Regional Court of Essen gave leave to appeal on whether there is causation of damage, and in 2022 visited the lake.^[451] There has also been heightened responsibility on member state governments. In Urgenda v State of Netherlands the Dutch Supreme Court held the Dutch government must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25% before 2020, following the IPCC 2007 minimum recommendations, and that failure to do so would violate the right to life and home in ECHR articles 2 and 8.^[452] In the Klimaschutz case, the German Constitutional Court held that the German government must speed up its climate protection measures to protect the rights to life, and the environment under the Grundgesetz 1949, articles 2 and 20a.^[453] However the EU and member states have so far failed to codify liability to prevent pollution and climate damage by corporations that profit,^[454] and the EU Emissions Trading System has failed to adequately price carbon for the damage it causes (prices traded under €98 per metric ton until the end of 2022^[455]).

As clean energy from wind, solar or hydro storage replaces pollution from gas, oil and coal, EU law has standards for generation and distribution networks. First, in generation, the Renewable Energy Directive 2018 still enables biomass and biofuel to count toward "renewable" energy statistics based on the argument that trees or plants absorb greenhouse gases when they grow,^[456] even though biomass burning (usually in ex-coal plants) releases more greenhouse gases than coal, biomass transport is not clean, forests take decades to replenish, and smoke damages human health. Second, the EU does not yet have a feed-in tariff system, requiring energy grids and retailers to pay a fair price to households or businesses with solar or wind generation, however in PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG the Court of Justice held that member states could fix any price they chose, so that energy companies would have to reimburse producers for the energy they received. A company now owned by E.ON claimed the feed-in tariff was state aid under TFEU article 107, and should have to pass rules for exemption, as a way to hinder renewable energy funding. The Court rejected this, because although the policy might have 'negative repercussions' for big energy companies it 'cannot be regarded' as giving to small producers 'a particular advantage at the expense of the state'.^[458]

The third main set of standards is that the EU requires that electricity or gas enterprises acquire a licence from member state authorities.^[459] There must be legal separation into different entities of owners of networks from retailers, although they can be owned by the same enterprise, to ensure transparency of accounting.^[460] Then, different enterprises have rights to access infrastructure of network owners on fair and transparent terms,^[461] as a way to ensure different member state networks and supplies can become integrated across the EU. Most EU operators are publicly owned, and the Court of Justice in Netherlands v Essent NV emphatically rejected that there was any violation of EU law on free movement of capital by a Dutch Act requiring electricity and gas distributors to be publicly owned, that system operators could not be connected by ownership to generators, and limited the level of debt.^[462]The Court of Justice held a public ownership requirement was justified by 'overriding reasons in the public interest', 'to protect consumers' and for the 'security of energy supply'.^[463] It further pointed to the foundational case of Costa v ENEL, where the Court held in 1964 that the treaties do 'not prohibit the creation of any state monopolies' so long as they do not operate commercially and discriminate.^[464] The approach of EU law is that even where energy companies are privatised, they still are subject to the same rules as the state on direct effect, because it remains that they are 'providing a public service'.^[465] The evidence suggests "consumers pay lower electricity net-of-tax prices in countries where there are still incumbents owned by national governments."^[466] With the sharp rise in fossil fuel prices that came from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the fossil fuel cartel OPEC deciding to restrict supply, the EU Commission proposed a windfall fossil fuel tax.^[467] There are not yet common standards on energy enterprise governance, although a number of member states ensure that workers and energy bill payers have the right to vote for directors.^[468]

Agriculture, forestry and water

Everyone has the right to food and water,^[469] and under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU "the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union".^[470] The Common Agricultural Policy's origins lay in ensuring that all farm workers had fair wages and everyone had food, since in 1960 a third of employment and a fifth of GDP was in agriculture,^[471] and after WW2 Europe had been on the brink of starvation. In 2020, the agricultural workforce was 4.2% of the EU total.^[472] The CAP's objectives are still to increase production, "a fair standard of living for the agricultural community", to stabilise markets and supplies, and "reasonable prices" for consumers.^[473] In 2021, the CAP was 33.1% of the entire EU budget, at €55.1 billion, however there are no requirements for subsidies to be used so that farm workers (as opposed to owners) have fair pay scales, few requirements for rural development, and minimal standards for environmental improvement.

The CAP has three main parts. First, the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund distributes 'direct payments',^[474] which are 70.9% of the CAP budget. The Direct Payments Regulation 2013 gives payments to an 'active farmer' that carries out agricultural activity, grazing or cultivation, does not operate airports, rail, waterworks, real estate, sport or recreation grounds, and has the land at their disposal.^[475] The farm must have at least 1 hectare and receive €100 for each, though member states can set higher thresholds (e.g. 5 hectares and €200).^[476] If payments reach over €150,000 there is a 5% reduction per hectare for each hectare.^[477] This favours large farm corporations, and the largest 1% typically receive around 10 to 15% of all subsidies in member states. As conditions of receiving subsidies, farms can be required to keep land in good condition, for public, animal, and plant health, and maintain environment standards.^[478] For minimal biodiversity, farmers must have over two crops if they have 10 hectares, not farm at least 5% of lintensively (an 'ecological focus area' over 15 hectares, and have three crops over 30 hectares.^[479] Environmentally sensitive grasslands, as designated by the Habitats Directive 1992 and the Wild Birds Directive 2009, should not be more turned into more than 5% agricultural area.^[480] The second main part, also carried out by the EAGF, is 'market measures'. Under the Agricultural Products Regulation 2013 certain crops and meat are eligible for purchase by member state authorities, to be 'stored by them until disposed of', with extra aid for storage.^[481] The goal of this is to restrict supply and therefore raise prices, particularly in response to unexpected drops in demand, a health scare, or international market volatility. In 2018, this was 4.59% of the CAP budget. The benefits of many of these subsidies go to the parties in the food supply chains with most bargaining power, which is usually supermarkets. The Agricultural Unfair Trading Practices Directive 2019 article 3 prohibits practices such as late payments by buyers of food to suppliers, cancellations at short notice, unilateral alteration of terms, threats of commercial retaliation, and payments by suppliers to the buyers (i.e. from farmers to supermarkets) for stocking, adverts, marketing or staff.^[482] These rules limit supermarkets' abuse of a dominant position but do not ensure subsidies reach farm communities. The Food Safety Regulation 2002 article 14 requires that food is not place on the market if it is 'injurious to health' or is 'unfit for human consumption', but there is no requirement that supermarkets or others eliminate harmful packaging such as plastic. The third main part, administered by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, is 'rural development' payments,^[483] which are 24.4% of the CAP budget. Following the 'Europe 2020 Strategy by promoting sustainable rural development', payments are made for knowledge transfer, advice, asset investment, and business development aid.^[484] Priorities may include improving water and energy use.^[485] The courts give the EU a wide discretion to implement policy, so judicial review is possible only if agricultural measures are 'manifestly inappropriate'.^[486] EU law does not yet have a systematic plan or subsidies to rewild depleted environments, and to move to complete clean energy infrastructure.

Outside farms, forests cover just 43.52% of the EU's land, compared to 80% forest cover historically across Europe.^[487] There is no requirement yet to undertake any reforesting or rewilding of land, while the Land Use and Forestry Directive 2018 merely requires that member states keep accounts of land use and forestry changes based on greenhouse gas emissions, and that emissions do not exceed removals of greenhouse gases.^[488] Globally, the Timber Regulation 2010 requires that all timber traders know their supply chains and keep records for 5 years, to ensure that any illegally harvested timber is banned in the EU law,^[489] however there is not yet any ban on imports of goods (such as beef or palm oil) from countries that continue to deforest their landscape. For water resources, in nature or for drinking, the Water Framework Directive 2000 sets common standards and provides that member states should oversee water industry standards.^[490] The Drinking Water Quality Directive 2020 requires water that is "wholesome and clean", and article 4 defines this as free from micro-organisms and parasites dangerous to health, and compliant with chemical and biological standards in Annex I.^[491] The Bathing Waters Directive 2006 sets standards for quality of bathing waters, namely riviers and beaches, to be free from toxic waste or sewage.^[492] There must be adequate remedies for breaches, so in Commission v United Kingdom (1992) it was held that the UK's approach of accepting undertakings from water companies to behave better in future, instead of using enforcement orders, was inadequate to comply with EU law.^[493] Fines can be and often are significant, ranging into hundreds of thousands or millions of euros for breach.^[494]

Transport and buildings

Clean road, rail, sea and air transport are fundamental goals of the EU, given its commitment to human rights for 'improvement of the quality of the environment', 'services of general economic interest',^[495] and the right to 'the benefits of scientific progress'.^[496] However, the pace of reform is slow compared to the urgency of reversing global heating. The Renewable Energy Directive 2018 article 25 requires that final energy consumption in transport in each member state is 'at least 14%' renewable by 2030.^[497] This is within the 2030 target for 32% "share of energy from renewable sources in the Union's gross final consumption of energy".^[498] In 2022, the EU promised to ban sale of new petrol and diesel vehicles only by 2035, enabling manufacturing corporations to profit from toxic emissions for another 13 years,^[499] though many member states have higher standards. There is not yet a plan for full rail electrification, or clean shipping or air travel, even where technology exists.

In road transport, the Emission Performance Regulation 2019 says manufacturers of "new passenger cars" should not allow emissions to exceed 95 grams of CO₂ per kilometre, and 147 grams of CO₂ per kilometre for new light commercial vehicles, but this is merely an "EU fleet-wide target" rather than requirements for each vehicle.^[501] Manufacturers can agree to pool their production quotas, so as to meet their targets on average,^[502] but there is no legal sanction for failure to meet the target. Member states are simply required to record the relevant success or failure, and manufacturers' performance is published.^[503] By contrast the Vehicles Emissions Regulation 2007 sets the "Euro 6" standards in maximum emissions that car manufacturers can have.^[504] Since the 'Euro 1' standard was introduced in 1992, standards became cleaner each 4 to 5 years, but recently stalled. Article 2 states this applies to vehicles under 2,610 kilograms, while the Heavy Vehicle Emission Regulation 2019 applies to heavier vehicles, with looser CO₂ limits.^[505] Article 4 states manufacturers must 'demonstrate that all new vehicles sold, registered or put into service in the Community are type approved in accordance with this Regulation'. Article 6 requires manufacturers to 'provide unrestricted and standardised access to vehicle repair and maintenance information' should there be any non-compliance. Article 13 requires penalties imposed by member states for breach are 'effective, proportionate and dissuasive', and breaches include any 'false declarations' as well as 'use of defeat devices'. This reference follows the "Dieselgate" scandal where Volkswagen and manufacturers around Europe and the world fraudulently concealed their true emissions. In 2007, Commission v Germany held that the German Volkswagen Act 1959 violated free movement of capital in TFEU article 63 by ensuring that the state of Lower Saxony had a golden share to exercise public control over the company's governance. It limited voting rights of individual shareholder to 20% of the company. The German government's justification that the restrictions were an overriding public interest, for instance, to protect workers was rejected. A justification for environmental protection was not offered. After this, the Porsche family dominated Volkswagen, and in 2007 a new CEO, Martin Winterkorn took up his post and aimed in 'Strategie 2018' to become the world's largest auto-manufacturer, and it began to install cheat devices.^[506]

People need to have a driving licence to drive on a road, and there is a common system of recognition around the EU.^[508] For delivery vehicle workers, the Road Transport Regulation 2006 limits daily driving time to 9 hours a day, a maximum of 56 hours a week, and requires at least a 45-minute break after 4+1⁄2 hours. Drivers may also not be paid according to distance travelled if this would endanger road safety.^[509] Taxi enterprises are usually regulated separately in each member state, and the attempts of the app-based firm Uber to evade regulation by arguing it was not a "transport service" rather than an "Information Society Service" failed.^[510] Most bus networks are publicly owned or procured, but there are common rights. If buses are delayed in journeys over 250 kilometres, the Bus Passenger Rights Regulation 2011 entitles passengers to compensation.^[511] Under article 19, a delay over two hours must result in compensation of 50% of the ticket price, as well as rerouting and reimbursement. Article 6 says 'Carriers may offer contract conditions that are more favourable for the passenger', although it is not clear many take up this option. Article 7 says member states cannot set maximum compensation for death or injury lower than €220,000 per passenger or €1200 per item of luggage. There is not yet a requirement for the major bus, delivery, taxi enterprises to electrify their fleets even though this would create the fastest reduction of emissions and would be cheaper for business in total operating costs.^[512]

In rail transport, the Single European Railway Directive 2012 requires that ownership of tracks and operating companies are separated to prevent conflicts of interest and pricing, particularly to ensure that trains can run from one member state to another.^[513] Most European railways are publicly owned, and each train enterprise must have separate accounts and member states should run railways 'at the lowest possible cost for the quality of service required'.^[514] The Rail Passenger Rights Regulation 2007 article 17 states that 25% of a ticket price should be refunded if there is a one-hour delay, and 50% over two hours, with a threshold of €4 to claim. Passengers have a right to take bicycles on trains where they are not overcrowded, there must be clear information on tickets, and there are rights to make reservations.^[515] Finally, in air transport, under the Flight Compensation Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 there is a minimum right of €250 compensation for 2 hour delay on 1500 km flight, €400 compensation for 3 hour delay or more on a 1500–3500 km flight, and €600 for 4 hours in flights over 3500 km flight, plus the right to refreshments, hotels, and alternative transport. There are not yet duties on airline companies to invest in research for clean fuels, and eliminate unnecessary flight paths when clean land transport alternatives (such as high-speed rail) exist.

Finally, the 'right to housing assistance' is a basic part of EU law.^[516] House prices are affected by monetary policy (above), but otherwise the EU's involvement is so far limited to minimal environmental standards. The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 2010 aims to eliminate unclean materials and energy waste to have "nearly zero-energy buildings", particularly by setting standards for new buildings since 2020 and upgrading existing buildings by 2050.^[517] There is, however, no requirement yet that all buildings replace gas heating with electric or heat-pumps, have solar or wind energy generation, electric vehicle charging, and particular insulation standards, wherever possible.

Communications and data

The right 'to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers'^[518] is a basic part of freedom of expression, as much as the right against 'arbitrary or unlawful interference with [our] privacy, family, home or correspondence', whether interference is by business, government or anyone else.^[519] Communication networks, from the post to telephone lines to the internet, are crucial for friends, families, business and government, and EU law sets standards for their construction and use. For example, the Postal Services Directive 1997 article 3 requires 'universal service' at minimum standards by the main postal provider.^[520] For mobile phone access anywhere in the EU, the Roaming Regulation 2022 eliminates extra charges for mobile calls, texts and data when abroad in other member states, and wholesale charges must be fair.^[521] To ensure internet service providers do not slow speeds for some websites to gain unfair profit, the Net Neutrality Regulation 2015 states providers 'of internet access services shall treat all traffic equally' but this shall not prevent 'reasonable traffic management measures'.^[522]

Since today's communications have mostly merged into the internet, the Electronic Communications Code Directive 2018 is critical for EU infrastructure.^[524] Article 5 requires a member state regulator or a "competent authority" is set up that will license use of the radio spectrum, through which mobile and internet signals travel. A regulator must also enable access and interconnection to other infrastructure (such as telecomms and broadband cables), protect end-user rights, and monitor "competition issues regarding open internet access" to ensure rights such as universal service and portability of phone numbers.^[525] Articles 6-8 require the regulators are independent, with dismissal of heads only for a good reason, and articles 10-11 require cooperation with other authorities. Articles 12-13 require that use of electronic communication networks is authorised by a regulator, and that conditions attached are non-discriminatory, proportionate and transparent.^[526] The owner of a communication network has duties to allow access and interconnection on fair terms, and so article 17 requires that its accounts and financial reports are separate from other activities (if the enterprise does other business),^[527] article 74 foresees that regulators can control prices, and article 84 says member states should "ensure that all consumers in their territories have access at an affordable price, in light of specific national conditions, to an available adequate broadband internet access service and to voice communications services". While some EU member states have privatised all, and some part, of their telecomms infrastructure, publicly or community-owned internet providers (such as in Denmark or Romania) tend to have the fastest web speeds.^[528]

Historically to protect people's privacy and correspondence, the post banned tampering with letters, and excluded post offices from responsibility for letters even if the contents were for something illegal.^[530] As the internet developed, the original Information Society Directive 1998 aimed for something similar, so that internet server providers or email hosts, for instance, protected privacy.^[531] After this the Electronic Commerce Directive 2000 also sought to ensure free movement for an "information society service",^[532] requiring member states to not restrict them unless it was to fulfill a public policy, prevent crime, fight incitement to hatred, protect individual dignity, protect health, or protect consumers or investors.^[533] Articles 12 to 14 further said that an ISS operating as a "mere conduit" for information, doing "caching" or "hosting" is 'not liable for information stored' if the 'provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity' and 'is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent', but must act quickly to remove or disable access 'upon obtaining knowledge or awareness'.^[534] Article 15 states that member states should 'not impose a general obligation on providers... to monitor the information which they transmit or store' nor 'seek facts' on illegality.^[535] However the meaning of who was an "ISS" was not clearly defined in law,^[536] and has become a problem with social media that was not meant to be protected like private communication. An internet service provider has been held to be an ISS,^[537] and so has a Wi-Fi host,^[538] the Electronic Commerce Directive 2000 recital 11 states email services, search engines, data storage, and streaming, are information society services, and an individual email is not,^[539] and the Information Society Directive 2015 makes clear that TV and radio stations do not count as ISS's.^[540] None of these definitions include advertising, which is never "at the request of a recipient of services" as the 2015 Directive requires, however various cases have decided that eBay,^[541] Facebook,^[542] and AirBnB,^[543] may count as ISSs, but the cab app Uber does not.^[544]

The main rights to data privacy are found in the General Data Protection Regulation 2016. First, there is the right to have data about someone processed only with their 'consent',^[545] or based on other justifiable grounds, such as a lawful purpose. It has been held that consent is not given if there is 'a pre-checked checkbox which the user must deselect to refuse'.^[546] Under the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002 a well-known result is that websites must not install "cookies" into someone's internet browser unless they positively accept cookies.^[547] The EU has not yet simply enabled people to block all cookies within a browser, and required that websites give people this option without thousands of annoying buttons to click.^[548] Second, people have the right to be informed about data kept on them.^[549] Third, there is a right to be forgotten and the data to be deleted.^[550] Where legal standards do not exist, Alphabet, Facebook or Microsoft have largely been uncontrolled in privacy invasion, for instance, Gmail pioneering surveillance of emails for ads as its first business model,^[551] and Facebook abolishing service-user voting rights over changes to its privacy policies in 2012.^[552] There are no rights yet in EU law for service-users to vote for representatives on boards of big tech companies that take their data, or to have decision-rights over use of their data, in contrast to the rights of service-users of websites like Wikipedia.^[553]

Media and markets

Pluralism and regulation of the media, such as through 'the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises',^[554] have long been seen as essential to protect freedom of opinion and expression,^[555] to ensure that citizens have a more equal voice,^[556] and ultimately to support the universal 'right to take part in the government'.^[557] In almost all member states there is a well funded public, and independent broadcaster for TV and radio, and there are common standards for all TV and radio, which are designed to support open, fact-based discussion and deliberative democracy. However, the same standards have not yet been applied to equivalent internet television, radio or "social media" such as the platforms controlled by YouTube (owned by Alphabet), Facebook or Instagram (owned by Meta), or Twitter (owned by Elon Musk), all of which have spread conspiracy theories, discrimination, far-right, extremist, terrorist, and hostile military content.

General standards for broadcasting are found in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010. It defines an audiovisual media services to mean those 'devoted to providing programmes, under the editorial responsibility of a media service provider, to the general public, in order to inform, entertain or educate, to the general public by electronic communications networks', either on TV or an 'on-demand' service.^[559] An 'on-demand' service involves 'viewing of programmes at the moment chosen by the user and at his individual request on the basis of a catalogue of programmes selected by the media service provider'. Member states must ensure audiovisual services 'do not contain any incitement to hatred' based on race, sex, religion, nationality or other protected characteristics.^[560] Article 9 prohibits media with 'surreptitious' communication or 'subliminal' techniques, to 'prejudice respect for human dignity', that would 'promote any discrimination', prejudice health and safety or 'encourage behaviour grossly prejudicial to the protection of the environment'. Social media on Facebook, YouTube or Twitter may be thought to be exempt as they lack 'editorial responsibility', however each use algorithms to exert 'effective control' and profit from arrangement of media.^[561] After 2018 new provisions on "video-sharing platform service" providers were introduced, with duties on member states to ensure under article 28b that video-sharing platform providers protect (a) minors from content that "may impair their physical, mental or moral development", (b) the general public from content "containing incitement to violence or hatred", and (c) the general public from content whose dissemination is criminal in EU law, such as terrorism, child pornography or offences concerning racism or xenophobia. Under the Digital Services Act Regulation 2022 the rules from the Electronic Commerce Directive 2000 were repeated, so that a platform's or "gatekeeper's" liability is limited unless the platforms have failed to act with due diligence to stop certain illegal content, complying with transparent terms and algorithms.^[562] New codes of conduct should be drawn up for best practice.^[563] Fines for large platforms go up to 6% of annual turnover.^[564] These rules fall short of most TV standards that restrict inaccurate news (such as flat Earth conspiracies or global warming denial), discriminatory content short of incitement to hatred, systematic bias, or propaganda from dictatorships or corporations. By contrast, Wikipedia's online content has user-regulated policies preventing uncontrolled use of bots, preventing personal attacks by suspending or banning users that break rules, and ensuring Wikipedia maintains a neutral point of view.

The EU has also begun to regulate marketplaces that operate online, both through competition law and the Digital Markets Act Regulation 2022. First, in a series of Commission decisions, Google and Amazon were fined for competition violations. In the Google Shopping case, the Commission fined Google €2.4 billion for giving preference to its own shopping results over others in Google's search, leading to huge increases in traffic for Google over rivals.^[565] In the Google Android case the Commission fined Alphabet Inc (by then Google's rebranded parent name) €4.34 billion, or 4.5% of worldwide turnover, for paying phone manufacturers to pre-install its apps, such as Google search or Chrome, as a condition to license its app marketplace Google Play.^[566] In the Google AdSense case, the Commission fined Google €1.49 billion for stopping third-party websites displaying their adverts in Google's embedded search widgets, given that it was dominant in the ad market, and unfairly excluding competitors from results.^[567] In the Amazon Marketplace case an investigation for abuse of dominant position was launched for Amazon using other traders' data to benefit its own retail business, and preferencing itself in its "Buy Box" and in access to "Prime" seller status. This was settled after Amazon committed in 2022 "not to use non-public data relating to, or derived from, the independent sellers' activities on its marketplace, for its retail business", and to not discriminate against third parties in its Buy Box and Prime services.^[568] The Digital Markets Act codifies many of these standards.

Foreign, security and trade policy

Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (funded by the European Defence Fund and European Defence Agency), membership of NATO, the United Nations
TFEU art 214, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
European Neighbourhood Policy
Common Commercial Policy (EU), European Commissioner for Trade, European Union free trade agreements, World Trade Organization
TFEU art 218, advisory opinion procedure on international agreements

Security and justice

Area of freedom, security and justice and European Arrest Warrant, TFEU art 67

In 2006, a toxic waste spill off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire, from a European ship, prompted the commission to look into legislation against toxic waste. Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas stated that "Such highly toxic waste should never have left the European Union". With countries such as Spain not even having a crime against shipping toxic waste, Franco Frattini, the Justice, Freedom and Security Commissioner, proposed with Dimas to create criminal sentences for "ecological crimes". The competence for the Union to do this was contested in 2005 at the Court of Justice resulting in a victory for the commission.^[569] That ruling set a precedent that the commission, on a supranational basis, may legislate in criminal law – something never done before. So far, the only other proposal has been the draft intellectual property rights directive.^[570] Motions were tabled in the European Parliament against that legislation on the basis that criminal law should not be an EU competence, but was rejected at vote.^[571] However, in October 2007, the Court of Justice ruled that the commission could not propose what the criminal sanctions could be, only that there must be some.^[572]

Notes

^ "Population on 1 January". ec.europa.eu. Eurostat. Retrieved 12 July 2023.
^ Treaty on European Union art 2
^ "Living in the EU". European Union. 5 July 2016.
^ See TEU art 3(1) 'The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.' (3) '... and shall promote social justice and protection...'
^ See TEU arts 3(3) 'It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment'. Art 4(3) 'Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties'.
^ a b Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62
^ a b TEU art 50. On the most sophisticated discussion of constitutional law and human rights principles for secession, see Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, particularly [67] "The consent of the governed is a value that is basic to our understanding of a free and democratic society. Yet democracy in any real sense of the word cannot exist without the rule of law". And [149] "Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule".
^ See TEU arts 13–19
^ a b Defrenne v Sabena (1976) Case 43/75, [10]
^ Distinct from the idea of conquest or empire, examples include Pierre Dubois proposing a standing committee of princes in 1306, Quaker William Penn proposing a Parliament in 1693, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham and Henri Saint-Simon.
^ Craig & de Búrca 2011.
^ Craig, P (2014). "2. The Development of the EU". In Barnard, Catherine; Peers, S (eds.). European Union Law.
^ W Penn, An ESSAY towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates (1693) in AR Murphy, The Political Writings of William Penn (2002) See D Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration (1995)
^ C de Saint-Pierre, A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe (1713)
^ JJ Rousseau, A lasting peace through the federation of Europe; and, The state of war (1756)
^ I Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch or Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (1795)
^ V Hugo, Opening Address to the Peace Congress (21 August 1849). Afterwards, Giuseppe Garibaldi and John Stuart Mill joined Victor Hugo at the Congress of the League of Peace and Freedom in Geneva 1867.
^ See JM Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919)
^ See the UN Charter 1945 Preamble
^ R Schuman, Speech to the French National Assembly (9 May 1950)
^ N Khrushchev, On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences (25 February 1956)
^ See Comite Intergouvernemental créé par la conference de Messine. Rapport des chefs de delegation aux ministres des affaires etrangeres (21 April 1956 Archived 27 February 2008 at the Wayback Machine) text in French.
^ See the European Communities Act 1972
^ See the European Union Referendum Act 2015 (c 36) on the campaign rules for the poll.
^ TEU arts and TFEU arts 293–294
^ e.g. J Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (1999), C Hoskyns and M Newman, Democratizing the European Union (2000), A Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union' (2002) 40 JCMS 603, Craig & de Búrca 2011, ch 2.
^ e.g. Habermas, J. (2015). "Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the EU into a Transnational Democracy Is Necessary and How It Is Possible". European Law Journal. 21 (4): 546. doi:10.1111/eulj.12128. S2CID 153849884. See also HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) ch 4, on the danger of a static system and "rules of change".
^ In 2005, a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was rejected by referendums in France and the Netherlands.
^ This is similar to the United Kingdom. See AW Bradley and KD Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (2012) ch 1 and W Bagehot, The English Constitution (1867)
^ TEU art 17
^ TFEU art 294
^ Vienna Convention 1969 art 5, on application to constituent instruments of international organisations.
^ TEU art 48. This is the "ordinary" procedure, and a further "simplified" procedure for amending internal EU policy, but not increasing policy competence, can work through unanimous member state approval without a Convention.
^ See further Arnull, Anthony (1990). "Does the Court of Justice Have Inherent Jurisdiction?". Common Market Law Review. 27 (4): 683. doi:10.54648/cola1990043. S2CID 146781250.
^ Island territories geographically outside the EU, but politically within include Madeira, the Canary Islands and the French overseas departments. The Faroe Islands are expressly excluded from EU law. Specific provisions can be made for others, like Gibraltar Åland, and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.
^ TEU art 2
^ cf Lechner, Susanne; Ohr, Renate (2011). "The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lisbon: a game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU". European Journal of Law and Economics. 32: 357. doi:10.1007/s10657-009-9139-1. S2CID 53362666.
^ TEU art 7
^ TFEU art 273, for a 'special agreement' of the parties, and Pringle v Ireland (2012) C-370/12 held the 'special agreement' could be given in advance with reference to a whole class of pre-defined disputes.
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, ch 2, 31–40.
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, p. 36.
^ TFEU art 282–287
^ TEU art 17(6)
^ TFEU art 250
^ , despite TEU art 17(5) allowing this figure to be reduced to two-thirds of the number of member states. It is now unclear whether this will happen.
^ TEU art 17(7)
^ Humblet v Belgium (1960) Case 6/60
^ Sayag v Leduc (1968) Case 5/68, [1968] ECR 395 and Weddel & Co BV v Commission (1992) C-54/90, [1992] ECR I-871, on immunity waivers.
^ (2006) C-432/04, [2006] ECR I-6387
^ Committee of Independent Experts, First Report on Allegations of Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission (15 March 1999)
^ TFEU art 282–287
^ c.f. TEU art 9
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, chs 2 and 5, 40–56 and 124–160.
^ TFEU art 225(2) and 294(2)
^ TEU art 14(2) and Council Decision 2002/772
^ TEU art 16(3) and TFEU art 238(3)
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, ch 2(6) 50–51. See also the European Parliament Resolution of 30 March 1962. Recognised in SEA art 3(1). TEEC art 190(4) required proposals for elections
^ See Marias, 'The Right to Petition the European Parliament after Maastricht' (1994) 19 ELR 169
^ TEU art 14(3) and Decision 2002/772. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) art 223(1) requires the Parliament to eventually propose a uniform voting system, adopted by the Council, but it is unclear when this may happen.
^ TEU art 14(2) reduced from 765 in 2013.
^ Germany 96. France 74. UK and Italy 73. Spain 54. Poland 51. Romania 31. Netherlands 26. Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal 21. Sweden 20. Austria 18. Bulgaria 17. Denmark, Slovakia, Finland 13. Ireland, Croatia, Lithuania 11. Latvia, Slovenia 8. Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta 6.
^ (1986) Case 294/83, [1986] ECR 1339. The Greens challenged funding, contending its distribution was unfair against smaller parties, and it was held all funding was ultra vires. See Joliet and Keeling, 'The Reimbursement of Election Expenses: A Forgotten Dispute' (1994) 19 ELR 243
^ TFEU art 226 and 228
^ TFEU art 230 and 234
^ See Roquette v Council (1980) Case 138/79, [1980] ECR 3333 and European Parliament v Council (1995) C-65/93, [1995] ECR I-643, Parliament held not to have done everything it could have done within a sufficient time to give an opinion, so it could not complain the Council had gone ahead. See Boyron, 'The Consultation Procedure: Has the Court of Justice Turned against the European Parliament?' (1996) 21 ELR 145
^ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (ca 411 BC) Book 2, para 37, where Pericles said, 'Our government does not copy our neighbors, but is an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few'.
^ TEU art 15(3) and (6)
^ TEU art 15(1)
^ TEU art 16(2)
^ The numbers are currently Germany, France, Italy, and UK: 29 votes each. Spain and Poland: 27. Romania: 14. Netherlands: 13. Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal: 12. Bulgaria, Austria, Sweden: 10. Denmark, Ireland, Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Finland: 7. Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovenia: 4. Malta: 3. This was set by the 2014 Protocol No 36 on Transitional Provisions, art 3(3) amended by art 20 for Croatia Accession Treaty 2011.
^ TFEU art 288 outlines the main legislative acts as Directives, Regulations, and Decisions. Commission v Council (1971) Case 22/70, [1971] ECR 263 acknowledged that the list was not exhaustive, relating to a Council 'resolution' on the European Road Transport Agreement. Atypical acts^{[clarification needed]} include communications and recommendations, and white and green papers.
^ e.g. M Banks, 'Sarkozy slated over Strasbourg seat' (24 May 2007) EU Politix Archived 27 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine
^ This does not extend to foreign and security policy, where there must be consensus.
^ TFEU art 294
^ TFEU art 313–319
^ TEU art 20 and TFEU arts 326 and 334
^ Protocol No 1 to the Treaty of Lisbon
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, ch 2, 57–67.
^ Statute of the Court art 48 Archived 21 July 2010 at the Wayback Machine
^ TEU art 19(2) and TFEU arts 253–254
^ Kuhnert, Jan; Leps, Olof (1 January 2017). Neue Wohnungsgemeinnützigkeit (in German). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 213–258. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-17570-2_8. ISBN 978-3-658-17569-6.
^ (1963) Case 26/62
^ (2005) C-144/04
^ (2008) C-402
^ Statute of the Court art 4 and TFEU art 253
^ TFEU arts 254–255
^ Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice arts 28 and 60 and Statute of the Court art 16(3) Archived 21 July 2010 at the Wayback Machine
^ See Statute of the Court art 20 and Craig & de Búrca 2015, p. 61
^ TFEU art 267
^ TFEU arts 258–259
^ See TFEU arts 256, 263, 265, 268, 270, 272
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, chs 9–10.
^ Ente nazionale per l'energia elettrica was privatised once again in 1999.
^ This included TEEC arts 102 (on consulting with the Commission on distortions to the common market), art 93 (on state aids), art 53 (right of establishment), and art 37 (national monopolies of a commercial character should treat all EC nationals equally). See now TFEU.
^ At the time, TEEC art 177
^ Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62
^ a b "EUR-Lex - 61964CJ0006 - EN - EUR-Lex". eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved 8 November 2016.
^ (1964) Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585
^ (1978) Case 106/77, [1978] ECR 629, [17]-[18]
^ Macarthys v Smith [1979] 3 All ER 325, per Lord Denning MR
^ [1990] UKHL 7, (1990) C-213/89
^ a b [2014] UKSC 3
^ See Grundgesetz arts 20 and 79(3). Note that "rule of law" may not be a perfect translation of the German concept of "Rechtsstaat".
^ Solange I or Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (1970) Case 11/70
^ Solange II or Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (22 October 1986) BVerfGE, [1987] 3 CMLR 225
^ Kadi v Commission (2008) C-402 and 415/05
^ (2014). In summary, these were it (1) undermined the CJEU's autonomy (2) allowed for a parallel dispute resolution mechanism among member states, when the treaties said the CJEU should be the sole arbiter (3) the "co-respondent" system, allowing the EU and member states to be sued together, allowed the ECtHR to illegitimately interpret EU law and allocate responsibility between the EU and member states, (4) did not allow the Court of Justice to decide if an issue of law was already dealt with, before the ECHR heard a case, and (5) the ECtHR was illegitimately being given power of judicial review over Common Foreign and Security Policy.
^ cf P Eeckhout, 'Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky' (2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal 955 and A Lasowski and RA Wessel, 'When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European Union to the ECHR' (2015) 16 German Law Journal 179
^ See Magna Carta, ECHR art 6 and CFREU art 47
^ Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (2008) C-402 and 415/05, [2008] ECR I-6351
^ TEU art 6(2) and Opinion 2/13 (2014)
^ Marshall v Southampton Health Authority (1986) Case 152/84
^ CFREU 2000 art 47, right to an effective remedy.
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, ch 7.
^ (1963) Case 26/62
^ Formerly TEEC art 12
^ (1972) Case 39/72, [1973] ECR 101
^ e.g. Commission v United Kingdom (1979) Case 128/78, Court of Justice held the UK had failed to implement art 21 of the Tachograph Regulation 1463/70, art 4 (now repealed) on time. This said in commercial vehicles use of tachographs (recording devices) was compulsory from a certain date. Art 21(1) then said MSs should, after consulting with the Comm, adopt implementing regulations, and penalties for breach. Potentially it could also not have imposed a criminal offence, as it was far too vague.
^ AG van Gerven, in Marshall (No 2) (1993) C-271/91, [1993] ECR I-4367 (Opinion), AG Jacobs, in Vaneetveld, C-316/93, [1994] ECR I-763, AG Lenz, in Faccini Dori (1994) C-91/92, [1994] ECR I-3325
^ n.b. under TFEU art 288 there is no reason why a Regulation cannot do the same.
^ Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC art 7. A contract of employment can also require more. cf JM Keynes, The Economic Possibilities of our Grandchildren (1930) arguing that as society became wealthier, increasing production would allow everyone to work less. See also the European Social Charter 1961 article 3. Oddly, the UK chose to express 28 days as 5.6 weeks in its own regulations (assuming a week is 5 working days).
^ First held in Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (1986) Case 152/84, [1986] ECR 723, following the Opinion of AG Slynn, the Court of Justice held that Ms Marshall, who was made to retire at 60 as a woman, unlike the men at 65, was unlawful sex discrimination, but only on the basis that the employer (the NHS) was the state. Obiter, at [48] the Court of Justice suggested she would not have succeeded if it were a 'private' party.
^ c.f. Shelley v Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) per Vinson CJ at 19, 'These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which the States have made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell'.
^ AG van Gerven, in Marshall (No 2) (1993) C-271/91, [1993] ECR I-4367, AG Jacobs, in Vaneetveld, C-316/93, [1994] ECR I-763, AG Lenz, in Faccini Dori (1994) Case C-91/92, [1994] ECR I-3325
^ (1979) Case 148/78, [1979] ECR 1629
^ (1979) Case 148/78, [22]. See further in Barber (1990) C-262/88, AG van Gerven referred to the principle of nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans, a civil law analogue of estoppel.
^ (1996) C-194/94, [1996] ECR I-2201, regarding Directive 83/189 which said various 'technical regulations' on alarm systems requiring approval from government.
^ (2010) C-555/07, [2010] IRLR 346. This revised the position in Mangold v Helm (2005) C-144/04, [2005] ECR I-9981, which suggested that Directives would have horizontal direct effect. See also Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV (2005) C-397/01, which found there could be no "horizontal" direct effect to claim against an employer that was a private ambulance service.
^ (1990) C-188/89, [1989] ECR 1839
^ Griffin v South West Water Services [1995] IRLR 15. This was not true for Doughty v Rolls-Royce [1991] EWCA Civ 15, but was for NUT v St Mary's School [1997] 3 CMLR 638.
^ See Paolo Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl (1994) Case C-91/92, [1994] ECR I-3325, holding Miss Dori could not rely on the Consumer Long Distance Contracts Directive 85/577/EEC, to cancel her English language course subscription in 7 days, but the Italian court had to interpret the law in her favour if it could.
^ First Company Law Directive 68/151/EEC
^ (1990) C-106/89. See also Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1984) Case 14/83, [1984] ECR 1891, which held that because the member state had a choice of remedy, the Equal Treatment Directive did not allow Ms Van Colson to have a job as a prison worker.
^ Also, Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles (1989) C-322/88, [1989] ECR 4407, [18] requires member state courts take account of Recommendations.
^ (1966) Case 61/65
^ (2011) C-196/09
^ See Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2015: Judicial Activity (2016)
^ Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] Ch 401
^ CPR 68.2(1)(a)
^ (1982) Case 283/81, [1982] ECR 3415, [16]
^ (2002) C-99/00
^ [2000] 3 CMLR 205
^ [2015] UKSC 67, Mr Beavis received an £85 charge for parking too long in a carpark. Lord Toulson dissenting, would have held this charge, contrary to the requirement of good faith, created a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and duties. He pointed out that £85 was two-thirds of a state pension, and criticised the majority for wrongly applying the Court of Justice's case law.
^ Outright Monetary Transactions case (14 January 2014) BVerfGE 134, 366, 2 BvR 2728/13
^ cf Wilson v St Helens BC [1998] UKHL 37, [1999] 2 AC 52, per Lord Slynn on specific performance.
^ (1991) C-6/90 and C-9/90, [1991] ECR I-5357
^ Brasserie du Pecheur v Germany and R (Factortame) v SS for Transport (No 3) (1996) C-46/93 and C-48/93, [1996] ECR I-1029
^ (1996) C-46/93 and C-48/93, [1996] ECR I-1029
^ (1996) C-46/93, [56]-[59]. Curiously, the German High Court, the Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, EuZW 1996, 761, eventually decided that the breach was not serious enough, though one might have read the Court of Justice to have believed otherwise.
^ Case C-224/01, [2003] ECR I-10239
^ P Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission Case C-352/98, [2000] ECR I-5291
^ (1967) Case 8/66
^ (1967) Case 8/66, [91]
^ (2011) C-463/10P, [38] and [55]
^ (1981) Case 60/81
^ a b (1963) Case 25/62
^ Hartley 2014, p. 387.
^ (1985) Case 11/82, [9]
^ (1984) Case 222/83
^ (2002) C-50/00 P, AG Opinion, [60] and [103]
^ (2002) C-50/00 P, [38]-[45]
^ (2013) C-583/11
^ Compare, for example, the German Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) §90, which requires the probability that a claimant's human rights are infringed, or the Administrative Court Order (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung) §42, which requires a probable infringement of a subjective right.
^ TEU art 6(2)
^ For example, in this vast philosophical debate, see on the one hand O Gierke, The Social Role of Private Law (1889), F Kessler, 'Natural Law, Justice and Democracy—Some Reflections on Three Types of Thinking About Law and Justice' (1944) 19 Tulane Law Review 32, 52, R Dworkin, Law's Empire (1985). For well known minority positions advocating 'legal positivism' (the view that the concept of law and morality should be intellectually segregated) see HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (1961). For the work that is widely seen as having resolved the positivism debate in philosophy, see L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953)
^ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) Case 11/70, [1970] ECR 1125
^ Nold v Commission (1974) Case 4/73, [1974] ECR 491
^ See above.
^ a b (2012) C-544/10
^ (2011) C-236/09
^ Regulation No 1924/2006 art 2(2)(5)
^ (2014) C-176/12
^ See e.g. R (Seymour-Smith) v Secretary of State for Employment [2000] UKHL 12 and (1999) C-167/97
^ See Mangold v Helm (2005) C-144/04 and Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG (2010) C-555/07
^ See Eurostat, Table 1.
^ Treaty on European Union article 3(3), introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. But see previously, Deutsche Post v Sievers (2000) C-270/97, 'the economic aim pursued by Article [157 TFEU] ..., namely the elimination of distortions of competition between undertakings established in different Member States, is secondary to the social aim pursued by the same provision, which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right'. Defrenne v Sabena (1976) Case 43/75, [10] 'this provision forms part of the social objectives of the community, which is not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples'.
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, ch 17.
^ Barnard 2013, ch 1, 3–30.
^ D Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (3rd 1821) ch 7
^ See EB Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, social and economic forces 1950–1957 (1958) and B Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (1961)
^ See generally P Krugman and M Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy (4th edn Addison-Wesley 1997) and HJ Chang, 'Kicking Away the Ladder: Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective' (2003) 31(1) Oxford Development Studies 21. MJ Trebilcock and R Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3rd edn 2005) ch 1, summarising and attempting to rebut various arguments.
^ Defrenne v Sabena (No 2) (1976) Case 43/75, [10]
^ White Paper, Completing the Internal Market (1985) COM(85)310
^ c.f. Hünermund v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg (1993) C-292/92, AG Opinion, [1] asking whether TFEU art 30 is "intended to liberalize intra-Community trade or is it intended more generally to encourage the unhindered pursuit of commerce in individual Member States?"
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, ch 18–19.
^ Barnard 2013, chs 2–6.
^ TFEU arts 28–30
^ (1974) Case 8/74, [1974] ECR 837
^ Previously TEEC article 30.
^ See D Chalmers et al, European Union Law (1st edn 2006) 662, 'This is a ridiculously wide test.'
^ Commission v Ireland (1982) Case 249/81
^ Commission v France (1997) C-265/95. See further K Muylle, 'Angry famers and passive policemen' (1998) 23 European Law Review 467
^ PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG (2001) C-379/98, [2001] ECR I-2099, [75]-[76]
^ (2003) C-112/00, [2003] ECR I-5659
^ (2003) C-112/00, [79]-[81]
^ c.f. Leppik (2006) C-434/04, [2006] ECR I‑9171, Opinion of AG Maduro, [23]-[25]
^ (2003) C-112/00, [2003] ECR I-5659, [77]. See ECHR articles 10 and 11.
^ Oebel (1981) Case 155/80
^ Mickelsson and Roos (2009) C-142/05
^ Vereinigte Familiapresse v Heinrich Bauer (1997) C-368/95
^ Dansk Supermarked A/S (1981) Case 58/80
^ Barnard 2013, pp. 172–173.
^ (1979) Case 170/78
^ At the time, TEEC article 30
^ (1979) Case 170/78, [13]-[14]
^ (1983) Case 261/81
^ (1983) Case 261/81, [17]
^ (2003) C-14/00, [88]-[89]
^ (2009) C-110/05, [2009] ECR I-519
^ (2009) C-110/05, [2009] ECR I-519, [56]. See also Mickelsson and Roos (2009) C-142/05, on prohibiting jet skis, but justified if proportionate towards the aim of safeguarding health and the environment.
^ (1993) C-267/91
^ See also Torfaen BC v B&Q plc (1989) C-145/88, holding the UK Sunday trading laws in the former Shops Act 1950 were probably outside the scope of article 34 (but not clearly reasoned). The "rules reflect certain political and economic choices" that "accord with national or regional socio-cultural characteristics".
^ cf Vereinigte Familiapresse v Heinrich Bauer (1997) C-368/95
^ (1997) C-34/95, [1997] ECR I-3843
^ (2001) C-405/98, [2001] ECR I-1795
^ Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, ch 21.
^ Barnard 2013, chs 8–9 and 12–13.
^ Craig, P; de Burca, G (2003). European Union Law. p. 701. there is a tension 'between the image of the Community worker as a mobile unit of production, contributing to the creation of a single market and to the economic prosperity of Europe' and the 'image of the worker as a human being, exercising a personal right to live in another state and to take up employment there without discrimination, to improve the standard of living of his or her family (This book is not listed on WorldCat, metadata is probably incorrect.
^ Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg (1986) Case 66/85, [1986] ECR 2121
^ (1988) Case 196/87, [1988] ECR 6159
^ Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig (2014) C‑333/13
^ European Commission, 'The impact of free movement of workers in the context of EU enlargement' COM(2008) 765, 12, 'Practically of post-enlargement labour mobility on wages and employment of local workers and no indication of serious labour market imbalances through intra-EU mobility, even in those Member States with the biggest inflows'.
^ Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA (2000) C-281/98, [2000] ECR I-4139
^ Free Movement of Workers Regulation 492/2011 arts 1–4
^ (1995) C-415/93
^ (1989) Case 379/87, [1989] ECR 3967
^ (2000) C-281/98, [2000] ECR I-4139, [36]-[44]
^ (1995) C-279/93
^ (2004) C-387/01, [54]-[55]
^ (2007) C-287/05, [55]
^ (2007) C-213/05
^ Hartmann v Freistaat Bayern (2007) C-212/05. Discussed in Barnard 2013, ch 9, 293–294
^ See Van Duyn v Home Office Case 41/74, [1974] ECR 1337
^ See NN Shuibhne, 'The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship' (2010) 47 CMLR 1597 and HP Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (1972) on the concept of a 'market citizen' (Marktbürger).
^ Grzelczyk v Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve (2001) C-184/99, [2001] ECR I-6193
^ See T Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1950) 28-9, positing that 'citizenship' passed from civil rights, political rights, to social rights, and JHH Weiler, 'The European Union belongs to its citizens: Three immodest proposals' (1997) 22 European Law Review 150
^ Lashyn, Serhii (1 October 2021). "The Aporia of EU Citizenship". Liverpool Law Review. 42 (3): 361–377. doi:10.1007/s10991-021-09279-y. ISSN 1572-8625.
^ 5th Report on Citizenship of the Union COM(2008) 85. The First Annual Report on Migration and Integration COM(2004) 508, found by 2004, 18.5m third country nationals were resident in the EU.
^ CRD 2004 art 2(2) defines 'family member' as a spouse, long term partner, descendant under 21 or depednant elderly relative that is accompanying the citizen. See also Metock v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2008) C-127/08, holding that four asylum seekers from outside the EU, although they did not lawfully enter Ireland (because their asylum claims were ultimately rejected) were entitled to remain because they had lawfully married EU citizens. See also, R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh [1992] 3 CMLR 358
^ See also the Communist Manifesto
^ (1998) C-85/96, [1998] ECR I-2691
^ (2004) C-456/02, [2004] ECR I-07573
^ (2001) C-184/99, [2001] ECR I-6193
^ (2005) C-209/03, [2005] ECR I-2119
^ (2005) C-147/03
^ (2014) C‑333/13
^ See Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (1996) C-107/94, [1996] ECR I-3089, holding a director and sole shareholder of a company was not regarded as a "worker" with "a relationship of subordination".
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, ch 22.
^ Barnard 2013, chs 10–11 and 13.
^ (1995) C-55/94, [1995] ECR I-4165
^ Gebhard (1995) C-55/94, [37]
^ TFEU art 54 treats natural and legal persons in the same way under this chapter.
^ ITWF and Finnish Seamen's Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti (2007) C-438/05, [2007] I-10779, [34]
^ (1974) Case 2/74, [1974] ECR 631
^ See also Klopp (1984) Case 107/83, holding a Paris avocat requirement to have one office in Paris, though "indistinctly" applicable to everyone, was an unjustified restriction because the aim of keeping advisers in touch with clients and courts could be achieved by 'modern methods of transport and telecommunications' and without living in the locality.
^ (2011) C-565/08
^ (2011) C-565/08, [52]
^ Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd (2003) C-167/01
^ cf Employee Involvement Directive 2001/86/EC
^ (1988) Case 81/87, [1988] ECR 5483
^ (1999) C-212/97, [1999] ECR I-1459. See also Überseering BV v Nordic Construction GmbH (2002) C-208/00, on Dutch minimum capital laws.
^ The classic arguments are found in WZ Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Little, Brown & Co 1927), Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) per Brandeis J and W Cary, 'Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware' (1974) 83(4) Yale Law Journal 663. See further S Deakin, 'Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonisation. A Law and Economics Perspective on Centros' (1999) 2 CYELS 231.
^ (2002) C-208/00, [92]-[93]
^ (2008) C-210/06
^ See further National Grid Indus (2011) C-371/10 (an exit tax for a Dutch company required justification, not justified here because it could be collected at the time of transfer) and VALE Epitesi (2012) C-378/10 (Hungary did not need to allow an Italian company to register)
^ Craig & de Búrca 2015, p. 815: "it seems that the CJEU's rulings, lacking any deep understanding of business law policies, have brought about other corporate law changes in Europe that were neither intended by the Court nor by policy-makers"
^ TFEU arts 56 and 57
^ (1974) Case 33/74
^ cf Debauve (1980) Case 52/79, art 56 does not apply to 'wholly internal situations' where an activity are all in one member state.
^ Belgium v Humbel (1988) Case 263/86, but contrast Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach (2007) C-76/05
^ Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover (1993) C-109/92
^ (2001) C-157/99, [2001] ECR I-5473
^ (2001) C-157/99, [48]-[55]
^ (2001) C-157/99, [94] and [104]-[106]
^ See Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust (2006) C-372/04 and Commission v Spain (2010) C-211/08
^ (2010) C‑137/09, [2010] I-13019
^ (1995) C-384/93, [1995] ECR I-1141
^ (2004) C-36/02, [2004] ECR I-9609
^ (2009) C‑42/07, [2007] ECR I-7633
^ "Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market". 27 December 2006.
^ cf J Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (2011) ch 9 and 349
^ "EUR-Lex - 12008E063 - EN - EUR-Lex".
^ Capital Movement Directive 1988 (88/361/EEC) Annex I, including (i) investment in companies, (ii) real estate, (iii) securities, (iv) collective investment funds, (v) money market securities, (vi) bonds, (vii) service credit, (viii) loans, (ix) sureties and guarantees (x) insurance rights, (xi) inheritance and personal loans, (xii) physical financial assets (xiii) other capital movements.
^ (2000) C-251/98, [22]
^ e.g. Commission v Belgium (2000) C-478/98, holding that a law forbidding Belgian residents getting securities of loans on the Eurobond was unjustified discrimination. It was disproportionate in preserving, as Belgium argued, fiscal coherence or supervision.
^ See Commission v United Kingdom (2001) C-98/01 and Commission v Netherlands (2006) C‑282/04, AG Maduro's Opinion on golden shares in KPN NV and TPG NV.
^ (2007) C-112/05
^ (2010) C-171/08
^ a b TFEU art 345
^ See Delors Report, Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the EC (1988)
^ e.g. J Stiglitz, 'Too important for bankers' (11 June 2003) The Guardian and J Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (2011) ch 9 and 349
^ See R Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State' (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 472. RB Reich, Saving Capitalism: for the many not the few (2015) chs 2, 4–7 and 21
^ See, for example, S Deakin and F Wilkinson, 'Rights vs Efficiency? The Economic Case for Transnational Labour Standards' (1994) 23(4) Industrial Law Journal 289
^ See TEU art 3(3) and Directives and Regulations issued under TFEU arts 101–109 and 145–172.
^ (1976) Case 43/75, [10]
^ See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)
^ See TFEU Part III, arts 26-197. further, AO Hirschmann, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970)
^ See British Airways plc v Commission (2007) C- 95/04, [106], stating TFEU article 102 "is aimed not only at practices which may cause prejudice to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure".
^ TFEU art 169
^ TFEU art 169(3) and the CFREU art 38
^ a b See Banco Español de Crédito SA v Camino (2012) Case C-618/10, [39] and Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores (2000) C-240/98 to C-244/98 and [2000] ECR I-4941, [25]
^ Product Liability Directive 1985 85/374/EEC, recital 1 and 6
^ PLD 1985 arts 1 and 3
^ UTCCD 1993 93/13/EC and see H Collins, 'Good Faith in European Contract Law' (1994) 14 OJLS 229
^ Banco Español de Crédito SA v Camino (2012) Case C-618/10
^ See further, for the history behind the parallel in German contract law, BGB §307 Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch §307 Rn 32
^ RWE AG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV (2013) C-92/11
^ (2013) C-488/11
^ (2013) Case C-415/11
^ (2014) Case C-34/13
^ TFEU art 147
^ TFEU art 153(1)
^ See further O Kahn-Freund, 'Hugo Sinzheimer' in Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic (1981) 103, 'The technique of bourgeois society and its law is to cover social facts and factors of social existence with abstractions: property, contract, legal person. All these abstractions contain within them socially opposed and contradictory phenomena: property used for production and property used for consumption, agreements between equal parties and agreements between unequal parties, capitalist and worker. Through abstraction it is possible to extend legal rules, which are appropriate to the social phenomenon for which they were originally developed, to other social phenomena, thereby concealing the exercise of social power behind a veil of law'. A Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (2001). S Deakin and F Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (2005) 90.
^ See the Charter's text
^ European Social Charter 1961 art 2(1)
^ WTD 2003 art 7, referring to "four weeks" and arts 5 and 6 referring to the concept of "weekly" as meaning a "seven-day period". The choice to phrase time off as "weeks" was interpreted by the UK Supreme Court to mean employees have the right to take weeks off at a time, rather than separate days in the UK context: Russell v Transocean International Resources Ltd [2011] UKSC 57, [19]
^ See further JM Keynes, Economic Possibilities of our Grandchildren (1930) arguing a 15-hour week was achievable by 2000 if gains in productivity increases were equitably shared.
^ e.g. Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive 2003 arts 11–12, 17–18
^ e.g. Pensions Act 2004 ss 241–243
^ UDHR art 24, Holidays with Pay Convention 1970 (no 132) and see also the European Social Charter 1961 art 2(1).
^ WTD 2003 art 7. In the UK, the implementing Working Time Regulations 1998 state "5.6 weeks" is needed, although this is also 28 days, as a "week" was originally taken to refer to a 5-day working week.
^ WTD 2003 arts 2–5 and 8–13
^ WTD 2003 arts 6 and 17 and Pfeiffer v Deutsches Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV (2005) C-397/01
^ Boyle v Equal Opportunities Commission (1998) C-411/96 requires pay be at least the same level as statutory sick pay.
^ Safety and Health at Work Directive 1989 art 11
^ See also the Health and Safety of Atypical Workers Directive 1991 extends these protections to people who do not have typical, full-time or permanent employment contracts.
^ (2010) C-555/07
^ ECHR art 11. This codified traditions in democratic member states before World War II. See for example Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1941] UKHL 2
^ [2002] ECHR 552
^ [2008] ECHR 1345
^ Demir and Baykara v Turkey [2008] ECHR 1345
^ See further Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey (2009) Application No 68959/01
^ (2007) C-438/05
^ (2007) C-319/05, and C-319/06
^ e.g. The Rome I Regulation
^ (1991) C-6/90
^ Statute for a European Company Regulation 2001 No 2157/2001
^ Statute for a European Company Regulation 2001 art 3
^ Employee Involvement Directive 2001 Annex
^ See for example, BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders [2008] 3 SCR 560
^ Contrast Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] UKHL 41 and Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525
^ See the Thirteenth Company Law Directive 2004 2004/25/EC
^ Insolvency Regulation (EC) 1346/2000
^ Centros Ltd v Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen (1999) C-212/97
^ Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd (2003) C-167/01
^ a b See LD Brandeis, Other People's Money And How the Bankers Use It (1914) and E McGaughey, 'Does Corporate Governance Exclude the Ultimate Investor?' (2016) 16(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 221
^ See M Gold, 'Worker directors in the UK and the limits of policy transfer from Europe since the 1970s' (2005) 20 Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 29, 35
^ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 §957, inserting Securities Exchange Act 1934 §6(b)(10)
^ Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive 2003 2003/41/EC
^ UCITS Directive 2009 art 19(3)(o)
^ See N Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn 2014). On the original conception of the need for securities market regulation, see AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) Part III
^ UCITS V Directive 2014/91/EU
^ 2004/39/EC, art 18 on conflicts of interest
^ 2011/61/EU art 3(2)
^ 2011/61/EU respectively arts 22–23, 13 and Annex II, 14 and 30
^ "EUR-Lex - 32009L0138 - EN - EUR-Lex". eur-lex.europa.eu.
^ (2004) Case T-201/04, [1052]
^ Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige (2011) C-52/09, [22]; GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission (2009) C-513/06, [63]; British Airways plc v Commission (2007) C-95/04, [106]. Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v Commission (1973) Case 6–72, [26]. Also TEU art 3(3) states the EU's goals as "aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment".
^ Höfner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH (1991) C-41/90
^ See Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission (2003) T-319/99
^ Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie''''' (1999) C-67/96
^ TFEU art 49 distinguishes the right of establishment for "self employed persons" from the right "to set up and manage undertakings". Transfers of Understakings Directive 2001/23/EC art 1(b) defines an "economic entity" as an "organised grouping of resources". Contrast FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden (2014) C-413/13 and clarification that solo-self-employed persons will not be subject to competition law in Communication from the commission Guidelines on the application of Union competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons 2022/C 374/02
^ See the Clayton Act 1914 s 6, ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 1948 (No 87) which protects anyone, including self-employed, who works for a living. ECHR article 11, freedom of association subject only to proportionate restrictions in a democracy.
^ Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten (2002) C-309/99, [2002] ECR I-1577
^ Meca Medina and Majcen v Commission (2006) C-519/04 P, [2006] ECR I-6991.
^ See Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1996] ECR 234, [249] and Javico International and Javico AG v Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA [1998] ECR I-1983, [25]
^ See Courage Ltd v Crehan (2001) C-453/99, "the matters to be taken into account... include the economic and legal context... and... the respective bargaining power and conduct of the two parties to the contract".
^ AKZO Chemie BV v Commission (1991) C-62/86, [60]. Cf. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission (1979) Case 85/76, [41]: 'very large shares are in themselves... evidence of... a dominant position'.
^ British Airways plc v Commission (2003) T-219/99, [211], [224]–[225], given the nearest rival only had a 5.5% market share.
^ Società Italiana Vetro SpA v Commission (1992) T-68/89, [358]. Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v Commission (2000) C-395/96, [41]–[45].
^ Viho Europe BV v Commission (1996) C-73/95, [16].
^ Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. Inc. v Commission (1973) Case 6/72, [26], list in treaties 'not an exhaustive enumeration'.
^ United Brands Co v Commission (1978) Case 27/76, [250]–[252].
^ COMP/C-1/36.915, Deutsche Post AG – Interception of cross-border mail (25 July 2001) para 166.
^ AKZO Chemie BV v Commission (1991) C-62/86, [71]–[72]
^ France Telecom SA v Commission (2009) C-202/07
^ (2012) C-457/10 P, [98] and [132].
^ a b "CURIA - Documents". curia.europa.eu.
^ (1974) Cases 6-7/73
^ (2004) Case T-201/04
^ British Airways plc v Commission (2007) C-95/04, [68]
^ (2004) Case T-201/04
^ (2017) C-413/14, (2022) T-286/09 RENV
^ Merger Regulation 2004 139/2004/EC arts 1 and 2(3)
^ e.g. Tetra Laval BV v Commission (2002 T-5/02, [155]
^ e.g. M Bajgar, G Berlingieri, S Calligaris, C Criscuolo and J Timmis, 'Industry Concentration in Europe and North America' (January 2019) OECD Productivity Working Paper No. 18, 2
^ (2014) C-434/13
^ e.g. ICI Ltd v Commission (1972) Cases 48–57/69, [66]
^ CECED [2000] OJ L187/47, [48]–[51]. Also Philips/Osram [1994] OJ L378/37.
^ See further H Collins, The European Civil Code: The Way Forward (2009)
^ Brussels I Regulation 2012 1215/2012
^ Rome I Regulation (EC) 593/2008 arts 3 and 8
^ Rome II Regulation (EC) No 864/2007
^ "EUR-Lex - 02015L2436-20151223 - EN - EUR-Lex".
^ European Social Charter 1961 arts 7, 10 and 17. ICESCR 1966 art 13(2)(c). cf in the UK, the Higher Education Act 2004 ss 23-24 and 31-39 (tuition fees and plans) and Higher Education (Higher Amount) Regulations 2010 regs 4-5A.
^ For and example, see the French Education Code, arts L712-1 to 7 (governing bodies) and Higher Education Law (2019) art 90 (academic council powers). Compare the Oxford University Statute IV and VI, Council Regulations 13 of 2002, regs 4-10 (majority-elected Council, tracing back to Oxford University Act 1854 ss 16 and 21) and Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 2016 ss 10 and 18.
^ ICESCR 1966 art 13(2)(c), "Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education". UDHR 1948 art 26 "free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages" and "higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."
^ European Social Charter 1961 arts 7, 10 and 17. cf ECHR 1950 Protocol 1, article 2 and the Belgian Linguistic case (No 2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252. CFREU 2000 art 14.
^ W Rüegg et al, A History of the University in Europe (1992) vol 1, 'Universities in the Middle Ages'
^ See further S Garben, EU Higher Education Law. The Bologna Process and Harmonization by Stealth (2011)
^ Commission v Austria (2005) C-147/03, higher requirements for non-Austrians (mainly Germans) were held invalid despite the alleged 'structural, staffing and financial problems'. Commission v Belgium (2004) C-65/03, held invalid Belgian university limits on foreign (mainly French) students.
^ See Skovgaard-Petersen, Henrik (December 2013). "There and back again: portability of student loans, grants and fee support in a free movement perspective". European Law Review. 38 (6): 783. S2CID 140851472.
^ R (Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing (2005) C-209/03, under TFEU arts 18-21.
^ France Education Code, arts L712-1 to 7
^ French Higher Education Law (2019) art 90
^ L Crehan, Cleverlands: The Secrets Behind the Success of the World's Education Superpowers (2011)
^ UDHR 1948 art 25. ICESCR 1966 art 12(2)(d). European Social Charter 1961 art 13. CFREU 2000 art 35. ECHR 1950 arts 2, 3 and 8 (right to life)
^ See W Beveridge, Social insurance and allied services (1942) Cmd 6404, Part VI, §427, 'Restoration of a sick person to health is a duty of the State and the sick person, prior to any other consideration.' Department of Health, NHS Constitution for England (27 July 2015) art 1(2) access 'to NHS services is based on clinical need, not an individual's ability to pay'. The UK's NHS, since 2010, has suffered from substantial underfunding, and increasing privatisation after the Health and Social Care Act 2012 ss 164-5, amending NHS Act 2006 s 43A.
^ See Germany, Sozialgesetzbuch V, §§1-6, 12, 20 and 138. 'Germany: Health system review' (2020) 22(6) HSiT 1, 30-49
^ Patients' Rights Directive 2011/24/EU arts 4-8
^ See EHIC Decision 2003/751/EC, No 189
^ [2008] ECHR 453
^ D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423
^ UDHR 1948 art 23. ICESCR 1966 art 7. E McGaughey, Principles of Enterprise Law: the Economic Constitution and Human Rights (Cambridge UP 2022) ch 10
^ TFEU art 131
^ TFEU art 283(2)
^ European Central Bank Statute arts 10-11
^ TFEU art 282 and TEU art 3(3)
^ In the OPEC led 1970s energy crisis and the Russia and OPEC led 2021–2022 global energy crisis
^ TFEU art 282 and TEU art 3(3). M Roth, 'Employment as a Goal of Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank' (2015) ssrn.com argues that the price stability objective cannot be interpreted in a way that conflicts with general EU goals.
^ Statute of the European Central Bank art 19
^ Statute of the European Central Bank art 18.1
^ (2015) C-62/14, [103]-[105]
^ Credit Institutions Directive 2013/36/EU arts 8-18, 35, 88-96
^ Capital Requirements Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 arts 114-134
^ Deposit Guarantee Directive 2014/49/EU
^ See Gross National Income Regulation (EU) 2019/516 arts 1-2. K Raworth, Doughnut Economics (2017)
^ See the Multilateral Financial Framework Regulation 2020/2093 Annex I
^ Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union arts 3-4
^ Pringle v Government of Ireland (2012) C‑370/12 held the mechanism lawful despite a challenge that it exceeded the EU's competence for economic policy.
^ Gross National Income Regulation (EU) 2019/516 arts 1-2. See previously GDP Directive 89/130/EEC, now repealed.
^ See the proposals for an EU financial transaction tax, and minor policies of an EU withholding tax and EU tax haven blacklist
^ ECHR 1950 art 2. ICCPR 1966 art 6(1)
^ CFREU 2000 art 37
^ TFEU art 3(3) "improvement of the environment"
^ ICCPR 1966 art 1(2) and ICESCR 1966 art 1(2). See also TFEU art 194, requiring a functioning energy market, security of supply, energy efficiency and 'new and renewable forms of energy', and network interconnection. Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c)" which in turn requires unanimity for "measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply." This does not prevent measures to make energy sources internalise pollution costs in full.
^ UDHR 1948 arts 3 and 27(1). ICESCR 1966 art 15. On origins, see L Shaver, 'The right to science and culture' [2010] Wisconsin Law Review 121.
^ Climate Neutral Communication COM/2020/562
^ Renewable Energy Directive (EU) 2018/2001 arts 3, 7, Annexes I and V (32% renewable target)
^ 'Parliament backs boost for renewables use and energy savings' (14 September 2022) europarl.europa.eu
^ RePowerEU Communication COM(2022) 108 final
^ Hydrocarbons Directive 94/22/EC arts 2-6
^ e.g. M Roser, 'Why did renewables become so cheap so fast?' (1 December 2020) Our World in Data
^ E McGaughey, Principles of Enterprise Law: the Economic Constitution and Human Rights (Cambridge UP 2022) ch 11, 411-414
^ Also ICCPR 1966 articles 6 and 17
^ Friends of the Earth v Royal Dutch Shell plc (26 May 2021) C/09/571932 / HA ZA 19-379
^ T Wilson, 'Shell investors back moving HQ from Netherlands to UK' (10 December 2021) Financial Times
^ A Elfar, 'Landmark Climate Change Lawsuit Moves Forward as German Judges Arrive in Peru' (4 August 2022) Columbia Climate School, appealing from the Regional Court (2015) Case No. 2 O 285/15.
^ Judgment (20 December 2019) 19/00135
^ Klimaschutz or Climate Change case (24 March 2021) 1 BvR 2656/18
^ Compare the Environmental Liability Directive 2004 (2004/35/EC) which requires polluters pay for damage and take remedial action for species and habitats as defined in the Birds Directive 2009/147/EC arts 2 and 4, duty to protect birds, and Habitats Directive 92/43/EC
^ See 'Weekly European Union Emission Trading System (EU-ETS) carbon pricing in 2022' (13 December 2022) Statistia
^ a b Renewable Energy Directive 2018 art 2(a) and (e) and Annex V
^ Le Page, Michael (21 September 2016). "The Great Carbon Scam". New Scientist. 231: 20–21. doi:10.1016/S0262-4079(16)31736-5. S2CID 125134562. Norton, Michael; et al. (2019). "Serious mismatches continue between science and policy in forest bioenergy". GCB Bioenergy. 11 (11): 1256. doi:10.1111/gcbb.12643. hdl:20.500.11755/3e9ea771-9762-42d6-b1db-6f63ba2b6e5c. S2CID 202007944. Searchinger, Timothy; et al. (28 November 2022). "EU climate plan sacrifices carbon storage and biodiversity for bioenergy". Nature. 612: 27. doi:10.1038/d41586-022-04133-1. PMID 36443604. S2CID 254021202. the EU's 'own modeling predicts that yearly use of bioenergy will more than double between 2015 and 2050, from 152 million to 336 million tonnes of oil equivalent. That requires a quantity of biomass each year that is twice Europe's present annual wood harvest.'
^ (2001) C-379/98, [62], following the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs.
^ Electricity Directive 2019/944 2019/944 art 8 and the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC art 4.
^ Electricity Directive 2019/944 art 35 and the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC art 9
^ Electricity Directive 2019/944 arts 3 and 6.
^ Netherlands v Essent (2013) C-105/12, [4]
^ (2013) C-105/12, [66]
^ Costa v ENEL (1964) Case 6-64
^ Foster v British Gas plc (1990) C-188/89, [22]
^ M Florio, 'The Return of Public Enterprise' (2014) Working Paper N. 01/2014, 7-8. Also R Brau, R Doronzo, C Fiorio and M Florio, 'EU gas industry reforms and consumers' prices' (2010) 31(4) Energy Journal 163.
^ Draft Energy Price Regulation COM/2022/473 final
^ e.g. in the German state of North Rhine Westfalia, see Gemeindeordnung Nordrhein-Westfalen 1994 §§107-113
^ UDHR 1948 art 25(1). ICESCR 1966 art 11(1). UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002) General Comment No.15, water implicit in right to food.
^ CFREU 2000 art 37. TFEU arts 4 (shared competence for agriculture and environment), 13 (pay regard to animal welfare)
^ JC Bureau and A Matthews, 'EU Agricultural Policy: What Developing Countries Need to Know' (2005) IIS Discussion Paper No 91, 3. E McGaughey, Principles of Enterprise Law: the Economic Constitution and Human Rights (Cambridge UP 2022) ch 13
^ 'Farmers and the agricultural labour force - statistics' (November 2022)
^ TFEU arts 38-44, and art 39 on CAP objectives.
^ Management and Financing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 art 4
^ Direct Payments Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 arts 9 and 33
^ DPR 2013 arts 10 and Annex IV. Wachauf v Federal Republic of Germany (1989) Case 151/78 held that milk subsidies are a type of property and a real asset that could not simply be withdrawn without compensation.
^ DPR 2013 arts 10-11 and 32
^ Management and Financing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 arts 91-101
^ DPR 2013 arts 45
^ Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC and the Wild Birds Directive 2009/147/EC
^ Agricultural Products Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 art 8
^ Agricultural Unfair Trading Practices Directive 2019/633 art 3
^ Management and Financing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 arts 4-5
^ Rural Development Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 arts 3, 7-9, 17 and 19
^ RDR 2013 art 5
^ Cheminova A/S v Commission [2009] ECR II-02685
^ Kaplan, Jed O.; et al. (2009). "The prehistoric and preindustrial deforestation of Europe" (PDF). Quaternary Science Reviews. 28: 3016. doi:10.1016/J.QUASCIREV.2009.09.028. S2CID 42090586.
^ Land Use and Forestry Directive 2018 2018/841 arts 1-4
^ Timber Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 arts 3-6
^ Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC arts 4-9
^ Drinking Water Quality Directive 2020/2184, arts 4-5 and Annex
^ Bathing Waters Directive 2006/7/EC arts 3-5
^ (1992) C-337/89, on Water Industry Act 1991 ss 18-19
^ e.g. Commission v Spain (2003) C-278/0, confirming fines of €624,150 a year and per 1% of bathing areas in Spanish inshore waters which were found unclean.
^ CFREU 2000 arts 27 and 36
^ UDHR 1948 art 27, and ICESCR 1966 art 15(1)(b)
^ Renewable Energy Directive 2018/2001 arts 25 and 27. RED 2009, article 3(4) required at least 10% of transport was fueled from renewable energy by 2020.
^ Renewable Energy Directive 2018/2002 art 3(1). The previous target was 15% by 2020.
^ 'EU ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars from 2035 explained' (3 November 2022) europarl.europa.eu
^ J Armour, 'Volkswagen's Emissions Scandal: Lessons for Corporate Governance?' (2016) OxBLB pt 1, 2.
^ Emission Performance Regulation 2019/631 arts 1(2) and 2, previously 120 grams of CO₂ per km.
^ EPR 2019 art 6
^ EPR 2019 arts 7-10. Also art 11 derogations.
^ Vehicle Emissions Regulation (EC) 715/2007 Annex, sets out the Euro 6 limits. See summary in 'EU: Light-Duty: Emissions' and 'EU: Heavy-Duty: Emissions' (2021) transportpolicy.net
^ Heavy Vehicle Emission Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 arts 4-5, the Commission determining limits ad hoc, and a zero-emission vehicle counting as two.
^ J Armour, 'Volkswagen's Emissions Scandal: Lessons for Corporate Governance?' (2016) OxBLB pt 1, 2, in 2014, the year that VW fraud was first alleged, Winterkorn was paid €18 million, of which €16 million was 'performance based' variable pay.
^ Trans-European transport network Regulation, COM(2021) 812 final and European Court of Auditors Report (2018)
^ Driving Licenses Directive 2006/126/EC
^ Road Transport Regulation (EC) No. 561/2006 arts 4 and 6
^ Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL (2017) C-434/15
^ Bus Passenger Rights Regulation 2011 (EU) No 181/2011 art 2.
^ e.g. 'Electric Dreams: Green Vehicles Cheaper Than Petrol' (29 June 2020) Direct Line Group
^ Single European Railway Directive 2012/34/EU arts 4 and 7. This followed the First Railway Directive 91/440/EC.
^ Single European Railway Directive 2012/34/EU art 5-6
^ Passenger Rights Regulation 2007 (EC) No 1371/2007 art 3 (bikes), 8-9 (information and tickets)
^ CFREU 2000 arts 7 and 34(3) 'the right to social and housing assistance'. UDHR 1948 art 25. ICESCR 1966 art 11 (right to adequate standard of living for housing). ECHR 1950 art 8, 'respect for [their] private and family life, [and their] home', and Prot 1, art 1, right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
^ Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 2010/31/EC arts 2, 4-8
^ ICCPR 1966 art 19(2). See also UDHR 1948 arts 18-19. ECHR 1950 arts 9-10. CFREU 2000 arts 10-11 and 19(1).
^ ICCPR 1966 art 17. UDHR 1948 art 12(1). ECHR 1950 art 8(1). CFREU 2000 art 7.
^ Postal Services Directive 1997 1997/67/EC
^ In R (Vodafone Ltd) v SS for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2010) C-58/08, the CJEU rejected Vodafone's argument that the Regulation was disproportionate to the EU's legislative power, holding price controls were necessary for competitive markets to function, and 'only the regulation of retail charges could improve the situation of consumers directly.'
^ Net Neutrality Regulation 2015/2120 art 3(3)
^ e.g. K Finley, 'The First US City With 10 GB Internet Is ... Salisbury' (4 September 2015) Wired, reporting speeds in Salisbury, North Carolina, of 10 Gigabits, or 10,000Mbps.
^ See previously the Telecoms Package, Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC, Electronic Communications Directive 2009/140/EC and Universal Service Directive 2009/136/EC
^ Electronic Communications Code Directive 2018 art 5
^ Also article 46, member states should set out conditions for use of a wireless telegraphy station or using apparatus, unless exempt. Articles 68-73 require various standards for setting conditions.
^ arts 17 and 71, 77-70. Under arts 61-62, member states should encourage this.
^ See Speedtest.net for average broadband and mobile internet speeds by country.
^ CFREU 2000 art 8
^ This is the basis for ECHR article 8: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."
^ Information Society Directive 98/48/EC recital 11, noting it would be 'be premature to coordinate national rules' entirely because 'enough is not yet known about the form the new services will take or their nature'. Also art 1(2) amending Directive 98/34/EC art 1(2)
^ TFEU arts 56-57 and 52
^ Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC arts 1 and 3. Under art 3(4)-(5) if the ISS is based abroad, a member state can ask the host state to regulate, and inform the Commission.
^ Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, art 14
^ Electronic Commerce Directive 2000, art 15
^ Information Society Directive 2015/1535 art 1 says an ISS is "normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services".
^ Cartier International AG v BT plc [2018] UKSC 28, [21] referring to 'mere conduits'
^ McFadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (2016) C-484/14
^ Electronic Commerce Directive 2000 recital 11
^ Information Society Directive 2015/1535 Annex I lists those that are not, including TV and radio.
^ L'Oréal SA v eBay International AG (2011) C-324/09
^ Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Ltd (2019) C-18/18
^ Airbnb Ireland UC (2019) C-390/18
^ Asociación profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain (2017) C-434/15
^ GDPR 2016/679 art 4(11) says this must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data'.
^ Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen v Planet49 GmbH (2019) C-673/17
^ 2002/58/EC recital 25 and arts 5-15
^ cf T Macaulay, 'How to stop annoying cookie pop-ups from ruining your browsing: It doesn't have to be this way' (26 May 2022) TNW
^ GDPR 2016 arts 12-16, including a right to have mistaken data rectified.
^ GDPR 2016 art 17, where data is no longer necessary for legitimate purposes, or consent is withdrawn.
^ S Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019)
^ J Constine, 'Facebook Asks Users If It Can Abolish Their Right To Vote On Future Site Governance Changes' (21 November 2012) TechCrunch
^ See the Wikimedia Board of Trustees.
^ ECHR 1950 art 10(2). CFREU 2000 art 11, 'The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.'
^ UDHR 1948, arts 19. ICCPR 1966 art 19
^ See R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [48] per Lady Hale, "In the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe, we do not want our government or its policies to be decided by the highest spenders. Our democracy is based upon more than one person one vote. It is based on the view that each person has equal value... We want everyone to be able to make up their own minds on the important issues of the day. For this we need the free exchange of information and ideas. We have to accept that some people have greater resources than others with which to put their views across. But we want to avoid the grosser distortions which unrestricted access to the broadcast media will bring."
^ UDHR 1948 art 21. ICCPR 1966 art 25
^ A Nix, 'The Power of Big Data and Psychographics' (27 September 2016) 2016 Concordia Annual Summit, Alexander Nix of Cambridge Analytica explaining they had "four or five thousand data points on every adult in the United States", that they worked for the Cruz campaign and were working for Trump. C Wylie, Mindf*ck (2020) on Cambridge Analytica working to procure Brexit. R Darbyshire, '"We Dumped Our Entire Budget in the Last 10 days": Inside the Behavioural Science Strategy of Vote Leave' (13 June 2017) The Drum, Dominic Cummings organiser of Vote Leave saying they targeted 'roughly 7 million people, who saw something like one and a half billion ads'. R Mueller, Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election (March 2019) 1, on Russian cyber-war against the US in the 2016 election. House of Commons, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and 'fake news': Interim Report (29 July 2018) HC 363, 43-4, §162, Russia engaged in "unconventional warfare" against the UK to back Brexit.
^ Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU art 1(1)(a)
^ Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU art 6, and art 7 requires services are made 'more accessible to persons with disabilities'.
^ Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU art 1(1)(c)
^ DSAR 2022 arts 3-7 (exemptions for being a conduit, caching or hosting), 8-9 (illegal content and orders), 12-13 (terms and transparency)
^ DSAR 2022 arts 35-36 (codes of conduct)
^ DSAR 2022 art 59 (fines).
^ (27 June 2017) Case 39740
^ (18 July 2018) Case 40099
^ (20 March 2019) Case 40411
^ (20 December 2022) Case 40462
^ "? - EUR-Lex". eur-lex.europa.eu.
^ Charter, David (2007). "A new legal environment". E!Sharp. People Power Process. pp. 23–5.
^ Gargani, Giuseppe (2007). "Intellectual property rights: criminal sanctions to fight piracy and counterfeiting". European Parliament. Retrieved 30 June 2007.
^ Mahony, Honor (23 October 2007). "EU court delivers blow on environment sanctions". EU Observer. Retrieved 23 October 2007.; Case C-440/05 Commission v Council

References

Butler, Graham; Wessel, Ramses A (2022). EU External Relations Law: The Cases in Context. Oxford: Hart Publishing/Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1-5099-3969-5.
Craig, Paul; de Búrca, Gráinne (2020). EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (7th ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-871492-7.
McGaughey, Ewan (2022). Principles of Enterprise Law: the Economic Constitution and Human Rights. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-04573-5.
Tobler, Christa; Beglinger, Jacques (2020). Essential EU Law in Charts. Budapest HVG-ORAC. ISBN 978-963-258-489-8.
Weiler, JHH (1991). "The Transformation of Europe". Yale Law Journal. 100 (8): 2403–2483. doi:10.2307/796898. ISSN 0044-0094. JSTOR 796898.
Barnard, Catherine (2013). The substantive law of the EU : the four freedoms (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-967076-5. (later editions are available)
Craig, Paul; de Búrca, Gráinne (2011). The evolution of EU Law (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-959296-8. (later editions are available)
Craig, Paul; de Búrca, Gráinne (2015). The evolution of EU Law (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-882118-2.
Hartley, Trevor (2014). The foundations of European Union law : an introduction to the constitutional and administrative law of European Union. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-873467-3.

External links

EUR-Lex – online access to existing and proposed European Union legislation
Treaties
Summaries of EU legislation
Evolution of European Union legislation
The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law, 2014, by Marcus Klamert, Legal Officer, European Commission