Las invasiones japonesas de Corea , comúnmente conocidas como la Guerra de Imjin , involucraron dos invasiones separadas pero vinculadas: una invasión inicial en 1592 ( coreano : 임진왜란 ; Hanja : 壬辰倭亂), una breve tregua en 1596 y una segunda invasión en 1597 ( 정유재란 ;丁酉再亂). El conflicto terminó en 1598 con la retirada de las fuerzas japonesas [1] [20] de la península de Corea después de un estancamiento militar [21] en las provincias del sur de Corea. [22]
Las invasiones fueron lanzadas por Toyotomi Hideyoshi con la intención de conquistar la península de Corea y China propiamente dicha , que estaban gobernadas por las dinastías Joseon y Ming , respectivamente. Japón rápidamente logró ocupar grandes porciones de la península de Corea, pero la contribución de refuerzos por parte de los Ming, [23] [24] [25] así como la interrupción de las flotas de suministro japonesas a lo largo de las costas occidental y sur por parte de la Armada Joseon , [26] [27] [ 28] [29] [30] obligaron a las fuerzas japonesas a retirarse de Pyongyang y las provincias del norte. Posteriormente, con ejércitos justos (milicias civiles Joseon) [31] llevando a cabo una guerra de guerrillas contra las fuerzas japonesas de ocupación y dificultades de suministro que obstaculizaban a ambos bandos, ninguna fuerza pudo montar una ofensiva exitosa ni ganar territorio adicional, lo que resultó en un punto muerto militar. La primera fase de la invasión terminó en 1596, y fue seguida posteriormente por negociaciones de paz finalmente infructuosas entre Japón y los Ming.
En 1597, Japón renovó su ofensiva invadiendo Corea por segunda vez. El patrón de la segunda invasión reflejó en gran medida el de la primera. Los japoneses tuvieron éxitos iniciales en tierra, capturando varias ciudades y fortalezas, solo para ser detenidos y obligados a retirarse a las regiones costeras del sur de la península. Sin embargo, las fuerzas Ming y Joseon que los perseguían no pudieron desalojar a los japoneses de estas posiciones, [32] [33] [34] donde ambos bandos volvieron a quedar atrapados en un punto muerto militar de diez meses de duración.
Tras la muerte de Toyotomi Hideyoshi en 1598, el limitado progreso en tierra y la continua interrupción de las líneas de suministro por parte de la Armada Joseon, el nuevo Consejo de los Cinco Ancianos ordenó a las fuerzas japonesas en Corea que se retiraran a Japón . A continuación se entablaron negociaciones de paz finales entre las partes, que continuaron durante varios años y que finalmente dieron como resultado la normalización de las relaciones. [35]
En coreano , la primera invasión (1592-1593) se denomina «Disturbios japoneses de Imjin» (倭亂), donde 1592 es un año imjin en el ciclo sexagenario . La segunda invasión (1597-1598) se denomina «Segunda guerra de Jeong-yu» (丁酉). En conjunto, las invasiones se conocen como «Guerra de Imjin».
En chino , estas guerras se conocen como la " Campaña Coreana de Wanli ", en honor al emperador chino reinante .
En japonés , la guerra se llama Bunroku no eki (文禄の役) . Bunroku hace referencia al nombre de la era japonesa que abarca el período de 1592 a 1596. La segunda invasión (1597-1598) se llama Keichō no eki (慶長の役) . Durante el período Edo (siglos XVII-XIX), la guerra también se llamó Kara iri (唐入り) ("entrada en China" o, más exactamente, "entrada en Tang ", la dinastía cuyo nombre es sinónimo de China ). El objetivo final de Japón era la invasión de la China Ming. Sin embargo, durante la guerra, a medida que se filtraba la realidad de que el conflicto se limitaba en gran medida a la península de Corea, Toyotomi Hideyoshi pronto alteraría sus objetivos originales.
En 1592, con un ejército de aproximadamente 158.000 soldados, Toyotomi Hideyoshi lanzó lo que terminaría siendo la primera de dos invasiones de Corea , con la intención de conquistar la Corea de Joseon y, finalmente, la China Ming . Inicialmente, las fuerzas japonesas tuvieron un éxito abrumador en tierra, capturando tanto Hanseong , la capital de Corea, como Pyongyang , y completando la ocupación de grandes porciones de la península de Corea en tres meses. Las fuerzas japonesas, bien entrenadas, confiadas y experimentadas después de las numerosas batallas y conflictos del período Sengoku , generalmente mantuvieron el campo en la mayoría de los enfrentamientos terrestres. Sin embargo, este éxito en tierra se vio limitado por las campañas navales de la armada coreana que continuaría atacando las flotas de suministro japonesas en sus aguas costeras, obstaculizando los avances japoneses a medida que las líneas de suministro se interrumpían a lo largo de la costa occidental de Corea y los refuerzos navales japoneses eran repelidos. [36] [37] Estas tendencias, con algunas excepciones en ambos lados, se mantuvieron durante gran parte del conflicto.
Bajo el gobierno del emperador Wanli , la China Ming interpretó rápidamente las invasiones japonesas como un desafío y una amenaza al sistema tributario chino imperial . [38] El interés de los Ming también era mantener la guerra confinada a la península de Corea y fuera de su propio territorio. [39] Entraron en el conflicto enviando refuerzos para atacar desde el norte. En los enfrentamientos que siguieron, la mayoría del ejército de Joseon se centró en defender las provincias del norte de las ofensivas japonesas, al tiempo que apoyaba las campañas del ejército Ming para recuperar el territorio ocupado por los japoneses. En consecuencia, fue la combinación de estas campañas terrestres lideradas por Ming y la guerra naval liderada por Joseon lo que finalmente obligó al ejército japonés a retirarse de Pyongyang hacia el sur, donde los japoneses continuaron ocupando Hanseong y las regiones del sur con la excepción de la provincia suroccidental de Jeolla . [23] [24] [25] Los ejércitos Ming y Joseon que los perseguían intentaron avanzar más hacia el sur, pero fueron detenidos por el ejército japonés en la batalla de Byeokjegwan . [40] [41] Posteriormente, los ejércitos japoneses lanzaron un contraataque en un intento de reocupar las provincias del norte, pero fueron repelidos por el ejército defensor de Joseon en la fortaleza de Haengju . Además, los ejércitos liderados por civiles de Joseon libraron activamente una guerra de guerrillas contra las fuerzas japonesas en el sur, lo que debilitó el control japonés en las ciudades que ocupaban. [31] Posteriormente, con dificultades de suministro que obstaculizaban a ambos bandos, ni los japoneses ni las fuerzas combinadas Ming y Joseon pudieron montar una ofensiva exitosa ni ganar territorio adicional, lo que resultó en un punto muerto militar en las áreas entre Hanseong y Kaesong . La guerra continuó de esta manera durante cinco años, y fue seguida por un breve interludio entre 1596 y 1597 durante el cual Japón y los Ming participaron en conversaciones de paz finalmente infructuosas. [42] [43]
En 1597, Japón renovó su ofensiva invadiendo Corea por segunda vez. El patrón de la segunda invasión reflejó en gran medida el de la primera. Los japoneses tuvieron éxitos iniciales en tierra, pero la contribución de las fuerzas Ming, así como la interrupción de las flotas de suministro japonesas por parte de la marina Joseon, resultó en una retirada de las fuerzas japonesas hacia las regiones costeras de la península. Sin embargo, las fuerzas Ming y Joseon que perseguían no lograron desalojar a los japoneses de sus fortalezas y posiciones atrincheradas en las áreas costeras del sur [32] [33] [34] donde ambos bandos quedaron atrapados en un punto muerto militar de diez meses.
Tras la muerte de Toyotomi Hideyoshi en septiembre de 1598, el limitado progreso en tierra y la continua interrupción de las líneas de suministro a lo largo de las costas occidental y meridional por parte de la armada Joseon, el nuevo Consejo de los Cinco Ancianos ordenó a las fuerzas japonesas que quedaban en Corea que se retiraran a Japón . Las negociaciones de paz finales entre las partes se llevaron a cabo después y continuaron durante varios años, hasta que finalmente se normalizaron las relaciones.
En 1392, el general Yi Seonggye lideró un exitoso golpe de estado para tomar el poder político en Corea de U de Goryeo . Los seguidores de Seonggye lo obligaron a tomar la corona como Taejo de Joseon, estableciendo así una nueva dinastía. [44] En busca de una justificación para su gobierno dada la falta de un linaje real, el nuevo régimen recibió el reconocimiento de China y la integración en el sistema tributario chino imperial en el contexto del Mandato del Cielo . [45] [46] Dentro de este sistema tributario, China asumió el papel de un "hermano mayor", con Corea manteniendo la posición más alta entre los estados tributarios , [47] [48] que también incluían países como el Reino de Ryukyu , Lan Xang , Đại Việt y el Reino de Ayutthaya , [49] [50] a cambio de aceptar el papel tributario subordinado de un "hermano menor". [51]
En 1402, el shogun japonés Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (a pesar de no ser el Emperador de Japón ) recibió el título de "Rey de Japón" por parte del emperador chino y, a través de este título, también había aceptado una posición en el sistema tributario imperial a partir de 1404. Esta relación terminó en 1408 cuando Japón, a diferencia de Corea, decidió poner fin a su reconocimiento de la hegemonía regional de China y cancelar cualquier misión tributaria futura. [52] La membresía en el sistema tributario era un requisito previo para cualquier intercambio económico con China. Al salir del sistema, Japón renunció a su relación comercial con China. [53] [54] [n 2]
Mil años antes, las dinastías Sui y Tang de China tenían complicadas relaciones políticas y comerciales con los Tres Reinos de Corea . La China Ming, por otro lado, tenía estrechas relaciones comerciales y diplomáticas con el Imperio Joseon, que permaneció integrado en el sistema tributario imperial, pero también recibía tributos y comercio del clan Sō de Tsushima , Japón. [56] [57] [58] [59]
La China Ming y la Corea Joseon tenían mucho en común. Ambas surgieron durante el siglo XIV después del final de la dinastía Yuan , abrazaron los ideales confucianos en la sociedad y enfrentaron amenazas similares ( los invasores Jurchen y los wokou ). [60] Ambas tenían facciones políticas internas en competencia, que influirían en las decisiones tomadas antes y durante la guerra. [61] [62] Debido al comercio cercano y a los enemigos comunes, Joseon y Ming tenían una alianza amistosa.
En la última década del siglo XVI, Toyotomi Hideyoshi , el daimyō más destacado , había unificado todo Japón en un breve período de paz. Dado que llegó a tener el poder en ausencia de un sucesor legítimo del linaje Minamoto necesario para la comisión del shōgun imperial, buscó el poder militar para legitimar su gobierno y disminuir su dependencia de la familia imperial. [63] También se sugiere que Hideyoshi planeó una invasión de China para cumplir los sueños de su difunto señor, Oda Nobunaga , [64] y para mitigar la posible amenaza de desorden civil o rebelión planteada por la gran cantidad de samuráis y soldados ahora inactivos en el Japón unificado. [65] También es posible que Hideyoshi se haya fijado un objetivo más realista de subyugar a los estados vecinos más pequeños (las Islas Ryukyu , Taiwán y Corea) y tratar a los países más grandes o más distantes como socios comerciales, [63] porque a lo largo de la invasión de Corea, Hideyoshi buscó un comercio de cuenta legal con China. [63]
La necesidad de Hideyoshi de supremacía militar como justificación de su gobierno, que carecía de antecedentes shogunales, podría haberse transformado, a nivel internacional, en un orden con los países vecinos de Japón por debajo de Japón. [63] Hideyoshi no tomó el título de shōgun con el argumento de que carecía de la descendencia Minamoto necesaria, pero dado que era muy común en el Japón del siglo XVI que los genealogistas "descubrieran" que alguien tenía ascendencia ilustre por el precio correcto, eso sugiere que Hideyoshi estaba planeando crear un nuevo cargo para él mismo para reemplazar al bakufu . Hideyoshi también se vio tentado por un conflicto externo para evitar una rebelión interna dentro de Japón, lo que mantendría a su estado recién formado unido contra un enemigo común y evitaría que los daimyōs actuaran según cualquier ambición contra su gobierno. Luchar en una guerra lejos del territorio japonés también evitaría la destrucción territorial y mantendría la infraestructura del estado. [66] Tales consideraciones serían coherentes con el hecho de que Hideyoshi no era shōgun y no tenía vínculos con el linaje imperial.
Stephen Turnbull también sugiere la ambición personal y la megalomanía de Hideyoshi como razones para la invasión. Hideyoshi había conquistado Japón en una serie de guerras y ahora quería dedicarse a cosas más grandes, señalando que no solo hablaba de su deseo de "abrirse paso" en Corea para invadir China, sino también Filipinas y la India . [67] Además, durante miles de años, China había sido el centro intelectual, económico, militar y político de Asia Oriental y, tradicionalmente, los estados de Asia Oriental habían reconocido a los emperadores de China como sus señores y habían pagado tributo a cambio de que se les permitiera comerciar con China. Japón generalmente se había resistido a la demanda de pagar tributo a China, pero el shōgun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu había reconocido al emperador de China como su señor a cambio de acceso al enorme mercado chino. [67] El derecho de Japón a pagar tributo y, con él, el derecho a comerciar con China fue eliminado en la década de 1540 por la corte Ming en respuesta a las incursiones de piratas chino-japoneses conocidos como wakō . [67]
Al intentar invadir China, Hideyoshi estaba en realidad reivindicando para Japón el papel que tradicionalmente había desempeñado China en Asia Oriental como centro del orden internacional de esa región. Hideyoshi consiguió apoyo en Japón como hombre de orígenes relativamente humildes que debía su posición a su poderío militar. [68] Finalmente, durante las décadas de 1540 y 1550, los wakō habían organizado una serie de incursiones samuráis en Corea, algunas de las cuales eran tan grandes que eran «miniinvasiones». Hideyoshi pensó erróneamente que sus enemigos eran débiles. [67]
Hideyoshi planeó una posible guerra con Corea mucho antes de haber completado la unificación de Japón. Hizo preparativos en muchos frentes. Ya en 1578, Hideyoshi, que luchaba entonces bajo el mando de Oda Nobunaga contra Mōri Terumoto por el control de la región de Chūgoku , informó a Terumoto del plan de Nobunaga de invadir China. [69] En 1585, Hideyoshi le comunicó al padre jesuita portugués Gaspar Coelho su deseo de conquistar todo el este de Asia. Hideyoshi le pidió a Coelho que enviara un mensaje a su señor, el rey Felipe II de España , que también era el rey Felipe I de Portugal, pidiéndole que pusiera su armada a disposición para ayudar a Japón (la China Ming, España y Portugal eran las principales potencias navales de la época). Sin embargo, Felipe rechazó a Hideyoshi, prefiriendo no molestar a China. [67] La derrota del clan Hōjō con base en Odawara en 1590 [70] finalmente provocó la segunda unificación de Japón, y Hideyoshi comenzó a prepararse para la siguiente guerra.
A partir de marzo de 1591, los daimyōs de Kyūshū y sus fuerzas de trabajo construyeron el Castillo de Nagoya en Nagoya, Saga (actual Karatsu, Saga , que no debe confundirse con la actual ciudad de Nagoya en la prefectura de Aichi ), como centro para la movilización de las fuerzas de invasión. [71] En 1592, Hideyoshi envió una carta a Filipinas exigiendo tributo al gobernador general español y afirmando que Japón ya había recibido tributo de Corea (lo cual era un malentendido) y de las Ryukyu. [72]
En cuanto a los preparativos militares, la construcción de hasta 2.000 barcos puede haber comenzado ya en 1586. [73] Para estimar la fuerza del ejército coreano, Hideyoshi envió una fuerza de asalto de 26 barcos a la costa sur de Corea en 1587. [74] En el frente diplomático, Hideyoshi comenzó a establecer relaciones amistosas con China mucho antes de que hubiera completado la unificación de Japón. También ayudó a vigilar las rutas comerciales contra los wokou. [75]
En 1587, Hideyoshi envió a su primer enviado, Yutani Yasuhiro (柚谷康広) , [76] [77] a Corea, que se encontraba durante el gobierno del rey Seonjo , [78] para restablecer las relaciones diplomáticas entre Corea y Japón (rotas desde la incursión wokou en 1555). [79] Hideyoshi esperaba utilizar esto como base para inducir a la corte coreana a unirse a Japón en una guerra contra China. [80] Yasuhiro, con su formación de guerrero y una actitud desdeñosa hacia los funcionarios coreanos y sus costumbres, no recibió la promesa de futuras misiones de embajador de Corea. [81]
Alrededor de mayo de 1589, la segunda embajada de Hideyoshi, compuesta por Sō Yoshitoshi , [82] Yanagawa Shigenobu (柳川調信) , [83] y el monje budista Genso (玄蘇) , llegó a Corea y consiguió la promesa de una embajada coreana en Japón a cambio de un grupo de rebeldes coreanos que se habían refugiado en Japón. [81]
En 1587, Hideyoshi había ordenado al padre adoptivo de Yoshitoshi y al daimyō de la isla Tsushima , Sō Yoshishige (宗義調) , [76] que ofreciera a la dinastía Joseon un ultimátum: se sometían a Japón y participaban en la conquista de China, o se enfrentaban a la perspectiva de una guerra abierta con Japón. Sin embargo, como la isla Tsushima disfrutaba de una posición comercial especial como único punto de control hacia Corea para todos los barcos japoneses y tenía permiso de Corea para comerciar con hasta 50 de sus propios barcos, [84] la familia Sō tenía un interés personal en prevenir el conflicto con Corea, y retrasó las conversaciones durante casi dos años. [82] Incluso cuando Hideyoshi renovó su orden, Sō Yoshitoshi redujo la visita a la corte coreana a una campaña para mejorar las relaciones entre los dos países. Cerca del final de la misión de embajador, Yoshitoshi le entregó al rey Seonjo un par de pistolas pavo real y de mecha , las primeras armas de fuego avanzadas que llegaron a Corea. [85] Ryu Seong-ryong , un funcionario académico de alto rango, sugirió que el ejército pusiera en producción y uso el arcabuz (un arma de fuego de mecha), pero la corte coreana no supo apreciar sus méritos. Esta falta de interés y subestimación del poder del arcabuz contribuyó en gran medida a los fracasos del ejército coreano al comienzo de la guerra.
En abril de 1590, los embajadores coreanos, entre ellos Hwang Yun-gil y Kim Saung-il, [86] partieron hacia Kioto , donde esperaron durante dos meses mientras Hideyoshi terminaba su campaña contra el clan Hojo . [87] A su regreso, intercambiaron regalos ceremoniales y entregaron la carta del rey Seonjo a Hideyoshi. [87] Hideyoshi asumió erróneamente que los coreanos habían venido a rendir homenaje tributario a Japón. Por esta razón, los embajadores no recibieron el trato formal que se debía a los representantes diplomáticos. Al final, los embajadores coreanos pidieron a Hideyoshi que escribiera una respuesta al rey coreano, por lo que esperaron 20 días en el puerto de Sakai . [88] La carta, redactada de nuevo según lo solicitado por los embajadores con el argumento de que era demasiado descortés, invitaba a Corea a someterse a Japón y unirse a una guerra contra China. [85]
Tras el regreso de los embajadores, la corte de Joseon mantuvo serias discusiones sobre la invitación de Japón, [89] mientras que Hwang Yun-gil informó de estimaciones contradictorias sobre la fuerza militar y las intenciones japonesas. No obstante, insistieron en que una guerra era inminente. Kim Saung-il afirmó que la carta de Hideyoshi no era más que un engaño. Además, la corte, consciente únicamente de que Japón estaba en crisis con varios ejércitos de clanes luchando entre sí, subestimó sustancialmente la fuerza y las capacidades combinadas de muchos ejércitos japoneses en ese momento. Algunos, incluido el rey Seonjo, argumentaron que Ming debía ser informado sobre los tratos con Japón, ya que de no hacerlo, Ming podría sospechar de la lealtad de Corea, pero la corte finalmente decidió esperar más hasta que se decidiera el curso de acción apropiado. [90]
Al final, las negociaciones diplomáticas de Hideyoshi con Corea no produjeron el resultado deseado. La corte de Joseon consideró a Japón un país inferior a Corea y se consideró superior de acuerdo con su posición privilegiada dentro del sistema tributario chino. Erróneamente evaluó las amenazas de invasión de Hideyoshi como no mejores que las comunes incursiones piratas japonesas wokou. [91] La corte coreana entregó a Shigenobu [83] y Genso, la tercera embajada de Hideyoshi, la carta del rey Seonjo reprendiendo a Hideyoshi por desafiar el sistema tributario chino. Hideyoshi respondió con otra carta, pero como no fue presentada por un diplomático en persona como se esperaba por costumbre, la corte la ignoró. [92] Después de esta negación de su segunda solicitud, Hideyoshi procedió a lanzar sus ejércitos contra Corea en 1592.
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En el núcleo del ejército japonés estaban los samuráis , la casta militar de Japón que dominaba la sociedad japonesa. [93] La sociedad japonesa estaba dividida en cuatro castas : samuráis, campesinos, artesanos y comerciantes, en ese orden. La casta samurái poseía la mayor parte de la tierra en Japón, tenía el derecho exclusivo de portar espadas y ejecutar en el acto a cualquier plebeyo que no fuera lo suficientemente deferente, y se les permitía poseer caballos y montar a la batalla. [93] El arma estándar de los samuráis en 1592 era el yari , una lanza destinada a apuñalar, a menudo con una hoja cruzada que permitía al samurái tirar a su oponente de su caballo. [93] Si el samurái deseaba cortar a su oponente en lugar de apuñalar, las armas eran el ōdachi , una espada extremadamente larga con un mango enorme, o la naginata , un arma de asta con una hoja curva muy afilada. [93] La más famosa de todas las armas samuráis era la katana , una espada descrita por el historiador militar británico Stephen Turnbull como "... el arma de mejor filo en la historia de la guerra". [93] Los samuráis nunca llevaban escudos, y la katana se utilizaba para desviar los golpes. [93] En 1592, la armadura de los samuráis consistía en láminas hechas de escamas de hierro o cuero unidas entre sí que habían sido modificadas para incluir una placa sólida para ayudar a proteger al samurái de las balas. [93] Los samuráis participaban en la guerra psicológica al llevar una máscara de hierro en la batalla con un bigote hecho de crin de caballo y una "sonrisa siniestra" unida al exterior. [94]
En total, 158.800 soldados, trabajadores y tropas de transporte (de los cuales una cuarta parte tenía armas de fuego) [95] estaban preparados para participar en la invasión, con aproximadamente un tercio de la fuerza siendo unidades de combate armadas (samuráis, sus asistentes y reclutas ashigaru ), mientras que los otros dos tercios llenaban una unidad de apoyo (médicos, sacerdotes, secretarios, barqueros y trabajadores). La siguiente tabla muestra las fuerzas de Gotō Sumiharu, que tenía el feudo de Fukue (valuado en 140.000 koku ) en el archipiélago de Gotō . Los registros familiares muestran que dirigió una fuerza de 705, con 27 caballos, 220 de los cuales eran hombres de combate, mientras que 485 cumplían un papel de apoyo. El desglose del contingente de combate fue el siguiente: [96]
Otro daimyō cuya cuota de servicio militar se ha conservado en un registro escrito es Shimazu Yoshihiro , cuya contribución consistió en: [97]
La mayoría de las tropas de combate japonesas enviadas a Corea eran ashigaru (infantería ligera), que generalmente eran campesinos reclutados armados con lanzas, tanegashima (arcabuces japoneses) o yumi (arcos japoneses). [94] A diferencia de los samuráis con sus costosas armaduras, los ashigaru usaban armaduras baratas de hierro alrededor de sus pechos. [94] Los ashigaru armados con arcabuces fueron entrenados para luchar al estilo europeo, con los hombres entrenados para disparar sus armas en formación para crear una descarga de fuego, luego arrodillarse para recargar, mientras los hombres detrás de ellos disparaban, y el ciclo se repetía una y otra vez. [94]
El comandante de la Primera División japonesa y comandante general de la fuerza de invasión era Konishi Yukinaga , un daimyō de Uto de la provincia de Higo en Kyushu , elegido como comandante de la fuerza de invasión más por sus habilidades diplomáticas que por sus habilidades militares, ya que Toyotomi Hideyoshi no esperaba que los coreanos se resistieran. [98] Konishi se había convertido al catolicismo en 1583 y era conocido por los españoles y portugueses como Dom Agostinho. [99] Katō Kiyomasa , que lideró la Segunda División en Corea, era conocido en Japón como Toranosuke ("el joven tigre") y por los coreanos como el "general diablo", debido a su ferocidad. [99] Katō fue uno de los " Siete Lanzas de Shizugatake ", un grupo de siete samuráis que se distinguieron en combate en la Batalla de Shizugatake en 1583, donde los samuráis habían luchado entre sí mano a mano , y donde Katō demostró sus habilidades con una lanza de hoja cruzada con gran efecto al cortar a tantos hombres, cuyas cabezas cortadas y saladas fueron luego atadas a un tallo de bambú verde y llevadas por uno de los asistentes de Katō a la batalla. [99] Katō era un devoto seguidor del budismo Nichiren , un tipo de budismo estrechamente asociado con el militarismo y el ultranacionalismo en Japón, y sus relaciones con el católico Konishi fueron extremadamente hostiles, hasta el punto de que los dos hombres casi nunca se conocieron durante la campaña en Corea. [100] El estandarte de batalla de Katō era un banderín blanco que llevaba un mensaje supuestamente escrito por el propio Nichiren que decía Namu Myōhō Renge Kyō ("Saludos al Loto de la Ley Divina"). [100] El comandante naval era Wakisaka Yasuharu , otro de los "Siete Lanzas de Shizugatake", que había sido nombrado daimyō de la isla de Awaji en el Mar Interior de Seto en 1585, donde aprendió mucho sobre navegación ya que la isla está ubicada cerca de remolinos que son notoriamente peligrosos para los marineros. [100]Toyotomi Hideyoshi nunca abandonó Japón y permaneció cerca de Kioto; sin embargo, la idea de conquistar China era su obsesión y durante toda la guerra se negó a aceptar la derrota, tratando la guerra como una simple cuestión de fuerza de voluntad, creyendo que si sus samuráis luchaban lo suficiente, podría tomar China. Turnbull escribe: "En un sentido táctico, por lo tanto, no se puede considerar a Hideyoshi como uno de los comandantes, pero, como su voluntad impulsó todo el proyecto hasta su muerte, su influencia política no puede subestimarse". [101]
El ejército chino de la dinastía Ming era el más grande de Asia, con un total de alrededor de 845.000 tropas. Sin embargo, en 1592 el ejército imperial estaba involucrado en guerras con los mongoles y en el aplastamiento de una rebelión en el noroeste . [94] El ejército Ming era capaz de considerables hazañas de organización, por ejemplo, llevar 400 cañones de artillería a través de 480 km de paisajes hostiles para proporcionar potencia de fuego contra los mongoles. [94]
El núcleo del ejército Ming era la infantería, dividida en cinco secciones: los armados con armas de fuego, espadas, arqueros con flechas de fuego , arqueros con flechas ordinarias y lanceros, respaldados por la caballería y la artillería. [94] Las armas básicas de la infantería china eran la ballesta y el arcabuz, mientras que la caballería estaba formada por arqueros montados. [94] La infantería china llevaba cascos cónicos de hierro y armaduras hechas de cuero o hierro. [102]
Según Turnbull, "la artillería de campaña y los cañones de asedio chinos eran los mejores de la región". [102] La artillería china estaba hecha de hierro fundido y se dividía en varios tipos, siendo los más importantes el "gran cañón general" y el folang zhi (佛朗支), siendo estos últimos cañones de artillería con retrocarga. [102]
Uno de los comandantes chinos fue Li Rusong , un hombre que ha sido tradicionalmente menospreciado en los relatos japoneses. En opinión de Turnbull, fue "uno de los generales más consumados de la China Ming". [103] Aunque Li fue derrotado en la batalla de Pyokjeyek, su derrota fue temporal. Fue un estratega hábil que logró su objetivo de expulsar a los japoneses de Corea, y los relatos japoneses centrados en su derrota en Pyokjeyek sirvieron para distraer la atención de sus logros. [103]
Otro comandante naval chino fue Chen Lin , un nativo de Guangdong que resultó fundamental en la derrota de Japón y la defensa de Corea. Después de ayudar a ganar la guerra, Chen fue celebrado como un héroe en Corea y China. Chen posteriormente se convirtió en el fundador del clan Gwangdong Jin de Corea, y hoy, sus descendientes están repartidos por China y Corea. Chen recibió el apodo de Maestro de Guangdong por sus logros navales y militares. [104]
Los oficiales del Ejército y la Marina de Joseon provenían exclusivamente de la aristocracia, pero a diferencia de la alta aristocracia militarista japonesa entrenada para ser soldados desde su juventud en adelante, para la aristocracia de Joseon, la erudición era valorada y la guerra era menospreciada como algo indigno de un caballero erudito confuciano . [105] La calidad del generalato coreano era muy variable, con algunos oficiales coreanos capaces y otros siendo hombres que no habían dedicado mucho tiempo al estudio de la guerra, prefiriendo el tiro con arco, la escritura, la práctica de su caligrafía y la lectura de los clásicos confucianos. [106]
Al final del período de caos tras el colapso de la dinastía Yuan, Joseon se centró principalmente en hacer frente al saqueo del pueblo Jurchen y los piratas japoneses en el norte. Durante el reinado del rey Jeongjong en 1400, el sistema de ejército privado fue derrocado, y durante el reinado del rey Sejo en 1457, se formó una unidad llamada Cinco Guardias ( 오위 ;五衛; Owi ), que continuó hasta la Guerra de Imjin. En los primeros días de la guerra, Joseon tenía una infantería ligera reclutada, un ejército permanente y una organización de élite orientada a la caballería, especialmente Arqueros a Caballo. Estaba especializada en hacer frente a los saqueadores nómadas. Sin embargo, como el ejército de Joseon fue derrotado fácilmente en los primeros días de la Guerra de Imjin, el gobierno de Joseon se sintió limitado en el sistema de Cinco Guardias y cambió al sistema de Cinco Campamentos del Ejército . [107]
La infantería ligera protegía sus pechos usando eomsimgap ( 엄심갑 ;掩心甲), que estaba hecho de cuero sobre una túnica de tela que tenía una función similar al gambesón , o usando una armadura de escamas . [108] [109]
Los pengbaesu ( 팽배수 ;彭排手), infantería pesada especializada en el combate cuerpo a cuerpo, eran el pilar de la infantería de Joseon, vestían cota de malla o armadura de placas y estaban armados con un escudo redondo y una espada. Respondían a las incursiones nómadas con escudos y cuchillos en la guerra de montaña, y en las llanuras construían un muro de escudos para disuadir los ataques de la caballería. [110] [111]
Las tropas y oficiales de élite, formadas por hijos de nobles llamados Gapsa ( 갑사 ;甲士), debían poseer más de una cierta cantidad de riqueza para presentarse al examen de calificación. En lugar de ser tratados como burócratas de cierta clase y recibir un salario del estado, los gastos militares, de caballos y de comida de los sirvientes corrían por su cuenta. Por esta razón, el gobierno de Joseon, que tenía que ahorrar el presupuesto, intentó aumentar el número de Gapsa aumentando los rangos inferiores. Como resultado, el número de Gapsa aumenta a 14000 en 1475, pero el ejército permanente, que en realidad tiene que mantener un cierto número, no se gestiona, lo que provoca un problema de que la mayoría de los números se declaran falsamente justo antes de la guerra. [112] Llevaban armadura de brigantina , que era popular en Manchuria y Mongolia en ese momento. Esto se llama Dujeong-gap ( 두정갑 ;頭釘甲).
A menudo se malinterpreta que no llevan armadura militar coreana debido a la influencia de pinturas o medios hechos después de la guerra, pero esto no es cierto. Como ejemplo, Luís Fróis escribió en la Historia de Japam que el ejército de Joseon usaba armadura de cuero sólido y gorras de acero de estilo europeo, algunos de los cuales usaban armadura de hierro fundido o hierro. Se pueden encontrar registros de distribución o inspección de la armadura de los soldados de Joseon durante la guerra en los Anales de la Dinastía Joseon y el Nanjung ilgi , pero no se han confirmado registros de que el ejército de Joseon luchara sin armadura. [113] [114] [115] La identidad erróneamente conocida del Ejército de Joseon es un oficial de policía terminal ( 포졸 ;捕卒) perteneciente a Podocheong , una secuización de la Dinastía Joseon.
La espada coreana estándar era el hwando , una espada curva que usaban habitualmente los soldados de Joseon en tiempos de paz, que es más corta pero más ligera que su homóloga japonesa. Un arma exclusiva de Corea era el mayal , un palo de madera dura de 1,5 metros de largo (4,9 pies), pintado de rojo, que actuaba como mango de una cadena unida a un asta con clavos de hierro. [106] Los soldados de infantería de Joseon solían luchar como arqueros, y una fuente japonesa de 1592 comentó que los coreanos eran superiores como soldados a los japoneses solo como arqueros porque sus arcos tenían un alcance de 450 metros (1480 pies) frente a los 300 metros (980 pies) de los arqueros japoneses. [106]
Turnbull escribió que la salvación de Corea fue su armada. [116] El barco coreano estándar era el panokseon , un buque de guerra que no era muy diferente en apariencia de los buques de guerra japoneses estándar excepto por el hecho de que los barcos coreanos eran más grandes y llevaban cañones pesados mientras que los barcos japoneses no. [116] Los famosos " barcos tortuga " que estaban fuertemente blindados y armados y que iban a causar estragos en los barcos japoneses eran una minoría de los barcos de la armada coreana. [116] Los relatos coreanos y japoneses hablan mucho de los "barcos tortuga", pero ninguno de esos barcos ha sobrevivido, y los historiadores aún debaten sobre cómo eran los barcos tortuga, aunque la mayoría ahora está de acuerdo en que, de hecho, tenían forma de tortuga. [116] El almirante Yi Sun-sin , que comenzó la guerra como comandante naval izquierdo [n 3] de la provincia de Jeolla , se convertiría en el comandante de la armada coreana y fue descrito por Turnbull como "el héroe más grande de Corea" y "uno de los comandantes navales más destacados en toda la historia del mundo". [100]
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Las dos principales amenazas a la seguridad de la China de Joseon y Ming en ese momento eran los jurchen , que atacaban las fronteras del norte, y los wokou, que saqueaban las aldeas costeras y los barcos comerciales. [118] [119]
Esta postura defensiva en un entorno de relativa paz empujó a los coreanos a depender de la fuerza de sus fortalezas y buques de guerra. Con la transmisión de la tecnología de la pólvora y las armas de fuego desde China durante Goryeo , Corea mejoró los diseños originales de armas de fuego chinas, la bomba de impacto de trueno , y desarrolló cañones avanzados que se utilizaron con gran eficiencia en el mar. A pesar de que China era la principal fuente de nuevas tecnologías militares en Asia, Corea fue una base de fabricación tanto de cañones como de construcción naval durante esta era. [120]
Japón, por otra parte, había estado en un estado de guerra civil durante más de un siglo, lo que tuvo como resultado convertir a la nación insular en una sociedad guerrera muy competente. Cuando los comerciantes del Imperio portugués llegaron a Japón e introdujeron arcabuces y mosquetes , los caudillos japoneses se adaptaron rápidamente a esta innovación disruptiva , produciendo en masa el arcabuz de mecha tanegashima . En el conflicto civil en curso, los japoneses refinaron los ejercicios y las tácticas para hacer el mejor uso de la nueva arma, lo que les dio una gran ventaja sobre los ejércitos coreanos.
Los cañones coreanos no estaban adaptados para un uso eficaz en tierra y las armas de fuego eran de un diseño menos avanzado. Las armas pequeñas que llevaban los soldados japoneses demostraron ser particularmente eficaces durante los enfrentamientos terrestres y los asedios. Esta diferencia estratégica en el desarrollo y la implementación de las armas contribuyó a la tendencia durante la guerra de dominio japonés en tierra y dominio coreano en el mar. [121]
Como Japón había estado en guerra desde mediados del siglo XV, Toyotomi Hideyoshi tenía 500.000 soldados curtidos en la batalla a su disposición [122] para formar un ejército profesional notable en Asia para la invasión de Corea. [123] Si bien el estado caótico de Japón había dejado a los coreanos con una estimación muy baja de Japón como amenaza militar, [123] hubo un nuevo sentido de unidad entre las diferentes facciones políticas en Japón, como lo indica la " cacería de espadas " en 1588 (la confiscación de todas las armas de los campesinos). [124] Junto con la caza vino "El Edicto de Separación" en 1591, que efectivamente puso fin a toda la piratería wokou japonesa al prohibir a los daimyōs apoyar a los piratas dentro de sus feudos. [124] Irónicamente, los coreanos creían que la invasión de Hideyoshi sería solo una extensión de las incursiones piratas anteriores que habían sido repelidas antes. [125] En cuanto a la situación militar en Joseon, el funcionario académico coreano Ryu Seong-ryong observó que "ni uno de cada cien [generales coreanos] conocía los métodos de instrucción de los soldados": [126] el ascenso en rango dependía mucho más de las conexiones sociales que del conocimiento militar. [127] Los soldados coreanos estaban desorganizados, mal entrenados y mal equipados, [127] y habían sido utilizados principalmente en proyectos de construcción como la construcción de muros de castillos. [79]
El sistema de defensa militar coreano de la era Joseon tenía varios defectos en su organización. [128] Un ejemplo de ello era una política que establecía que los oficiales locales no podían responder individualmente a una invasión extranjera fuera de su jurisdicción hasta que un general de mayor rango, designado por la corte del rey, llegara con un ejército recién movilizado. [128] Este arreglo era altamente ineficiente ya que las fuerzas cercanas permanecerían estacionarias hasta que el comandante fronterizo móvil llegara al lugar y tomara el control. [128] En segundo lugar, como el general designado a menudo provenía de una región externa, era probable que no estuviera familiarizado con el entorno natural, la tecnología disponible y la mano de obra de la región invadida. [128] Finalmente, como nunca se mantenía un ejército principal, los reclutas nuevos y mal entrenados reclutados durante la guerra constituían una parte significativa del ejército. [128]
La corte coreana logró llevar a cabo algunas reformas, pero siguieron siendo problemáticas. Por ejemplo, el centro de entrenamiento militar establecido en 1589 en la provincia de Gyeongsang reclutaba principalmente a hombres demasiado jóvenes o demasiado viejos para ser buenos soldados, a los que se sumaban algunos aristócratas en busca de aventuras y esclavos que compraban su libertad, porque los hombres sanos y de la edad adecuada, a los que apuntaba la política, tenían mayores prioridades, como la agricultura y otras actividades económicas. [128]
La forma dominante de las fortalezas coreanas era el sanseong ("fortaleza de montaña"), [129] que consistía en una muralla de piedra que continuaba alrededor de una montaña en forma de serpentina. [123] Estas murallas estaban mal diseñadas, con poco uso de torres y posiciones de fuego cruzado (que se ven habitualmente en las fortificaciones europeas), y eran en su mayoría de baja altura. [123] Era una política de guerra que estas fortalezas sirvieran como castillos de refugio y que todos evacuaran a uno de ellos, y se asumía que aquellos que no lo hacían eran colaboradores del enemigo; sin embargo, la política nunca tuvo un gran efecto porque las fortalezas estaban fuera del alcance de la mayoría de los refugiados. [123]
Toyotomi Hideyoshi movilizó su ejército en el Castillo de Nagoya , ubicado en la antigua provincia de Hizen en Kyushu, construido recientemente con el único propósito de albergar a las fuerzas de invasión y las reservas. Ninguna de las estructuras originales permanece, pero los cimientos en ruinas del castillo sobreviven en la antigua ciudad separada de Chinzei, ahora parte de la ciudad de Karatsu en la prefectura de Saga . [130] La primera invasión consistió en nueve divisiones con un total de 158.800 hombres, de los cuales los dos últimos de 21.500 estaban estacionados como reservas en la isla de Tsushima y la isla de Iki , respectivamente. [131] Los japoneses utilizaron un total de 320.000 tropas a lo largo de toda la guerra. [122]
Por otro lado, Joseon mantenía sólo unas pocas unidades militares sin ejército de campaña, y su defensa dependía en gran medida de la movilización de los soldados ciudadanos en caso de emergencia. [79] Durante la primera invasión, Joseon desplegó un total de 84.500 tropas regulares en todo el territorio, asistidos por 22.000 voluntarios irregulares . [132]
Las tropas Ming nunca superaron los 60.000 soldados en Corea en ningún momento de la guerra. [133] A lo largo de la guerra, los Ming enviaron un total de 166.700 tropas, y también enviaron 17 millones de liang en plata y suministros a Corea (equivalente a aproximadamente medio año de ingresos para el Imperio Ming). [11]
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Desde su introducción por los comerciantes portugueses en la isla de Tanegashima en 1543, [134] el arcabuz se había vuelto ampliamente utilizado en Japón. [135] Si bien tanto Corea como China también habían sido introducidas a armas de fuego similares al arcabuz portugués, la mayoría eran modelos más antiguos. Las armas pequeñas de los soldados coreanos eran cañones de mano con un mecanismo simple y con una culata o un eje de madera adjunto. Después de que los diplomáticos japoneses obsequiaran los arcabuces de la corte coreana, el erudito y funcionario coreano Ryu Seong-ryong abogó por el uso de la nueva arma, pero la corte coreana no se dio cuenta de su potencia. [87] En contraste, los japoneses a menudo usaban el arcabuz en combinación con el tiro con arco en la guerra. [136]
Durante las acciones de asedio, los chinos utilizaban escudos de ratán y pavés de hierro (escudos grandes), considerados a prueba de mosquetes. Los chinos utilizaban una variedad de armas, incluido el arco corto, [137] espadas, [138] [139] armas de fuego, los primeros tipos de minas terrestres y las primeras granadas de mano . [140]
Los coreanos también demostraron un uso masivo de hwacha (flechas lanzadas por cohetes múltiples), en particular durante el Sitio de Pyongyang en enero de 1593. Tenía la capacidad de disparar hasta 200 singijeon , un tipo de flecha lanzacohetes, a la vez. La hwacha consistía en un carro de dos ruedas que transportaba una tabla llena de agujeros en los que se insertaban los singijeon . Aunque los chinos tenían sus propias flechas lanzacohetes, optaron por los hu dun pao , o "cañones de tigre agazapado", que se llevaban a mano .
Los japoneses derrotaron a los sucesivos ejércitos coreanos con una combinación de mosquetes, lanzas y espadas. Si bien los mosquetes utilizados por los japoneses eran superiores a los arcos coreanos en términos de penetración y alcance, [141] los primeros carecían de la cadencia de fuego de los segundos. Numerosos relatos de batalla de los Anales de la dinastía Joseon y varios ensayos, diarios de funcionarios coreanos y espadas coreanas muestran que el mosquete por sí solo no podía asegurar la victoria. Al emplear tanto el mosquete como las armas blancas ("armas blancas", es decir, espadas de metal, lanzas, lanzas y similares), los japoneses pudieron lograr el éxito durante la primera fase de la guerra. De hecho, la feroz carga de las tropas japonesas con lanzas y espadas fue a menudo más decisiva que con mosquetes. Esto se debió a que los coreanos estaban mal entrenados en el combate cuerpo a cuerpo y carecían de experiencia y disciplina en el campo de batalla. Por lo tanto, los soldados coreanos no pudieron mantener su línea contra la carga de los soldados japoneses. Las siguientes palabras de un oficial militar coreano llamado Shi-eon Lee al rey coreano analizan esta debilidad:
El rey le preguntó a Shi-eon Lee: "Ya me has hablado de la baja precisión de los mosquetes japoneses. ¿Por qué, entonces, los ejércitos coreanos tienen tantos problemas para derrotarlos?"
[Shi-eon Lee] entonces respondió:
"Los soldados coreanos se acobardan ante el enemigo y huyen para salvar sus vidas incluso antes de haberlo combatido. En cuanto a los comandantes, rara vez abandonan sus puestos porque temen que los puedan ejecutar por desertar. Sin embargo, hay un límite a la hora de ejecutar a los soldados desertores, ya que son muchos. En verdad, los japoneses no son buenos mosqueteros, pero avanzan tan rápido que aparecen justo delante de los coreanos en el tiempo que los coreanos pueden disparar sólo dos flechas. Se dice que los coreanos son buenos arqueros, pero rara vez alcanzan los objetivos cuando el enemigo está demasiado lejos, y tienen demasiado miedo de disparar cuando el enemigo está cerca porque temen a las espadas japonesas. El tiro con arco a menudo se vuelve inútil porque los coreanos, temiendo la arma blanca japonesa, apenas pueden disparar. Los japoneses tienen fama de ser buenos espadachines, pero es posible para los coreanos desenvainar espadas y mantenerse firmes. Sin embargo, los coreanos rara vez lo hacen y simplemente corren para salvar sus vidas". [142]
Sin embargo, otro oficial coreano, Yu Song-nyong , afirma que los arcabuceros japoneses tenían una superioridad innegable en largas distancias, lo que (junto con la baja disciplina y experiencia de combate del ejército coreano) fue la principal causa de las derrotas:
En la invasión de 1592, todo fue arrasado. En quince días o un mes, las ciudades y fortalezas se perdieron, y todo en las ocho direcciones se desmoronó. Aunque esto se debió [en parte] a que había habido un siglo de paz y a que la gente no estaba familiarizada con la guerra, en realidad se debió a que los japoneses tenían el uso de mosquetes que podían alcanzar más allá de varios cientos de pasos, que siempre perforaban lo que golpeaban, que llegaban como el viento y el granizo, y con los que los arcos y las flechas no podían compararse. [143]
En la actualidad, los japoneses utilizan exclusivamente mosquetes para atacar las fortificaciones. Pueden alcanzar el objetivo a varios cientos de pasos de distancia. Los arcos y flechas de nuestro país no pueden alcanzarlos. En cualquier punto llano fuera de las murallas, los japoneses construyen montículos de tierra y "torres volantes". Miran hacia abajo dentro de las fortificaciones y disparan sus balas para que la gente dentro de ellas no pueda ocultarse. Al final, las fortificaciones son tomadas. No se puede culpar a los defensores por su situación. [144]
Los soldados japoneses también confiaban en su ventaja en el combate a distancia. Uno de los comandantes japoneses escribió a casa en 1592:
Por favor, dispongan lo necesario para enviarnos armas y municiones. No sirven de nada las lanzas. Es vital que dispongan de algún modo de obtener una cantidad suficiente de armas. Además, deben asegurarse de que las personas que parten [hacia Corea] comprendan esta situación. Los preparativos para las armas deben recibir la máxima atención. [145]
El comandante japonés Asano Yoshinaga le escribió a su padre:
Cuando las tropas lleguen a Corea desde la provincia de Kai , que traigan tantas armas como sea posible, ya que no se necesita ningún otro equipo. Den órdenes estrictas de que todos los hombres, incluso los samuráis, lleven armas. [146]
Los coreanos rara vez emplearon artillería de campaña, y los cañones se utilizaron principalmente en acciones de asedio y para defender castillos. Hubo muy pocos casos de coreanos que emplearon artillería en el campo de batalla, con resultados en gran medida ineficaces. [147] Algunas unidades irregulares coreanas con armas proporcionadas por el gobierno dispararon proyectiles explosivos desde morteros, pero esto ocurrió solo en casos aislados. [147] Los chinos fueron más activos en el empleo de artillería de campaña que los coreanos. Uno de los cañones de campaña chinos notables fue el "Gran Cañón General", un gran cañón de retrocarga con un carro de dos ruedas, que disparaba una bola de hierro que pesaba alrededor de 10 kilogramos. Los japoneses emplearon artillería de campaña solo cuando era estratégicamente ventajoso tanto en situaciones de asedio como de guerra de campo, a menudo utilizando piezas capturadas cuando estaban disponibles.
Los coreanos desplegaron activamente sus divisiones de caballería en acción. Pero el terreno era a menudo montañoso, lo que no era generalmente adecuado para la caballería. Las tierras de cultivo tendían a tener muchas zanjas, y a menudo eran estériles y carecían de la hierba esencial para alimentar a los caballos. Además, el uso japonés del arcabuz a larga distancia y en descargas concentradas anuló cualquier posibilidad de tácticas de caballería efectivas. [139] Las armas principales de los soldados de caballería coreanos eran arcos, con espadas y lanzas que ocupaban solo posiciones secundarias. La mayor parte de la acción de caballería de los coreanos tuvo lugar en la batalla de Chungju al comienzo de la guerra, donde fueron superados en número y aniquilados por la infantería japonesa. [148] Aunque las divisiones japonesas también desplegaron caballería, generalmente se desmontaban cuando entraban en acción, actuando más como infantería montada . Aunque se utilizaban armas de fuego especializadas a caballo, la mayoría de los soldados de caballería preferían la yari (lanza) convencional, [149] pero su uso estaba limitado por el creciente uso de armas de fuego por parte de los coreanos y los chinos. [150]
En contraste con las ventajas japonesas en tierra, los coreanos poseían una ventaja en el mar. Debido a la avanzada tecnología de artillería y construcción naval, junto con una extensa historia naval contra piratas japoneses, las armadas coreanas desplegaron barcos muy avanzados y formidables. En el momento de la invasión japonesa, Corea empleó el panokseon , un poderoso barco tipo galera armado con cañones que superaba en alcance a la mayoría de los buques japoneses. La marina coreana utilizó esta superioridad naval para interrumpir la red logística japonesa frente a la costa oeste de la península de Corea. Esta ventaja, sin embargo, no afectó la capacidad de Japón para reforzar continuamente sus ejércitos a través de la ruta de suministro desde Tsushima en Japón a Busan en Corea, especialmente una vez que las bases navales coreanas en el área inmediata fueron neutralizadas por las fuerzas terrestres japonesas. La marina coreana, liderada por Yi Sun-sin, se retiraría y se reacomodaría en la frontera norte de la provincia de Jeolla. Si bien no pudo evitar por completo el refuerzo, la marina coreana continuó acosando e infligiendo pérdidas a las flotas de suministro japonesas durante toda la duración de la guerra.
Como prácticamente todos los barcos japoneses en la primera fase de la guerra carecían de artillería de cañón, [120] los barcos coreanos superaron en alcance y bombardearon a los barcos japoneses con impunidad fuera del alcance de los mosquetes, flechas y catapultas japoneses. [120] Cuando los japoneses intentaron equipar cañones a sus barcos, [151] su diseño ligero prohibía usar más de unos pocos por barco, y los barcos generalmente carecían de la potencia de fuego o el alcance de sus contrapartes coreanas. [152] Para reforzar su flota, los japoneses consideraron emplear dos galeones portugueses en la invasión. [153]
Además de la falta de armamento naval efectivo, la mayoría de los barcos japoneses eran buques mercantes modificados más adecuados para el transporte de tropas y equipos que para el despliegue de armas de artillería. [120] [154]
Durante el período entre la primera y la segunda invasión, el gobierno coreano tuvo la oportunidad de examinar las razones por las que los japoneses habían podido invadirlos con tanta facilidad. Ryu Seong-ryong , el primer ministro, habló sobre las desventajas de Corea.
Ryu señaló que las defensas de los castillos coreanos eran extremadamente débiles, un hecho que había señalado antes de la guerra. Observó que los castillos coreanos tenían fortificaciones incompletas y muros que eran demasiado fáciles de escalar. También quería que se instalaran cañones en los muros. Ryu propuso construir torres fuertes con torretas para los cañones. Además de los castillos, Ryu quería formar una línea de defensa en Corea. En este tipo de defensa, el enemigo tendría que escalar muchos muros para llegar a la capital, Hanseong .
Ryu también destacó la eficiencia del ejército japonés, ya que sólo les llevó un mes llegar a Hanseong, y lo bien organizados que estaban los japoneses. Señaló cómo los japoneses movían sus unidades en maniobras complejas, a menudo debilitando a su enemigo con el uso de arcabuces, para luego atacar con armas cuerpo a cuerpo .
El rey Seonjo y la corte coreana finalmente comenzaron a reformar el ejército. En septiembre de 1593, se estableció la Agencia de Entrenamiento Militar ( en coreano : 훈련도감 , que también se traduce como Comando de Entrenamiento Militar). La agencia dividió cuidadosamente el ejército en unidades y compañías. Dentro de las compañías había escuadrones de arqueros, arcabuceros, espadachines e infantería con lanza. La agencia estableció unidades divisionales en cada región de Corea y guarneció batallones en castillos. La agencia, que originalmente tenía menos de 80 tropas, pronto creció a alrededor de 10.000. [ cita requerida ]
Uno de los cambios más importantes fue que tanto los ciudadanos de clase alta como los esclavos estaban sujetos al reclutamiento. Todos los varones tenían que ingresar al servicio militar para recibir entrenamiento y familiarizarse con las armas. [ cita requerida ]
También fue en esta época que el oficial militar y erudito militar Han Gyo ( en coreano : 한교 ) escribió el manual de artes marciales Muyejebo , basado en el libro Jixiao Xinshu del famoso general chino Qi Jiguang . [155]
El 23 de mayo de 1592, la Primera División del ejército de invasión japonés, compuesta por 7000 hombres liderados por Konishi Yukinaga , [158] partió de Tsushima por la mañana y llegó a las afueras de la ciudad portuaria de Busan por la tarde. [159] La inteligencia naval coreana había detectado la flota japonesa, pero Won Gyun , el comandante naval de la derecha de la provincia de Gyeongsang , identificó erróneamente la flota como buques mercantes en una misión. [160] Un informe posterior de la llegada de otros 100 buques japoneses despertó sus sospechas, pero no hizo nada al respecto. [160] Sō Yoshitoshi desembarcó solo en la costa de Busan para pedir a los coreanos un pasaje seguro a China por última vez. Los coreanos se negaron como lo habían hecho anteriormente, y Sō Yoshitoshi sitió la ciudad . Konishi Yukinaga atacó el cercano fuerte de Dadaejin a la mañana siguiente. [159] Los relatos japoneses afirman que las batallas resultaron en la aniquilación completa de las fuerzas coreanas (uno afirma 8.500 muertos y otro, 30.000 cabezas), mientras que un relato coreano afirma que los propios japoneses sufrieron pérdidas significativas antes de saquear la ciudad de Busan. [161] Jeong Bal , el comandante coreano en Busan, fue asesinado por una bala japonesa y, con su muerte, la moral coreana se derrumbó. [162] Mientras tanto, Konishi tomó el fuerte de Dadaejin, donde bajo fuertes descargas de fuego de apoyo, los japoneses pudieron colocar escaleras contra las paredes y tomaron el fuerte. [163] Konishi ordenó que no se tomaran prisioneros y toda la guarnición fue masacrada . [163] Konishi y la Primera División luego giraron hacia el norte, marchando para tomar Hanseong . [163] Los disciplinados japoneses hicieron caer una lluvia de balas que fue letal para cualquiera que no se cubriera. [163] En la mañana del 25 de mayo de 1592, la Primera División llegó a la fortaleza de Dongnae . [161] Konishi envió un mensaje a Song Sang-hyeon , el comandante de la fortaleza, explicándole que su objetivo era la conquista de China y que si los coreanos se sometían, sus vidas serían perdonadas. Song respondió: "Es fácil para mí morir, pero difícil dejarte pasar", lo que llevó a Konishi a ordenar que no se tomaran prisioneros para castigar a Song por su desafío. [163] El asedio resultante de Dongnae duró doce horas, mató a 3000 personas y resultó en una victoria japonesa. [164]Los japoneses no tomaron prisioneros y mataron a todos en Dongnae, civiles y militares, incluso mataron a todos los gatos y perros que había allí. [163] La intención de Konishi era aterrorizar a los coreanos para que se sometieran mostrándoles cuál era el precio de resistirse a Japón, pero en lugar de eso estimuló la resistencia coreana, ya que los coreanos comunes estaban enfurecidos con un enemigo que invadió sin provocación y se comportó tan brutalmente. [163]
Después de tomar Dongnae, Konishi tomó el castillo de Miryang , al que siguió la toma de Daegu , que se rindió sin oposición mientras los coreanos concentraban su ejército más al norte. [165] Tras cruzar el río Nakdong , Konishi se enteró de que los coreanos estaban concentrando sus tropas en Sangju . [165] Mientras tanto, se habían enviado enviados coreanos desesperados a la Ciudad Prohibida en Pekín para pedir al emperador Wanli que protegiera a sus leales tributarios en Corea enviando un ejército para expulsar a los japoneses. [165] Los chinos aseguraron a los coreanos que se enviaría un ejército, pero estaban involucrados en una guerra importante en Ningxia , y los coreanos tendrían que esperar la llegada de su ayuda. [165]
La Segunda División de Katō Kiyomasa desembarcó en Busan el 27 de mayo, y la Tercera División de Kuroda Nagamasa , al oeste del río Nakdong, el 28 de mayo . [166] La Segunda División tomó la ciudad abandonada de Tongdo el 28 de mayo y capturó Gyeongju el 30 de mayo. [166] La Tercera División, al desembarcar, capturó el cercano castillo de Gimhae manteniendo a los defensores bajo presión con disparos mientras construía rampas hasta las murallas con manojos de cultivos. [167] El 3 de junio, la Tercera División capturó Unsan , Changnyeong , Hyeonpung y Seongju . [167] Mientras tanto, la Primera División de Konishi Yukinaga pasó la fortaleza de la montaña Yangsan (capturada en la noche del Sitio de Dongnae, cuando sus defensores huyeron después de que los grupos de exploración japoneses dispararan sus arcabuces), y capturó el castillo de Miryang en la tarde del 26 de mayo. [168] La Primera División aseguró la fortaleza de Cheongdo en los siguientes días y destruyó la ciudad de Daegu. [168] El 3 de junio, la Primera División cruzó el río Nakdong y se detuvo en la montaña Seonsan . [168]
Al recibir noticias de los ataques japoneses, el gobierno de Joseon nombró al general Yi Il como comandante móvil de la frontera, como era la política establecida. [169] El general Yi se dirigió a Mungyeong cerca del comienzo del estratégicamente importante Paso de Choryong para reunir tropas, pero tuvo que viajar más al sur para encontrarse con las tropas reunidas en la ciudad de Daegu. [168] Allí, el general Yi trasladó todas las tropas de regreso a Sangju , excepto a los sobrevivientes del asedio de Dongnae, que iban a ser estacionados como retaguardia en el Paso de Choryong. [168] El 4 de junio, el general Yi desplegó una fuerza de menos de 1000 hombres en dos pequeñas colinas para enfrentar a la Primera División que se acercaba. [170] Suponiendo que la visión del humo que se elevaba era de la quema de edificios por parte de una fuerza japonesa cercana, el general Yi envió a un oficial a explorar a caballo. Sin embargo, cuando se acercaba a un puente, el oficial fue emboscado por fuego de mosquete japonés desde debajo del puente y fue decapitado. [170] Las tropas coreanas, viéndolo caer, se desmoralizaron enormemente. [170] Pronto los japoneses comenzaron la Batalla de Sangju con sus arcabuces. Los coreanos respondieron con sus flechas, que no alcanzaron sus objetivos. [170] Las fuerzas japonesas, divididas en tres, atacaron las líneas coreanas tanto por el frente como por los dos flancos. La batalla terminó con la retirada del general Yi Il y 700 bajas coreanas. [170]
El general Yi Il planeó entonces utilizar el paso de Joryeong , el único camino a través del extremo occidental de la cordillera de Sobaek , para frenar el avance japonés. [170] Sin embargo, otro comandante designado por el gobierno de Joseon, Sin Rip , había llegado a la zona con una división de caballería y había trasladado 100.000 tropas combinadas [171] a la fortaleza de Chungju situada sobre el paso de Joryeong. [172] En lugar de enfrentarse a un asedio, Sin Rip decidió librar una batalla en los campos abiertos de Tangeumdae, que consideró ideal para el despliegue de su unidad de caballería. [172] Sin embargo, dado que la caballería estaba formada principalmente por nuevos reclutas, a Sin Rip le preocupaba que sus tropas pudieran verse fácilmente tentadas a huir de la batalla. Como resultado, sintió la necesidad de atrapar a sus fuerzas en la zona triangular formada por la convergencia de los ríos Tancheon y Han en forma de "Y". [172] Este campo, sin embargo, estaba salpicado de arrozales inundados y en general no era adecuado para la acción de la caballería. [172]
El 5 de junio de 1592, la Primera División de aproximadamente 18.000 hombres liderada por Konishi Yukinaga partió de Sangju y llegó a una fortaleza abandonada en Mungyeong al anochecer. [173] Al día siguiente, la Primera División llegó a Tangeumdae a primera hora de la tarde, donde se enfrentó a la unidad de caballería coreana en la Batalla de Chungju. Konishi dividió sus fuerzas en tres y atacó con arcabuces desde ambos flancos, así como desde el frente. [173] Las flechas coreanas no alcanzaron a las tropas japonesas, que estaban fuera de su alcance, y las dos cargas del general Sin no lograron romper las líneas japonesas. El general Sin se suicidó en el río, y los coreanos que intentaron escapar por el río se ahogaron o fueron decapitados por los japoneses que los perseguían. [173]
La Segunda División, liderada por Katō Kiyomasa, llegó a Chungju, con la Tercera División acampada no muy lejos detrás. [174] Allí, Katō expresó su enojo contra Konishi Yukinaga por no esperar en Busan como estaba planeado e intentar tomar toda la gloria para sí mismo; Nabeshima Naoshige propuso entonces un compromiso de dividir las tropas japonesas en dos grupos separados para seguir dos rutas diferentes a Hanseong (la capital y actual Seúl), y permitir que Katō Kiyomasa eligiera la ruta que tomaría la Segunda División para llegar a Hanseong. [174] La división de las fuerzas japonesas se debió principalmente a la rivalidad entre Katō y Konishi, pero había un cierto "mérito estratégico" en dividir sus fuerzas en que el avance de Katō hacia el noreste de Corea protegería a los japoneses de cualquier intento del líder Jurchen Nurhaci de atacar su flanco oriental. [165] Sin embargo, la división de las fuerzas japonesas también significó que Konishi tendría que enfrentarse solo a los chinos cuando su ejército llegara a Corea. [165]
Las dos divisiones comenzaron la carrera para capturar Hanseong el 8 de junio, y Katō tomó la ruta más corta a través del río Han mientras Konishi fue más arriba, donde las aguas más pequeñas representaban una barrera menor. [174] Konishi llegó primero a Hanseong, el 10 de junio, mientras que la Segunda División se detuvo en el río sin botes con los cuales cruzar. [174] La Primera División encontró el castillo sin defensas con sus puertas bien cerradas, ya que el rey Seonjo había huido el día anterior. [175] Los japoneses irrumpieron en una pequeña compuerta , ubicada en la muralla del castillo, y abrieron la puerta de la ciudad capital desde adentro. [175] La Segunda División de Katō llegó a la capital al día siguiente (habiendo tomado la misma ruta que la Primera División), y la Tercera y Cuarta Divisiones al día siguiente. [175] Mientras tanto, las Divisiones Quinta, Sexta, Séptima y Octava habían desembarcado en Busan, con la Novena División mantenida en reserva en la isla de Iki . [175]
Partes de Hanseong ya habían sido saqueadas e incendiadas, incluidas las oficinas que contenían los registros de esclavos y las armas, y ya habían sido abandonadas por sus habitantes. [175] El general Gim Myeong-won , a cargo de las defensas a lo largo del río Han, se había retirado. [176] Los súbditos del rey robaron los animales de los establos reales y huyeron ante él, dejando a su rey a merced de los animales de granja. [176] En cada aldea, el grupo del rey se encontró con habitantes, alineados junto al camino, lamentando que su rey los estuviera abandonando y descuidando su deber de rendir homenaje. [176] Partes de la orilla sur del río Imjin fueron quemadas para privar a las tropas japonesas de materiales con los que hacer su cruce, y el general Gim Myeong-won desplegó 12.000 tropas en cinco puntos a lo largo del río. [176]
Mientras la Primera División descansaba en Hanseong (actual Seúl), la Segunda División comenzó a dirigirse al norte, pero el río Imjin la retrasó durante dos semanas . [176] Los japoneses enviaron un mensaje a los coreanos de la otra orilla pidiéndoles que abrieran el camino hacia China, pero los coreanos lo rechazaron. [176] Después, los comandantes japoneses retiraron sus fuerzas principales a la seguridad de la fortaleza de Paju . Los coreanos vieron esto como una retirada, y 13.000 tropas coreanas lanzaron un ataque al amanecer contra las tropas japonesas restantes en la orilla sur del río Imjin. [176] El cuerpo principal japonés contraatacó contra las tropas coreanas aisladas y adquirió sus barcos. Las tropas coreanas al mando del general Gim Myeong-won se retiraron con grandes pérdidas a la fortaleza de Kaesong . [177]
Tras el saqueo del castillo de Kaesong poco después de que el general Gim Myeong-won se retirara a Pyongyang, [177] las tropas japonesas dividieron sus objetivos: la Primera División perseguiría al rey coreano en la provincia de Pyongan en el norte (donde se encuentra Pyongyang); la Segunda División atacaría la provincia de Hamgyong en la parte noreste de Corea; la Sexta División atacaría la provincia de Jeolla en el extremo suroeste de la península; la Cuarta División aseguraría la provincia de Gangwon en la parte centro-oriental de la península; y las Divisiones Tercera, Quinta, Séptima y Octava estabilizarían las siguientes provincias respectivamente: provincia de Hwanghae (debajo de la provincia de Pyongan), provincia de Chungcheong (debajo de la provincia de Gyeonggi ); provincia de Gyeongsang (en el sureste donde los japoneses habían desembarcado primero); y provincia de Gyeonggi (donde se encuentra la ciudad capital). [178]
La Primera División bajo el mando de Konishi Yukinaga avanzó hacia el norte y saqueó Pyongsan , Sŏhŭng , Pungsan , Hwangju y Chunghwa en el camino. [179] En Chunghwa, la Tercera División bajo el mando de Kuroda Nagamasa se unió a la Primera y continuó hasta la ciudad de Pyongyang, ubicada detrás del río Taedong . [179] Un total de 10 000 tropas coreanas protegieron la ciudad contra los 30 000 japoneses que avanzaban. [180] Fueron liderados por varios comandantes, incluidos los generales Yi Il y Gim Myeong-won, y sus preparativos de defensa habían asegurado que no hubiera barcos disponibles para el uso japonés. [179]
At night, the Koreans silently crossed the river and launched a successful surprise attack against the Japanese encampment.[179] However, this alerted the rest of the Japanese army, which attacked the rear of the Korean positions and destroyed the remaining reinforcements crossing the river.[181] The remainder of the Korean troops then retreated back to Pyongyang, and the Japanese troops gave up their pursuit of the Koreans to observe the manner in which the Koreans had crossed the river.[181]
The next day, using what they had learned from observing the retreating Korean troops, the Japanese began sending troops to the other shore over the shallow points in the river, in a systematic manner, and at this sight the Koreans abandoned the city overnight.[182] On July 20, 1592, the First and Third Divisions entered the deserted city of Pyongyang.[182][183] In the city, they managed to capture 100,000 tons of military supplies and grain.[183]
The Fourth Division, under the command of Mōri Yoshinari, set out eastward from the capital city of Hanseong in July, and captured a series of fortresses along the eastern coast from Anbyon to Samcheok.[182] The division then turned inward to capture Jeongseon, Yeongwol, and Pyeongchang, and settled down at the provincial capital of Wonju.[182] There, Mōri Yoshinari established a civil administration, systematized social ranks according to the Japanese model, and conducted land surveys.[182] Shimazu Yoshihiro, one of the generals in the Fourth Division, arrived at Gangwon Province late, due to the Umekita uprising, and finished the campaign by securing Chuncheon.[184]
Katō Kiyomasa, leading the Second Division of more than 20,000 men, crossed the peninsula to Anbyon County with a ten-day march, and swept north along the eastern coast.[184] Among the castles captured was Hamhung, the provincial capital of Hamgyong Province. There, a part of the Second Division was assigned to defense and civil administration.[185]
The rest of the division, 10,000 men,[180] continued north, and fought a battle on August 23 against the southern and northern Hamgyong armies under the command of Yi Yong at Songjin.[185] A Korean cavalry division took advantage of the open field at Songjin, and pushed the Japanese forces into a grain storehouse.[185] There, the Japanese barricaded themselves with bales of rice, and successfully repelled a formation charge from the Korean forces with their arquebuses.[185] While the Koreans planned to renew the battle in the morning, Katō Kiyomasa ambushed them at night. The Second Division completely surrounded the Korean forces, with the exception of an opening leading to a swamp.[185] Those that fled were trapped and slaughtered in the swamp.[185]
The Koreans who fled gave alarm to the other garrisons, allowing the Japanese troops to easily capture Kilju County, Myongchon County, and Kyongsong County.[185] The Second Division then turned inland through Puryong County toward Hoeryong, where two Korean princes had taken refuge.[185] On August 30, 1592, the Second Division entered Hoeryong, where Katō Kiyomasa received the Korean princes and the provincial governor, Yu Yong-rip, these having already been captured by the local inhabitants.[185] Shortly afterward, a Korean warrior band handed over the head of an anonymous Korean general, plus General Han Kuk-ham, tied up in ropes.[185]
Katō Kiyomasa then decided to attack a nearby Jurchen castle across the Tumen River in Manchuria to test his troops against the "barbarians", as the Koreans called the Jurchens (Orangkae in Korean and Orangai, both derived from the Mongol term Uriankhai "forest barbarian").[186] Kato's army of 8,000 was joined by 3,000 Koreans at Hamgyong Province, because the Jurchens periodically raided across the border.[186] Soon the combined force sacked the castle, and camped near the border; after the Koreans left for home, the Japanese troops suffered a retaliatory assault from the Jurchens.[186] Katō Kiyomasa retreated with his forces to avoid heavy losses.[186] Because of this invasion, rising Jurchen leader Nurhaci offered military assistance to the Joseon and Ming in the war. However, the offer was refused by both countries, particularly Joseon, saying that it would be disgraceful to accept assistance from the "Barbarians" to the north.
The Second Division continued east, capturing the fortresses of Jangseong, Onsong, Kyongwon, and Kyonghung Counties, and finally arrived at Sosupo on the estuary of the Tumen River.[186] There the Japanese rested on the beach, and watched a nearby volcanic island on the horizon that they mistook as Mount Fuji.[186] After the tour, the Japanese continued their previous efforts to bureaucratize and administer the province, and allowed several garrisons to be handled by the Koreans themselves.[187]
Despite these measures, Katō Kiyomasa fails to maintain control of Hamgyeong Island. Because he encounters constant resistance except where his main force is located, Kato makes the fatal mistake of dispersing his troops by the hundreds in order to prove to Hideyoshi that he is in control of the occupied territory, unlike other daimyo who are attacked by Righteous armies.[188]
Moreover, the cold and rough land of Hamgyongdo made it difficult for Japanese troops from the warmer southwestern regions to withstand and supply. Unable to solve the problem, Kiyomasa Kato abandoned his ban on looting, and this provoked resistance from the Koreans. In response, on October 20, 1592, Jeong Mun-bu, an officer in Hamgyongdo, recruited men and reassembled the scattered government troops. With the support of the people of Hamgyong Province, the 3500 men easily recaptured Kyongsong, Hoeryong and Puryong and executed those who were collaborating with the Japanese, greatly spreading the movement throughout Hamgyong Province.[189][190] On October 30, 1592, a Japanese army of 1000 men returning from looting Joseon villages is attacked by 500 Joseon cavalry at Seokseongryeong and forced to retreat, becoming isolated in the extreme cold on Mount Jangdeok. In response, the Korean soldiers set fire to the mountain the next day at sunrise, annihilating the Japanese army.[190]
Even in this situation, Katō was hesitant to send troops or retreat as the tide of battle slowly turned. Eventually, as the situation worsened and the Japanese suffered heavy losses at Jinju Castle and were forced to concentrate their forces to the south, he ordered his troops to guard Kilju Castle and wait for relief.[191] Eventually, the remaining Japanese forces in Hamgyongdo retreated to Kilju Castle, and the righteous armies laid siege to the castle for three months to prevent them from gathering firewood.[192]In January, Kiyomasa Kato leads an army to retake Hamgyeongdo. On January 21, the Righteous armies launched a mauling attack at Dancheon, inflicting heavy losses on the Japanese vanguard but suffering three defeats against the main Japanese army, which was forced to break the siege of Kilju Castle and withdraw, allowing the trapped Japanese to escape.[193] However, Katō Kiyomasa was forced to abandon Hamgyeong Island due to cold and supply problems, and withdrew to Hanyang on February 29.[194][195]
Having secured Pyongyang, the Japanese planned to cross the Yalu River into Jurchen territory, and use the waters west of the Korean peninsula to supply the invasion.[196] However, Yi Sun-sin, who held the post of the Left Naval Commander[n 3] of the Jeolla Province (which covers the western waters of Korea), successfully destroyed the Japanese ships transporting troops and supplies.[196] Japan, lacking enough arms and troops to carry on the invasion of China, changed the objective of the war to the occupation of Korea.[196]
When the Japanese troops landed at the port of Busan, Bak (also spelled Park) Hong, the Left Naval Commander of Gyeongsang Province, destroyed his entire fleet, his base, and all armaments and provisions, and fled.[160] Won Gyun, the Right Naval Commander, also destroyed and abandoned his own base, and fled to Konyang with only four ships.[160] Thus, there was no Korean naval activity around Gyeongsang Province, and the surviving two, out of the four total fleets, were active only on the other (west) side of the peninsula.[160] Won Gyun later sent a message to Yi Sun-sin that he had fled to Konyang after being overwhelmed by the Japanese in a fight.[197] A messenger was sent by Yi Sun-sin to the nearby island of Namhae Island to give Yi's order for war preparations, only to find it pillaged and abandoned by its own inhabitants.[197] As soldiers began to flee secretly, Yi Sun-sin gave an order "to arrest the escapees" and had two of the fugitives brought back and beheaded; he then had their heads put out for display.[197] Yi Sun-sin's battles steadily affected the war and put significant strain on the sea lanes along the western Korean Peninsula supporting the Japanese advance.[198]
The Korean navy relied on a network of local fishermen and scouting boats to receive intelligence of the enemy movements.[198] On the dawn of July 21, 1592, Yi Sun-sin and Yi Eok-gi set sail with 24 panokseons, 15 small warships, and 46 boats (i.e. fishing boats), and arrived at the waters of Gyeongsang Province by sunset.[198] The Japanese had been sailing up and down the Korean coast, looting and burning all of the seaside villages, and did not expect opposition from the Korean navy.[199]
The next day, the Jeolla Province fleet sailed to the arranged location where Won Gyun was supposed to meet them, and met Yi Sun-sin on July 23. The augmented flotilla of 91 ships[203] then began circumnavigating Geoje Island, bound for Gadeok Island, but scouting vessels detected 50 Japanese vessels at Okpo harbor .[198] Upon sighting the approaching Korean fleet, some of the Japanese who had been busying themselves with plundering got back to their ships, and began to flee.[198] At this, the Korean fleet encircled the Japanese ships and finished them with artillery bombardments.[204] The Japanese fired with their arrows and arquebuses, but the Koreans kept a good distance from them, rendering the Japanese fire ineffective.[199] A teenage Korean girl, taken by the Japanese to be used as a sex slave on board one of their ships, recalled:
Cannonballs and long arrows poured down like hail on the Japanese vessels from our ships. Those who were struck by the missiles fell dead, bathed in blood, while others rolled on deck with wild shrieks or jumped into the water to climb up to the hills. At that time, I remained motionless with fear in the bottom of the boat for longs hours, so I did not know what was happening in the outside world.[199]
The Koreans spotted five more Japanese vessels that night, and destroyed four.[204] After one day's fighting, Yi Sun-sin's fleet had destroyed 26 Japanese ships.[205] The next day, the Koreans approached 13 Japanese ships at Jeokjinpo.[204] In the same manner as the previous success at Okpo, the Korean fleet destroyed 11 Japanese ships—completing the Battle of Okpo without the loss of a single ship.[204] In his report to King Seonjo about his victory, Admiral Yi Sun-sin found the samurai helmets of the Japanese to be rather strange, writing:
The red-black Japanese armour, iron helmets, horse manes, gold crowns, gold fleece, gold armour, feather dress, feather brooms, shell trumpets, and many other curious things, in strange shapes with rich ornaments strike onlookers with awe, like weird ghosts or strange beasts.[205]
The Japanese generals were shocked to hear of the Battle of Okpo, where the Koreans had not lost a single ship, as it threatened to cut them off from Japan.[205] After his victory, Yi Sun-sin found the burnt out remains of countless coastal villages, where the Japanese had enslaved the women while killing all the men.[205]
About three weeks after the Battle of Okpo,[206] Yi Sun-sin and Won Gyun sailed with a total of 26 ships (23 under Yi Sun-sin) toward the Bay of Sacheon after receiving an intelligence report of the Japanese presence.[207] Yi Sun-sin had left behind his fishing vessels that made up most of his fleet in favor of his newly completed turtle ship.[206] At Sacheon, the Japanese ships were anchored in the bay below a promontory where the Japanese had set up a command base.[205]
A turtle ship is a vessel of a panokseon design with the removal of the elevated command post, the modification of the gunwales into curved walls, and the addition of a roof covered in iron spikes (and possibly hexagonal iron plates; this is disputed[200][201][202]).[208] Its walls contained a total of 36 cannon ports, and also openings above the cannon, through which the ship's crew members could look out and fire their personal arms.[207] The design prevented enemies from boarding the ship and aiming at the personnel inside.[208] The ship was the fastest and most maneuverable warship in the East Asian theater, powered by two sails and 80 oarsmen taking turns on the ship's 16 oars.[154] No more than six turtle ships served throughout the entire war, and their primary role was to cut deep into the enemy lines, cause havoc with their cannons, and destroy the enemy flagship.[154]
On July 8, 1592, the fleet arrived at the Bay of Sacheon, where the outgoing tide prevented the Korean fleet from entering.[206] Therefore, Yi Sun-sin ordered the fleet to feign withdrawal, which the Japanese commander, Wakisaka Yasuharu, observed from his tent on a rock.[208] The Japanese decided to give chase, embarked their 12 ships, and pursued the Korean fleet.[206] The Korean navy counterattacked, with the turtle ship in the front, and successfully destroyed all 12 ships.[206][209] In his report to King Seonjo, Admiral Yi wrote: "Previously, foreseeing the Japanese invasion, I had a turtle ship made...with a dragon's head, from whose mouth we could fire cannons, and with iron spikes on its back to pierce the enemy's feet when they tried to board. Because it is in the shape of a turtle, our men can look out from inside, but the enemy cannot look in from outside. It moves so swiftly that it can plunge into the midst of even many hundreds of enemy vessel in any weather to attack them with cannonballs and fire throwers".[209] The Japanese followed their code of Bushido by fighting ferociously, but the superior firepower and armor of the turtle ships more than compensated.[209] Admiral Yi commanded from his deck, and was badly wounded when a Japanese sniper put a bullet into his shoulder.[209]
At the Battle of Dangpo, fought by Miruk Island, 21 Japanese ships commanded by Kurushima Michiyuki were in the process of sacking a Korean seaside village, when the Korean fleet appeared to offer a challenge.[210] Yi Sun-sin once again followed his usual tactic of coming forward to challenge, then making a feigned retreat with the Japanese in hot pursuit, before ambushing them on the open sea.[211] A Korean girl who had been taken prisoner and forced to become Kurushima's mistress, in an interview after the battle, said: "On the day of the battle, arrows and bullets rained on the pavilion vessel where he [Kurushima] sat. First he was hit on the brow but was unshaken, but when an arrow pierced his chest, he fell down with a loud cry", while the turtle ship "dashed close to this pavilion vessel and broke it by shooting cannonballs from the dragon's mouth and by pouring down arrows and cannonballs from other cannon".[211]
After his victory, Yi Sun-sin spent the next days searching for more Japanese ships, which he found at Danghangpo.[211] Yi formed his ships in a circle while a turtle ship rammed the Japanese flagship, resulting in a melee battle.[212] Yi wanted to annihilate the Japanese, and fearing that the Japanese might land their ships in order to escape, ordered a feigned retreat to bring the battle out to the open sea, which lowered the odds of the Japanese surviving.[212] Yi noted in his report to King Seonjo that the Japanese had given no mercy to Korean civilians, raping, torturing, and murdering without regard to age and sex, and he would likewise give them no mercy. The feigned retreat worked, with the Japanese following the Koreans to the open sea, and Yi wrote:
Then our ships suddenly enveloped the enemy craft from the four directions, attacking them from both flanks at full speed. The turtle with the Flying Squadron Chief on board rammed the enemy's pavilion vessel once again, while wrecking it with cannon fire, and our other ships hit its brocade curtains and sails with fire arrows. Furious flames burst out and the enemy commander fell dead from an arrow hit".[212]
All but one of the Japanese ships were taken or sunk, and Yi Sun-sin sent King Seonjo the salted heads of 43 samurai officers.[212] The next day, the one Japanese ship that had escaped was confronted by a Korean ship sent to capture it, leading to a savage fight when the Koreans boarded the Japanese ship.[212] The captain of the Japanese ship "stood alone holding a long sword in his hand and fought to the last without fear", taking 10 arrows to kill him.[213] All 88 sailors of the Japanese ship were killed, and Yi had their ears cut off to be "salted and packed in a box for shipment to the court".[213]
In response to the Korean navy's success, Toyotomi Hideyoshi recalled three commanders from land-based activities: Wakisaka Yasuharu, Katō Yoshiaki, and Kuki Yoshitaka.[214] Hideyoshi understood that if the Koreans won command of the sea, this would be the end of the invasion of Korea, and ordered the destruction of the Korean fleet, with Yi Sun Sin's head to be brought to him.[213] Kuki, a former pirate, had the most naval experience, while Katō Yoshiaki was one of the "Seven Spears of Shizugatake".[213][215] However, the commanders arrived in Busan nine days before Hideyoshi's order was actually issued, and assembled a squadron to counter the Korean navy.[214] Eventually, Wakisaka completed his preparations, and his eagerness to win military honor pushed him to launch an attack against the Koreans without waiting for the other commanders to finish.[216]
The combined Korean navy of 53 ships,[217] under the commands of Yi Sun-sin and Yi Eok-gi, was carrying out a search-and-destroy operation because the Japanese troops on land were advancing into Jeolla Province.[218] Jeolla Province was the only Korean territory to be untouched by major military action, and served as home for the three commanders and the only active Korean naval force.[218] The Korean navy considered it best to destroy naval support for the Japanese to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy ground troops.[218]
On August 13, 1592, the Korean fleet sailing from Miruk Island at Dangpo received local intelligence that a large Japanese fleet was nearby.[218] After surviving a storm, the Korean fleet had anchored off Dangpo, where a local man appeared on the beach with the news that the Japanese fleet had just entered the narrow strait of Gyeonnaeryang that divided Koje Island.[218][219] The following morning, the Korean fleet spotted the Japanese fleet of 82 vessels anchored in the straits of Gyeonnaeryang.[218] Due to the narrowness of the strait and the hazard posed by the underwater rocks, Yi Sun-sin sent six ships as bait to lure out 63 Japanese vessels into the wider sea.[217] The Japanese fleet pursued and, once in the open water, was surrounded by the Korean fleet in a semicircular formation, called a "crane wing" by Yi Sun-sin.[220] With at least three turtle ships (two of which were newly completed) spearheading the clash against the Japanese fleet, the Korean vessels fired volleys of cannonballs into the Japanese formation.[220] The Korean ships then engaged in a free-for-all battle with the Japanese ships, maintaining enough distance to prevent the Japanese from boarding; Yi Sun-sin permitted melee combats only against severely damaged Japanese ships.[220] During the battle, the Korean navy made use of a metal-cased fire bomb that caused substantial damage to Japanese deck crews, and caused fierce fires on board their ships.[221][222] According to the Wakizaka ki:"A man called Manabe Samanosuke was a ship's captain that day, and the ship he was on was set on fire. This tormented him, and saying that he could face meeting the other samurai in the army again, committed suicide and died".[213] Yi noted that "countless numbers of Japanese were hit by arrows and fell dead into the water", but also complained that "...about four hundred exhausted Japanese, finding no way to escape, deserted their boats and fled ashore".[213]
The battle ended in a Korean victory, with Japanese losses of 59 ships—47 destroyed and 12 captured.[223] Not a single Korean ship was lost during the battle. Several Korean prisoners of war were rescued by the Korean soldiers throughout the fight. Wakisaka Yasuharu escaped due to the speed of his flagship.[223] When the news of the defeat at the Battle of Hansan Island reached Toyotomi Hideyoshi, he ordered that the Japanese invasion forces to cease all further naval operations.[224]
For two days after the battle at Dangpo, Yi Eok-gi, with his fleet, joined Yi Sun-sin and Won Gyun, and participated in a search for enemy vessels around Geojedo island and the mainland cost.[225] The admirals then received intelligence that a group of Japanese ships, including those that escaped from the Battle of Dangpo, was anchored in the Bay of Danghangpo.[225] After sending in a scout, the fleet advanced to find 26 enemy ships anchored along the shore.[226] Unable to form a line in the small bay, the Korean fleet formed a circle with the turtle ship in front and bombarded the Japanese.[227] Realizing that they would likely abandon their ships and flee inland, Yi Sun-sin ordered a feigned retreat to draw the Japanese forces out of the bay and into open water.[227] The Japanese took the bait and followed them, and were cut off.[228] All the Japanese ships were sunk or burned, and only a few survivors managed to swim to shore and escape.[229]
On August 16, 1592, Yi Sun-sin led their fleet to the harbor of Angolpo, where 42 Japanese vessels were docked, in the Battle of Angolpo.[230] After a false retreat bore no response, he arranged a relay of ships to keep up a rolling bombardment.[230] When only a few Japanese ships were left undamaged, Yi pulled his fleet back and allowed them to escape by sea, thereby protecting the inhabitants of local villages from possible reprisals by Japanese forces stranded on land.[230]
A naval engagement took place on 1 September 1592, during the first phase of the Japanese invasions of Korea. It was a Korean surprise attack on the fleet of Toyotomi Hideyoshi stationed at Busan. Over the course of the battle, Japanese forces lost 100 ships while no Korean ships were lost. Officer Woon (ko) and six Korean soldiers, as well as countless Japanese soldiers, were killed.[231][232] However, ultimately, the Korean fleet retreated, failing to take over Busan.[233] In the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty (a Korean official history, written by a bureaucrat of the Korean government located in Hanyang District), it is recorded that the Korean navy failed to defeat the Japanese at Busan.[233] However, in other primary historical sources, such as the official Joseon compendium (李忠武公全書) written by Joseon bureaucrats, and the War Diary of Yi Sun-sin and his military reports, it is recorded as a decisive Korean victory.[232][234][231][235][236] Modern historians have also summarized the battle as a decisive Korean victory.[237][238] Some Korean historians believe the War Diary of Yi Sun-sin more than the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty when they study the Imjin war because he was the on-scene commander.[239][240]
After the battle, the Korean government promoted Yi to Samdo Sugun Tongjesa,[n 4] which was the title for the commander of the Korean Navy until 1896.[241]
From the beginning of the war, the Koreans organized militias that they called "righteous armies" (Korean: 의병) to resist the Japanese invasion.[242] These fighting bands were raised throughout the country, and participated in battles, guerilla raids, sieges, and the transportation and construction of wartime necessities.[243]
There were three main types of Korean "righteous army" militias during the war: the surviving and leaderless Korean regular soldiers, the patriotic yangbans (aristocrats) and commoners, and Buddhist monks.[243] By the summer of 1592, there were about 22,200 Korean guerrillas serving the Righteous Army, who tied up much of the Japanese force.[244]
During the first invasion, Jeolla Province remained the only untouched area on the Korean peninsula.[243] In addition to the successful patrols of the sea by Yi Sun-sin, the activities of volunteer forces pressured the Japanese troops to avoid the province in favour of other priorities.[243]
Gwak Jae-u was a famous leader in the Korean militia movement, the first to form a resistance group against the Japanese invaders.[245] He was a land-owner in the town of Uiryeong, situated by the Nam River in Gyeongsang Province. In Korea, Gwak is remembered as an enigmatic, romantic hero.[244] As the Korean regulars abandoned the town[243] and an attack seemed imminent, Gwak organized 50 townsmen. However, the Third Division went from Changwon straight toward Seongju.[245] When Gwak used abandoned government stores to supply his army, the Gyeongsang Province Governor, Kim Su, branded Gwak's group as rebels, and ordered that it be disbanded.[245] When Gwak asked for help from other landowners, and sent a direct appeal to the king, the governor sent troops against Gwak, in spite of having enough troubles already with the Japanese.[245] However, an official from the capital city then arrived to raise troops in the province, and, since the official lived nearby and actually knew him, he saved Gwak from troubles with the governor.[245]
Gwak Jae-u deployed his troops in guerilla warfare under the cover of the tall reeds on the union of the Nakdong and the Nam rivers.[245] This strategy prevented Japanese forces from gaining easy access to Jeolla Province where Yi Sun-sin and his fleet were stationed.[245]
The Sixth Division, under the command of Kobayakawa Takakage, was in charge of conquering Jeolla Province.[245] The Sixth Division marched to Seongju through the established Japanese route (i.e. the Third Division, above), and cut left to Geumsan in Chungcheong Province, which Kobayakawa secured as his starting base for his invasion of the province.[245]
Ankokuji Ekei, a former Buddhist monk made into a general due to his role in the negotiations between Mōri Terumoto and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, led the units of the Sixth Division charged with the invasion of Jeolla Province. The units began their march to Uiryeong at Changwon, and arrived at the Nam River.[245] Ankokuji's scouts planted meters measuring the river's depths so that the entire squadron could cross the river. Overnight, the Korean militiamen moved the meters into the deeper parts of the river.[245] As the Japanese troops began to cross, the militia of Gwak Jae-u ambushed them, and caused them heavy losses.[245] In the end, to advance into Jeolla Province, Ankokuji's men had to try going north around the insecure grounds and within the security of the Japanese-garrisoned fortresses.[245] At Kaenyong, Ankokuji's target was changed to Geochang, to be taken with the aid of Kobayakawa Takakage.[245] However, the entire Jeolla campaign was then abandoned when Kim Myeon and his guerillas successfully ambushed Ankokuji's troops by firing arrows from hidden positions within the mountains.[245]
When the Japanese troops were advancing to Hanseong, Yi Gwang, the governor of Jeolla Province, attempted to check the Japanese progress by launching his army toward the capital city.[246] Upon hearing the news that the capital had already been sacked, the governor withdrew his army.[246] However, as the army grew in size to 50,000 men with the accumulation of several volunteer forces, Yi Gwang and the irregular commanders reconsidered their aim to reclaim Hanseong, and led the combined forces north to Suwon, 42 km (26 mi) south of Hanseong.[246] On June 4, an advance guard of 1,900 men attempted to take the nearby fortress at Yongin, but the 600 Japanese defenders under Wakizaka Yasuharu avoided engagement with the Koreans until June 5, when the main Japanese troops came to relieve the fortress.[246][247] The Japanese troops counterattacked successfully against the Jeolla coalition, forcing the Koreans to abandon arms and retreat.[246]
Around the time of the mobilization of the volunteer army of General Gwak Jae-u in Gyeongsang Province, Go Gyeong-myeong in Jeolla Province formed a volunteer force of 6,000 men.[246] Go then tried to combine his forces with another militia in Chungcheong Province, but upon crossing the provincial border he heard that Kobayakawa Takakage of the Sixth Division had launched an attack on Jeonju (the capital of Jeolla Province) from the mountain fortress at Geumsan. Go returned to his own territory.[246] Having joined forces with General Gwak Yong, Go then led his soldiers to Geumsan.[246] There, on July 10, the volunteer forces fought with a Japanese army retreating to Geumsan after a defeat at the Battle of Ichi two days earlier on July 8.[248]
Prompted by King Seonjo, the Buddhist monk Hyujeong issued a manifesto calling upon all monks to take up arms, writing, "Alas, the way of heaven is no more. The destiny of the land is on the decline. In defiance of heaven and reason, the cruel foe had the temerity to cross the sea aboard a thousand ships".[249] Hyujeong called the samurai "poisonous devils" who were "as virulent as snakes or fierce animals" whose brutality justified abandoning the pacifism of Buddhism to protect the weak and innocent.[250] Hyujeong ended his appeal with a call for monks who were able-bodied to "put on the armor of mercy of Bodhisattvas, hold in hand the treasured sword to fell the devil, wield the lightning bolt of the Eight Deities, and come forward!".[250] At least 8,000 monks responded to Hyujeong's call, some out of a sense of Korean patriotism and others motivated by a desire to improve the status of Buddhism, which suffered discrimination from a Sinophile court intent upon promoting Confucianism.[250]
In Chungcheong Province, the abbot Yeonggyu proved to be an active guerrilla leader and together with the Righteous Army of 1,100 commanded by Jo Heon attacked and defeated the Japanese at the Battle of Cheongju on 6 September 1592.[250] After the victory, the Korean leaders began to quarrel among themselves over who was most responsible, and it was that when the Koreans took the offensive, the regulars under Yun Songak refused to take part while the Righteous Army under Jo Heon and the warrior monks under abbot Yeonggyu marched separately.[251] On 22 September 1592, Jo Heon, with 700 Righteous Army guerrillas, attacked a Japanese force of 10,000 under Kobayakawa Takakage.[251] Turnbull described the second battle of Geumsan as an act of folly on Jo's part as his outnumbered force took on "10,000 of the toughest samurai", who encircled the Righteous Army and "exterminated" them, wiping out the entire Korean force as Kobayakawa ordered that no prisoners be taken.[252] Feeling obligated to come to Jo's aid, the abbot Yeonggyu now led his warrior monks against Kobayakawa at the third battle of Geumsan, who likewise suffered the same fate—"total annihilation".[252] However, as the Geumsan salient had taken three successive Korean attacks in a row in a single month, the 6th Division under Kobayakawa was pulled back as Toyotomi Hideyoshi decided the salient was not worth the trouble to hold it, and to the suffering people of the region that was all that mattered.[252] The Japanese withdrawal inspired further guerrilla attacks and one Righteous Army leader, Pak Chin, had an object hurled over the walls of the Japanese-held town of Gyeongju, which caused "the robbers", as Korean accounts always called the Japanese, to go examine it. The object turned out to be a bomb that killed 30 Japanese.[252] Fearing his garrison was now under-strength, the Japanese commander ordered a retreat to the coastal wajo (castle) at Sosaengpo.[252]
Jinju was a strategic stronghold that defended Gyeongsang Province. The Japanese commanders knew that control of Jinju would mean easy access to the ricebelts of Jeolla Province. Accordingly, a large army under Hosokawa Tadaoki approached Jinju. Jinju was defended by Gim Si-min, one of the better generals in Korea, commanding a Korean garrison of 3,000 men.[253] Gim had recently acquired about 170 new arquebuses that were equal in strength to the Japanese guns.[253] As customary, the Japanese began to collect heads, with the Taikōki mentioning how a samurai named Jirōza'emon "took the first head and raised it aloft. The other five men also attacked and took some excellent heads".[253] The Japanese had usually had little trouble with taking Korean castles and towns, and a certain contempt for the fighting abilities of the Koreans was common among the samurai, so it was a great surprise for the Japanese when they assaulted Jinju to be hit with a barrage of fire as Gim's men dropped heavy stones and bombs while firing their arquebuses, stopping their assault cold.[253]
Hosokawa ordered a new assault with the samurai advancing this time under bamboo shields with covering fire from their arquebuses, which allowed them to place ladders across the walls of Jinju.[254] A scene of carnage occurred, with the Koreans dumping rocks and delayed action bombs down on the Japanese.[254] The Taikōki reported:
As we try to become ichiban nori ["the first to climb in"], they climbed up as in a swarm. Because of this the ladders almost broke, and comrades fell down from their climb, so they could not use the ladders. Hosokawa Tadaoki's brother, Sadaoki, was one such, accompanied by foot soldiers on ladders on his right and left, and strictly ordered, "Until I have personally climbed into the castle this ladder is for one person to climb. If anyone climbs I will take his head!", then he climbed. Because of this, the ladder did not break and the men who saw him were loud in their praise. Consequently, before long he placed his hands on the wall, but when he tried to make his entry from within the castle, spears and naginata were thrust at him to try to make him fall, and lamentably, he fell to the bottom of the moat.[255]
For three days, the Japanese attacked Jinju fruitlessly with the moats becoming full of their dead.[256] On 11 November 1592, a force of Korean guerrillas led by Gwak Jae-u arrived as the relief force, and to fool the Japanese into thinking his force was much larger than it was, Gwak ordered his men to light fires at night on the hills while blowing their conch shells.[256] On 12 November, Hosokawa Tadaoki ordered a final attempt to storm Jinju, with heavy fighting on the northern gates, with General Gim being killed when a Japanese bullet went through his head, but the Korean arquebus fire drove off the Japanese.[257] At that time, another Korean relief force bringing badly needed ammunition arrived up the Nam River, causing Hosokawa to break off the siege, who argued that with the Japanese deep in enemy territory and no reserves to cover his rear that it was too dangerous to continue the siege.[256] Toyotomi Hideyoshi was enraged when he heard of the defeat, saying the Japanese should never be defeated by Koreans, and vowed vengeance.[256] With the help of arquebuses, cannon, and mortars, the Koreans were able to drive the Japanese from Jeolla Province. The result of the battle at Jinju prevented the Japanese from entering Jeolla Province.
Unable to repel the Japanese invasion, Korea ultimately had to rely on the intervention of Ming China to halt the Japanese advance, despite the various logistical and organizational difficulties suffered by the Japanese.[258]
Korean Court historian and politician Ryu Seong-ryong stated that the Korean naval victory stalled the entire strategy of the invaders by "cutting off one of the arms" with which Japan tried to envelop Korea, isolating Konishi Yukinaga's army at Pyongyang and securing Chinese waters from the feared Japanese attack, such that "the Celestial Army could come by land to the assistance" of Korea.[213][258]
Viewing the crisis in Joseon, the Wanli Emperor and the Ming court were initially filled with confusion and skepticism as to how their tributary could have been overrun so quickly.[259]
The Korean court was at first hesitant to call for help from the Ming dynasty, and began a withdrawal to Pyongyang.[259] After repeated requests by King Seonjo, and after the Japanese army had already reached Korea's border with China, China finally came to the aid of Korea.[26] China was also somewhat obligated to come to the assistance of Korea because Korea was a tributary state of China, and the Ming dynasty did not tolerate the possibility of a Japanese invasion of China.[38][39] The local governor at Liaodong eventually acted upon King Seonjo's request for aid following the capture of Pyongyang by sending a small force of 5,000 soldiers led by Zu Chengxun.[260] Zu, a general who had fought successfully against the Mongols and the Jurchens, was over-confident, holding the Japanese in contempt.[257] This cavalry force advanced almost unhindered and managed to enter Pyongyang, but was promptly and decisively defeated by the Japanese troops in the city. On 23 August 1592, the Chinese attacked under the cover of a heavy rainstorm, taking the Japanese by surprise.[261] Once the Japanese realized that they outnumbered the Chinese by six to one, they allowed the Chinese cavalry to spread out over the streets of Pyongyang and counter-attacked, using their superior numbers to annihilate the Chinese.[261] As the Chinese retreated into the muddy fields outside of Pyongyang, the samurai cut them down in the hundreds.[261] One of their leading generals, Shi Ru, was killed in this engagement. The Japanese were elated at having defeated an army from China, the foremost power in East Asia, but Konishi Yukinaga grew despondent over the fall of 1592 as it became clear that no reinforcements would arrive from Japan.[261] The fleet of Admiral Yi Sun-sin was preventing any Japanese ships from landing, while the attacks of the Korean Righteous Army guerrillas left the Japanese forces in northern Korea largely cut off from the forces in southern Korea.[261] At conference in Hanseong, Konishi told Ukita Hideie that he was not certain if Pyongyang could be held if the Chinese were to attack again with greater numbers.[261] During the later half of 1592, the Ming sent investigation teams into Pyongyang to clarify the situation.[259] The Ming became fully aware of the situation and made the decision for a full reinforcement by September 1592. With the victory in Ningxia, the Chinese finally had the forces available for Korea, and Li Rusong, the general who crushed the Ningxia revolt was sent to expel the Japanese from Korea.[261]
By then, it had become clear that this was a situation much more serious than something that could be handled by local forces. Thus, the Ming Emperor mobilized and dispatched a larger force in January 1593 under the general Li Rusong and Imperial Superintendent Song Yingchang, the former being one of the sons of Ming dynasty's Liaodong military magistrate, Li Chengliang, and the latter being a bureaucratic officer (Ming military law stipulated that any military officer would have an accompanying bureaucrat appointed by the Imperial Court acting as the general's superior). According to the collection of letters left by Song Yingchang, the strength of the Ming army was around 40,000,[n 5] composed mostly of garrisons from the north, including around 3,000 men with experience against Japanese pirates under Qi Jiguang. Li wanted a winter campaign as the frozen ground would allow his artillery train to move more easily than it would under the roads turned into mud by the fall rains.[262] On 5 January 1593, Wu Weizhong led an advance force of 3,000 men across the Yalu River into Korea, followed by two battalions of 2,000 men each later the same day.[261] At Uiju, King Seonjo and the Korean court formally welcomed Li and the other Chinese generals to Korea, where strategy was discussed.[263]
Thailand, a longtime faithful tributary state of the Chinese dynasties,[264][265] offered to directly attack Japan to intervene in Toyotomi Hideyoshi's plans, but Ming did not accept, instead ordering Thailand to attack Burma.[266]
On February 5, 1593, the Ming expeditionary army arrived outside Pyongyang accompanied by a group of Korean soldiers. Ming general Li Rusong was appointed the supreme commander of all armies in Korea. After initial attempts to negotiate with the Japanese defenders under Konishi Yukinaga broke down,[23] the two sides began skirmishing on the outskirts over the next couple of days, with Li Rusong attempting to dislodge a Japanese garrison on the hills north of the city while Konishi Yukinaga attempted a night raid on the Ming camp.[23] The Japanese night attack was beaten off by the Chinese fire archers, and Li ordered a feigned retreat, leading the over-confident samurai to fall into a trap, resulting in their annihilation.[263] The Sino-Korean force consisted of 43,000 Chinese, 10,000 Koreans, plus Righteous Army guerrillas, and about 5,000 warrior monks.[267] Li admitted that the Japanese infantry were better equipped with guns, but assured his officers: "Japanese weapons have a range of a few hundred paces, while my great cannon have a range of five to six li [2.4 km]. How can we not be victorious?"[263] The city of Pyongyang was one of the most powerful fortresses in Korea, and to take it, Li's plans called for surrounding the city on all four sides, starting a fierce bombardment under which his infantry would advance.[268]
The Korean warrior monks, led by Abbot Hyujeong, attacked the headquarters of Konishi Yuninaga on Moranbong, coming under heavy Japanese arquebus fire, taking hundreds of dead, but they persevered.[254] Later that same day, the Chinese under Wu Weizhong joined the attack, and with a real danger that Konishi would be cut off from the rest of his army, So Yoshitoshi led a counterattack that rescued the Japanese forces from Moranbong.[268] After the fall of Moranbong after two days fighting, Li Rusong ordered his cannons to open fire while fire arrows and incendiary bombs set much of the city on fire.[268] On the morning of February 6, Li ordered an all-out assault on three sides of the city. The Chinese took heavy losses as the Japanese fire was withering, but Li, whose horse was killed, was able to bring up the siege ladders, called "cloud ladders" by the Chinese.[269] Li had offered 5,000 ounces of silver for the first man to get over the wall, an honor that was claimed by an infantryman from Zhejiang Province named Luo Shangzhi, who got up unto the wall while using his halberd to great effect.[269]
Japanese defenders were forced off the walls fairly quickly, and retreated to the citadel they built on the eastern portions of the city. Chinese officers initially scoffed at the earth walls of the Japanese citadel, but after coming under fire from the Japanese arquebuses, soon learned to respect the defense.[269] The Jingbirok reported: "The enemy built clay walls with holes on top of their fortress, which looked like a beehive. They fired their muskets though those holes as much as they could, and as a result, a number of Chinese soldiers were wounded".[269] The allies were unwilling to commit to a direct assault on the heavily defended fortification during the day. Instead, they left an opening for the Japanese to rally while making preparations for a fire assault on their position at night. Japanese forces sallied out of the undefended eastern walls and made a run for Hanseong, and they were hit with additional ambushes on the way back south and took heavy casualties.[23][270]
A samurai, Yoshino Jingoze'emon, wrote about the retreat:
There was hardly a gap between the dead bodies that filled the surroundings of Matsuyama Castle [Moranbong]. Finally, when we had repulsed the enemy, they burned the food storehouses in several places, so there was now no food. On the night of the seventh day, we evacuated the caste, and made our escape. Wounded men were abandoned, while those who were not wounded but simply exhausted crawled almost prostrate along the road...Because it is a cold country, there is ice and deep snow, and hands and feet are burned by the snow, and this gives rise to frostbite, which makes them swell up. The only clothes they had were the garments worn under their armour, and even men who were normally gallant resembled scarecrows on the mountains and fields because of their fatigue, and were indistinguishable from the dead.[271]
The fortress of Pungsan, held by Otomo Yoshimune of the Third Division, had been abandoned and burned down by him, before Konishi's force reached it, adding to the misery of the retreat.[271] Otomo ruined his reputation by retreating without being attacked, and as a result, the Otomo clan, one of the oldest and most respected daimyō families on Kyushu, were disgraced forever, as under Bushido, cowardice was the worst disgrace for a samurai.[271] Otomo's disgrace was also a blow for the efforts of Jesuit missionaries in Japan as Otomo had converted to Catholicism after long talks with the Portuguese Jesuits, and many Japanese concluded that Christianity with its emphasis on love and gentleness was not a suitable religion for a samurai.[271] Song Yingchang's letters on March 1, 1593, described the battle in full to the Ming court. After their defeat, the Japanese shifted their strategy to hit-and-run tactics and ambushes. The use of gunpowder technology and street fighting contributed to the victory, which would permanently deter the invasion.[272]
Soon after retaking Pyongyang, Li Rusong also succeeded in retaking the major city of Kaesong on January 19, 1592,[273] and met only minor resistance from the Japanese defenders.
Overconfident with his recent success and possibly misled by false reports,[274] Li Rusong advanced towards the capital city of Hanseong with his allied army of 20,000[275] on January 21, 1593. On January 26, the force ran into an unexpected confrontation at Byeokjegwan with a large Japanese formation of about 30,000.
Initially, the scouting party of the group under Cha Da Sho and a Korean general confronted a small band of Japanese numbering no more than 600 men. The party overran them successfully but soon ran into a much larger host under Tachibana Muneshige, and retreated to a nearby hill to defend themselves.
Upon hearing of his scouting party's plight, Li decided to rush forward with the rest of his small host. He met up with his scouting party around noon, but by that time even more Japanese forces were converging on the area.
The Ming forces gradually retreated north while fighting off several waves of attacks. Li Rusong and many other generals personally fought in the brawl, and they sustained heavy casualties before they met up with the rest of their army toward the later portion of the day. At that point, the Japanese gave up further attacks and both sides pulled back. Because the Ming suffered heavy casualties among their elite retinues, Li became reluctant to move aggressively for the remainder of the war.[276]
The Japanese invasion into Jeolla Province was broken down and pushed back by General Gwon Yul at the hills of Ichiryeong, where outnumbered Koreans fought Japanese troops in the Battle of Byeokjegwan and gained a victory. Gwon Yul quickly advanced northwards, retaking Suwon and then swung north toward Haengju Fortress, a wooden stockade on a cliff over the Han River, where he would wait for Chinese reinforcements. After he was informed that the Ming army under Li Rusong was pushed back at Byeokje, Gwon Yul decided to fortify Haengju.[277]Kwon's force of 2,300 men were a mixture of regulars, warrior monks, and Righteous Army guerrillas.[277]
Bolstered by the victory at the Battle of Byeokjegwan, Katō Kiyomasa and his army of 30,000 men advanced to the south of Hanseong to attack Haengju Fortress, an impressive mountain fortress that overlooked the surrounding area.[277] An army of a few thousand led by Gwon Yul was garrisoned at the fortress, waiting for the Japanese. Katō believed his overwhelming army would destroy the Koreans and therefore ordered the Japanese soldiers to simply advance upon the steep slopes of Haengju with little planning at about 6 am.[277] Gwon Yul responded to the Japanese advance with fierce fire from the fortification using hwachas, rocks, handguns, and bows.[277] The hwach'a ("fire wagon") was a cart that could fire either 100 rockets or 200 arrows at once; the hwach'a took much time to load, but were capable of bringing down deadly fire.[278] Gwon had trained his men to fire their hwach'as all at once, and as the Japanese were packed closely together, the volley from the "fire wagons" inflicted heavy losses.[278] The women of Hanseong joined their menfolk, bringing up rocks in their skirts.[278] In the course of nine assaults, the Japanese pushed the Koreans back to their second line, but could advance no further, losing about 10,000 dead in the process.[278] （How could you possibly die 10000? This is a fabrication used by future generations to commemorate this battle. According to contemporary Korean records, the Korean army harvested 130 Japanese heads, and the Koreans estimated that they killed five to six Japanese soldiers。）The Jingbirok wrote: "Gwon Yul ordered his soldiers to gather the dead bodies of the enemy and vent their anger by tearing them apart and hanging them on the branches of the trees".[278] Facing unexpected resistance and mounting casualties, Katō Kiyomasa burned his dead and finally pulled his troops back.
The Battle of Haengju was an important victory for the Koreans, as it greatly improved the morale of the Korean army. The battle is celebrated today as one of the three most decisive Korean victories (the other two being the 1592 Battle of Hansan Island and the siege of Jinju). Today, the site of Haengju fortress has a memorial built to honor Gwon Yul. By this time, the Japanese invasion force of about 150,000 men were down to about 100,000 men, with Chinese reinforcements arriving every day.[278] Most of the Japanese were suffering from hunger, frostbite, and snow-blindness and some Japanese soldiers were so weakened by hunger that they were unable to defend themselves from tigers in the mountains.[278] With the situation untenable, the Japanese retreated to the coast.[277]
After the Battle of Byeokjegwan, the Ming army took a cautious approach and moved on Hanseong again later in February after the successful Korean defense in the Battle of Haengju.[279]
The two sides remained at a stalemate between the Kaesong to Hanseong line for the next couple of months, with both sides unable and unwilling to commit to further offensives. The Japanese lacked sufficient supplies to move north, and the defeat at Pyongyang had caused part of the Japanese leadership, such as Konishi Yukinaga and Ishida Mitsunari, to seriously consider negotiating with the Ming dynasty forces. This got them into a heated debate with other hawkish generals such as Katō Kiyomasa, and these conflicts would eventually have further implications following the war in Japan when the two sides became rivals in the Battle of Sekigahara.
The Ming forces had their own set of problems. Soon after arriving in Korea, the Ming officials began to note the inadequate logistical supply from the Korean court. The records by Qian Shizhen noted that even after the Siege of Pyongyang, the Ming forces were already stalled for nearly a week due to the lack of supplies, before moving on to Kaesong.[280] As time went on, the situation only become more serious. When the weather warmed, the road conditions in Korea also became terrible, as numerous letters from Song Yingchang and other Ming officers attest, which made resupplying from China itself also a tedious process.[281]
The Korean countryside was already devastated from the invasion when the Ming forces arrived, and in the heart of winter it was extremely difficult for the Koreans to muster sufficient supplies. Even though the court had assigned the majority of the men on hand to tackle the situation, their desire to reclaim their country, along with the militarily inexperienced nature of many of their administrators, resulted in their continual requests to the Ming forces to advance despite the situation. These events created an increasing level of distrust between the two sides.
Though by mid April 1593, faced with ever-greater logistical pressure from a Korean naval blockade of Yi Sun-sin, in addition to a Ming force special operation that managed to burn down a very significant portion of the Japanese grain storage,[282] the Japanese broke off talks and pulled out of Hanseong.
Unlike the first siege of Jinju, the second siege resulted in a Japanese victory. Toyotomi Hideyoshi was especially determined to take Jinju and ordered that the previous Japanese failure to take the city be avenged.[283] Ukita Hideie led 90,000 Japanese troops to take Jinju, making it the largest mobilization of Japanese forces for a single operation in the entire war.[283] The Koreans, not knowing where the Japanese were going, divided their forces, with Kim Cheon-il commanding the garrison of 4,000 soldiers at Jinju, who were joined by volunteers, guerrillas, a small Chinese force, and a large number of civilians including women and children, making for a total of about 60,000.[284] On 20 July 1593, the Japanese began to construct wooden shields to allow them to advance against the walls.[285] To the west were Konishi Yukinaga with 26,000 men, and to the north were Kato Kiyomasa with 25,000, while Ukita Hideie commanded the reserve of 17,000.[285] On 21 July 1593, the Japanese attacked, breaking the dyke that filled the moat around Jinju, while the samurai advanced under their wooden shields, to be stopped by Korean fire arrows, cannonballs, and arquebuses.[283] On 23 July, the Japanese attacked with wooden siege towers, which were knocked down by Korean cannon fire.[177] On 25 July, under a flag of truce, Ukita sent a messenger to Kim, telling him that the Japanese would slaughter 10,000 Korean peasants whom they had taken prisoner if Jinju did not surrender at once, but Kim refused, and so 10,000 Korean peasants were beheaded.[286]
The Japanese now attacked with armored carts called "tortoise shell wagons", which allowed the Japanese to advance up to the walls, where the sappers would pull out the stones. But as a Japanese account complained: "They tried to attack, but from inside the castle, pine torches were thrown that set the grass alight. The soldiers inside the tortoise wagons were also burned and retreated".[283] On 27 July, the Japanese again attacked with the "tortoise shell wagons", but this time, there was a heavy thunderstorm that prevented Korean attempts to incinerate the Japanese by dropping torches soaked in fat.[178] The Japanese sappers broke down a section of the wall and a great rush broke out with the samurai pushed each other down as it was a great honor to be the first samurai to enter a fortress.[178] Goto Mototsugu, a retainer of Kuroda Nagamasa, was about to be the first samurai to enter Jinju when Iida Kakbei, a retainer of Kato Kiyomasa, threw the Nichiren flag into the breach to claim that honor for himself.[178] The Korean garrison was out of ammunition and were short of swords, so many Koreans fought with wooden sticks against the onrush of samurai armed with katanas.[178] One Korean, General Sŏ Yewon, engaged in a lengthy single combat with a samurai named Okamoto Gonjo, which ended when the wounded General Sŏ lost his breath and fell down by a tree, and Okamoto took the chance to sever his head with a single blow from his katana.[178] Sŏ's head fell down by the Nam River, which as it was a great honor for a samurai to take the head of their enemies, led Okamoto to order a search to find Sŏ's head, so that it could be salted and taken back to Japan.[178] The Korean commander, General Kim Cheon-il, committed suicide.[178]
As usual, the Japanese took no prisoners, killing almost everyone, both military and civilian, and the Nam River ran red with blood as thousands attempted to swim across it, only to be cut down by the samurai waiting on the other side.[178] The chronicler of the Kato clan noted: "All the Chinese were terrified of our Japanese blades, and jumped into the river, but we pulled them and cut off their heads".[178] Korean accounts mention that almost all of the 60,000 soldiers in Jinju were killed while Japanese accounts mention the samurai sent 20,000 heads back to Japan after their victory.[178] Only the kisaeng (courtesans) of Jinju were spared as they were pressed into service for the victorious Japanese generals at a party they held to celebrate their victory on the evening of the same day at the Ch'oksŏngu Pavilion on a nearby hill, as it offered the best view of the "hellish scene" below them.[178] One courtesan, Nongae, attracted the attention of a samurai, Keyamura Rokunosuke, whom she lured to a cliff by promising him sex, and then threw both herself and him off the cliff, becoming a national heroine in Korea.[287] Jinju was taken only for symbolic purposes, and instead of advancing, the Japanese force at Jinju retreated back to Busan as there was a larger Chinese force to the north.[288] Toyotomi Hideyoshi was well satisfied that he had avenged the defeat of 1592 at Jinju, though Turnbull argued that to lose so many men to take a town only for symbolic reasons was wasteful.[288]
There were two factors that triggered the Japanese to withdraw: first, a Chinese commando penetrated Hanseong (present-day Seoul) and burned storehouses at Yongsan, destroying most of what was left of the Japanese troops' depleted stock of food. Secondly, Shen Weijing made another appearance to conduct negotiations, and threatened the Japanese with an attack by 400,000 Chinese. The Japanese under Konishi Yukinaga and Katō Kiyomasa, aware of their weak situation, agreed to withdraw to the Busan area while the Chinese would withdraw back to China. A ceasefire was imposed, and a Ming emissary was sent to Japan to discuss peace terms.[289] For the next three years, there was little fighting as the Japanese retained control of a few coastal fortresses, with the rest of Korea being controlled by the Koreans.[290]
By May 18, 1594, all the Japanese soldiers had retreated to the area around Busan and many began to make their way back to Japan. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce.
Once peace negotiations between China and Japan finally got underway, Chinese negotiators gave the Ming emperor the mistaken impression that he was about to deal with a minor state that had been subdued by war. Furthermore, they conveyed the idea that the Japanese regent, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, was prepared to become his vassal. Under such conditions, the Chinese sought to resolve the issue in their favor by including Japan in their tributary system of foreign relations. They would establish Hideyoshi as king of Japan and grant him the privilege of formal tribute trade relations with the Ming dynasty.
In Japan, Hideyoshi's negotiators apparently led him to believe that China was suing for peace and was ready to accept him as their emperor. Thus, Hideyoshi issued the demands of a victor; first, a daughter of the Ming emperor must be sent to become the wife of the Japanese emperor; second, the southern provinces of Joseon must be ceded to Japan; third, normal trade relations between China and Japan must be restored; and fourth, a Joseon prince and several high-ranking government officials must be sent to Japan as hostages.
Bargaining from such fundamentally different perspectives, there was no prospect whatsoever for success in the talks. Early in 1597, both sides resumed hostilities.[291]
After the failed peace negotiations of the inter-war years, Toyotomi Hideyoshi launched the second invasion of Korea. One of the main strategic differences between the first and second invasions was that conquering China was no longer an explicit goal for the Japanese. Failing to gain a foothold during Katō Kiyomasa's Chinese campaign, and the near complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces during the first invasion, had established that the Korean peninsula was the more prudent and realistic objective.
Japan's second force arrived unopposed on the southern coast of Gyeongsang Province in 1596. Soon after the Chinese ambassadors had safely returned to China in 1597, Hideyoshi sent approximately 200 ships with an estimated 141,100 men under the overall command of Kobayakawa Hideaki.[124]
However, the Japanese found that the Korean army was both better equipped and better prepared to deal with an invasion than several years prior.[292] In addition, upon hearing the news in China, the imperial court in Beijing appointed Yang Hao as the supreme commander of an initial mobilization of 55,000 troops from various (and sometimes remote) provinces across China, such as Sichuan, Zhejiang, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong.[293] A naval force of 21,000 was included in the effort.[294] Ray Huang, a Chinese-American philosopher and historian, estimated that the combined strength of the Chinese army and navy at the height of the second campaign was around 75,000.[294] Korean forces totaled approximately 30,000 men, with General Gwon Yul's army in Gong Mountain in Daegu, General Gwon Eung's troops in Gyeongju, General Gwak Jae-u's soldiers in Changnyeong, Yi Bok-nam's army in Naju, and Yi Si-yun's troops in Chungpungnyeong.
Initially, the Japanese found limited success, being largely confined to Gyeongsang Province and only launching numerous raids to harass and weaken the Korean defenders. In the early autumn of 1597, the Japanese began a more focused and sustained advance. The Japanese planned to attack Jeolla Province in the southwestern part of the peninsula and eventually occupy Jeonju, the provincial capital. Korean success in the First Siege of Jinju in 1592 had mostly saved this area from devastation during the first invasion (the Second Siege of Jinju in 1593, while a Japanese victory, was only undertaken for symbolic purposes). Two Japanese armies, under Mōri Hidemoto and Ukita Hideie, began the assault in Busan and marched towards Jeonju, taking Sacheon and Changpyeong along the way.
The Korean navy was again to play a crucial part in the second invasion, as in the first, by hampering Japanese advances on land by harassing supply fleets at sea.[295] However, despite his previous successes, Yi Sun-sin was both demoted and jailed by King Seonjo, largely due to a Japanese plot to deceive the Korean court and take advantage of the court's political infighting. Government officials gave direct orders to launch a surprise naval operation against the Japanese, based on a tip from a presumed reliable Japanese spy. Yi refused to obey these orders, knowing that this was an obvious trap meant to have his own fleet sail into an ambush. This development allowed others within the court to further advance their personal agendas while Yi was severely punished. Ultimately, Won Gyun was appointed in Yi Sun-sin's place at the head of the Korean navy.
After Won Gyun replaced Yi Sun-sin as head of the Korean navy, he was quick to take action and justify his newly acquired position. He gathered the entire Korean fleet, which now had more than 100 ships, outside of Yeosu, to search for the Japanese. Without any previous preparations or planning, Won Gyun then had his entire fleet sail towards Busan.
After one day at sea, Won Gyun was informed of a large Japanese fleet near Busan. He decided to attack immediately, despite reports of exhaustion among the crews of his ships.
At the subsequent Battle of Chilcheollyang, Won Gyun was completely outmaneuvered by the Japanese in a surprise attack. His ships were overwhelmed by arquebus fire and the traditional Japanese boarding attacks, which largely resulted in the destruction of his entire fleet. Prior to this engagement, Bae Seol (1551–1599), a naval officer who did not submit to Won Gyun's leadership, kept thirteen panokseons under his command and out of the battle, instead escaping to the southwestern Korean coast. These would form the entire fighting force of the Korean navy during the following months.
The Battle of Chilcheollyang was Japan's only decisive naval victory of the war. Won Gyun was himself killed by a Japanese garrison after he struggled ashore on an island following the destruction of his flagship. The victory allowed the Japanese navy to safely escort its troop ships and to support planned landing operations.[296]
After the disaster at Chilcheollyang, the allied defenses in the south began to quickly break down and the Japanese forces stormed into Jeolla Province. The garrison of Namwon became their next key target.
Namwon was located 50 kilometres southeast of Jeonju. Correctly predicting a Japanese attack, a coalition force of 6,000 soldiers (including 3,000 Chinese troops under Yang Yuan and civilian volunteers) were prepared to fight the approaching Japanese forces.[297] The Japanese laid siege to the walls of the fortress with ladders and siege towers.[298] The two sides exchanged volleys with arquebuses and bows. Eventually, the Japanese forces scaled the walls and sacked the fortress. According to Japanese commander Okochi Hidemoto, author of the Chosen Ki (Korean Record), the Siege of Namwon resulted in 3,726 casualties[n 6] among the Korean and Chinese forces.[299] The Korean forces and its leaders were almost entirely killed.
When the gates were opened, many Koreans simply laid down on their knees, knowing the samurai would behead them, while others tried to flee north, where the samurai commanded by Katō Yoshiaki and Shimazu Yoshihiro were waiting and proceeded to cut down all Koreans with their katanas.[300] The Japanese Buddhist monk Keinen, who was traveling with the samurai, described a scene of utter horror as the full moon illuminated the scenes of destruction with much of the town on fire, the formerly white walls of Namwon turned red with blood, and the wailing of the Koreans, knowing it was their time to die as the samurai gave no mercy, killing all.[301] Only Yang Yuan managed to sally out after the walls were breached, with a handful of men, to return to Hanseong. He was later executed by the Ming court because of his defeat in battle. Traditionally, samurai collected the heads of those they killed, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi had insisted that the samurai send him the noses of those they had killed as proof that they were fighting.[301] Okochi counted the heads of 3,725 Koreans killed that day, and removed their noses, which were pickled in salt and sent back to Japan.[301] All of the noses of the Koreans killed by the samurai are buried near the shrine to the Great Buddha put up by Hideyoshi in Kyoto, which, as Turnbull noted "...they remain to this day inside Kyoto's least mentioned and most often avoided tourist attraction, the grassy burial mound that bears the erroneous name of the Mimizuka, the 'Mound of Ears'.".[301]
Hwangseoksan Fortress consisted of extensive walls that circumscribed the Hwangseok Mountain and garrisoned thousands of soldiers led by generals Jo Jong-do and Gwak Jun. When Katō Kiyomasa laid siege to the mountain with the Army of the Right, and attacked at night under the full moon, the Koreans lost morale and retreated with 350 casualties.[300] The successful siege did not, however, lead to a subsequent advance from beyond Gyeongsang Province.
Upon the start of the second invasion, the Ming Emperor was furious about the entire debacle of the peace talks and turned his wrath on many of its chief supporters; particularly Shi Xing, the Minister of War, who was removed from his position and jailed (he died several years later, in prison). The chief negotiator, Shen Weijing, was executed. Xing Jie, the Chief Commissioner of the Liaodong Commandery, was named the new Minister of War and Yang Hao as the new Chief Superintendent of Korea; Xing Jie himself was also stationed in Korea for the remainder of the war. The Ming leadership quickly pulled in many units stationed near its border with Korea.
After the steady advances on land, the Japanese planned to assault Hanseong by late August or early September 1597. However, the plans were foiled by a Ming defense around Jiksan (modern-day Cheonan).
Forces under Kuroda Nagamasa formed the vanguard of the Right Army and marched toward Hanseong, which deeply disturbed the court there. Several of the Ming generals stationed in Korea suggested to the court that they pull back their forces until they could gather more reinforcements, but the Ming administrators overruled their generals and ordered them to make a stand. Thus the Chief Commander of the Ming forces at the time, Ma Gui, sent out General Jie Sheng and three other generals with an elite cavalry force to confront the Japanese forces. The Battle of Jiksan halted the Japanese northward advance.[302]
According to Korean records, the Ming forces ran into the vanguard forces under Kuroda Nagamasa around the area of Jiksan. On the first day, they beat back a small scouting party. On the second day, the two forces clashed in earnest, with the Japanese being beaten back.[303]
On 16 October 1597, Kuroda Nagamasa's force of 5,000 arrived at Jiksan, where 6,000 Ming soldiers were stationed. Kuroda's forces charged the enemies and was soon joined by the rest of the army, bringing Japanese forces to 30,000. Although heavily outnumbering the Ming, the Japanese were unable to do much damage due to the Ming's superior armor. According to Kuroda and Mōri Hidemoto, their firearms could not penetrate the iron shields used by Chinese soldiers, and their armor was at least partially bulletproof.[304] The battle continued until dusk when the two sides withdrew.[304][305]
Kuroda launched another attack at night, this time in a pronged sweeping crane formation that sought to crush the enemies between them. The attack failed and turned into a rout that was joined by 2,000 Ming cavalry.[305]
Jiksan was the furthest the Japanese ever got towards reaching Hanseong (Seoul) during the second invasion.[305]
After the debacle in Chilcheollyang, King Seonjo immediately reinstated Yi Sun-sin. Yi Sun-sin quickly returned to Yeosu, where he found the majority of his navy destroyed. Yi re-organized the navy, now reduced to the thirteen ships that Bae Seol had held back from Chilcheollyang and approximately 200 men.[306] On October 26, 1597, in the Myeongnyang Strait, Yi Sun-sin encountered a large Japanese fleet of approximately 133 warships, with a further 200 logistical ships in support.[307] By making use of a narrow passage, Yi positioned his ships in a battle line that prevented the Japanese navy from making use of their numerical superiority. The Battle of Myeongnyang resulted in a Korean victory, with Yi Sun-sin retaking the naval initiative.[308] The Koreans did not lose a single ship and destroyed approximately 30 Japanese combat ships, severely damaging another 30 (the oft-cited number of 333 ships in the Japanese fleet includes support ships, which would not be considered combat ships). The Battle of Myeongnyang is considered Yi Sun-sin's greatest battle, largely as a result of the disparity of numbers. Even after the victory, however, the Joseon navy was still outnumbered by the remaining Japanese navy, so Admiral Yi withdrew to the Yellow Sea to resupply his fleet and have more space for a mobile defense.[309] After the Korean navy withdrew, the Japanese navy made an incursion into the western coast of Korea, near some islands in Yeonggwang County.[310][311]
By January 29, 1598, the Joseon and Ming allied forces achieved victory in Jiksan and pushed the Japanese further south. After the news of the loss at Myeongnyang, Katō Kiyomasa and his retreating army looted Gyeongju, the former capital of Unified Silla.
The Japanese forces sacked the city and many artifacts and temples were destroyed, most prominently, the Bulguksa, a Buddhist temple. Ming and Joseon forces continued to harass the Japanese forces, who then withdrew further south to Ulsan,[312] a harbor that had been an important Japanese trading post a century before, and which Katō had chosen as a strategic stronghold.
Yi Sun-sin's control of the areas around the coast of Jeolla permitted no supply ships to reach the western side of the Korean Peninsula, into which many extensive tributaries merge. Without provisions and reinforcements, the Japanese forces were constrained to the coastal fortresses, known as wajō, that they still controlled. The advancing Ming forces attempted to take advantage of this situation by attacking Ulsan. This siege was the first major offensive from the Ming forces in the second phase of the war.
The effort of the Japanese garrison (about 7,000 men) of Ulsan was largely dedicated to its fortification in preparation for the expected attack. Katō Kiyomasa assigned command and defense of the base to Katō Yasumasa, Kuki Hirotaka, Asano Nagayoshi, and others before proceeding to Sosaengpo near Ulsan.[313] The Ming army's first assault on January 29, 1598, caught the Japanese army unaware and still encamped, for the large part, outside Ulsan's unfinished walls.[314]
A total of around 36,000 troops with the help of singijeons and hwachas nearly succeeded in sacking the fortress, but reinforcements under the overall command of Mōri Hidemoto came across the river to aid the besieged fortress.[315] Although the Japanese garrison was desperately short of supplies, the Ming commander Ma Gui judged the situation to be going against the allies, because more and more Japanese forces began to arrive from the surrounding area and the allied forces were quickly becoming outnumbered.[316] Late one night, Ma Gui decided to order a general organized retreat of the allied forces, but soon confusion set in, and matters were further complicated by heavy rainfall and harassing attacks by the Japanese. The Chief Superintendent Yang Hao panicked and left hastily for Hanseong ahead of the army.[317][318][316]
The general retreat quickly turned into a chaotic rout, of which the Japanese took quick advantage by attacking the retreating Ming and Joseon forces.[316] The retreating Ming and Joseon forces had 20,000 losses.[34] （The Second Army actually lost 1621 soldiers in action, but due to internal strife, there was a rumor that 20000 soldiers died in the Second Army）The disaster was a heavy setback for Joseon, who would not be in a position to move on the Japanese position again for more than eight months.
After the siege at Ulsan, the two sides remained in a stalemate for the next several months. Xing Jie decided that they would require further reinforcements to launch a final large offensive to permanently remove the Japanese presence on the Korean Peninsula.
Reinforcements from China began to pour in through most of mid-1598, with Chen Lin and Deng Zilong and their navy arriving in May. By September 1598, the Ming presence in Korea had swelled to 75,000 overall, by far the largest at any point in the war.
Xing Jie divided his forces into four groups, with Ma Gui leading the offensive against Ulsan yet again, Li Rumei (Li Rusong's brother) leading the offensive against Sacheon, Chen Lin commanding the navy, and Liu Ting and Yi Sun-sin coordinating a land-sea effort against Suncheon.
Just before they set out, however, news came that Li Rusong was killed by Mongolian tribesmen back in Liaodong. Xing Jie decided then to remove his emotionally weakened brother Li Rumei in favor of Dong Yiyuan.
In June 1598, after Commander Konishi Yukinaga raised concerns about the supply situation and limited prospects for further territorial gains in the peninsula, 70,000 troops were withdrawn back to Japan, with only 60,000 left behind to guard the territory still under Japanese control. These forces were mostly Satsuma soldiers of the Shimazu clan under commanders Shimazu Yoshihiro and his son Tadatsune.[319] Kato Kiyomasa remained in command of the defenses of Ulsan while Konishi Yukinaga himself commanded the defenses at Suncheon. The forces at Sacheon and Ulsan continued to be engaged in a military deadlock in the months that followed.
At Ulsan, Kato Kiyomasa defended the castle with 10,000 Japanese soldiers.[320] In September 1598, 29,500 Ming and Joseon troops tried again to capture Ulsan Castle, but all their attempts were repulsed by the Japanese. The Ming and Joseon forces withdrew with heavy losses.[32]
The Chinese believed that Sacheon was crucial to their goal of retaking the lost castles in Korea and ordered a general attack. Although the Chinese made initial progress, the tide of battle turned when Japanese reinforcements attacked the rear of the Chinese army and the Japanese soldiers inside the fortress sallied from the gates and counter-attacked.[321] The Chinese Ming forces retreated with 30,000 losses, with the Japanese in pursuit.[18] （The Ming Army actually lost 7,000 soldiers. The record of 30000 people comes from Japan, but in Japanese history books, the Ming Army had 200,000 or even 1,000,000 people, which is impossible.）According to Chinese and Korean sources concerning the battle, the forces led by Dong Yiyuan had breached the castle wall and were making progress in capturing the castle until a gunpowder accident caused an explosion in their camp, and the Japanese took advantage of the situation to rout the confused and weakened troops.[322]
At Suncheon, Konishi Yukinaga defended his position at the Suncheon Castle along with 13,700 Japanese soldiers.[18] A total of 43,000 Ming and Joseon troops tried to capture it, but their attempts were repulsed after three failed assaults, suffering 800 losses.[323]
In the fall of 1598, following the successful Japanese defense at the battles of Sacheon, Ulsan, and Suncheon, the Ming, Joseon, and Japanese forces were locked in a military stalemate in the south of the peninsula.[32] After the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi on September 18, 1598, the Council of Five Elders, in late October, issued orders for the withdrawal of all forces from Korea. Hideyoshi's death was kept a secret by the council to preserve the morale of the army.
The Battle of Noryang was the final naval battle in the war. A Japanese fleet of approximately 500 ships, under Shimazu Yoshihiro, was assembled and preparing to link up with the blockaded fleet under Konishi Yukinaga, and together withdraw via Busan back to Japan.[324]
The Korean navy under Yi Sun-sin discovered the Shimazu fleet anchored in the narrow strait of Noryang. Noting the narrow geography of the area, Ming general Chen Lin, who led Deng Zilong and Yi Sun-sin,[325] made a surprise attack against the Japanese fleet, under the cover of darkness on December 16, 1598, using cannon and fire arrows.
By dawn, more than half of the Japanese fleet was scattered and destroyed. During the pursuit of the remaining Japanese ships, both Yi Sun-sin and Deng Zilong were killed.[326] Despite suffering high casualties, in the end the battle was a great tactical victory for the Korean forces and resulted in the loss of over half of the Japanese fleet and the deaths of thousands of their men.[327]
Strategically, the Japanese attained their objective by allowing Konishi Yukinaga, who was earlier blockaded by the Ming and Korean forces, to leave his fortress on December 16 with his men and withdraw unopposed by sailing through the southern end of Namhae Island, bypassing both the Noryang Strait and the battle, with the cost of betraying his own fellow Japanese generals. Konishi Yukinaga, Shimazu Yoshihiro, Katō Kiyomasa, and other Japanese generals of the Left Army, congregated in Busan and withdrew to Japan on December 21. The last ships damaged sailed to Japan on December 24, bringing an end to six years of war.
As Tsushima Island had suffered greatly from its loss of trade with Korea as a result of the invasions, Sō Yoshitoshi of the Sō clan, then dominant in Tsushima, undertook the lead in the peace negotiations by Japan. He sent four peace missions to Joseon in 1599 to normalize relations. The first three were captured and sent directly to Beijing by Chinese troops, but the fourth one, in 1601, successfully obtained from the Joseon court the promise of a normalizing of relations upon the return of remaining Joseon captives.[328] As Ming troops continued to be present in Korea following the withdrawal of Japanese forces, the major incentive for Joseon for the normalization of relations with Japan was the withdrawal of the Chinese soldiers from their territory. The Ming Chinese themselves were causing havoc, and their presence continued to strain Joseon's national economy and infrastructure.[328] In response to the Joseon request, Yoshitoshi promptly released several Joseon prisoners and between 1603 and 1604 helped the Joseon envoys to repatriate a further 3,000 by organizing negotiations at Kyoto with Tokugawa Ieyasu, by then the shogun of Japan.[328]
In the continuation of the diplomatic talks toward peaceful relations, Joseon in 1606 expanded its conditions and demanded that the shogun write a formal letter requesting peace, and to extradite the Japanese soldiers who had defiled the Joseon Royal Tombs near Hanseong.[328] Realizing that the Shogunate would never agree to such a request, Sō Yoshitoshi sent a forged letter and a group of criminals instead; the great need to expel the Ming soldiers pushed Joseon into accepting and to send an emissary in 1608.[328] The result was a return of Joseon prisoners and the restoration of diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries.[329]
The Japanese invasions were East Asia's first regional wars involving massed armies equipped with modern weapons.[330] The conflict saw the regular employment of Japanese armies of up to 200,000 men, Ming Chinese armies of 80,000,[133] and the ongoing deployment of local Korean forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands.
The invasions also stood as a challenge to the existing Chinese world order on two levels:[331] the military, in which the war challenged Ming China's status as the supreme military power in East Asia, and the political, in which the war affirmed Chinese willingness to aid in the protection of its tributary states.[332]
Contrary to Toyotomi Hideyoshi's intentions, the cost of the Japanese invasions of Korea significantly weakened the Toyotomi clan's power in Japan. After Hideyoshi's death, his young son Toyotomi Hideyori became head of the Toyotomi clan. However, the losses suffered by varying daimyōs during the campaign were a contributing factor to the imbalance of power in Japan after the war. As the western-based daimyōs of Kyushu and western Honshu (partially by geographic convenience) contributed the majority of the forces used during the Korean conflict, it left the pro-Hideyoshi alliance weakened for the eventual struggle with the mostly eastern-backed forces of Tokugawa Ieyasu (who himself never sent forces to Korea). Tokugawa would go on to unify Japan and establish himself as shogun in 1603, following the decisive Battle of Sekigahara against a coalition of mostly western-based daimyōs.[333]
Ming China also sustained a heavy financial burden for its role in defending Korea while also fighting several other conflicts in the same decade. Falling tax revenues, troop desertions, a flow of foreign silver which brought unexpected problems in the Chinese economy, poor granary supervision and harsh weather eventually culminated in the collapse of the Ming Dynasty.[334] The Ming Dynasty was eventually defeated by a rebel leader named Li Zicheng.[335] With the help of Wu Sangui, a former Ming general, the Manchus defeated Li and established its rule over China in 1644.[336] However, the sinocentric tributary system that the Ming had defended continued to be maintained by the Qing, and ultimately, the war resulted in a maintenance of the status quo—with the re-establishment of trade and the normalization of relations between all three parties.[337]
Given that the conflict was fought exclusively on Korean soil, Korea ultimately suffered the most damage of the three participants.[338] It lost a large portion of its military strength and civilian population, had numerous cultural heritage sites damaged or destroyed, and many of its technological advancements pillaged.[29] In many ways the invasions proved to be more devastating than any other event in the nation's history (even, arguably, more so than the Korean War).[337] The peninsula suffered a reduction of arable land to 66% of the prewar total,[339] greatly hurting Korea's mainly agricultural economy;[150] in the years that followed, famine, disease, and rebellions were widespread throughout Korea.[338] In Gyeongsang Province alone 90% of the land under cultivation was destroyed.[340] Significant losses of historical archives, cultural and scientific artifacts (such as the Ja-gyuk-roo water clock[341]), and skilled artisans resulted in a waning of Korean science.[342] The main Korean royal palaces Gyeongbokgung, Changdeokgung, and Changgyeonggung were burned down, and Deoksugung was used as a temporary palace. The Baekjeong (Korean natives of the lowest social rank) took advantage of the lack of internal security brought on by the invasions, and set fire to changnye (Korean government offices) in which census ledgers had been kept.[343] The destruction of land and census registers made fiscal recovery difficult since taxation and corvée labour were based on them. The government was forced to trade rank and titles in order to obtain grain, using a practice called napsok pogwan (appointment through grain contributions),[340] and the yangban elite, which was exempt from household taxes, exploited the occasion to increase its landholdings, thereby further depriving the central government of taxes raised on property.[344]
The total military and civilian casualties, as estimated by the late-19th-century historian, George H. Jones, were one million,[345] and total combat casualties were estimated at between 250,000 and 300,000.[346] A total of over 100,000 Japanese,[4][19] 185,000 Korean and over 29,000 Chinese troops were killed, and an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 captives were taken by the Japanese throughout the war.[17] Among those captured, a total of 7,500 were later returned to Korea through diplomatic means at the conclusion of the conflict.[347] A large portion of the remaining captives were sold to European traders—mainly Portuguese in Macau, who then resold them throughout Southeast Asia.[348][349]
Although Korea suffered the most of the three combatants, there were some significant technological and cultural transfers that resulted from the war. Japanese swords, which were sometimes collected in the battlefield from dead Japanese soldiers, would inspire some of the basic designs of later Korean swords such as the hwando. Arquebus rifles, which the Joseon court had initially dismissed as ineffective and useless due to their low rate of fire, was rapidly adopted during and after the war by the Joseon military and production began as early as 1593.[350] Some scholars believe that the reason the Joseon-Ming Army was not easily driven out and defeated during the reignition of hostilities in 1597 was in part due to the widespread adoption of arquebuses in the Joseon military.[351] Besides this, Catholicism was first introduced in Korea during the war, as Catholic missionaries had begun arriving in Japan before the war and had become acquainted. In Korea, many of the first converts to Catholicism were Korean captives in Japan, records indicate more than 7,000 Korean captives converted from 1594 to 1598.[352] Spanish missionary Gregorio de Céspedes (1551–1611) was a prominent driver behind this missionary work, and was also the first recorded Westerner to arrive in Korea and the only European eyewitness to the war.[352] Last but not least, significant food and luxury items were introduced to Korea via the invasions. Evidence heavily suggests this, because Korean records initially recorded chili peppers, one of the most important ingredients in modern Korean cuisine as "Japanese mustard", "southern barbarian herb" and "Japanese herb."[352]
The captives brought to Japan, including scholars, craftsmen, medicine makers, and gold smelters, provided Japan with many cultural and technological gains.[17] In the years that followed, Japanese pottery and art advanced and developed a significant similarity to their Korean counterparts.[198] Advances in other areas such as agriculture were also aided by technology and artisans acquired and captured during the invasions. Japanese typography advanced with the adoption of Chinese fonts.[353] Because Korean pottery was highly prized in Japan, many Japanese lords established pottery-producing kilns with captured Korean potters in Kyushu and other parts of Japan.[354] The production of Arita porcelain in Japan began in 1616 at the town of Imari with the aid of Korean potters who had been enticed to relocate there after the war.[354]
Furthermore, Neo-Confucianism, which had originated from China and spread to Korea, was introduced to Japan because of the invasions. Many Korean scholars who were captured during the war by the Japanese would later become tutors of prominent Japanese daimyo.[355] Furthermore, many classical Confucian texts were captured during the early stages of the war and taken back to Japan.[356]
Japanese troops engaged in crimes against civilians in battles and often killed indiscriminately. Scorched earth policies were often employed: over 60% of farmland was destroyed and burned, and farm animals were slaughtered to prevent their use by Joseon or Ming forces.[161] Outside of the main battles, raids to acquire food and supplies from civilians were common.[357] Captured prisoners were often mistreated or worked to near-death by starvation and neglect.[358] In following their battlefield practice at the time, the Japanese also collected the ears and noses of dead soldiers as proof of their exploits on the battlefield and as a record of casualty counts.[359] The high casualty rate of the Joseon and Ming forces, and the large number of ears collected during the campaign was enough to build a large mound near Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Great Buddha, called the Mimizuka ("Mound of Ears").[360]
Korean armies were also known to forcefully acquire food and supplies from civilians, both on an individual and organized level.[168] Korean bandits and highwaymen also took advantage of the chaos during the war to form raiding parties and rob other Koreans.[361]
According to British historian who specializes in Japanese military history, Stephen Turnbull, the Ming forces arriving in support of Joseon were often no better than the Japanese in the amount of destruction they caused and the degree of the crimes they committed.[328] After the immediate Japanese military threat was neutralized, Turnbull states that the Joseon desire for the Ming armies to quickly withdraw from Korean territory was a contributing factor to the pace of the eventual peace resolution.[328]
Rape was common during the war, and Korean women were indiscriminately assaulted and brutalized by Japanese, Chinese and Korean soldiers throughout the conflict.[362] Records from the war indicate that Japanese soldiers "frequently decapitated all the young men of a locale and carried off all the attractive women—along with the goods they had stolen—on the backs of horses and oxen" and descriptions claim that the key priorities of Japanese soldiers during the conflict were "granaries, understanding local geography, and beautiful women."[363] Meanwhile, Joseon soldiers, such as those led by Kim Myon, captured not only Japanese soldiers but also many Korean women who had "been taken prisoner by the enemy. [The women] begged for their lives, only to be burned to death by the Choso˘n guerrillas along with the Japanese."[363] Records also indicate that Ming Chinese and Joseon Korean forces committed rape against the civilian populace during the conflict.[362]
The war left significant legacies in all three countries. In the context of Japanese imperialism, the invasions are seen as the first Japanese attempt to become a global power.[337] The partial occupation of Korea developed the Japanese concept that Korea belonged within Japan's sphere of influence, and the Japanese leaders of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries used the 1592–1597 invasions to reinforce the justification for their 20th-century annexation of Korea.[364] Yi-Sun Sin also served as an inspiration for Imperial Japanese admirals during the 19th and 20th centuries, as they often stressed the importance of studying and utilizing his battle tactics to further strengthen their navy.[365]
In China, the war was used politically to inspire nationalistic resistance against Japanese imperialism during the 20th century.[337] In Chinese academia, historians list the war as one of the Wanli Emperor's "Three Great Punitive Campaigns".[337] Contemporary Chinese historians often use the campaigns as an example of the friendship that China and Korea shared.[citation needed]
In Korea, the war is a historic foundation of Korean nationalism and, as in China, inspired and politically used to instigate nationalistic resistance against Japanese imperialism during the 20th century. Korea gained several national heroes during the conflict, including Yi Sun-sin and Chen Lin (founder of the Gwangdong Jin clan).[337] Modern anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea can be traced as far back as the Japanese invasions in 1592, although the principal cause is rooted in more recent events, particularly the hardships suffered by Koreans during the Japanese rule of Korea from 1910 through 1945. The widespread guerilla warfare fought by various righteous armies, which spearheaded the Korean civilian resistance against the Japanese invasion, had a significant impact on the common Korean populace's conceptions of nationhood and identity. The invasions and subsequent efforts by the local gentry to rally the commoners had a critical impact on perceptions of national identity in Korea, as the gentry were recorded to have sent many letters and declarations against the Japanese invaders and called upon shared Korean history, culture and beliefs to unite the Korean people.[366]
Despite great interest in the war in East Asia,[367] the Japanese invasions of Korea are not widely studied in the West.[368][119] Many history textbooks publish only a few lines of mention regarding the war. With the exception of Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War 1592–98 (2002) by Turnbull, no other complete academic studies on the subject exist in English.[369] Although true, both James Murdoch and George Sansom covered the topic in some detail in their general historical surveys of Japan, A History of Japan (1903) and A History of Japan (1958), respectively. Henry Kissinger also mentions the conflict in World Order (2014).[citation needed]
At this point in 1593, the war entered a stalemate during which intrigues and negotiations failed to produce a settlement. As the suzerain of Joseon Korea, Ming China exercised tight control over the Koreans during the war. At the same time, Ming China negotiated bilaterally with Japan while often ignoring the wishes of the Korean government.
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