La armada bizantina era la fuerza naval del Imperio bizantino . Al igual que el estado al que servía, era una continuación directa de su predecesora romana , pero desempeñaba un papel mucho más importante en la defensa y supervivencia del estado que su iteración anterior. Si bien las flotas del Imperio romano se enfrentaban a pocas grandes amenazas navales, operando como una fuerza policial muy inferior en poder y prestigio al ejército , el dominio del mar se volvió vital para la existencia misma del estado bizantino, al que varios historiadores han llamado un "imperio marítimo". [5] [6]
La primera amenaza a la hegemonía romana en el mar Mediterráneo la plantearon los vándalos en el siglo V, pero su amenaza terminó con las guerras de Justiniano I en el siglo VI. El restablecimiento de una flota permanente y la introducción de la galera dromon en el mismo período también marcan el punto en el que la marina bizantina comenzó a alejarse de sus raíces romanas tardías y a desarrollar su propia identidad característica. Este proceso se vería impulsado con el inicio de las primeras conquistas musulmanas en el siglo VII. Tras la pérdida del Levante y, más tarde, de África, el Mediterráneo se transformó de un "lago romano" en un campo de batalla entre los bizantinos y una serie de estados musulmanes. En esta lucha, las flotas bizantinas fueron fundamentales, no solo para la defensa de las extensas posesiones del Imperio en la cuenca mediterránea, sino también para repeler los ataques marítimos contra la propia capital imperial de Constantinopla . Gracias al uso del recién inventado " fuego griego ", el arma secreta más conocida y temida de la armada bizantina, Constantinopla se salvó de varios asedios y numerosos enfrentamientos navales dieron como resultado victorias bizantinas.
Inicialmente, la defensa de las costas bizantinas y de los accesos a Constantinopla estuvo a cargo de la gran flota de los Karabisianoi . Sin embargo, progresivamente se dividió en varias flotas regionales , mientras que una flota imperial central se mantuvo en Constantinopla, protegiendo la ciudad y formando el núcleo de las expediciones navales. A finales del siglo VIII, la armada bizantina, una fuerza bien organizada y mantenida, volvió a ser la potencia marítima dominante en el Mediterráneo. Los conflictos con las armadas del mundo musulmán continuaron con éxito alternado, pero en el siglo X, los bizantinos pudieron obtener la supremacía en el Mediterráneo oriental.
Durante el siglo XI, la marina, al igual que el propio Imperio, comenzó a declinar. Ante los nuevos desafíos navales procedentes de Occidente, los bizantinos se vieron cada vez más obligados a depender de las armadas de las ciudades-estado italianas, como Venecia y Génova , con efectos desastrosos para la economía y la soberanía del Imperio. A un período de recuperación bajo la dinastía Comneno le siguió otro período de decadencia, que culminó con la desastrosa disolución del Imperio por la Cuarta Cruzada en 1204. Tras la restauración del Imperio en 1261, varios emperadores de la dinastía Paleólogo intentaron revivir la marina, pero sus esfuerzos solo tuvieron un efecto temporal. El emperador Andrónico II Paleólogo llegó incluso a disolver por completo la armada, lo que permitió a Venecia derrotar a los bizantinos en dos guerras, la primera de las cuales resultó en un humillante tratado que vio a los venecianos conservar múltiples islas capturadas a las fuerzas bizantinas durante la guerra y obligó a estas últimas a compensar a Venecia por la destrucción del barrio veneciano de Constantinopla a manos de los residentes genoveses de la ciudad. A mediados del siglo XIV, la flota bizantina, que alguna vez pudo poner cientos de buques de guerra en el mar, se limitó a unas pocas docenas en el mejor de los casos, y el control del mar Egeo pasó definitivamente a las armadas italianas y, en el siglo XV, a la naciente Armada Otomana . La disminuida armada bizantina continuó activa hasta la caída de Constantinopla ante el Imperio Otomano en 1453.
La armada bizantina, al igual que el Imperio Romano de Oriente o el propio Imperio Bizantino, continuó los sistemas del Imperio Romano . Después de la Batalla de Actium en el 31 a. C., en ausencia de cualquier amenaza externa en el Mediterráneo, la armada romana realizó principalmente tareas de policía y escolta. Las batallas navales masivas, como las libradas siglos antes en las Guerras Púnicas (264 a 146 a. C.), ya no ocurrieron, y las flotas romanas estaban compuestas por barcos relativamente pequeños, más adecuados para sus nuevas tareas. A principios del siglo IV d. C., las flotas romanas permanentes habían menguado, de modo que cuando las flotas de los emperadores rivales Constantino el Grande y Licinio se enfrentaron en el 324 d. C. , [7] estaban compuestas en gran medida por barcos de nueva construcción o requisados de las ciudades portuarias del Mediterráneo oriental. [8] Sin embargo, las guerras civiles del siglo IV y principios del V estimularon un resurgimiento de la actividad naval, con flotas empleadas principalmente para transportar ejércitos. [9] Durante el primer cuarto del siglo V se siguieron empleando fuerzas navales considerables en el Mediterráneo occidental, especialmente desde el norte de África, pero el dominio de Roma sobre el Mediterráneo se vio puesto en tela de juicio cuando África fue invadida por los vándalos [10] (429 a 442).
El nuevo reino vándalo de Cartago , bajo el capaz Genserico ( r. 428-477 ), lanzó inmediatamente incursiones contra las costas de Italia y Grecia, incluso saqueando y pillando Roma en 455. [11] Las incursiones vándalas continuaron sin cesar durante las siguientes dos décadas, a pesar de los repetidos intentos romanos de derrotarlos. [11] El Imperio Occidental era impotente, su armada se había reducido a casi nada, [12] pero los emperadores orientales aún podían recurrir a los recursos y la experiencia naval del Mediterráneo oriental. Sin embargo, una primera expedición oriental en 448 no llegó más allá de Sicilia, y en 460, los vándalos atacaron y destruyeron una flota de invasión romana occidental en Cartagena en España. [11] Finalmente, en 468, una enorme expedición oriental se reunió bajo Basilisco , supuestamente con 1.113 barcos y 100.000 hombres, pero fracasó desastrosamente. Los barcos incendiarios destruyeron unos 600 barcos y el coste económico de 130.000 libras de oro y 700.000 libras de plata casi llevó al Imperio a la ruina. [13] Esto obligó a los romanos a llegar a un acuerdo con Genserico y a firmar un tratado de paz. Sin embargo, tras la muerte de Genserico en 477, la amenaza vándala retrocedió. [14]
El siglo VI marcó el renacimiento del poder naval romano. En 508, cuando el antagonismo con el reino ostrogodo de Teodorico estalló, se dice que el emperador Anastasio I ( r. 491-518 ) envió una flota de 100 barcos de guerra para atacar las costas de Italia. [15] En 513, el general Vitaliano se rebeló contra Anastasio. Los rebeldes reunieron una flota de 200 barcos que, a pesar de algunos éxitos iniciales, fueron destruidos por el almirante Marino , que empleó una sustancia incendiaria a base de azufre para derrotarlos. [16]
En 533, aprovechando la ausencia de la flota vándala, enviada para reprimir una revuelta en Cerdeña , un ejército de 15.000 hombres al mando de Belisario fue transportado a África por una flota de invasión de 92 dromones y 500 transportes, [17] comenzando la Guerra Vandálica , la primera de las guerras de reconquista del emperador Justiniano I ( r. 527-565 ). Se trataba de operaciones en gran medida anfibias, posibles gracias al control de las vías fluviales del Mediterráneo, y la flota desempeñó un papel vital en el transporte de suministros y refuerzos a las fuerzas expedicionarias y guarniciones bizantinas ampliamente dispersas. [16] Este hecho no pasó desapercibido para los enemigos de los bizantinos. Ya en la década de 520, Teodorico había planeado construir una flota masiva dirigida contra los bizantinos y los vándalos, pero su muerte en 526 limitó el alcance de estos planes. [18] En 535, la Guerra Gótica comenzó con una ofensiva bizantina de dos frentes: una flota que transportaba nuevamente al ejército de Belisario a Sicilia y luego a Italia, y otro ejército que invadía Dalmacia . El control bizantino del mar era de gran importancia estratégica, lo que permitió que el ejército bizantino, más pequeño, ocupara con éxito la península en 540. [19]
En 541, sin embargo, el nuevo rey ostrogodo, Totila , creó una flota de 400 barcos de guerra con los que negar los mares alrededor de Italia al Imperio. Dos flotas bizantinas fueron destruidas cerca de Nápoles en 542, [20] y en 546, Belisario comandó personalmente 200 barcos contra la flota goda que bloqueaba las desembocaduras del Tíber , en un esfuerzo infructuoso por aliviar a Roma . [21] En 550, Totila invadió Sicilia y, durante el año siguiente, su flota de 300 barcos capturó Cerdeña y Córcega , y atacó Corfú y la costa de Epiro . [22] Sin embargo, una derrota en una batalla naval frente a Sena Gallica marcó el comienzo de la supremacía imperial final. [16] Con la conquista final de Italia y el sur de España bajo Justiniano, el Mediterráneo volvió a convertirse en un "lago romano". [16]
A pesar de la posterior pérdida de gran parte de Italia ante los lombardos , los bizantinos mantuvieron el control de los mares alrededor de la península. Como los lombardos rara vez se aventuraban al mar, los bizantinos pudieron conservar varias franjas costeras de territorio italiano durante siglos. [23] La única acción naval importante de los siguientes 80 años ocurrió durante el asedio de Constantinopla por parte de los persas sasánidas , ávaros y eslavos en 626. Durante ese asedio, la flota de monoxila de los eslavos fue interceptada por la flota bizantina y destruida, negando al ejército persa el paso a través del Bósforo y finalmente obligando a los ávaros a retirarse. [24]
Durante la década de 640, la conquista musulmana de Siria y Egipto creó una nueva amenaza para Bizancio. Los árabes no solo conquistaron importantes áreas de reclutamiento y producción de ingresos, sino que, después de que la efímera reconquista bizantina de Alejandría en 644 demostrara la utilidad de una armada fuerte, se dedicaron a crear una armada propia . En este esfuerzo, la nueva élite musulmana, que provenía de la parte norte de la península arábiga orientada hacia el interior , dependía en gran medida de los recursos y la mano de obra del Levante conquistado (especialmente los coptos de Egipto), que hasta unos años antes habían proporcionado barcos y tripulaciones a los bizantinos. [25] [26] [27] Sin embargo, hay evidencia de que en las nuevas bases navales en Palestina también se emplearon carpinteros de barcos de Persia e Irak. [28] La falta de ilustraciones anteriores al siglo XIV significa que no se sabe nada sobre los detalles de los primeros buques de guerra musulmanes, aunque generalmente se asume que sus esfuerzos navales se basaron en la tradición marítima mediterránea existente. Dada la nomenclatura náutica ampliamente compartida y la interacción de siglos entre las dos culturas, los barcos bizantinos y árabes compartían muchas similitudes. [29] [30] [31] Esta similitud también se extendía a las tácticas y la organización general de la flota; las traducciones de los manuales militares bizantinos estaban disponibles para los almirantes árabes. [29]
"En ese momento, Kallinikos, un artífice de Heliópolis , huyó a los romanos. Había ideado un fuego marino que incendió los barcos árabes y los quemó con toda su tripulación. Así fue como los romanos regresaron victoriosos y descubrieron el fuego marino".
Crónica de Teófanes el Confesor , Annus Mundi 6165. [32]
Tras apoderarse de Chipre en 649 y asaltar Rodas, Creta y Sicilia, la joven armada árabe derrotó decisivamente a los bizantinos bajo el mando personal del emperador Constante II (641-668) en la Batalla de los Mástiles de 655. [33] Esta catastrófica derrota bizantina abrió el Mediterráneo a los árabes y dio inicio a una serie de conflictos navales que durarían siglos por el control de las vías navegables del Mediterráneo. [33] [34] A partir del reinado de Muawiyah I (661-680), las incursiones se intensificaron, mientras se hacían preparativos para un gran asalto a la propia Constantinopla. En el largo primer asedio árabe de Constantinopla, la flota bizantina resultó fundamental para la supervivencia del Imperio: las flotas árabes fueron derrotadas mediante el uso de su arma secreta recientemente desarrollada, conocida como " fuego griego ". El avance musulmán en Asia Menor y el Egeo se detuvo, y poco después se concluyó un acuerdo para una tregua de treinta años. [35]
En la década de 680, Justiniano II ( r. 685-695, 705-711 ) prestó atención a las necesidades de la armada, reforzándola con el reasentamiento de más de 18.500 mardaítas a lo largo de las costas meridionales del Imperio, donde fueron empleados como infantes de marina y remeros. [36] Sin embargo, la amenaza naval árabe se intensificó a medida que gradualmente tomaron el control del norte de África en las décadas de 680 y 690. [37] La última fortaleza bizantina, Cartago, cayó en 698, aunque una expedición naval bizantina logró recuperarla brevemente . [38] El gobernador árabe Musa bin Nusair construyó una nueva ciudad y base naval en Túnez , y se trajeron 1.000 carpinteros de barcos coptos para construir una nueva flota, que desafiaría el control bizantino del Mediterráneo occidental. [39] Así, desde principios del siglo VIII, las incursiones musulmanas se sucedieron incesantemente contra las posesiones bizantinas en el Mediterráneo occidental, especialmente Sicilia. [28] [40] Además, la nueva flota permitiría a los musulmanes completar su conquista del Magreb e invadir y capturar con éxito la mayor parte de la península Ibérica controlada por los visigodos. [41]
Los bizantinos no pudieron responder eficazmente al avance musulmán en África porque las dos décadas entre 695 y 715 fueron un período de gran agitación interna . [42] Reaccionaron con sus propias incursiones en Oriente, como la de 709 contra Egipto que capturó al almirante local, [40] pero también eran conscientes de un ataque inminente: mientras el califa al-Walid I ( r. 705-715 ) preparaba sus fuerzas para un renovado asalto contra Constantinopla, el emperador Anastasio II ( r. 713-715 ) preparaba la capital y lanzó un ataque preventivo infructuoso contra los preparativos navales musulmanes. [42] Anastasio fue pronto derrocado por Teodosio III ( r. 715-717 ), quien a su vez fue reemplazado, justo cuando el ejército musulmán avanzaba a través de Anatolia, por León III el Isaurio ( r. 717-741 ). Fue León III quien se enfrentó al segundo y último asedio árabe de Constantinopla . El uso del fuego griego, que devastó la flota árabe, fue nuevamente decisivo en la victoria bizantina, mientras que un duro invierno y los ataques búlgaros minaron aún más la fuerza de los sitiadores. [43]
Tras el asedio, los restos en retirada de la flota árabe fueron diezmados en una tormenta, y las fuerzas bizantinas lanzaron una contraofensiva, con una flota saqueando Laodicea y un ejército expulsando a los árabes de Asia Menor. [44] [45] Durante las siguientes tres décadas, la guerra naval presentó constantes incursiones de ambos lados, con los bizantinos lanzando repetidos ataques contra las bases navales musulmanas en Siria (Laodicea) y Egipto ( Damietta y Tinnis ). [40] En 727, una revuelta de las flotas temáticas provinciales , motivada en gran medida por el resentimiento contra la iconoclasia del Emperador, fue sofocada por la flota imperial mediante el uso del fuego griego. [46] A pesar de las pérdidas que esto supuso, se dice que se enviaron unos 390 buques de guerra para atacar Damietta en 739, y en 746 los bizantinos derrotaron decisivamente a la flota alejandrina en Keramaia , en Chipre, rompiendo el poder naval del califato omeya . [40]
Los bizantinos continuaron con la destrucción de las flotillas del norte de África y combinaron sus éxitos en el mar con severas limitaciones comerciales impuestas a los comerciantes musulmanes. Dada la nueva capacidad del Imperio para controlar las vías navegables, esto estranguló el comercio marítimo musulmán. [47] Con el colapso del estado omeya poco después y la creciente fragmentación del mundo musulmán, la marina bizantina quedó como la única fuerza naval organizada en el Mediterráneo. [40] Así, durante la segunda mitad del siglo VIII, los bizantinos disfrutaron de un segundo período de superioridad naval completa. [26] No es coincidencia que en los numerosos textos apocalípticos islámicos compuestos y transmitidos durante los siglos I y II del Islam, el Fin de los Tiempos esté precedido por una invasión bizantina por mar. Muchas tradiciones de la época subrayan que ocupar los puestos de guardia ( ribat ) en las costas de Siria equivale a participar en la yihad , y se cita a autoridades como Abu Hurayrah que consideraban que un día de ribat era un acto más piadoso que una noche de oración en la Kaaba . [48]
Estos éxitos permitieron al emperador Constantino V ( r. 741-775 ) trasladar la flota del Mediterráneo al mar Negro durante sus campañas contra los búlgaros en la década de 760. En 763, una flota de 800 barcos que transportaban 9.600 jinetes y algo de infantería navegó hacia Anchialus , donde obtuvo una victoria significativa , pero en 766, una segunda flota, supuestamente de 2.600 barcos, nuevamente con destino a Anchialus, se hundió en el camino . [49] Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, los emperadores isaurios socavaron la fuerza naval de Bizancio: con la amenaza árabe desaparecida por el momento, y con los themes navales en gran parte iconódulos firmemente opuestos a sus políticas iconoclastas , los emperadores redujeron el tamaño de la armada y degradaron los themes navales. [50]
El predominio naval bizantino duró hasta principios del siglo IX, cuando una sucesión de desastres a manos de las flotas musulmanas resurgentes significó su final e inauguró una era que representaría el cenit de la ascendencia musulmana. [51] [52] Ya en 790, los bizantinos sufrieron una gran derrota en el Golfo de Antalya , y las incursiones contra Chipre y Creta se reanudaron durante el reinado de Harun al-Rashid (786-809). [53] Alrededor del Mediterráneo, estaban surgiendo nuevas potencias, la más importante de ellas el Imperio carolingio , mientras que en 803, la Pax Nicephori reconoció la independencia de facto de la Venecia bizantina , que se afianzó aún más por la repulsión de un ataque bizantino en 809. [54] Al mismo tiempo, en Ifriqiya , se estableció la nueva dinastía aglabí , que inmediatamente realizó incursiones en todo el Mediterráneo central. [54]
Los bizantinos, por otra parte, se vieron debilitados por una serie de derrotas catastróficas contra los búlgaros, seguidas en 820 por la Rebelión de Tomás el Eslavo , que atrajo el apoyo de una gran parte de las fuerzas armadas bizantinas, incluidas las flotas temáticas. [55] A pesar de su supresión, la revuelta había mermado gravemente las defensas del Imperio. Como resultado, Creta cayó entre 824 y 827 en manos de una banda de exiliados andalusíes . Tres intentos sucesivos de recuperación bizantina fracasaron en los años siguientes, y la isla se convirtió en una base para la actividad pirata musulmana en el Egeo, alterando radicalmente el equilibrio de poder en la región. [56] [57] A pesar de algunos éxitos bizantinos sobre los corsarios cretenses, y la destrucción de Damieta por una flota bizantina de 85 barcos en 853, [58] el poder naval árabe en el Levante estaba reviviendo de forma constante bajo el gobierno abasí. [59] Otros intentos bizantinos de recuperar Creta, en 843 y 866, fueron fracasos totales. [60]
"Durante ese tiempo [...] los musulmanes se hicieron con el control de todo el Mediterráneo. Su poder y dominio sobre él eran enormes. Las naciones cristianas no podían hacer nada contra las flotas musulmanas en ningún lugar del Mediterráneo. En todo momento, los musulmanes se subieron a la ola de conquista."
Ibn Jaldún , Muqaddimah , III.32 [61]
La situación era aún peor en Occidente. En 827, el Imperio recibió un golpe crítico cuando los aglabíes iniciaron la lenta conquista de Sicilia , ayudados por la deserción del comandante bizantino Eufemio y la flota temática de la isla. [59] [62] En 838, los musulmanes cruzaron a Italia, tomaron Taranto y Brindisi , seguidas pronto por Bari . Las operaciones venecianas contra ellos no tuvieron éxito y, a lo largo de la década de 840, los árabes atacaron libremente Italia y el Adriático, e incluso atacaron Roma en 846. [62] Los ataques de los lombardos y Lotario I no lograron desalojar a los musulmanes de Italia, mientras que dos intentos bizantinos a gran escala de recuperar Sicilia fueron derrotados en gran medida en 840 y 859. [63] En 850, las flotas musulmanas, junto con un gran número de asaltantes ghazi independientes , habían surgido como la principal potencia del Mediterráneo, poniendo a los bizantinos y a los cristianos en general a la defensiva. [59] [64]
El mismo período, cuando un Bizancio maltrecho se defendía contra enemigos en todos los frentes, también vio el surgimiento de una nueva amenaza inesperada: los rus hicieron su primera aparición en la historia bizantina con una incursión contra Paflagonia en la década de 830, seguida por una importante expedición en 860. [65] [66]
A finales del siglo IX y principios del siglo X, cuando el Califato se dividió en estados más pequeños y el poder árabe se debilitó, los bizantinos lanzaron una serie de campañas exitosas contra ellos. [67] Esta "Reconquista bizantina" fue supervisada por los capaces soberanos de la dinastía macedonia (867-1056), y marcó el mediodía del estado bizantino. [68] [69]
La ascensión al trono del emperador Basilio I (867-886) anunció este resurgimiento, ya que se embarcó en una política exterior agresiva. Continuando las políticas de su predecesor, Miguel III (842-867), mostró un gran cuidado de la flota y, como resultado, se sucedieron victorias sucesivas. [71] En 868, una flota bajo el droungarios tou ploïmou Nicetas Ooryphas liberó a Ragusa de un asedio árabe y restableció la presencia bizantina en el área. [72] Unos años más tarde, derrotó dos veces duramente a los piratas cretenses en Kardia y en el golfo de Corinto , [73] [74] asegurando temporalmente el Egeo. [59] Chipre también fue recuperada temporalmente y Bari ocupada. [75] Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, la presencia musulmana en Cilicia se fortaleció, y Tarsos se convirtió en una base importante para ataques terrestres y marítimos contra territorio bizantino, especialmente bajo el famoso emir Yazaman al-Khadim (882-891), a pesar de la dura derrota de una de sus incursiones ante Euripos . [76]
En Occidente, los musulmanes siguieron avanzando con firmeza, ya que las fuerzas bizantinas locales resultaron insuficientes: el Imperio se vio obligado a depender de la ayuda de sus súbditos italianos nominales y tuvo que recurrir al traslado de las flotas orientales a Italia para lograr algún avance. [77] Tras la caída de Enna en 855, los bizantinos se vieron confinados en la costa oriental de Sicilia y sometidos a una presión cada vez mayor. Una expedición de socorro en 868 logró poco. Siracusa fue atacada de nuevo en 869 y, en 870, Malta cayó en manos de los aglabíes. [78] Los corsarios musulmanes atacaron el Adriático y, aunque fueron expulsados de Apulia , a principios de la década de 880 establecieron bases a lo largo de la costa occidental italiana, de donde no serían desalojados por completo hasta 915. [79] En 878, Siracusa, el principal bastión bizantino en Sicilia, fue atacada de nuevo y cayó, en gran parte porque la flota imperial estaba ocupada transportando mármol para la construcción de la Nea Ekklesia , la nueva iglesia de Basilio. [80] En 880, el sucesor de Ooryphas, el droungarios Nasar , obtuvo una importante victoria en una batalla nocturna sobre los aglabíes que atacaban las islas Jónicas . Luego procedió a atacar Sicilia, llevándose un gran botín, antes de derrotar a otra flota musulmana frente a Punta Stilo . Al mismo tiempo, otro escuadrón bizantino obtuvo una importante victoria en Nápoles. [81] [82] Estos éxitos permitieron que se desarrollara una contraofensiva bizantina de corta duración en Occidente en las décadas de 870 y 880 bajo Nicéforo Focas el Viejo , expandiendo la presencia bizantina en Apulia y Calabria y formando el thema de Longobardia , que más tarde se convertiría en el Catepanato de Italia . Sin embargo, una dura derrota frente a Milazzo en 888 marcó la virtual desaparición de la actividad naval bizantina importante en los mares alrededor de Italia durante el siglo siguiente. [59] [83]
A pesar de los éxitos bajo Basilio, durante el reinado de su sucesor León VI el Sabio (886-912), el Imperio volvió a enfrentarse a graves amenazas. En el norte, estalló una guerra contra el zar búlgaro Simeón , y una parte de la flota imperial fue utilizada en 895 para transportar un ejército de magiares a través del Danubio para atacar Bulgaria . [84] La guerra búlgara produjo varias derrotas costosas, mientras que al mismo tiempo la amenaza naval árabe alcanzó nuevas alturas, con sucesivas incursiones que devastaron las costas del corazón naval de Bizancio, el mar Egeo. En 891 o 893, la flota árabe saqueó la isla de Samos y tomó prisionero a su estratega (gobernador militar), y en 898, el almirante eunuco Raghib se llevó a 3.000 marineros bizantinos de los Cibyrrhaeots como prisioneros. [85] Estas pérdidas debilitaron las defensas bizantinas, abriendo el Egeo a las incursiones de las flotas sirias. [76] El primer golpe duro llegó en 901, cuando el renegado Damián de Tarso saqueó Demetrias , mientras que al año siguiente, Taormina , el último puesto avanzado del Imperio en Sicilia, cayó en manos de los musulmanes . [86] [85] El mayor desastre, sin embargo, llegó en 904, cuando otro renegado, León de Trípoli , invadió el Egeo. Su flota penetró incluso en los Dardanelos , antes de proceder a saquear la segunda ciudad del Imperio, Tesalónica , todo mientras la flota del Imperio permaneció pasiva ante la superioridad numérica de los árabes. [87] Además, las incursiones de los corsarios cretenses alcanzaron tal intensidad, que al final del reinado de León, la mayoría de las islas del sur del Egeo fueron abandonadas o se vieron obligadas a aceptar el control musulmán y pagar tributo a los piratas. [88] No sorprende que en las instrucciones contemporáneas de León sobre la guerra naval ( Naumachica ) prevaleciera una mentalidad defensiva y cautelosa. [59]
El almirante bizantino más distinguido de la época fue Himerios , el logothetes tou dromou . Nombrado almirante en 904, no pudo evitar el saqueo de Tesalónica, pero logró la primera victoria en 905 o 906, y en 910 dirigió un ataque exitoso a Laodicea. [89] [90] La ciudad fue saqueada y su interior saqueado y devastado sin pérdida de ningún barco. [91] Sin embargo, un año después, una enorme expedición de 112 dromones y 75 panfiloi con 43.000 hombres, que había navegado bajo el mando de Himerios contra el Emirato de Creta , no solo no logró recuperar la isla, [92] sino que en su viaje de regreso, fue emboscada y derrotada por León de Trípoli frente a Quíos (octubre de 912). [93] [94]
La marea comenzó a cambiar de nuevo después de 920. Casualmente, ese mismo año fue testigo de la ascensión de un almirante, Romano Lecapeno (920-944), al trono imperial, por segunda (después de Tiberio Apsímaro ) y última vez en la historia del Imperio. Finalmente, en 923, la derrota decisiva de León de Trípoli frente a Lemnos , junto con la muerte de Damián durante un asedio a una fortaleza bizantina al año siguiente, marcó el comienzo del resurgimiento bizantino. [95]
El crecimiento del Imperio se puede ver en 942, cuando el emperador Romano I envió un escuadrón al mar Tirreno . Usando fuego griego, el escuadrón destruyó una flota de corsarios musulmanes de Fraxinetum . [96] En 949, sin embargo, otra expedición de unos 100 barcos, lanzada por Constantino VII (945-959) contra el Emirato de Creta, terminó en desastre, debido a la incompetencia de su comandante, Constantino Gongyles . [97] [98] Una renovada ofensiva en Italia en 951-952 fue derrotada por los fatimíes , pero otra expedición en 956 y la pérdida de una flota ifriqiyana en una tormenta en 958 estabilizaron temporalmente la situación en la península. [96] En 962, los fatimíes lanzaron un asalto a las fortalezas bizantinas restantes en Sicilia; Taormina cayó el día de Navidad de 962 y Rometta fue sitiada. En respuesta, en 964 se lanzó una importante expedición bizantina que terminó en desastre. Los fatimíes derrotaron al ejército bizantino frente a Rametta y luego aniquilaron la flota en la Batalla de los Estrechos , en particular mediante el uso de buzos que portaban dispositivos incendiarios. Ambas potencias centraron su atención en otros lugares y en 967 se firmó una tregua entre Bizancio y los fatimíes que frenó la actividad naval bizantina en Occidente: los mares de Italia quedaron en manos de las fuerzas bizantinas locales y de los diversos estados italianos hasta después de 1025, cuando Bizancio volvió a intervenir activamente en el sur de Italia y Sicilia. [99] [100]
En Oriente, en 956 el estratega Basilio Hexamilites infligió una aplastante derrota a la flota tarsiota, abriendo el camino para otra gran expedición para recuperar Creta. [96] Fue confiada a Nicéforo Focas , quien en 960 partió con una flota de 100 dromones, 200 chelandia y 308 transportes, llevando una fuerza total de 77.000 hombres, para someter la isla. [101] Aunque la armada finalmente tuvo un papel de combate limitado en la campaña, fue esencial para mantener abiertas las rutas marítimas después de un desastroso ataque al interior de la isla que requirió que los suministros fueran traídos por mar. [102] La conquista de Creta eliminó la amenaza directa al Egeo, el corazón naval de Bizancio, mientras que las operaciones posteriores de Focas llevaron a la recuperación de Cilicia (en 963), Chipre (en 968), [103] y la costa norte de Siria (en 969). [104] Estas conquistas eliminaron la amenaza de las otrora poderosas flotas musulmanas sirias, restableciendo efectivamente el dominio bizantino en el Mediterráneo oriental para que Nicéforo Focas pudiera jactarse ante Liutprando de Cremona con las palabras "Yo solo mando el mar". [71] [105] Se produjeron algunas incursiones y enfrentamientos navales a medida que aumentaba el antagonismo con los fatimíes a fines de la década de 990, pero las relaciones pacíficas se restablecieron poco después, y el Mediterráneo oriental permaneció relativamente tranquilo durante varias décadas. [106]
Durante el mismo período, la flota bizantina también estuvo activa en el Mar Negro: una flota de la Rus que amenazaba a Constantinopla en 941 fue destruida por 15 viejos barcos reunidos apresuradamente y equipados con fuego griego, y la armada jugó un papel importante en la Guerra Ruso-Bizantina de 970-971 , cuando Juan I Tzimiskes (969-976) envió 300 barcos para bloquear la retirada de la Rus de Kiev sobre el Danubio. [107]
"Esforzaos en todo momento por tener la flota en las mejores condiciones y que no le falte nada. Porque la flota es la gloria de Rhōmania . [...] Los droungarios y protonotarios de la flota deben [...] investigar con rigor la más mínima cosa que se haga a la flota. Porque cuando la flota quede reducida a la nada, seréis derribados y caeréis."
Advertencias al Emperador, del Strategikon de Kekaumenos, cap. 87 [108]
Durante la mayor parte del siglo XI, la armada bizantina enfrentó pocos desafíos. La amenaza musulmana había retrocedido, ya que sus armadas declinaban y las relaciones entre los fatimíes, especialmente, y el Imperio eran en gran parte pacíficas. La última incursión árabe contra territorio imperial se registró en 1035 en las Cícladas , y fue derrotada al año siguiente. [109] Otro ataque de la Rus en 1043 fue rechazado con facilidad, y con la excepción de un breve intento de recuperar Sicilia bajo Jorge Maniakes , tampoco se emprendieron grandes expediciones navales. Inevitablemente, este largo período de paz y prosperidad condujo a la complacencia y el abandono del ejército. Ya en el reinado de Basilio II (976-1025), la defensa del Adriático fue confiada a los venecianos. Bajo Constantino IX (1042-1055), tanto el ejército como la marina se redujeron a medida que el servicio militar se conmutaba cada vez más a favor de pagos en efectivo, lo que resultó en una mayor dependencia de mercenarios extranjeros. [110] [111] Las grandes flotas temáticas declinaron y fueron reemplazadas por pequeños escuadrones sujetos a los comandantes militares locales, orientados más a la supresión de la piratería que a enfrentar a un enemigo marítimo importante. [112]
En el último cuarto del siglo XI, la armada bizantina era una sombra de lo que era, habiendo decaído por la negligencia, la incompetencia de sus oficiales y la falta de fondos. [113] Kekaumenos , escribiendo en c. 1078, lamenta que "con el pretexto de patrullas razonables, [los barcos bizantinos] no están haciendo nada más que transportar trigo, cebada, legumbres, queso, vino, carne, aceite de oliva, una gran cantidad de dinero y cualquier otra cosa" de las islas y costas del Egeo, mientras que "huyen [del enemigo] antes de que los hayan avistado, y así se convierten en una vergüenza para los romanos". [108] Para cuando Kekaumenos escribió, habían surgido nuevos y poderosos adversarios. En Occidente, el Reino normando de Sicilia , que había expulsado a los bizantinos del sur de Italia y había conquistado Sicilia, [114] ahora estaba poniendo su mirada en las costas adriáticas bizantinas y más allá. En Oriente, la desastrosa batalla de Manzikert en 1071 había provocado la pérdida de Asia Menor, el corazón militar y económico del Imperio, a manos de los turcos seléucidas , que en 1081 habían establecido su capital en Nicea , apenas a cien millas al sur de Constantinopla. [115] Poco después, los piratas turcos y cristianos aparecieron en el Egeo. Las flotas temáticas bizantinas, que antaño patrullaban los mares, estaban entonces tan mermadas por la negligencia y las sucesivas guerras civiles que eran incapaces de responder de forma eficaz. [116]
En ese momento, el lamentable estado de la flota bizantina tuvo consecuencias nefastas. La invasión normanda no pudo ser prevenida y su ejército se apoderó de Corfú, desembarcó sin oposición en Epiro y sitió Dirraquio , [117] iniciando una década de guerra que consumió los escasos recursos del Imperio en conflicto. [118] El nuevo emperador, Alejo I Comneno (1081-1118 ) , se vio obligado a pedir la ayuda de los venecianos, quienes en la década de 1070 ya habían afirmado su control del Adriático y Dalmacia contra los normandos. [119] En 1082, a cambio de su ayuda, les otorgó importantes concesiones comerciales. [120] Este tratado, y las posteriores ampliaciones de estos privilegios, prácticamente convirtieron a los bizantinos en rehenes de los venecianos (y más tarde también de los genoveses y los pisanos). El historiador John Birkenmeier señala que:
La falta de una armada en Bizancio [...] significaba que Venecia podía extorsionar regularmente privilegios económicos, determinar si los invasores, como los normandos o los cruzados, entraban al Imperio y detener cualquier intento bizantino de restringir la actividad comercial o naval veneciana. [118]
En los enfrentamientos con los normandos a lo largo de la década de 1080, la única fuerza naval bizantina eficaz era un escuadrón comandado, y posiblemente mantenido, por Michael Maurex , un veterano comandante naval de décadas anteriores. Junto con los venecianos, inicialmente prevaleció sobre la flota normanda, pero la flota conjunta fue tomada por sorpresa y derrotada por los normandos frente a Corfú en 1084. [121] [122]
Alejo se dio cuenta inevitablemente de la importancia de tener su propia flota y, a pesar de su preocupación por las operaciones terrestres, tomó medidas para restablecer la fuerza de la marina. Sus esfuerzos tuvieron cierto éxito, especialmente al contrarrestar los intentos de emires turcos como Tzachas de Esmirna de lanzar flotas en el Egeo. [123] [124] La flota bajo el mando de Juan Ducas se utilizó posteriormente para reprimir las revueltas en Creta y Chipre. [125] Con la ayuda de los cruzados , Alejo pudo recuperar las costas de Anatolia occidental y expandir su influencia hacia el este: en 1104, un escuadrón bizantino de 10 barcos capturó Laodicea y otras ciudades costeras hasta Trípoli . [126] En 1118, Alejo pudo pasar una pequeña armada a su sucesor, Juan II Comneno (1118-1143). [127] Al igual que su padre, Juan II se concentró en el ejército y en las campañas terrestres regulares, pero se ocupó de mantener la fuerza de la marina y el sistema de aprovisionamiento. [124] Sin embargo, en 1122, Juan se negó a renovar los privilegios comerciales que Alejo había concedido a los venecianos. En represalia, los venecianos saquearon varias islas bizantinas y, como la flota bizantina no pudo hacerles frente, Juan se vio obligado a renovar el tratado en 1125. [127] Evidentemente, la marina bizantina en este punto no era lo suficientemente poderosa para que Juan se enfrentara con éxito a Venecia, especialmente porque había otras demandas apremiantes sobre los recursos del Imperio. No mucho después de este incidente, se dice que Juan II, siguiendo el consejo de su ministro de finanzas, Juan de Poutza, recortó la financiación de la flota y la transfirió al ejército, equipando los barcos solo de forma ad hoc . [127] [128]
The navy enjoyed a major comeback under the ambitious emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143–1180), who used it extensively as a powerful tool of foreign policy in his relations with the Latin and Muslim states of the Eastern Mediterranean.[129] During the early years of his reign, the Byzantine naval forces were still weak: in 1147, the fleet of Roger II of Sicily under George of Antioch was able to raid Corfu, the Ionian islands and into the Aegean almost unopposed.[130] In the next year, with Venetian aid, an army accompanied by a very large fleet (allegedly 500 warships and 1,000 transports) was sent to recapture Corfu and the Ionian Islands from the Normans. In retaliation, a Norman fleet of 40 ships reached Constantinople itself, demonstrating in the Bosporus off the Great Palace and raiding its suburbs.[131][132] On its return voyage however it was attacked and destroyed by a Byzantine or Venetian fleet.[132]
In 1155, a Byzantine squadron of 10 ships in support of Norman rebel Robert III of Loritello arrived at Ancona, launching the last Byzantine bid to regain Southern Italy. Despite initial successes and reinforcements under megas doux Alexios Komnenos Bryennios, the expedition was ultimately defeated in 1156, and 4 Byzantine ships were captured.[133] By 1169, the efforts of Manuel had evidently borne fruit, as a large and purely Byzantine fleet of about 150 galleys, 10-12 large transports and 60 horse transports under megas doux Andronikos Kontostephanos was sent to invade Egypt in cooperation with the ruler of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.[134][135] The invasion failed, however, and the Byzantines lost half the fleet in a storm on the way back.[136]
Following the Empire-wide seizure and imprisonment of all Venetians in March 1171, the Byzantine fleet was strong enough to deter an outright attack by the Venetians, who sailed to Chios and settled for negotiations. Manuel sent a fleet of 150 ships under Kontostephanos to confront them there and employed delaying tactics, until, weakened by disease, the Venetians began to withdraw and were pursued by Kontostephanos' fleet.[137] It was a remarkable reversal of fortunes, compared with the humiliation of 1125. In 1177, another fleet of 70 galleys and 80 auxiliary ships under Kontostephanos, destined for Egypt, returned home after appearing off Acre, as Count Philip of Flanders and many important nobles of the Kingdom of Jerusalem refused to participate in the campaign.[136][138][139] However, by the end of Manuel's reign, the strains of constant warfare on all fronts and the Emperor's various grandiose projects had become evident: the historian Niketas Choniates attributes the rise of piracy in the latter years of Manuel's reign to the diversion of the funds intended for the maintenance of the fleet for other needs of the imperial treasury.[140]
After the death of Manuel I and the subsequent demise of the Komnenian dynasty in 1185, the navy declined swiftly. The maintenance of galleys and the upkeep of proficient crews were very expensive, and neglect led to a rapid deterioration of the fleet. Already by 1182 the Byzantines had to pay Venetian mercenaries to crew some of their galleys,[141] but in the 1180s, as the bulk of the Komnenian naval establishment persisted, expeditions of 70–100 ships are still recorded in contemporary sources.[142] Thus Emperor Andronikos I Komnenos (1183–1185) could still gather 100 warships in 1185 to resist and later defeat a Norman fleet in the Sea of Marmara.[143] However, the subsequent peace treaty included a clause that required the Normans to furnish a fleet for the Empire. This, together with a similar agreement made by Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195 and 1203–1204) with Venice the next year, in which the Republic would provide 40–100 galleys at six months' notice in exchange for favourable trading concessions, is a telling indication that the Byzantine government was aware of the inadequacy of its own naval establishment.[141]
The period also saw the rise of piracy across the Eastern Mediterranean. The pirate activity was high in the Aegean, while pirate captains frequently offering themselves as mercenaries to one or the other of the region's powers, providing for the latter a quick and cheap way of raising a fleet for particular expeditions, without the costs of a standing navy. Thus a Byzantine fleet of 66 vessels sent by Isaac II to recapture Cyprus from Isaac Komnenos was destroyed by the pirate Margaritus of Brindisi, who was in the employ of the Normans of Sicily.[144] The depredations of the pirates, especially the Genoese captain Kaphoures, described by Niketas Choniates and his brother, the Metropolitan of Athens Michael Choniates, finally forced the Angeloi to action. The fleet tax was once again levied from the coastal regions and a navy of 30 ships was equipped, which was entrusted to the Calabrian pirate Steiriones. Despite scoring a few early successes, Steiriones' fleet was destroyed in a surprise attack by Kaphoures off Sestos. A second fleet, augmented by Pisan vessels and again commanded by Steiriones, was finally able to defeat Kaphoures and end his raids.[145]
At the same time, however, the then megas doux, Michael Stryphnos, was accused by Niketas Choniates of enriching himself by selling off the equipment of the imperial fleet,[141][146] while by the early 13th century the authority of the central government had weakened to such an extent that various local potentates began seizing power in the provinces.[147] The general atmosphere was one of lawlessness, which enabled men like Leo Sgouros in southern Greece and the imperial governor of Samos, Pegonites, to use their ships for their own purposes, launching raids of their own. Even Emperor Alexios III Angelos (1195–1203) is said to have licensed one of his commanders, Constantine Phrangopoulos, to launch pirate raids against commerce in the Black Sea.[148]
The Byzantine state and its fleet were thus in no state to resist the naval might of Venice, which supported the Fourth Crusade. When Alexios III and Stryphnos were alerted to the fact that the Crusade was sailing for Constantinople, only 20 "wretched and decayed" vessels could be found, according to Niketas Choniates. During the first Crusader siege of the city in 1203, the attempts of the Byzantine ships to oppose the Crusader fleet from entering the Golden Horn were repulsed, and the Byzantine attempt to employ fireships failed due to the Venetians' skill at handling their ships.[149]
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After the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204, the Byzantine Empire was partitioned between the Crusaders, while three Greek successor states were set up, the Despotate of Epirus, the Empire of Trebizond, and the Empire of Nicaea, each claiming the Byzantine imperial title. The former did not maintain a fleet, the Trapezuntine navy was minuscule and mostly used for patrols and transporting troops, while the Nicaeans initially followed a policy of consolidation and used their fleet for coastal defence.[150][151] Under John III Vatatzes (1222–1254), a more energetic foreign policy was pursued, and in 1225, the Nicaean fleet was able to occupy the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Icaria.[152] It was, however, no match for the Venetians: attempting to blockade Constantinople in 1235, the Nicaean navy was defeated by a far smaller Venetian force, and in another similar attempt in 1241, the Nicaeans were again routed.[152] Nicaean efforts during the 1230s to support a local rebellion in Crete against Venice were also only partially successful, with the last Nicaean troops being forced to leave the island in 1236.[153][154] Aware of the weakness of his navy, in March 1261 the Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos (1259–1282) concluded the Treaty of Nymphaeum with the Genoese, securing their aid against Venice at sea, in return for commercial privileges.[155][156]
Following the recapture of Constantinople a few months later however, Michael VIII was able to focus his attention on building up his own fleet. In the early 1260s, the Byzantine navy was still weak and depended still greatly on Genoese aid. Even so, the allies were not able to stand up to Venice in a direct confrontation, as evidenced by the defeat of a combined Byzantine–Genoese fleet of 48 ships by a much smaller Venetian fleet in 1263.[157] Taking advantage of the Italians' preoccupation with the ongoing Venetian–Genoese war,[156] by 1270 Michael's efforts had produced a strong navy of 80 ships, with several Latin privateers sailing under imperial colours. In the same year, a fleet of 24 galleys besieged the town of Oreos in Negroponte (Euboea), and defeated a Latin fleet of 20 galleys.[158] This marked the first successful independent Byzantine naval operation and the beginning of an organized naval campaign in the Aegean that would continue throughout the 1270s and would result in the recapture, albeit briefly, of many islands from the Latins.[159]
This revival did not last long. Following the death of Charles of Anjou in 1285 and the end of the threat of an invasion from Italy, Michael's successor Andronikos II Palaiologos (1282–1328) assumed that, by relying on the naval strength of his Genoese allies, he could do without the maintenance of a fleet, whose particularly heavy expenditure the increasingly cash-strapped treasury could no longer afford. At the same time, Andronikos was less concerned with the West and more with affairs in Asia Minor and his—eventually futile—attempt to stop the Turkish advance there, a policy where the fleet lacked a role. Consequently, the entire fleet was disbanded, its crews dismissed and the ships are broken up or left to rot.[160][161] The results were quick to follow: during Andronikos' long reign, the Turks gradually took permanent possession of the Aegean coasts of Anatolia, with the Empire unable to reverse the situation,[162][163] while the Venetian fleet was able to attack Constantinople and raid its suburbs at will during the 1296–1302 war.[164][165]
Andronikos' decision aroused considerable opposition and criticism from contemporary scholars and officials almost from the outset, and historians like Pachymeres and Nikephoros Gregoras dwell long on the disastrous long-term effects of this short-sighted decision: piracy flourished, often augmented by the crews of the disbanded fleet who took service under Turkish and Latin masters, Constantinople was rendered defenceless towards the Italian maritime powers, and more and more Aegean islands fell under foreign rule—including Chios to the Genoese Benedetto Zaccaria, Rhodes and the Dodecanese to the Hospitallers, Lesbos and other islands to the Gattilusi. As Gregoras commented, "if [the Byzantines] had remained masters of the seas, as they had been, then the Latins would not have grown so arrogant [...], nor would the Turks ever have gazed upon the sands of the [Aegean] sea, [...] nor would we have to pay to everyone tribute every year."[166][167][168] After 1305, bowing to popular pressure and the need to contain the Catalan Company, the Emperor belatedly tried to rebuild the navy of 20 vessels, but although a few ships were built and a small fleet appears to have been active over the next couple of years, it eventually was disbanded again.[169][170]
In the 14th century, recurrent civil wars, attacks from Bulgaria and Serbia in the Balkans and the devastation caused by ever-increasing Turkish raids hastened the collapse of the Byzantine state, which would culminate in its final fall to the Ottoman Turks in 1453.[171] Several emperors after Andronikos II also tried to re-build a fleet, especially in order to secure the security and hence the independence of Constantinople itself from the interference of the Italian maritime powers, but their efforts produced only short-term results.[172]
Thus Andronikos II's successor Andronikos III Palaiologos (1328–1341), immediately after his accession, with the help of contributions from various magnates, assembled a large fleet of reportedly 105 vessels. This he personally led in the last major foray of a Byzantine navy in the Aegean, recovering Chios and Phocaea from the Genoese and forcing various smaller Latin and Turkish principalities to come to terms with him.[173][174] His campaigns against the Ottomans in Bithynia were failures, however, and soon the Ottomans had established their first naval base at Trigleia on the Sea of Marmara, from where they raided the coasts of Thrace.[175] To defend against this new threat, towards the end of Andronikos III's reign a fleet of some 70 ships was built at Constantinople to oppose the Turkish raids, and headed by the megas doux, Alexios Apokaukos.[176] This fleet was very active during the civil war of 1341–1347, in which its commander played a prominent role.[177][178] Following the civil war, Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos (1347–1354) tried to restore the navy and merchant fleet, as a means of both reducing the Empire's economic dependency on the Genoese colony of Galata, which controlled the trade passing through Constantinople, and of securing the control of the Dardanelles against passage by the Turks.[179][180] To that end, he enlisted the aid of the Venetians, but in March 1349, his newly built fleet of nine warships and about 100 smaller vessels were caught in a storm off the southern shore of Constantinople. The inexperienced crews panicked, and the ships were either sunk or captured by the Genoese.[179][181] Undeterred, Kantakouzenos launched another effort at building a fleet, which allowed him to re-establish Byzantine authority over Thessalonica and some coastal cities and islands. A core of this fleet was maintained at Constantinople, and although Byzantine ships remained active in the Aegean, and scored some successes over Turkish pirates, they were never able to stop their activities, let alone challenge the Italian navies for supremacy at sea.[182] Lack of funds condemned the fleet to a mere handful of vessels maintained at Constantinople.[172] It is characteristic that in his 1418 pamphlet to the despotes Theodore II Palaiologos, the scholar Gemistos Plethon advises against the maintenance of a navy, on the grounds that resources were insufficient to adequately maintain both it and an effective army.[183]
Henceforth, the impoverished Byzantine state became a pawn of the great powers of the day, trying to survive by exploiting their rivalries.[184] Thus, for instance, in 1351, Kantakouzenos was induced to side with Venice in its war with Genoa, but, abandoned by the Venetian admirals, his fleet was easily defeated by the Genoese and he was forced to sign an unfavourable peace.[185] During the brief usurpation of John VII in 1390, Manuel II (1391–1425) was able to gather only five galleys and four smaller vessels (including some from the Hospitallers of Rhodes) to recapture Constantinople and rescue his father John V.[186] Six years later, Manuel promised to arm ten ships to assist the Crusade of Nicopolis;[187] twenty years later, he personally commanded 4 galleys and 2 other vessels carrying some infantry and cavalry, and saved the island of Thasos from an invasion.[188] Byzantine ships were active throughout the Ottoman Interregnum, when Byzantium sided with various rival Ottoman princes in turn. Manuel used his ships to ferry the rival pretenders and their forces across the Straits.[189] With Genoese assistance, Manuel's fleet was also able to muster a fleet of eight galleys and capture Gallipoli in May 1410, albeit for a brief time;[190] and in August 1411, the Byzantine fleet was instrumental in the failure of a siege of Constantinople by the Ottoman prince Musa Çelebi, when it defeated Musa's attempt to blockade the city by sea as well.[191] Likewise, in 1421, 10 Byzantine warships were engaged in support of the Ottoman pretender Mustafa against Sultan Murad II.[187]
The last recorded Byzantine naval victory occurred in 1427 in a battle off the Echinades Islands, when the Emperor John VIII Palaiologos (1425–1448) defeated the superior fleet of Carlo I Tocco, Count of Cephalonia and Despot of Epirus, forcing him to relinquish all his holdings in the Morea to the Byzantines.[192] The last appearance of the Byzantine navy was in the final Ottoman siege of 1453, when a mixed fleet of Byzantine, Genoese and Venetian ships (varying numbers are provided by the sources, ranging from 10 to 39 vessels) defended Constantinople against the Ottoman fleet.[193][194] During the siege, on 20 April 1453, the last naval engagement in Byzantine history took place when three Genoese galleys escorting a Byzantine transport fought their way through the huge Ottoman blockade fleet and into the Golden Horn.[195]
Very little is known about the organization of the Roman fleets of late Antiquity, from the gradual break-up of the large provincial fleets into smaller squadrons in the 3rd century to the formation of a new navy at the onset of the Muslim conquests. Despite the evidence of considerable naval activity in this period, earlier scholars believed that the Roman navy had all but vanished by the 4th century, but more recent work has altered this picture towards a transformation into a mainly fluvial and coastal force, designed for close co-operation with the army.[196]
Under Emperor Diocletian (284–305), the navy's strength reportedly increased from 46,000 men to 64,000 men,[197] a figure that represents the numerical peak of the late Roman navy. The Danube Fleet (Classis Histrica) with its attendant legionary flotillas is still well attested in the Notitia Dignitatum, and its increased activity is commented upon by Vegetius (De Re Militari, IV.46). In the West, several fluvial fleets are mentioned, but the old standing praetorian fleets had all but vanished (De Re Militari, IV.31) and even the remaining western provincial fleets appear to have been seriously understrength and incapable of countering any significant barbarian attack.[198] In the East, the Syrian and Alexandrian fleets are known from legal sources to have still existed in c. 400 (Codex Justinianus, XI.2.4 & XI.13.1), while a fleet is known to have been stationed at Constantinople itself, perhaps created out of the remnants of the praetorian fleets.[8] In 400 it was sufficient to slaughter a large number of Goths who had built rafts and tried to cross the strip of sea that separates Asia from Europe.[199] Its size, however, is unknown, and it does not appear in the Notitia.[200]
For operations in the Mediterranean during the 5th century, fleets appear to have been assembled on an ad hoc basis and then disbanded.[16] The first permanent Byzantine fleet can be traced to the early 6th century and the revolt of Vitalian in 513–515, when Anastasius I created a fleet to counter the rebels' own.[16] This fleet was retained and under Justinian I and his successors it was developed into a professional and well-maintained force.[26] Because of the absence of any naval threat, however, the navy of the late 6th century was relatively small, with several small flotillas in the Danube and two main fleets maintained at Ravenna and Constantinople.[201] Additional flotillas must have been stationed at the other great maritime and commercial centres of the Empire: at Alexandria, providing the escort to the annual grain fleet to Constantinople, and at Carthage, controlling the western Mediterranean. Justinian also stationed troops and ships at the more remote outposts of the Empire, at Septem (Ceuta), Cherson in the Crimea, and Aelana (Eilat) in the Gulf of Aqaba.[202][203][204] The long-established naval tradition and infrastructure of those areas made the maintenance of the fleet easier, and, in the event of a naval expedition, a large fleet could be quickly and inexpensively assembled by impressing the numerous merchant vessels.[205]
In response to the Arab conquests during the 7th century, the whole administrative and military system of the Empire was reformed, and the thematic system established. According to this, the Empire was divided into several themes (Ancient Greek: θέματα, romanized: themata, sing. θέμα, thema), which were regional civil and military administrations. Under the command of a strategos, each theme maintained its own, locally levied forces. Following a series of revolts by thematic forces, under Constantine V the larger early themes were progressively broken up, while a central imperial army, the tagmata, was created, stationed at or near Constantinople, serving as a central reserve that henceforth formed the core of campaigning armies.[206][207]
A similar process was followed in the fleet, which was organized along similar lines. In the second half of the 7th century, the fleet of the Karabisianoi (Ancient Greek: Καραβισιάνοι, lit. 'the Ships' Men') was created.[208] The exact date is unknown, with suggestions ranging from the 650s/660s, in response to the Battle of the Masts,[33][209][210] or following the first Arab siege of Constantinople in 672–678.[211] Its origin is also unknown: it was recruited possibly from the remainders of the old quaestura exercitus,[212] or the army of the Illyricum.[213] It was headed by a strategos (strategos ton karabon/karabisianon, lit. 'general of the ships/seafarers'),[214] and included the southern coast of Asia Minor from Miletus to the frontier with the Caliphate near Seleucia in Cilicia, the Aegean islands and the imperial holdings in southern Greece. Its headquarters was initially perhaps at Samos, with a subordinate command under a droungarios at Cibyrrha in Pamphylia. As its name suggests, it comprised most of the Empire's standing navy, and faced the principal maritime threat, the Arab fleets of Egypt and Syria.[105][212]
The Karabisianoi however proved inadequate and were replaced in the early 8th century by a more complex system composed of three elements, which with minor alterations survived until the 11th century: a central imperial fleet based at Constantinople, a small number of large regional naval commands, either naval themes or independent commands termed "droungariates", and a greater number of local squadrons charged with purely defensive and police tasks and subordinate to the local provincial governors.[215] Unlike the earlier Roman navy, where the provincial fleets were decidedly inferior in numbers and included only lighter vessels than the central fleets, the Byzantine regional fleets were probably formidable formations in their own right.[216]
The capital's navy had played a central role in the repulsion of the Arab sieges of Constantinople,[212] but the exact date of the establishment of the Imperial Fleet (βασιλικὸς στόλος, basilikos stolos, or βασιλικὸν πλόϊμον, basilikon ploïmon) as a distinct command is unclear. The Irish historian J. B. Bury, followed by the French Byzantinist Rodolphe Guilland, considered it "not improbable" that the Imperial Fleet existed as a subordinate command under the strategos ton karabisianon already in the 7th century.[217][218] On the other hand, the droungarios of the Imperial Fleet first appears in the Taktikon Uspensky of c. 842/3;[218] and as there is little evidence for major fleets operating from Constantinople during the 8th century, the Greek Byzantinist Hélène Ahrweiler dated the fleet's creation to the early 9th century.[219] From that point on, the Imperial Fleet formed the main naval reserve force and provided the core of various expeditionary fleets.[220]
The first and for a long time only maritime theme (θέμα ναυτικόν, thema nautikon) was the Theme of the Cibyrrhaeots (θέμα Κιβυρραιωτῶν, thema Kibyrrhaioton). It was created from the Karabisianoi fleet, and assigned to the administration and defence of the southern coasts of Asia Minor.[221][222] The exact date of its creation is unclear, with one view proposing c. 719[223][224] and another c. 727.[46] Its strategos, first mentioned in 734, was based at Attaleia.[225][226] His principal lieutenants were the katepano (head commander) of the Mardaites, an ek prosopou (deputy commander) at Syllaeum and droungarioi of Attaleia and Kos.[226][227] Being located closest to the Muslim Levant, it remained the Empire's principal naval fleet for centuries,[105] until it was reduced with the decline of the Arab naval threat. The fleet is last mentioned in 1043, and thereafter the theme became a purely civilian province.[226]
The Cibyrrhaeots were complemented by two independent naval commands in the Aegean, each headed by a droungarios: the Aigaion Pelagos ('Aegean Sea'), covering the northern half of the Aegean and the Dardanelles and Marmara Sea,[228] and the command variously known as the Dodekanesos ('Twelve Islands') and Kolpos ('Gulf'), which was based at Samos and comprised the southern Aegean including the Cyclades.[229] Unlike the other droungarioi, who headed subordinate commands, these two circumscriptions were completely independent, and their droungarioi exercised both civil and military authority over them.[230] Eventually, they were raised to full maritime themes, the Theme of the Aegean Sea (θέμα τοῦ Αἰγαίου Πελάγους, thema tou Aigaiou Pelagous) in c. 843,[58][231] while the eastern parts of the Dodekanesos/Kolpos droungariate formed the Theme of Samos (θέμα Σάμου, thema Samou) in the late 9th century. It comprised it the Ionian coast, and its capital was at Smyrna.[229][232]
Some of the other, 'land' themes also maintained sizeable squadrons, usually placed under a tourmarches (mentioned collectively as tourmarchai ton ploïmaton in the Taktikon Uspensky). They played an intermediate role between the large thematic fleets and the central Imperial Fleet: they were permanent squadrons with professional crews (taxatoi), maintained by resources from the imperial treasury and not the province they were stationed in, but subordinate to the local thematic strategos and charged mainly with local defence and police duties.[233] These were:
Isolated regions of particular importance for the control of the major sea-lanes were covered by separate officials with the title of archon, who in some cases may have commanded detachments of the Imperial Fleet. Such archontes are known for Chios, Malta, the Euboic Gulf, and possibly Vagenetia and "Bulgaria" (whose area of control is identified by Ahrweiler with the mouths of the Danube).[239] These vanished by the end of the 9th century, either succumbing to Arab attacks or being reformed or incorporated into themes.[240]
Just as with its land counterpart, the exact size of the Byzantine navy and its units is a matter of considerable debate, owing to the scantness and ambiguous nature of the primary sources. One exceptions are the numbers for the late 9th and early 10th century, for which we possess a more detailed breakdown, dated to the Cretan expedition of 911. These lists reveal that during the reign of Leo VI the Wise, the navy reached 34,200 oarsmen and perhaps as many as 8,000 marines.[3] The central Imperial Fleet totalled some 19,600 oarsmen and 4,000 marines under the command of the droungarios of the Imperial Fleet. These four thousand marines were professional soldiers, first recruited as a corps by Basil I in the 870s. They were a great asset to the Imperial Fleet, for whereas previously it had depended on thematic and tagmatic soldiers for its marines, the new force provided a more reliable, better trained and immediately available force at the Emperor's disposal.[73] The high status of these marines is illustrated by the fact that they were considered to belong to the imperial tagmata, and were organized along similar lines.[241] The Aegean thematic fleet numbered 2,610 oarsmen and 400 marines, the Cibyrrhaeot fleet stood at 5,710 oarsmen and 1,000 marines, the Samian fleet at 3,980 oarsmen and 600 marines, and finally, the Theme of Hellas furnished 2,300 oarsmen with a portion of its 2,000 thematic soldiers doubling as marines.[3]
The following table contains estimates, by Warren T. Treadgold, of the number of oarsmen over the entire history of the Byzantine navy:
Contrary to popular perception, galley slaves were not used as oarsmen, either by the Byzantines or the Arabs, or by their Roman and Greek predecessors.[247] Throughout the existence of the Empire, Byzantine crews consisted of mostly lower-class freeborn men, who were professional soldiers, legally obliged to perform military service (strateia) in return for pay or land estates. In the first half of the 10th century, the latter were calculated to be of the value of 2–3 pounds (0.91–1.36 kg) of gold for sailors and marines.[248][249] Use was however made of prisoners of war and foreigners as well. Alongside the Mardaites, who formed a significant part of the fleet's crews, an enigmatic group known as the Toulmatzoi (possibly Dalmatians) appears in the Cretan expeditions, as well as many Rus', who were given the right to serve in the Byzantine armed forces in a series of 10th-century treaties.[250][251]
In his De Ceremoniis, Constantine Porphyrogennetos gives the fleet lists for the expeditions against Crete of 911 and 949. These references have sparked a considerable debate as to their interpretation: thus the numbers given for the entire Imperial Fleet in 949 can be interpreted as either 100, 150 or 250 ships, depending on the reading of the Greek text. The precise meaning of the term ousia (οὺσία) is also a subject of confusion: traditionally, it is held to have been a standard complement of 108 men, and that more than one could be present aboard a single ship. In the context of the De Ceremoniis however, it can also be read simply as "unit" or "ship".[252][253] The number of 150 seems more compatible with the numbers recorded elsewhere, and is accepted by most scholars, although they differ as to the composition of the fleet. Makrypoulias interprets the number as 8 pamphyloi, 100 ousiakoi and 42 dromones proper, the latter including the two imperial vessels and the ten ships of the Stenon squadron.[254][4] As for the total size of the Byzantine navy in this period, Warren Treadgold extrapolates a total, including the naval themes, of c. 240 warships, a number which was increased to 307 for the Cretan expedition of 960–961. According to Treadgold, the latter number probably represents the approximate standing strength of the entire Byzantine navy (including the smaller flotillas) in the 9th and 10th centuries.[4] It is however noteworthy that a significant drop in the numbers of ships and men attached to the thematic fleets is evident between 911 and 949. This drop, which reduced the size of thematic fleets from a third to a quarter of the total navy, was partly due to the increased use of the lighter ousiakos type instead of the heavier dromon proper, and partly due to financial and manpower difficulties. It is also indicative of a general trend that would lead to the complete disappearance of the provincial fleets by the late 11th century.[255]
Although naval themes were organized much the same way as their land counterparts, there is some confusion in the Byzantine sources as to the exact rank structure.[256] The usual term for admiral was strategos, the same term used for the generals that governed the land themes. Under the strategos were two or three tourmarchai (sing. tourmarches, effectively 'vice admiral'), in turn overseeing a number of droungarioi (sing. droungarios, corresponding to 'rear admiral').[257] Until the mid-9th century, the governors of the themes of the Aegean and Samos are also recorded as droungarioi, since their commands were split off from the original Karabisianoi fleet, but they were then raised to the rank of strategos.[257] As the thematic admirals also doubled as governors of their themes, they were assisted by a protonotarios (chief secretary) who headed the civilian administration of the theme. Further staff officers were the chartoularios in charge of the fleet administration, the protomandator (chief messenger), who acted as chief of staff, and a number of staff kometes ('counts', sing. komes), including a komes tes hetaireias, who commanded the bodyguard (hetaireia) of the admiral.[258]
The Imperial Fleet was a different case, as it was not tied to the thematic administration, but was considered as one of the tagmata, the professional central reserve forces.[259] Consequently, the commander of the Imperial Fleet remained known as the droungarios tou basilikou ploïmou (later with the prefix megas, 'grand').[260] Originally very lowly ranked, the office rose quickly in the hierarchy: by 899 he was placed immediately before or after the logothetes tou dromou, and ahead of various senior military and civil officials. He was also notable in not being classed with the other military commanders, whether of the themes or of the tagmata, but in the special class of military officials, the stratarchai, where he is listed second after the hetaireiarches, the commander of the imperial bodyguard.[261][262] His title is still found in the Komnenian era, albeit as commander of the imperial escort squadron, and survived until the Palaiologan era, being listed in the 14th-century Book of Offices of Pseudo-Kodinos.[263] The office of a deputy called topoteretes is also mentioned for the Imperial Fleet, but his role is unclear from the sources. He may have held a post similar to that of a port admiral.[264] Although some of these senior officers were professional seamen, having risen from the ranks, most fleet commanders were high court officials, who would have relied on their more experienced professional subordinates for nautical expertise.[265]
In the lower levels of organization, there was more uniformity: squadrons of three or five ships were commanded by a komes or droungarokomes, and each ship's captain was called kentarchos ('centurion'), although literary sources also used more archaic terms like nauarchos or even trierarchos.[266] Each ship's crew, depending on its size, was composed of one to three ousiai. Under the captain, there was the bandophoros ('banner bearer'), who acted as executive officer, two protokaraboi (sing. protokarabos, 'first ship-man'), sometimes also referred to archaically as kybernetes, and a bow officer, the proreus.[267] The protokaraboi were helmsmen, in charge of the steering oars in the stern, as well as of the rowers on either side of the ship. The senior of the two was the "first protokarabos (protos protokarabos).[268] In actual terms, there probably were several of each kind of officer upon each ship, working in shifts.[269] Most of these officers rose from the ranks, and there are references in the De Administrando Imperio to first oarsmen (protelatai) who rose to become protokaraboi in the imperial barges, and later assumed still higher offices; Emperor Romanos Lekapenos being the most successful example.[270] There were also a number of specialists on board, such as the two bow oarsmen and the siphonatores, who worked the siphons used for discharging the Greek fire.[267] A boukinator (trumpeter) is also recorded in the sources,[271] who conveyed orders to the rowers (koplatai or elatai).[272] Since the marine infantry were organized as regular army units,[272] their ranks followed those of the army.
After the decline of the navy in the 11th century, Alexios I rebuilt it on different lines. Since the thematic fleets had all but vanished, their remnants were amalgamated into a unified imperial fleet, under the new office of the megas doux. The first known occupant of the office was Alexios' brother-in-law John Doukas, in c. 1092. The megas droungarios tou ploïmou, once the overall naval commander, was subordinated to him, acting now as his principal aide.[124][273] The megas doux was also appointed as overall governor of southern Greece, the old themes of Hellas and the Peloponnese, which were divided into districts (oria) that supplied the fleet.[274][275] Under John II, the Aegean islands also became responsible for the maintenance, crewing and provision of warships, and contemporary sources took pride in the fact that the great fleets of Manuel's reign were crewed by "native Romans", although use continued to be made of mercenaries and allied squadrons.[124][276] However, the fact that the fleet was now exclusively built and based around Constantinople, and that provincial fleets were not reconstituted, did have its drawbacks, as outlying areas, in particular Greece, were left vulnerable to attack.[277]
With the decline of the Byzantine fleet in the latter 12th century, the Empire increasingly relied on the fleets of Venice and Genoa. Following the sack of 1204 however, sources suggest the presence of a relatively strong fleet already under the first Nicaean emperor, Theodore I Laskaris, although specific details are lacking. Under John III and Theodore II (r. 1254–1258), the navy had two main strategic areas of operations: the Aegean, entailing operations against the Greek islands (chiefly Rhodes) as well as the transport and supply of armies fighting in the Balkans, and the Sea of Marmara, where the Nicaeans aimed to interdict Latin shipping and threaten Constantinople. Smyrna provided the main shipyard and base for the Aegean, with a secondary one at Stadeia, while the main base for operations in the Marmara Sea was Holkos, near Lampsakos across the Gallipoli peninsula.[278]
Despite their efforts, the Nicaean emperors failed to successfully challenge the Venetian domination of the seas, and were forced to turn to the Genoese for aid.[279][155] After regaining Constantinople in 1261 however, Michael VIII initiated a great effort to lessen this dependence by building a "national" navy, forming a number of new corps to this purpose: the Gasmouloi (Γασμοῦλοι), who were men of mixed Greek-Latin descent living around the capital; and men from Laconia, called Lakones) or Tzakones (Τζάκωνες), were used as marines, forming the bulk of Byzantine naval manpower in the 1260s and 1270s.[280][281][282] Michael also set the rowers, called Prosalentai (Προσαλενταί) or Proselontes (Προσελῶντες), apart as a separate corps.[283] All these groups received small grants of land to cultivate in exchange for their service, and were settled together in small colonies.[284] The Prosalentai were settled near the sea throughout the northern Aegean,[285] while the Gasmouloi and Tzakones were settled mostly around Constantinople and in Thrace. These corps remained extant, albeit in a diminished form, throughout the last centuries of the Empire; indeed the Gasmouloi of Gallipoli formed the bulk of the crews of the first Ottoman fleets after the Ottomans captured the area.[280] Throughout the Palaiologan period, the fleet's main base was the harbour of Kontoskalion on the Marmara shore of Constantinople, dredged and refortified by Michael VIII.[282] Among the provincial naval centres, probably the most important was Monemvasia in the Peloponnese.[286]
At the same time, Michael and his successors continued the well-established practice of using foreigners in the fleet. Alongside the mistrusted Italian city-states, with whom alliances shifted regularly, mercenaries were increasingly employed in the last centuries of the Empire, often rewarded for their services with fiefs. Most of these mercenaries, like Giovanni de lo Cavo (lord of Anafi and Rhodes), Andrea Morisco (successor of de lo Cavo in Rhodes) and Benedetto Zaccaria (lord of Chios and Phocaea), were Genoese, the Byzantines' major ally in the period. Under Michael VIII, for the first time a foreigner, the Italian privateer Licario, became megas doux and was given Euboea as a fief.[287][288] In 1303, another high rank, that of amerales (ἀμηράλης or ἀμηραλῆς) was introduced. The term had already entered Byzantine usage through contact with the Kingdom of Naples and other Western nations, but was rarely used; it was adopted as part of the imperial hierarchy, coming after the megas doux and the megas droungarios, with the arrival of the mercenaries of the Catalan Company. Only two holders are known, Ferran d'Aunés and Andrea Morisco, both from 1303 to 1305, although the rank continued to be mentioned in various lists of offices long after that.[289] Thus, according to the mid-14th century Book of Offices, the subordinates of the megas doux were the megas droungarios tou stolou, the ameralios, the protokomes, the junior droungarioi, and the junior kometes.[290][1] Pseudo-Kodinos also records that, while the other warships flew "the usual imperial flag" (βασιλικὸν φλάμουλον, basilikon phlamoulon) of the cross and the firesteels, the megas doux flew an image of the emperor on horseback as his distinctive ensign.[1]
The primary warship of the Byzantine navy until the 12th century was the dromon and other similar ship types. Apparently an evolution of the light liburnian galleys of the imperial Roman fleets, the term first appears in the late 5th century, and was commonly used for a specific kind of war-galley by the 6th.[291] The term dromon (δρόμων) itself comes from the Greek root δρομ-(άω), lit. 'to run', thus meaning 'runner'; 6th-century authors like Procopius are explicit in their references to the speed of these vessels.[292] During the next few centuries, as the naval struggle with the Arabs intensified, heavier versions with two or possibly even three banks of oars evolved.[293] Eventually, the term was used in the general sense of 'warship', and was often used interchangeably with another Byzantine term for a large warship, chelandion (χελάνδιον, from the Greek word keles, 'courser'), which first appeared during the 8th century.[294]
The appearance and evolution of medieval warships is a matter of debate and conjecture: until recently, no remains of an oared warship from either ancient or early medieval times had been found, and information had to be gathered by analyzing literary evidence, crude artistic depictions and the remains of a few merchant vessels. Only in 2005–2006 did archaeological digs for the Marmaray project in the location of the Harbour of Theodosius (modern Yenikapi) uncover the remains of over 36 Byzantine ships from the 6th to 10th centuries, including four light galleys of the galea type.[295]
The accepted view is that the main developments which differentiated the early dromons from the liburnians, and that henceforth characterized Mediterranean galleys, were the adoption of a full deck (katastrōma), the abandonment of the rams on the bow in favour of an above-water spur, and the gradual introduction of lateen sails.[296] The exact reasons for the abandonment of the ram (Latin: rostrum; ἔμβολος, embolos) are unclear. Depictions of upward-pointing beaks in the 4th-century Vatican Vergil manuscript may well illustrate that the ram had already been replaced by a spur in late antique galleys.[297] One possibility is that the change occurred because of the gradual evolution of the ancient shell-first mortise and tenon hull construction method, against which rams had been designed, into the skeleton-first method, which produced a stronger and more flexible hull, less susceptible to ram attacks.[298] Certainly by the early 7th century, the ram's original function had been forgotten, if we judge by Isidore of Seville's comments that they were used to protect against collision with underwater rocks.[299] As for the lateen sail, various authors have in the past suggested that it was introduced into the Mediterranean by the Arabs, possibly with an ultimate origin in India. However, the discovery of new depictions and literary references in recent decades has led scholars to antedate the appearance of the lateen sail in the Levant to the late Hellenistic or early Roman period.[300][301][302][303] Not only the triangular, but also the quadrilateral version were known, used for centuries (mostly on smaller craft) in parallel with square sails.[300][304] Belisarius' invasion fleet of 533 was apparently at least partly fitted with lateen sails, making it probable that by the time the lateen had become the standard rig for the dromon,[305] with the traditional square sail gradually falling from use in medieval navigation.[304]
The dromons that Procopius describes were single-banked ships of probably 50 oars, arranged with 25 oars on each side.[306] Again unlike Hellenistic vessels, which used an outrigger (parexeiresia), these extended directly from the hull.[307] In the later bireme dromons of the 9th and 10th centuries, the two oar banks (elasiai) were divided by the deck, with the first oar bank was situated below, whilst the second oar bank was situated above deck; these rowers were expected to fight alongside the marines in boarding operations.[308] Makrypoulias suggests 25 oarsmen beneath and 35 on the deck on either side for a dromon of 120 rowers.[309] The overall length of these ships was probably about 32 meters.[310] Although most contemporary vessels had a single mast (histos or katartion), the larger bireme dromons probably needed at least two masts in order to manoeuvre effectively,[311] assuming that a single lateen sail for a ship this size would have reached unmanageable dimensions.[312] The ship was steered by means of two quarter rudders at the stern (prymne), which also housed a tent (skene) that covered the captain's berth (krab[b]at[t]os).[313] The prow (prora) featured an elevated forecastle (pseudopation), below which the siphon for the discharge of Greek fire projected,[314] although secondary siphons could also be carried amidships on either side.[315] A pavesade (kastelloma), on which marines could hang their shields, ran around the sides of the ship, providing protection to the deck crew.[316] Larger ships also had wooden castles (xylokastra) on either side between the masts, similar to those attested for the Roman liburnians, providing archers with elevated firing platforms.[317] The bow spur (peronion) was intended to ride over an enemy ship's oars, breaking them and rendering it helpless against missile fire and boarding actions.[318]
The four galeai ships uncovered in the Yenikapi excavations, dating to the 10th–11th centuries, are of uniform design and construction, suggesting a centralized manufacturing process. They have a length of c. 30 m, and are built of European Black Pine and Oriental plane.[319]
By the 10th century, there were three main classes of bireme (two oar-banks) warships of the general dromon type, as detailed in the inventories for the Cretan expeditions of 911 and 949: the [chelandion] ousiakon ([χελάνδιον] οὑσιακόν), so named because it was manned by an ousia of 108; the [chelandion] pamphylon ([χελάνδιον] πάμφυλον), crewed with up to 120–160 men, its name either implying an origin in the region of Pamphylia as a transport ship or its crewing with "picked crews" (from πᾶν+φῦλον, 'all tribes'); and the dromon proper, crewed by two ousiai.[320][321] In the De Ceremoniis, the heavy dromon is said to have an even larger crew of 230 rowers and 70 marines; naval historian John H. Pryor considers them as supernumerary crews being carried aboard, while the Greek scholar Christos Makrypoulias suggests that the extra men correspond to a second rower on each of the upper-bank oars.[322][323] A smaller, single-bank ship, the moneres (μονήρης, 'single-banked') or galea (γαλέα, from which the term 'galley' derives), with c. 60 men as crew, was used for scouting missions but also in the wings of the battle line.[324] The galea in particular seems to have been strongly associated with the Mardaites, and Christos Makrypoulias even suggests that the ship was exclusively used by them.[325] Three-banked ('trireme') dromons are described in a 9th-century work dedicated to the parakoimomenos Basil Lekapenos. However, this treatise, which survives only in fragments, draws heavily upon references on the appearance and construction of a Classical trireme, and must therefore be used with care when trying to apply it to the warships of the middle Byzantine period.[326][327] The existence of trireme vessels is, however, attested in the Fatimid navy in the 11th and 12th centuries, and references made by Leo VI to large Arab ships in the 10th century may also indicate trireme galleys.[328]
For cargo transport, the Byzantines usually commandeered ordinary merchantmen as transport ships (phortegoi) or supply ships (skeuophora). These appear to have been mostly sailing vessels, rather than oared.[329] The Byzantines and Arabs also employed horse-transports (hippagoga), which were either sailing ships or galleys, the latter certainly modified to accommodate the horses.[330] Given that the chelandia appear originally to have been oared horse-transports, this would imply differences in construction between the chelandion and the dromon proper, terms which otherwise are often used indiscriminately in literary sources. While the dromon was developed exclusively as a war galley, the chelandion would have had to have a special compartment amidships to accommodate a row of horses, increasing its beam and hold depth.[331] In addition, Byzantine sources refer to the sandalos or sandalion (σάνδαλος, σανδάλιον), which was a boat carried along by the bigger ships. The kind described in the De Ceremoniis had a single mast, four oars and a rudder.[332] In the earlier years of the empire, shipbuilding wood for transport and supply ships was mainly from conifers, but in the later years from broad-leaved trees, possibly from forests in what is now Turkey.[333]
The exact period when the dromon was superseded by galea-derived ships of Italian origin is uncertain. The term dromon continued in use until the late 12th century, although Byzantine writers were indiscriminate in their use of it.[334] Contemporary Western writers used the term to denote large ships, usually transports, and there is evidence to support the idea that this usage had also spread to the Byzantines.[335] William of Tyre's description of the Byzantine fleet in 1169, where "dromons" are classed as very large transports, and the warships with two oar banks are set apart from them, may thus indeed indicate the adoption of the new bireme galley types by the Byzantines.[336] From the 13th century on, the term dromon fell into gradual disuse and was replaced by katergon (κάτεργον, meaning 'detailed to/owing a service'), a late-11th century term which originally applied to the crews, who were drawn from populations detailed to military service.[337] During the latter period of the Byzantine Empire, Byzantine ships were based on Western models: the term katergon is used indiscriminately for both Byzantine and Latin ships, and the horse-carrying chelandion was replaced by the Western taride (itself deriving from Arabic tarrida, adopted as tareta, ταρέτα, in Greek).[338] A similar process is seen in surviving sources from Angevin Sicily, where the term lang was replaced by the taride, although for a time both continued to be used. No construction differences are mentioned between the two, with both terms referring to horse-carrying vessels (usserii) capable of carrying from 20 to 40 horses.[339]
The bireme Italian-style galleys remained the mainstay of Mediterranean fleets until the late 13th century, although again, contemporary descriptions provide little detail on their construction.[340] From that point on, the galleys universally became trireme ships, i.e. with three men on a single bank located above deck, each rowing a different oar; the so-called alla sensile system.[341][342] The Venetians also developed the so-called "great galley", which was an enlarged galley capable of carrying more cargo for trade.[343]
Little is known on particular Byzantine ships during the period. The accounts of the 1437 journey by sea of the Byzantine delegation to the Council of Florence, by the Byzantine cleric Sylvester Syropoulos and the Greek-Venetian captain Michael of Rhodes, mention that most of the ships were Venetian or Papal, but also record that Emperor John VIII travelled on an "imperial ship". It is unclear whether that ship was Byzantine or had been hired, and its type is not mentioned. It is, however, recorded as having been faster than the Venetian great merchant galleys accompanying it, possibly indicating that it was a light war galley.[344] Michael of Rhodes also wrote a treatise on shipbuilding, which provided construction instructions and illustrations of the main vessels, both galleys and sailing ships, used by Venice and the other maritime states of the region in the first half of the 15th century.
The Byzantines took care to codify, preserve and pass on the lessons of warfare at land and sea from past experience, through the use of military manuals. Despite their sometimes antiquarian terminology, these texts form the basis of our knowledge on Byzantine naval affairs. The main surviving texts are the chapters on sea combat (peri naumachias) in the Tactica of Leo the Wise and Nikephoros Ouranos (both drawing extensively from the Naumachiai of Syrianos Magistros and other earlier works),[326] complemented by relevant passages in the De Administrando Imperio of Constantine Porphyrogennetos and other works by Byzantine and Arab writers.[29]
When examining ancient and medieval naval operations, it is necessary to first understand the technological limitations of galley fleets. Galleys did not handle well in rough waters and could be swamped by waves, which would be catastrophic in the open sea; history is replete with instances where galley fleets were sunk by bad weather (e.g. the Roman losses during the First Punic War).[345] The sailing season was therefore usually restricted from mid-spring to September.[346] The maintainable cruising speed of a galley, even when using sails, was limited, as were the amount of supplies it could carry.[347] Water in particular, being essentially a galley's "fuel" supply, was of critical importance. There is no evidence that the navy operated dedicated supply ships to support the warships.[348] With consumption levels estimated at 8 litres a day for every oarsman, its availability was a decisive operational factor in the often water-scarce and sun-baked coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean.[349] Smaller dromons are estimated to have been able to carry about four days' worth of water.[350] Effectively, this meant that fleets composed of galleys were confined to coastal routes,[345] and had to make frequent landfall to replenish their supplies and rest their crews.[351] This is well attested in Byzantine overseas endeavours, from Belisarius' campaign against the Vandals to the Cretan expeditions of the 9th and 10th centuries. It is for these reasons that Nikephoros Ouranos emphasizes the need to have available "men with accurate knowledge and experience of the sea [...], which winds cause it to swell and which blow from the land. They should know both the hidden rocks in the sea, and the places which have no depth, and the land along which one sails and the islands adjacent to it, the harbours and the distance such harbours are the one from the other. They should know both the countries and the water supplies."[350]
Medieval Mediterranean naval warfare was therefore essentially coastal and amphibious in nature, carried out to seize coastal territory or islands, and not to exercise "sea control" as it is understood today.[352] Furthermore, following the abandonment of the ram, the only truly "ship-killing" weapon available prior to the advent of gunpowder and explosive shells,[353] sea combat became, in the words of John Pryor, "more unpredictable. No longer could any power hope to have such an advantage in weaponry or the skill of crews that success could be expected."[354] It is no surprise therefore that the Byzantine and Arab manuals emphasize cautious tactics, with the priority given to the preservation of one's own fleet, and the acquisition of accurate intelligence, often through the use of spies posing as merchants. Emphasis was placed on achieving tactical surprise and, conversely, on avoiding being caught unprepared by the enemy. Ideally, battle was to be given only when assured of superiority by virtue of numbers or tactical disposition.[355][356] Importance is also laid on matching one's forces and tactics to the prospective enemy: Leo VI, for instance, contrasted (Tactica, XIX.74–77) the Arabs with their heavy and slow ships (koumbaria), to the small and fast craft (akatia, chiefly monoxyla), of the Slavs and Rus'.[357]
On campaign, following the assembly of the various squadrons at fortified bases (aplekta) along the coast, the fleet consisted of the main body, composed of the oared warships, and the baggage train (touldon) of sailing vessels and oared transports, which would be sent away in the event of battle.[358] The battle fleet was divided into squadrons, and orders were transmitted from ship to ship through signal flags (kamelaukia) and lanterns.[359] The navy played key role in supplying land-based forces.[102]
On the approach to and during an actual battle, a well-ordered formation was critical: if a fleet fell into disorder, its ships would be unable to lend support to each other and probably would be defeated.[361] Fleets that failed to keep an ordered formation or that could not order themselves into an appropriate counter-formation (antiparataxis) to match that of the enemy, often avoided, or broke off from battle.[362][363] Tactical manoeuvres were therefore intended to disrupt the enemy formation,[362] including the use of various stratagems, such as dividing one's force and carrying out flanking manoeuvres, feigning retreat or hiding a reserve in ambush (Tactica, XIX.52–56).[364] Indeed, Leo VI openly advised (Tactica, XIX.36) against direct confrontation and advocates the use of stratagems instead.[365] According to Leo VI (Tactica, XIX.52), a crescent formation seems to have been the norm, with the flagship in the centre and the heavier ships at the horns of the formation, in order to turn the enemy's flanks.[366] A range of variants and other tactics and counter-tactics was available, depending on the circumstances.[29]
Once the fleets were close enough, exchanges of missiles began, ranging from combustible projectiles to arrows and javelins. The aim was not to sink ships, but to deplete the ranks of the enemy crews before the boarding actions, which decided the outcome.[367] Once the enemy strength was judged to have been reduced sufficiently, the fleets closed in, the ships grappled each other, and the marines and upper bank oarsmen boarded the enemy vessel and engaged in hand-to-hand combat.[368]
Unlike the warships of Antiquity, Byzantine and Arab ships did not feature rams, and the primary means of ship-to-ship combat were boarding actions and missile fire, as well as the use of inflammable materials such as Greek fire.[216] Despite the fearsome reputation of the latter, it was only effective under certain circumstances, and not the decisive anti-ship weapon that the ram had been in the hands of experienced crews.[369]
Like their Roman predecessors, Byzantine and Muslim ships were equipped with small catapults (mangana) and ballistae (toxoballistrai) that launched stones, arrows, javelins, pots of Greek fire or other incendiary liquids, caltrops (triboloi) and even containers full of lime to choke the enemy or, as Emperor Leo VI suggests, scorpions and snakes (Tactica, XIX.61–65).[370] Marines and the upper-bank oarsmen were heavily armoured in preparation for battle (Leo referred to them as "cataphracts") and armed with close-combat arms such as lances and swords, while the other sailors wore padded felt jackets (neurika) for protection and fought with bows and crossbows.[371] The importance and volume of missile fire during sea combat can be gauged from the fleet manifests for the Cretan expeditions of the 10th century, which mention 10,000 caltrops, 50 bows and 10,000 arrows, 20 hand-carried ballistrai with 200 bolts myai, 'flies') and 100 javelins per dromon.[372]
From the 12th century on, the crossbow (called τζᾶγγρα, tzangra in Greek) became increasingly important in Mediterranean warfare, remaining the most deadly weapon available until the advent of fully rigged ships with gunpowder artillery.[373] The Byzantines made infrequent use of the weapon, chiefly in sieges, although its use is recorded in some sea battles.[374] Cannons were introduced in the latter half of the 14th century, but they were rarely used by the Byzantines, who only had a few artillery pieces for the defence of the land walls of Constantinople. Unlike the Venetians and Genoese, there is no indication that the Byzantines ever mounted any on ships.[375]
"Greek fire" was the name given by Western Europeans to the flammable concoction used by the Byzantines, so called because the Europeans viewed the Byzantines as Greeks instead of Romans. The Byzantines themselves used various descriptive names for it, but the most common was 'liquid fire' (ὑγρόν πῦρ). Although the use of incendiary chemicals by the Byzantines has been attested to since the early 6th century, the actual substance known as Greek fire is believed to have been created in 673 and is attributed to an engineer from Syria, named Kallinikos.[376] The most common method of deployment was to emit the formula through a large bronze tube (siphon) onto enemy ships.[216] Alternatively, it could be launched in jars fired from catapults; pivoting cranes (gerania) are also mentioned as a method of pouring combustibles onto enemy ships.[377] Usually the mixture would be stored in heated, pressurized barrels and projected through the tube by some sort of pump while the operators were sheltered behind large iron shields. A portable version (cheirosiphon) also existed, reputedly invented by Leo VI, making it the direct analogue to a modern flamethrower.[378] The means of its production was kept a state secret, and its components are only roughly guessed or described through secondary sources like Anna Komnene, so that its exact composition remains to this day unknown. In its effect, the Greek fire must have been rather similar to napalm.[216] Contemporary sources make clear that it could not be extinguished by water, but rather floated and burned on top of it; sand could extinguish it by depriving it of oxygen, and several authors also mention strong vinegar and old urine as being able to extinguish it, presumably by some sort of chemical reaction. Consequently, felt or hides soaked in vinegar were used to provide protection against it.[379]
"As he [the Emperor] knew that the Pisans were skilled in sea warfare and dreaded a battle with them, on the prow of each ship he had a head fixed of a lion or other land-animal, made in brass or iron with the mouth open and then gilded over, so that their mere aspect was terrifying. And the fire which was to be directed against the enemy through tubes he made to pass through the mouths of the beasts, so that it seemed as if the lions and the other similar monsters were vomiting the fire."
From the Alexiad of Anna Komnene, XI.10[380]
Despite the somewhat exaggerated accounts of Byzantine writers, it was by no means a "wonder weapon", and did not avert some serious defeats.[381][382] Given its limited range, and the need for a calm sea and favourable wind conditions, its usability was limited.[383] Nevertheless, in favourable circumstances and against an unprepared enemy, its great destructive ability and psychological impact could prove decisive, as displayed repeatedly against the Rus'. Greek fire continued to be mentioned during the 12th century, but the Byzantines failed to use it against the Fourth Crusade, possibly because they had lost access to the areas (the Caucasus and the eastern coast of the Black Sea) where the primary ingredients were to be found.[384] The Arabs fielded their own 'liquid fire' after 835, but it is unknown if they used the Byzantine formula, possibly obtained through espionage or through the defection of strategos Euphemios in 827, or whether they independently created a version of their own.[216] A 12th-century treatise prepared by Mardi bin Ali al-Tarsusi for Saladin records a version of Greek fire, called naft (naphtha), which had a petroleum base, with sulphur and various resins added.[385]
It is not easy to assess the importance of the Byzantine navy to the Empire's history. On one hand, the Empire, throughout its life, had to defend a long coastline, often with little hinterland. In addition, shipping was always the quickest and cheapest way of transport, and the Empire's major urban and commercial centres, as well as most of its fertile areas, lay close to the sea.[386] Coupled with the threat posed by the Arabs in the 7th to 10th centuries, this necessitated the maintenance of a strong fleet. The navy was perhaps at its most significant in the successful defence of Constantinople from the two Arab sieges, which ultimately saved the Empire. Throughout the period however, naval operations were an essential part of the Byzantine effort against the Arabs in a game of raids and counter-raids that continued up to the late 10th century.[387]
On the other hand, the nature and limitations of the maritime technology of the age meant that the neither the Byzantines nor any of their opponents could develop a true thalassocracy.[388] Galley fleets were confined to coastal operations, and were not able to play a truly independent role. Furthermore, as the alternation of Byzantine victories and defeats against the Arabs illustrates, no side was able to permanently gain the upper hand. Although the Byzantines pulled off a number of spectacular successes, such as Nasar's remarkable night-time victory in 880 (one of a handful of similar engagements in the Middle Ages), these victories were balanced off by similarly disastrous losses.[389] Reports of mutinies by oarsmen in Byzantine fleets also reveal that conditions were often far from the ideal prescribed in the manuals.[390] Combined with the traditional predominance of the great Anatolian land-holders in the higher military and civil offices, all this meant that, as in the Roman Empire, the navy, even at its height, was still regarded largely as an adjunct to the land forces. This fact is clearly illustrated by the relatively lowly positions its admirals held in the imperial hierarchy.[391][392]
It is clear nevertheless that the gradual decline of the indigenous Byzantine naval power in the 10th and 11th centuries, when it was eclipsed by the Italian city-states, chiefly Venice and later Genoa, was of great long-term significance for the fate of the Empire. The sack of the Fourth Crusade, which shattered the foundations of the Byzantine state, was due in large part to the absolute defencelessness of the Empire at sea.[393] This process was initiated by Byzantium itself in the 9th century, when the Italians were increasingly employed by the Empire to compensate for its own naval weakness in the West. The Italian republics also profited from their role as intermediaries in the trade between the Empire and Western Europe, marginalizing the Byzantine merchant marine, which in turn had adverse effects on the availability of Byzantine naval forces.[394] Inevitably however, as the Italian republics slowly moved away from the Byzantine orbit, they began pursuing their own policies, and from the late 11th century on, they turned from protection of the Empire to exploitation and sometimes outright plunder, heralding the eventual financial and political subjugation of Byzantium to their interests.[395] The absence of a strong navy was certainly keenly felt by the Byzantines at the time, as the comments of Kekaumenos illustrate. Strong and energetic emperors like Manuel Komnenos, and later Michael VIII Palaiologos, could revive Byzantine naval power, but even after landing heavy strokes against the Venetians, they merely replaced them with the Genoese and the Pisans. Trade thus remained in Latin hands, its profits continued to be siphoned off from the Empire, and after their deaths, their achievements quickly evaporated.[277] After 1204, and with the brief exception of Michael VIII's reign, the fortunes of the now small Byzantine navy were more or less tied to the shifting alliances with the Italian maritime republics.[396]
When viewing the entire course of Byzantine history, the waxing and waning of the navy's strength closely mirrors the fluctuation of the Empire's fortunes. It is this apparent interrelation that led the French Byzantinist Louis Bréhier to remark: "The epochs of [Byzantium's] dominion are those in which it held control of the sea, and it was when it lost it, that its reverses began."[397]
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