El 2 de mayo de 2011, Osama bin Laden , fundador y primer líder del grupo militante islamista Al Qaeda , fue asesinado a tiros en su complejo en la ciudad paquistaní de Abbottabad por los SEAL de la Armada de los Estados Unidos del Equipo SEAL Seis (también conocido como DEVGRU). [1] La operación, cuyo nombre en código era Operación Neptune Spear , se llevó a cabo en una misión dirigida por la CIA , con el Comando Conjunto de Operaciones Especiales (JSOC) coordinando las Unidades de Misión Especial involucradas en la redada. Además del Equipo SEAL Seis, las unidades participantes bajo el JSOC incluyeron el 160.º Regimiento de Aviación de Operaciones Especiales (Aerotransportado) , también conocido como los "Acosadores Nocturnos", y la División de Actividades Especiales de la CIA , que recluta en gran medida de antiguas Unidades de Misión Especial del JSOC. [2] [3] El éxito de la operación puso fin a una búsqueda humana de casi una década de bin Laden , quien fue acusado de planear los ataques del 11 de septiembre en los Estados Unidos.
La incursión, aprobada por el presidente estadounidense Barack Obama e involucrando a dos docenas de SEALs de la Marina en dos helicópteros Black Hawk , fue lanzada desde aproximadamente 120 millas (190 km) de distancia en Afganistán , donde estaban estacionadas fuerzas estadounidenses. [4] [5] La incursión duró 40 minutos, y bin Laden fue asesinado poco antes de la 1:00 a.m. PKT [6] [7] (20:00 UTC , 1 de mayo). [8] Otros tres hombres, incluido uno de los hijos de bin Laden, y una mujer en el complejo también fueron asesinados. Después de la incursión, las fuerzas estadounidenses regresaron a Afganistán con el cuerpo de bin Laden para su identificación y luego volaron más de 850 millas (1,370 km) hasta el Mar Arábigo , donde fue enterrado de acuerdo con la tradición islámica. [9]
Al-Qaeda confirmó la muerte de Bin Laden el 6 de mayo a través de publicaciones realizadas en sitios web militantes y prometió vengar su asesinato. [10] Otros grupos militantes paquistaníes, incluido el Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan , también prometieron represalias contra los EE. UU.; y contra Pakistán, por no impedir la operación. [11] La incursión fue apoyada por más del 90 por ciento del público estadounidense, [12] [13] fue bien recibida por las Naciones Unidas, la OTAN , la Unión Europea y un gran número de gobiernos, [14] pero fue condenada por otros, incluidos dos tercios del público paquistaní. [15] Los aspectos legales y éticos del asesinato, como el hecho de no capturarlo con vida a pesar de que estaba desarmado, fueron cuestionados por organizaciones como Amnistía Internacional . [16] También fue controvertida la decisión de no publicar ninguna evidencia fotográfica o de ADN de la muerte de Bin Laden. [17] También hubo controversia en Pakistán sobre cómo se violaron las defensas del país y cómo la Fuerza Aérea no detectó el avión estadounidense. [18]
Tras el asesinato, el primer ministro paquistaní, Yousaf Raza Gillani, formó una comisión encabezada por el magistrado Javed Iqbal para investigar las circunstancias del ataque. [19] El informe de la Comisión Abbottabad resultante reveló el "fracaso colectivo" de las autoridades militares y de inteligencia del estado paquistaní que permitieron a Bin Laden esconderse en Pakistán durante nueve años y fue filtrado a Al Jazeera el 8 de julio de 2013. [20]
Los relatos sobre cómo los servicios de inteligencia estadounidenses localizaron a Bin Laden difieren. La Casa Blanca y el director de la CIA, John Brennan, afirmaron que el proceso comenzó con un fragmento de información desenterrado en 2002, lo que dio lugar a años de investigación. Este relato afirma que, en septiembre de 2010, estas pistas siguieron a un mensajero hasta el complejo de Abbottabad, donde Estados Unidos inició una intensa vigilancia multiplataforma. Según el periodista Seymour Hersh y NBC News, Estados Unidos recibió un aviso sobre la ubicación de Bin Laden por parte de un oficial de inteligencia paquistaní que ofreció detalles de dónde lo tenía detenido el Servicio de Inteligencia de Pakistán a cambio de una recompensa. [ cita requerida ]
Según la versión oficial anterior de su identificación por parte de un funcionario estadounidense, la identificación de los correos de Al Qaeda fue una prioridad temprana para los interrogadores en los sitios negros de la CIA y el campo de detención de la Bahía de Guantánamo , porque se creía que Bin Laden se comunicaba a través de dichos correos mientras ocultaba su paradero a los soldados de a pie y los altos comandantes de Al Qaeda. [21] Se sabía que Bin Laden no usaba teléfonos después de 1998, cuando Estados Unidos lanzó ataques con misiles contra sus bases en Afganistán en agosto de ese año rastreando el teléfono satelital de un asociado. [22]
El funcionario estadounidense había declarado que en 2002, los interrogadores habían oído afirmaciones no corroboradas sobre un mensajero de Al Qaeda con el kunya Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti (a veces llamado Sheikh Abu Ahmed de Kuwait). [21] Una de esas afirmaciones provino de Mohammed al-Qahtani , un detenido interrogado durante 48 días más o menos continuamente entre el 23 de noviembre de 2002 y el 11 de enero de 2003. En algún momento durante este período, Al-Qahtani les contó a los interrogadores sobre un hombre conocido como Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti que formaba parte del círculo íntimo de Al Qaeda. [23] Más tarde en 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed , el supuesto jefe operativo de Al Qaeda, dijo que conocía a Al-Kuwaiti pero que el hombre no estaba activo en Al Qaeda, según un funcionario estadounidense. [24]
Según un funcionario estadounidense, en 2004 un prisionero llamado Hassan Ghul reveló que Bin Laden confiaba en un mensajero de confianza conocido como al-Kuwaiti. [24] [25] Ghul dijo que al-Kuwaiti era cercano a Bin Laden, así como a Khalid Sheikh Mohammed y al sucesor de Mohammed, Abu Faraj al-Libbi . Ghul reveló que al-Kuwaiti no había sido visto en algún tiempo, lo que llevó a los funcionarios estadounidenses a sospechar que viajaba con Bin Laden. Cuando se le confrontó con el relato de Ghul, Mohammed mantuvo su historia original. [24] Abu Faraj al-Libbi fue capturado en 2005 y transferido a Guantánamo en septiembre de 2006. [26] Dijo a los interrogadores de la CIA que el mensajero de Bin Laden era un hombre llamado Maulawi Abd al-Khaliq Jan y negó conocer a al-Kuwaiti. Como tanto Mohammed como al-Libbi habían minimizado la importancia de al-Kuwaiti, los funcionarios especularon que éste formaba parte del círculo íntimo de Bin Laden. [24]
En 2007, los funcionarios se enteraron del verdadero nombre de al-Kuwaiti, [27] aunque dijeron que no revelarían ni el nombre ni cómo lo supieron. [24] Los funcionarios paquistaníes en 2011 declararon que el nombre del mensajero era Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, del valle de Swat de Pakistán . Él, su hermano Abrar y sus familias vivían en el complejo de bin Laden, dijeron los funcionarios. [28] El nombre Maulawi Abd al-Khaliq Jan aparece en la evaluación filtrada de detenidos de la JTF-GTMO para Abu Faraj al-Libbi, [ cita requerida ] pero la CIA nunca encontró a nadie llamado Maulawi Jan y concluyó que el nombre era una invención de al-Libbi. [24] Una intervención telefónica de 2010 de otro sospechoso captó una conversación con al-Kuwaiti. Los agentes paramilitares de la CIA localizaron a al-Kuwaiti en agosto de 2010 y lo siguieron hasta el complejo de Abbottabad, lo que los llevó a especular que era la ubicación de Bin Laden. [21]
El mensajero y un pariente (que era un hermano o un primo) murieron en la redada del 2 de mayo de 2011. [24] Después, algunos lugareños identificaron a los hombres como pastunes llamados Arshad y Tareq Khan. [29] Arshad Khan llevaba una vieja tarjeta de identificación paquistaní no informatizada , que lo identificaba como de Khat Kuruna, un pueblo cerca de Charsadda en el noroeste de Pakistán. Los funcionarios paquistaníes no han encontrado ningún registro de un Arshad Khan en esa zona y sospechan que los hombres vivían bajo identidades falsas. [30]
La CIA utilizó fotografías de vigilancia e informes de inteligencia para determinar las identidades de los habitantes del complejo de Abbottabad al que se dirigía el mensajero. En septiembre de 2010, la CIA concluyó que el complejo había sido construido a medida para ocultar a alguien importante, muy probablemente Bin Laden. [31] [32] Los funcionarios supusieron que vivía allí con su esposa más joven y su familia. [32]
Construido en 2004, el complejo de tres pisos [33] estaba al final de un estrecho camino de tierra [34] ubicado a 4,0 kilómetros ( 2+1 ⁄ 2 millas) al noreste del centro de la ciudad de Abbottabad. [31] Abbottabad está a unos 160 km (100 mi) de la frontera con Afganistán en el extremo oriental de Pakistán (a unos 30 km o 20 mi de la India). El complejo está a1,3 km ( 3 ⁄ 4 mi) al suroeste de la Academia Militar de Pakistán . [2] Ubicado en un terreno ocho veces más grande que las casas cercanas, el complejo estaba rodeado por un muro de hormigón de 3,7 a 5,5 metros (12 a 18 pies) [32] rematado con alambre de púas. [31] Tenía dos puertas de seguridad, y el balcón del tercer piso tenía un muro de privacidad de 2,1 metros de alto (7 pies), lo suficientemente alto como para ocultar a Bin Laden de 1,93 m (6 pies 4 pulgadas).
El complejo no tenía servicio de Internet ni de teléfono fijo. Sus residentes quemaban sus desechos, a diferencia de sus vecinos, que los dejaban en el suelo para que los recogieran. [33] Los residentes locales llamaban al edificio Waziristan Haveli , porque creían que el propietario era de Waziristán . [35] Tras la redada y el asesinato de Bin Laden por parte de los estadounidenses, el gobierno paquistaní demolió el complejo en febrero de 2012. [36]
La CIA lideró el esfuerzo de vigilar y reunir inteligencia sobre el complejo; otros papeles críticos en la operación fueron desempeñados por otras agencias de los Estados Unidos, incluyendo la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional , la Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia Geoespacial (NGA), la Oficina del Director de Inteligencia Nacional (ODNI) y el Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos . [37] Los funcionarios estadounidenses dijeron a The Washington Post que el esfuerzo de recopilación de inteligencia "fue tan extenso y costoso que la CIA fue al Congreso en diciembre [de 2010] para asegurar la autoridad para reasignar decenas de millones de dólares dentro de varios presupuestos de agencias para financiarlo". [6]
La CIA alquiló una casa en Abbottabad desde la que un equipo vigiló y observó el complejo durante varios meses. El equipo de la CIA utilizó informantes y otras técnicas, incluido un programa de vacunación contra la polio falsa ampliamente criticado [38] [39] para reunir información sobre el complejo. La casa segura fue abandonada inmediatamente después de la muerte de Bin Laden. [6] La Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia Geoespacial de los EE. UU. ayudó al Comando Conjunto de Operaciones Especiales a crear simuladores de misión para los pilotos y analizó datos de un dron RQ-170 [40] antes, durante y después del asalto al complejo. La NGA creó representaciones tridimensionales de la casa, creó horarios que describían los patrones de tráfico residencial y calculó el número, la altura y el género de los residentes del complejo. [41] También participó en las medidas de recopilación de información un brazo de la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional conocido como el grupo de Operaciones de Acceso a Medida [42] que, entre otras cosas, está especializado en instalar subrepticiamente software espía y dispositivos de seguimiento en computadoras y redes de teléfonos móviles específicos. Gracias al trabajo del grupo Tailored Access Operations, la NSA pudo recopilar información de teléfonos móviles utilizados por agentes de Al Qaeda y otras "personas de interés" en la búsqueda de Bin Laden. [43]
El diseño del complejo de Bin Laden puede haber contribuido en última instancia a su descubrimiento. Un ex funcionario de la CIA que participó en la búsqueda del hombre dijo a The Washington Post : "El lugar tenía tres pisos de altura y se podía ver desde distintos ángulos". [6]
La CIA utilizó un proceso llamado " red teaming " sobre la información recopilada para revisar de forma independiente las pruebas circunstanciales y los hechos disponibles de su caso de que Bin Laden vivía en el complejo de Abbottabad. [44] Un funcionario de la administración dijo: "Realizamos ejercicios de "red teaming" y otras formas de análisis alternativo para comprobar nuestro trabajo. Ningún otro candidato encajaba tan bien como Bin Laden". [45]
A pesar de lo que los funcionarios describieron como un esfuerzo de recolección extraordinariamente concentrado previo a la operación, ninguna agencia de espionaje estadounidense fue capaz de capturar una fotografía de Bin Laden en el complejo antes de la redada ni una grabación de la voz de la misteriosa figura masculina cuya familia ocupaba los dos pisos superiores de la estructura. [6]
El nombre en código oficial de la misión era Operación Lanza Neptuno. [2] La lanza de Neptuno es el tridente , que aparece en la insignia de Guerra Especial de la Armada de los EE. UU . [46]
La Associated Press informó en ese momento que dos funcionarios estadounidenses habían declarado que la operación era "una misión de matar o capturar, ya que Estados Unidos no mata a personas desarmadas que intentan rendirse", pero que "estaba claro desde el principio que quienquiera que estuviera detrás de esos muros no tenía intención de rendirse". [47] El asesor antiterrorista de la Casa Blanca, John O. Brennan, dijo después de la redada: "Si tuviéramos la oportunidad de capturar a Bin Laden con vida, si no presentaba ninguna amenaza, los individuos involucrados eran capaces y estaban preparados para hacerlo". [48] El director de la CIA, Leon Panetta, dijo en PBS NewsHour : "La autoridad aquí era matar a Bin Laden. ... Obviamente, según las reglas de enfrentamiento , si de hecho había levantado las manos, se había rendido y no parecía representar ningún tipo de amenaza, entonces debían capturarlo. Pero tenían plena autoridad para matarlo". [49] Un funcionario de seguridad nacional estadounidense, que no fue identificado, dijo a Reuters que "Esta fue una operación de matar". [50] Otro funcionario dijo que cuando se les dijo a los SEALS: "Creemos que encontramos a Osama bin Laden, y su trabajo es matarlo", comenzaron a aplaudir. [51] Un artículo publicado en Political Science Quarterly en 2016 examinó varios relatos e interpretaciones publicados del objetivo de la misión y concluyó que "la opción de captura estaba allí principalmente por las apariencias y para cumplir con los requisitos del derecho internacional y que todos los involucrados la consideraban, a todos los efectos prácticos, una misión para matar". [52]
En enero de 2011, la CIA informó al vicealmirante William H. McRaven , comandante del Comando Conjunto de Operaciones Especiales (JSOC), sobre el complejo. El almirante era a la vez estudiante y practicante de operaciones especiales, y había publicado una tesis sobre el tema durante la década de 1990. Su teoría sostenía que las operaciones especiales tenían el potencial de ser muy efectivas para lograr su objetivo si eran organizadas y comandadas por profesionales de operaciones especiales en lugar de estar subsumidas en unidades u operaciones militares más grandes. Creía que tales acciones requerían que se obtuviera una "superioridad relativa" durante la operación en cuestión a través de características como la simplicidad, la seguridad, los ensayos, la sorpresa, la velocidad y un propósito definido de manera clara pero estricta. [53]
En este caso, McRaven dijo que una incursión de comandos sería bastante sencilla, pero que le preocupaba la respuesta paquistaní. Asignó a un capitán del Grupo de Desarrollo de Guerra Especial Naval de los EE. UU. (DEVGRU) para que trabajara con un equipo de la CIA en su campus de Langley, Virginia . El capitán, llamado "Brian", instaló una oficina en la imprenta del complejo de la CIA en Langley y, con otros seis oficiales del JSOC, comenzó a planificar la incursión. [54] Los abogados de la administración consideraron las implicaciones y opciones legales antes de la incursión. [55]
Además de un ataque con helicópteros, los planificadores consideraron atacar el complejo con bombarderos furtivos B-2 Spirit . También consideraron una operación conjunta con fuerzas paquistaníes. Obama decidió que no se podía confiar en el gobierno y el ejército paquistaníes para mantener la seguridad operativa de la operación contra Bin Laden. "Había una verdadera falta de confianza en que los paquistaníes pudieran mantener este secreto durante más de un nanosegundo", dijo un asesor de alto rango del presidente a The New Yorker . [54]
Obama se reunió con el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional el 14 de marzo para analizar las opciones; le preocupaba que la misión quedara expuesta y quería proceder rápidamente. Por esa razón descartó la participación de los paquistaníes. El secretario de Defensa, Robert Gates, y otros funcionarios militares expresaron dudas sobre si Bin Laden estaba en el complejo y si una incursión de comandos valía la pena el riesgo. Al final de la reunión, el presidente parecía inclinarse por una misión de bombardeo. Dos oficiales de la Fuerza Aérea de Estados Unidos fueron encargados de explorar esa opción más a fondo. [56]
La CIA no pudo descartar la existencia de un búnker subterráneo debajo del complejo. Suponiendo que existiera uno, se necesitarían 32 bombas de 2.000 libras (910 kg) equipadas con sistemas de guía JDAM para destruirlo. [57] Con esa cantidad de munición , al menos otra casa estaba en el radio de la explosión . Se estima que hasta una docena de civiles morirían además de los que estaban en el complejo. Además, la evidencia de que Bin Laden estaba muerto habría sido borrada. Presentada con esta información en la siguiente reunión del Consejo de Seguridad el 29 de marzo, Obama puso el plan de bombardeo en suspenso. En su lugar, ordenó al almirante McRaven que desarrollara el plan para un ataque con helicóptero. La comunidad de inteligencia estadounidense también estudió una opción de golpear a Bin Laden con una pequeña munición táctica disparada por un dron mientras caminaba por el huerto de su complejo. [58]
McRaven seleccionó personalmente un equipo formado por los operadores más experimentados y de mayor antigüedad del Escuadrón Rojo , [59] uno de los cuatro que componen el DEVGRU. El Escuadrón Rojo regresaba a casa desde Afganistán y podía ser redirigido sin llamar la atención. El equipo tenía conocimientos de idiomas y experiencia en operaciones transfronterizas en Pakistán. [56] Casi todos los operadores del Escuadrón Rojo habían estado en diez o más misiones en Afganistán. [60]
Sin que se les dijera la naturaleza exacta de su misión, el equipo realizó ensayos de la redada en dos lugares de los EE. UU.: alrededor del 10 de abril en las instalaciones de Harvey Point Defense Testing Activity en Carolina del Norte , donde se construyó una versión 1:1 del complejo de Bin Laden ( 36°05′57.9″N 76°20′55.7″O / 36.099417, -76.348806 ), [61] [62] y el 18 de abril en Nevada . [54] [57] La ubicación en Nevada estaba a 1200 m (4000 pies) de altitud, elegida para probar los efectos que la altitud tendría en los helicópteros de los asaltantes. En la maqueta de Nevada se utilizaron vallas de alambre de cadena para simular los muros del recinto, lo que dejó a los participantes estadounidenses sin ser conscientes de los posibles efectos de los altos muros del recinto sobre las capacidades de elevación de los helicópteros. [58]
Los planificadores creían que los SEAL podrían llegar a Abbottabad y regresar sin ser desafiados por el ejército paquistaní. Los helicópteros ( helicópteros Black Hawk modificados ) que se utilizarían en la incursión habían sido diseñados para ser silenciosos y tener una baja visibilidad de radar. Dado que Estados Unidos había ayudado a equipar y entrenar a los paquistaníes, se conocía su capacidad defensiva. (Estados Unidos había suministrado F-16 Fighting Falcons a Pakistán con la condición de que se mantuvieran en una base militar paquistaní bajo vigilancia estadounidense las 24 horas.) [63]
Si Bin Laden se rindiera, lo retendrían cerca de la base aérea de Bagram . Si los SEALs fueran descubiertos por los paquistaníes en medio de la incursión, el jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto, el almirante Mike Mullen, llamaría al jefe del ejército de Pakistán, el general Ashfaq Parvez Kayani , y trataría de negociar su liberación. [64]
Cuando el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional (NSC) se reunió nuevamente el 19 de abril, Obama dio su aprobación provisional al ataque con helicópteros. Preocupado por la incertidumbre que existía en cuanto al plan para lidiar con los paquistaníes, Obama pidió al almirante McRaven que equipara al equipo para que pudiera abrirse paso luchando si era necesario. [56]
McRaven y los SEAL partieron hacia Afganistán para practicar en una réplica a escala real de un acre (4000 m2 ) del complejo construido en un área restringida de Bagram conocida como Camp Alpha. [65] [66] El equipo partió de los EE. UU. desde la Estación Aérea Naval Oceana el 26 de abril en un avión C-17, reabasteció combustible en tierra en la Base Aérea Ramstein en Alemania, aterrizó en la Base Aérea Bagram y luego se trasladó a Jalalabad el 27 de abril. [54]
El 28 de abril, el almirante Mullen explicó el plan final al Consejo de Seguridad Nacional. Como medida para reforzar el escenario de "luchar para salir", se colocarían helicópteros Chinook cerca con tropas adicionales. La mayor parte de los asesores en la reunión apoyaron seguir adelante con la incursión. El vicepresidente Joe Biden expuso el riesgo de que saliera mal y el potencial de enfrentamiento con los paquistaníes. Según el asesor de la NSA, Ben Rhodes , "no recuerdo que estuviera firmemente en contra, sino más bien como algo así como, 'Voy a señalar las desventajas que deben considerar desde la perspectiva de Pakistán' ... Biden solo estaba tratando de asegurarse de que Obama tuviera un montón de margen para su toma de decisiones". [67] Gates abogó por utilizar la opción de los drones y los misiles, pero cambió su apoyo al día siguiente al plan de la incursión en helicóptero. Obama dijo que quería hablar directamente con el almirante McRaven antes de dar la orden de proceder. El presidente preguntó si McRaven había aprendido algo desde su llegada a Afganistán que le hiciera perder la confianza en la misión. McRaven le dijo que el equipo estaba listo y que las próximas noches habría luna menguante , [68] buenas condiciones para una incursión. [54] [58]
El 29 de abril a las 8:20 am EDT , [64] Obama se reunió con sus asesores y dio el visto bueno final. La incursión se llevaría a cabo al día siguiente. Esa noche, el presidente fue informado de que la operación se retrasaría un día debido al tiempo nublado.
El 30 de abril, Obama llamó a McRaven una vez más para desearles lo mejor a los SEAL y agradecerles por su servicio. [54] Esa noche, el Presidente asistió a la cena anual de la Asociación de Corresponsales de la Casa Blanca , que fue presentada por el comediante y actor de televisión Seth Meyers . En un momento dado, Meyers bromeó: "La gente cree que Bin Laden se esconde en el Hindu Kush , pero ¿sabías que todos los días de cuatro a cinco presenta un programa en C-SPAN ?" Obama se rió, a pesar de su conocimiento de la operación que se avecinaba. [69]
El 1 de mayo a las 13:22 horas, Panetta, siguiendo las órdenes del presidente, ordenó a McRaven que siguiera adelante con la operación. Poco después de las 15:00 horas, el presidente se unió a los funcionarios de seguridad nacional en la Sala de Situación para supervisar la redada. Observaron imágenes de visión nocturna tomadas desde un avión no tripulado Sentinel mientras Panetta, que aparecía en la esquina de la pantalla desde la sede de la CIA, narraba lo que estaba sucediendo. [58] [64] Se establecieron enlaces de video con Panetta en la sede de la CIA y McRaven en Afganistán en la Sala de Situación. En una oficina contigua se encontraba la transmisión en vivo del avión no tripulado presentada en una computadora portátil operada por el general de brigada Marshall Webb , comandante asistente del JSOC. La secretaria de Estado Hillary Clinton se encontraba entre los presentes en la Sala de Situación, y lo describió así: "Contrariamente a lo que dicen algunos medios de comunicación y lo que se ve en las películas, no teníamos medios para ver lo que estaba sucediendo dentro del edificio. Todo lo que podíamos hacer era esperar una actualización del equipo sobre el terreno. Miré al presidente. Estaba tranquilo. Pocas veces me he sentido más orgulloso de servir a su lado que ese día". [70] Otros dos centros de mando vigilaron la redada desde la sede del Departamento de Defensa de Estados Unidos en el Pentágono y la embajada de Estados Unidos en Islamabad . [54]
Según el almirante McRaven, justo antes del lanzamiento de la misión, el sargento mayor de mando Chris Faris citó a sus hombres el lema del SAS británico: "Quien se atreve, gana". [71]
La operación fue llevada a cabo por aproximadamente dos docenas de SEALs de la Marina de los EE. UU. del Escuadrón Rojo del DEVGRU , que fueron transportados en helicóptero. Por razones legales (es decir, que los EE. UU. no estaban en guerra con Pakistán), el personal militar asignado a la misión fue transferido temporalmente al control de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia civil. [72] [73]
Los SEAL operaban en equipos y usaban armas que incluían el rifle de asalto HK416 [74] (su arma principal), la ametralladora Mark 48 para apoyo de fuego y el arma de defensa personal MP7 [54] , que es utilizada por algunos SEAL para espacios reducidos y un mayor silencio.
Según The New York Times , en la redada participaron un total de "79 comandos y un perro". [34] El perro de trabajo militar [75] era un malinois belga llamado Cairo. [76] Según un informe, el perro tenía la tarea de rastrear "a cualquiera que intentara escapar y alertar a los SEAL sobre cualquier fuerza de seguridad paquistaní que se acercara". [77] El perro se utilizaría para ayudar a disuadir cualquier respuesta terrestre paquistaní a la redada y para ayudar a buscar habitaciones o puertas ocultas en el complejo. [54] El personal adicional en la misión incluía un intérprete de idiomas, [77] el adiestrador de perros, pilotos de helicópteros, además de recolectores de inteligencia y navegantes que usaban imágenes hiperespectrales altamente clasificadas para ver la operación. [66]
Los SEAL volaron a Pakistán desde una base de preparación en la ciudad de Jalalabad en el este de Afganistán después de originarse en la Base Aérea de Bagram en el noreste de Afganistán. [78] El 160º Regimiento de Aviación de Operaciones Especiales (SOAR) , una unidad del Comando de Operaciones Especiales del Ejército de los EE. UU. conocida como los " Night Stalkers ", proporcionó los dos helicópteros Black Hawk modificados [79] que se utilizaron para la incursión en sí, así como los helicópteros de carga pesada Chinook mucho más grandes que se emplearon como respaldo. [51] [66] [77]
Los Black Hawks eran versiones "furtivas" nunca antes vistas que volaban más silenciosamente y eran más difíciles de detectar por radar que los modelos convencionales; [80] [81] debido al peso adicional del equipo furtivo, su carga estaba "calculada al detalle, teniendo en cuenta el clima". [77]
Los Chinooks que se mantuvieron en estado de alerta se encontraban en tierra "en una zona desierta a aproximadamente dos tercios del camino" de Jalalabad a Abbottabad, con dos equipos SEAL adicionales compuestos por aproximadamente 24 operadores del DEVGRU [77] para una "fuerza de reacción rápida" (QRF) . Los Chinooks estaban equipados con miniguns GAU-17/A de 7,62 mm y ametralladoras GAU-21 /B de calibre .50 y combustible adicional para los Black Hawks. Su misión era interceptar cualquier intento militar paquistaní de interferir en la incursión. Otros Chinooks, con 25 SEAL más del DEVGRU, estaban estacionados justo al otro lado de la frontera en Afganistán en caso de que se necesitaran refuerzos durante la operación. [54]
Los helicópteros SOAR 160 fueron apoyados por una serie de otras aeronaves, que incluían aviones de combate de ala fija y drones . [82] Según CNN , "la Fuerza Aérea tenía un equipo completo de helicópteros de búsqueda y rescate de combate disponibles". [82]
El ataque se programó para un momento en que no hubiera mucha luz de luna, de modo que los helicópteros pudieran entrar en Pakistán "a baja altura y sin ser detectados". [83] Los helicópteros utilizaron terreno accidentado y técnicas de aproximación al terreno para llegar al complejo sin aparecer en el radar y alertar al ejército paquistaní. El vuelo de Jalalabad a Abbottabad duró unos 90 minutos. [54]
Según el plan de la misión, el primer helicóptero sobrevolaría el patio del complejo mientras su equipo completo de SEALs descendía en cuerdas rápidas hasta el suelo. Al mismo tiempo, el segundo helicóptero volaría hasta la esquina noreste del complejo y desplegaría al intérprete, al perro y al adiestrador, y a cuatro SEALs para asegurar el perímetro. El equipo que se encontraba en el patio debía entrar a la casa desde la planta baja. [54] [84]
Mientras flotaban sobre el objetivo, el primer helicóptero experimentó una condición de flujo de aire peligrosa conocida como estado de anillo de vórtice . Esto se agravó por una temperatura del aire más alta de lo esperado [54] y las altas paredes del complejo, que impidieron que la corriente descendente del rotor se difundiera. [85] [86] La cola del helicóptero rozó una de las paredes del complejo, [87] dañando su rotor de cola , [88] y el helicóptero volcó sobre su costado. [21] El piloto enterró rápidamente el morro del helicóptero para evitar que se volcara. [77] Ninguno de los SEAL, la tripulación o los pilotos resultaron gravemente heridos en el suave aterrizaje forzoso, que provocó que el helicóptero descansara contra la pared, inclinado en un ángulo de 45 grados. [54] El otro helicóptero aterrizó fuera del complejo y los SEAL escalaron las paredes para entrar. [89] Los SEAL avanzaron hacia la casa, rompiendo paredes y puertas con explosivos. [77]
Los SEALs se encontraron con los residentes en la casa de invitados del complejo, en el edificio principal, en el primer piso, donde vivían dos hombres adultos, y en el segundo y tercer piso, donde Bin Laden vivía con su familia. El segundo y tercer piso fueron las últimas secciones del complejo que se desalojaron. [90] Se informó de que había "pequeños grupos de niños... en todos los niveles, incluido el balcón de la habitación de Bin Laden". [77]
Osama bin Laden murió en el ataque y las versiones iniciales dijeron que otros tres hombres y una mujer también murieron: el hijo adulto de bin Laden, Khalid, [91] [92] el mensajero de bin Laden , Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti , el hermano de al-Kuwaiti, Abrar, y la esposa de Abrar, Bushra. [54]
Existen informes contradictorios de un tiroteo inicial. El libro de Matt Bissonnette , No Easy Day , afirma que el equipo estuvo en un "corto tiroteo" antes de llegar a Bin Laden. [93] Un oficial de inteligencia le dijo a Seymour Hersh en 2015 que no hubo tiroteo. En las versiones anteriores, se dice que Al-Kuwaiti abrió fuego contra el primer equipo de SEAL con un AK-47 desde detrás de la puerta de la casa de huéspedes, hiriendo levemente a un SEAL con fragmentos de bala. Se produjo un breve tiroteo entre Al-Kuwaiti y los SEAL, en el que Al-Kuwaiti murió. [2] [94] Su esposa Mariam supuestamente recibió un disparo y resultó herida en el hombro derecho. [95] [96] Se dijo entonces que el pariente masculino del mensajero, Abrar, fue asesinado a tiros por el segundo equipo de los SEAL en el primer piso de la casa principal, ya que ya se habían realizado disparos y los SEAL pensaron que estaba armado con un AK-47 cargado (esto se confirmó más tarde como cierto en el informe oficial). [97] Una mujer cerca de él, identificada más tarde como la esposa de Abrar, Bushra, también fue asesinada a tiros en esta versión. Se dice que el hijo joven adulto de Bin Laden se encontró con los SEAL en la escalera de la casa principal, y que el segundo equipo le disparó y lo mató. [2] [87] [92] [94] [98] Un alto funcionario de defensa estadounidense anónimo dijo que solo una de las cinco personas asesinadas, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, estaba armada. [99] El interior de la casa estaba oscuro como boca de lobo, porque los agentes de la CIA habían cortado la electricidad del vecindario. [58] Los operadores militares estadounidenses llevaban gafas de visión nocturna que les permitían ver en la oscuridad. [100]
Los SEALs encontraron a Bin Laden en el tercer piso del edificio principal. [87] [101] Bin Laden estaba desarmado, "vistiendo la túnica holgada local y los pantalones conocidos como kurta paijama " , en los que luego se descubrió que tenían 500 € y dos números de teléfono cosidos en la tela. [57] [88] [94] [102]
Bin Laden miró a través de la puerta de su dormitorio a los estadounidenses que avanzaban por las escaleras, y el SEAL líder le disparó. Los informes difieren, aunque coinciden en que finalmente recibió disparos en el cuerpo y la cabeza. Los disparos iniciales fallaron, lo alcanzaron en el pecho, el costado o la cabeza. [103] [102] Varias parientes femeninas de Bin Laden estaban cerca de él. [102] Según el periodista Nicholas Schmidle, una de las esposas de Bin Laden, Amal Ahmed Abdul Fatah , hizo un gesto como si estuviera a punto de atacar; el SEAL líder le disparó en la pierna, luego agarró a las dos mujeres y las empujó a un lado. [54]
Robert J. O'Neill , que más tarde se identificó públicamente como uno de los SEAL que disparó contra Bin Laden, [104] [105] afirma que empujó al SEAL principal, entró por la puerta y se enfrentó a Bin Laden dentro del dormitorio. O'Neill afirma que Bin Laden estaba de pie detrás de una mujer con sus manos sobre sus hombros, empujándola hacia adelante. O'Neill inmediatamente disparó a Bin Laden dos veces en la frente, luego una vez más mientras Bin Laden se desplomaba en el suelo. [106]
Bissonnette da un relato contradictorio de la situación, escribiendo que Bin Laden ya había sido mortalmente herido por los disparos del SEAL líder desde la escalera. El SEAL líder empujó a las esposas de Bin Laden a un lado, tratando de proteger a los SEAL detrás de él en caso de que alguna de las mujeres tuviera un dispositivo explosivo. Después de que Bin Laden se tambaleara hacia atrás o cayera en el dormitorio, Bissonnette y O'Neill entraron en la habitación, vieron a Bin Laden herido en el suelo, dispararon varias veces y lo mataron. [107] El periodista Peter Bergen investigó las afirmaciones contradictorias y descubrió que la mayoría de los SEAL presentes durante la redada favorecían la versión de los hechos de Bissonnette. Según las fuentes de Bergen, O'Neill no mencionó haber disparado los tiros que mataron a Bin Laden en el informe posterior a la acción realizado después de la operación. [108]
El arma utilizada para matar a Bin Laden fue un HK416 que utilizaba munición OTM (open-tip match ) de 5,56 mm de la OTAN de 77 granos. [58] [109] El líder del equipo SEAL dijo por radio: "Por Dios y por la patria: Gerónimo, Gerónimo, Gerónimo" y luego, después de que McRaven le pidiera confirmación, dijo: "Geronimo EKIA" (enemigo muerto en acción). Al observar la operación en la Sala de Situaciones de la Casa Blanca, Obama simplemente dijo: "Lo tenemos". [2] [54] [58]
Varios autores han escrito que había dos armas en la habitación de Bin Laden: una carabina AKS-74U y una pistola Makarov de fabricación rusa . [110] Según su esposa Amal, Bin Laden recibió un disparo antes de que pudiera alcanzar la AKS-74U. [110] [111] Según Associated Press, las armas estaban en un estante junto a la puerta y los SEAL no las vieron hasta que estaban fotografiando el cuerpo. [77] Según el periodista Matthew Cole, las armas no estaban cargadas y solo se encontraron más tarde durante una búsqueda en el tercer piso. [102]
Cuando los SEALs se encontraron con mujeres y niños durante la redada, los sujetaron con esposas de plástico o bridas . [87] Una vez finalizada la redada, las fuerzas estadounidenses trasladaron a los residentes supervivientes al exterior [48] "para que las fuerzas paquistaníes los descubrieran". [87] Amal Ahmed Abdul Fatah, herido, siguió arengando a los asaltantes en árabe. [54] La hija de 12 años de Bin Laden, Safia, fue supuestamente golpeada en el pie o el tobillo por un trozo de escombro que volaba. [2] [112] [113]
Mientras que el cuerpo de Bin Laden fue recogido por las fuerzas estadounidenses, los cuerpos de los otros cuatro muertos en el ataque fueron abandonados en el complejo y luego puestos bajo custodia paquistaní. [30] [114]
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La incursión debía durar 40 minutos. El tiempo transcurrido entre la entrada y la salida del equipo del complejo fue de 38 minutos. [51] Según Associated Press, el asalto se completó en los primeros 15 minutos. [77]
El tiempo en el complejo se dedicó a matar a los defensores, [90] "moviéndonos con cuidado a través del complejo, de habitación en habitación, de piso en piso", asegurando a las mujeres y los niños, despejando "escondites de armas y barricadas" [87] incluyendo una puerta falsa, [115] y registrando el complejo en busca de información. [27] El personal estadounidense recuperó tres rifles Kalashnikov y dos pistolas, diez discos duros de computadora, documentos, DVD, casi un centenar de memorias USB , una docena de teléfonos celulares y "equipo electrónico" para su posterior análisis. [51] [116] [117] [b] Los SEAL también descubrieron una gran cantidad de opio almacenado en la casa. [119]
Como el helicóptero que había realizado el aterrizaje de emergencia estaba dañado y no podía sacar al equipo de allí, fue destruido para salvaguardar su equipo clasificado, incluida una aparente capacidad de sigilo . [81] El piloto destrozó el panel de instrumentos, la radio y otros elementos clasificados, y los SEAL demolieron el helicóptero con explosivos. Como el equipo SEAL quedó reducido a un helicóptero operativo, uno de los dos Chinooks que se tenían en reserva fue enviado para sacar a parte del equipo y el cuerpo de Bin Laden de Pakistán. [32] [54] [57] [120]
Mientras la fuerza estadounidense reunía información y destruía el helicóptero, una multitud de lugareños se reunió fuera del recinto, curiosos por el ruido y la actividad. Un oficial estadounidense que hablaba urdu , a través de un megáfono, dijo a los reunidos que se trataba de una operación militar paquistaní y que debían mantenerse a distancia. [121]
Aunque la versión oficial del Departamento de Defensa no menciona las bases aéreas utilizadas en la operación, [122] relatos posteriores indicaron que los helicópteros regresaron al aeródromo de Bagram . [77] El cuerpo de Osama bin Laden fue trasladado desde Bagram al portaaviones Carl Vinson en un avión de rotor basculante V-22 Osprey escoltado por dos aviones de combate F/A-18 de la Armada de los EE. UU. [123] [124]
According to U.S. officials, bin Laden was buried at sea because no country would accept his remains.[125] Before disposing of the body, the U.S. called the Saudi Arabian government, who approved of burying the body in the ocean.[54] Muslim religious rites were performed aboard Carl Vinson in the North Arabian Sea within 24 hours of bin Laden's death. Preparations began at 10:10 a.m. local time and at-sea burial was completed at 11 a.m. The body was washed, wrapped in a white sheet and placed in a weighted plastic bag. An officer read prepared religious remarks which were translated into Arabic by a native speaker. Afterward, bin Laden's body was placed onto a flat board. The board was tilted upward on one side and the body slid off into the sea.[126][127]
In Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace,[128] Leon Panetta wrote that bin Laden's body was draped in a white shroud, given final prayers in Arabic and placed inside a black bag loaded with 140 kg (300 lb) of iron chains, apparently to ensure that it would sink and never float. The body bag was placed on a white table at the rail of the ship, and the table was tipped to let the body bag slide into the sea, but the body bag did not slide and took the table with it. The table bobbed on the surface while the weighted body sank.[128]
According to Obama administration officials, U.S. officials did not share information about the raid with the government of Pakistan until it was over.[9][129] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen called Pakistan's army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani at about 3 am local time to inform him of the operation.[130]
According to the Pakistani foreign ministry, the operation was conducted entirely by the U.S. forces.[131] Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officials said they were present at what they called a joint operation;[132] President Asif Ali Zardari flatly denied this.[133] Pakistan's foreign secretary Salman Bashir later confirmed that Pakistani military had scrambled F-16s after they became aware of the attack but that they reached the compound after the U.S. helicopters had left.[134]
U.S. forces used multiple methods to positively identify the body of Osama bin Laden:
Beginning at 12:58 a.m. local time (19:58 UTC), Abbottabad resident Sohaib Athar sent a series of tweets starting with "Helicopter hovering above Abbottabad at 1AM (is a rare event)." By 1:44 a.m. all was quiet until a plane flew over the city at 3:39 a.m.[143] Neighbors took to their roofs and watched as U.S. special operations forces stormed the compound. One neighbor said, "I saw soldiers emerging from the helicopters and advancing towards the house. Some of them instructed us in chaste Pashto to turn off the lights and stay inside."[144] Another man said he heard shooting and screams, then an explosion as a grounded helicopter was destroyed. The blast broke his bedroom window and left charred debris over a nearby field.[145] A local security officer said he entered the compound shortly after the Americans left, before it was sealed off by the army. "There were four dead bodies, three male and one female and one female was injured," he said. "There was a lot of blood on the floor and one could easily see the marks like a dead body had been dragged out of the compound." Numerous witnesses reported that power, and possibly cellphone service,[146] went out around the time of the raid and apparently included the military academy.[147][148] Accounts differed as to the exact time of the blackout. One journalist concluded after interviewing several residents that it was a routine rolling blackout.[149]
ISI reported after questioning survivors of the raid that there were 17 to 18 people in the compound at the time of the attack and that the Americans took away one person still alive, possibly a bin Laden son. The ISI said that survivors included a wife, a daughter and eight to nine other children, not apparently bin Laden's. An unnamed Pakistani security official was quoted as saying one of bin Laden's daughters told Pakistani investigators that bin Laden had been captured alive, then in front of family members was shot dead by U.S. forces and dragged to a helicopter.[150][151]
U.S. officials said there were 22 people in the compound. Five were killed, including Osama bin Laden.[66] Pakistani officials gave conflicting reports suggesting between 12 and 17 survivors.[152] The Sunday Times subsequently published excerpts from a pocket guide, presumably dropped by the SEALs during the raid, containing pictures and descriptions of likely compound residents.[153] The guide listed several adult children of bin Laden and their families who were not ultimately found in the compound.[citation needed] Because of a lack of accurate information, some of what follows cannot be verified as true.[152]
Around 9:45 p.m. EDT, the White House announced that the president would be addressing the nation later in the evening.[163] At 10:24:05 p.m. EDT the first public leak was made by Navy Reserve intel officer Keith Urbahn and 47 seconds later by actor and professional wrestler Dwayne Johnson on Twitter.[164] Anonymous government officials confirmed details to the media, and by 11 p.m. numerous major news sources were reporting that bin Laden was dead;[163][165] the number of leaks were characterized as "voluminous" by David E. Sanger.[166]
At 11:35 p.m., President Obama appeared on major television networks:[163]
Good evening. Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, and a terrorist who was responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children ... (cont'd)
President Obama recalled the victims of the September 11 attacks. He praised the nearly ten-year-old war against al-Qaeda, which he said had disrupted terrorist plots, strengthened homeland defenses, removed the Taliban government, and captured or killed scores of al-Qaeda operatives. Obama said that when he took office he made finding bin Laden the top priority of the war. Bin Laden's death was the most significant blow to al-Qaeda so far but the war would continue. He reaffirmed that the U.S. was not at war against Islam and defended his decision to conduct an operation within Pakistan. He said Americans understood the cost of war but would not stand by while their security was threatened. "To those families who have lost loved ones to al-Qaeda's terror," he said, "justice has been done." This remark book-ended President Bush's statement to a joint session of Congress following the September 11 attacks that "justice will be done."
Before the official announcement, large crowds spontaneously gathered outside the White House, Ground Zero, The Pentagon, and in New York's Times Square to celebrate. In Dearborn, Michigan, where there is a large Muslim and Arab population, a small crowd gathered outside the City Hall in celebration, many of them of Middle Eastern descent.[167] From the beginning to the end of Obama's speech, 5,000 tweets per second were posted on Twitter.[168] As news of bin Laden's death filtered through the crowd at a nationally televised Major League Baseball game in Philadelphia between rivals Philadelphia Phillies and the New York Mets, "U-S-A!" cheers began.[169][170] In Tampa, Florida, at the conclusion of a professional wrestling event which was occurring at the time, WWE Champion John Cena announced to the audience that bin Laden had been "caught and compromised to a permanent end," prompting chants while he exited the arena to the march "The Stars and Stripes Forever."[171]
The deputy leader of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood said that, with bin Laden dead, Western forces should now pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan; authorities in Iran made similar comments.[172] Palestinian Authority leaders had contrasting reactions. Mahmoud Abbas welcomed bin Laden's death, while Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, condemned what he saw as the assassination of an "Arab holy warrior."[173]
The 14th Dalai Lama was quoted by the Los Angeles Times as saying, "Forgiveness doesn't mean forget what happened. ... If something is serious and it is necessary to take counter-measures, you have to take counter-measures." This was widely reported as an endorsement of bin Laden's killing and was criticized in Buddhist circles, but another journalist cited a video of the discussion to argue that the comment was taken out of context and the Dalai Lama supports killing only in self-defense.[174]
A CBS/The New York Times poll taken after bin Laden's death showed that 16% of Americans feel safer as the result of his death while 60% of Americans of those polled believe killing bin Laden would likely increase the threat of terrorism against the U.S. in the short term.[175]
In India, Minister for Home Affairs P. Chidambaram said that bin Laden hiding "deep inside" Pakistan was a matter of grave concern for India and showed that "many of the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks, including the controllers and the handlers of the terrorists who actually carried out the attack, continue to be sheltered in Pakistan." He also called on Pakistan to arrest them,[176] amidst calls for similar strikes being conducted by India against Hafiz Saeed and Dawood Ibrahim.[177]
Although the Abbottabad raid has been described in great detail by U.S. officials, no physical evidence constituting "proof of death" has been offered to the public, neither to journalists nor to independent third parties who have requested this information through the Freedom of Information Act.[178] Numerous organizations filed FOIA requests seeking at least a partial release of photographs, videos, and/or DNA test results, including The Associated Press, Reuters, CBS News, Judicial Watch, Politico, Fox News, Citizens United, and NPR.[179] On April 26, 2012, Judge James E. Boasberg held that the Department of Defense was not required to release any evidence to the public.[180]
According to a draft report by the Pentagon's inspector general, Admiral William McRaven, the top special operations commander, ordered the Department of Defense to purge from its computer systems all files on the bin Laden raid after first sending them to the CIA.[181][182][183][184] Any mention of this decision was expunged from the final version of the inspector general's report.[182] According to the Pentagon, this was done to protect the identities of the Navy SEALs involved in the raid.[182] The legal justification for the records transfer is that the SEALs were effectively working for the CIA at the time of the raid, which ostensibly means that any records of the raid belong to the CIA.[181][182] "Documents related to the raid were handled in a manner consistent with the fact that the operation was conducted under the direction of the CIA director," CIA agency spokesman Preston Golson said in an emailed statement. "Records of a CIA operation such as the (bin Laden) raid, which were created during the conduct of the operation by persons acting under the authority of the CIA Director, are CIA records."[185] Golson said it is absolutely false that records were moved to the CIA to avoid the legal requirements of the Freedom of Information Act.[185] The National Security Archive has criticized this maneuver, saying that the records have now gone into a "FOIA black hole":
What the transfer really did was ensure that the files would be placed in the CIA's operational records, a records system that—due to the 1986 CIA Operational Files exemption—is not subject to the FOIA and is a black hole for anyone trying to access the files within. The move prevents the public from accessing the official record about the raid, and bypasses several important federal records keeping procedures in the process.[182]
The United States Defense Department can prevent the release of its own military files citing risks to national security, but that can be contested in court, and a judge can compel the Pentagon to turn over non-sensitive portions of records. The CIA has special authority to prevent the release of operational files in ways that cannot be challenged in federal court.[185] Richard Lardner, reporting for the Associated Press, wrote that the maneuver "could represent a new strategy for the U.S. government to shield even its most sensitive activities from public scrutiny."[186]
The inspector general's draft report also described how former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta disclosed classified information to the makers of Zero Dark Thirty, including the unit that conducted the raid and the ground commander's name.[187]
Following the attacks of September 11, the U.S. Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, which authorized the President to use "necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons" he determines were involved in the attacks.[188] Congresswoman Barbara Lee has initiated several attempts to repeal the authorization.[189] The Obama administration justified its use of force by relying on that resolution, as well as international law set forth in treaties and customary laws of war.[190]
John Bellinger III, who served as the U.S. State Department's senior lawyer during President George W. Bush's second term, said the strike was a legitimate military action and did not run counter to the U.S.' self-imposed prohibition on assassinations:
The killing is not prohibited by the long-standing assassination prohibition in executive order 12333 [signed in 1981], because the action was a military action in the ongoing U.S. armed conflict with al-Qaeda, and it is not prohibited to kill specific leaders of an opposing force. The assassination prohibition does not apply to killings in self-defense.[191]
Similarly, Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department, said in 2010 that "under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute 'assassination.'"[191]
David Scheffer, director of the Northwestern University School of Law Center for International Human Rights, said the fact that bin Laden had previously been indicted in 1998 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations was a complicating factor. "Normally when an individual is under indictment the purpose is to capture that person in order to bring him to court to try him ... The object is not to literally summarily execute him if he's under indictment."[192] Scheffer and another expert stated that it was important to determine whether the mission was to capture bin Laden or to kill him. If the Navy SEALs were instructed to kill bin Laden without trying first to capture him, it "may have violated American ideals if not international law."[192]
In an address to the Pakistani parliament, Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani said, "Our people are rightly incensed on the issue of violation of sovereignty as typified by the covert U.S. air and ground assault on the Osama hideout in Abbottabad. ... The Security Council, while exhorting UN member states to join their efforts against terrorism, has repeatedly emphasized that this be done in accordance with international law, human rights and humanitarian law."[193] Former Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf denied a report in The Guardian that his government made a secret agreement permitting U.S. forces to conduct unilateral raids in search of the top three al-Qaeda leaders.[194]
In testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Eric Holder said, "The operation against bin Laden was justified as an act of national self-defense. It's lawful to target an enemy commander in the field." He called the killing of bin Laden "a tremendous step forward in attaining justice for the nearly 3,000 innocent Americans who were murdered on September 11, 2001."[195] Commenting on the legality under international law, University of Michigan Law Professor Steven Ratner said, "A lot of it depends on whether you believe Osama bin Laden is a combatant in a war or a suspect in a mass murder." In the latter case, "you would ... be able to kill a suspect [only] if they represented an immediate threat."[192]
Holder testified that bin Laden made no attempt to surrender, and "even if he had there would be a good basis on the part of those very brave Navy SEAL team members to do what they did in order to protect themselves and the other people who were in that building."[195] According to Anthony Dworkin, an international law expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, if bin Laden was hors de combat (as his daughter is said to have alleged)[151] that would have been a violation of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.[196]
Former Nuremberg prosecutor Benjamin B. Ferencz said it was unclear if bin Laden's killing was justified self-defense or premeditated illegal assassination,[197] and that "killing a captive who poses no immediate threat is a crime under military law as well as all other law,"[198] a view also held by legal scholar Philippe Sands.[197]
The UN Security Council released a statement applauding the news of bin Laden's death, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he was "very much relieved."[199] Two United Nations Special Rapporteurs issued a joint statement seeking more information regarding the circumstances in which bin Laden was killed and cautioning that "actions taken by States in combating terrorism, especially in high profile cases, set precedents for the way in which the right to life will be treated in future instances."[200]
Under Islamic tradition, burial at sea is considered inappropriate when other, preferred forms of burial are available, and several prominent Islamic clerics criticized the decision.[137][201][202] Mohamed Ahmed el-Tayeb, the head of Al-Azhar University, Egypt's seat of Sunni Muslim learning, said the disposal of the body at sea was an affront to religious and human values.[203] Scholars like el-Tayeb hold that sea burials can be allowed only in special cases where the death occurred aboard a ship, and that the regular practice should have occurred in this case—the body buried in the ground with the head pointing to Islam's holy city of Mecca.[204]
A stated advantage of a burial at sea is that the site is not readily identified or accessed, thus preventing it from becoming a focus of attention or "terrorist shrine."[204] The Guardian questioned whether bin Laden's grave would have become a shrine, as this is strongly discouraged in Wahhabism. Addressing the same concern, Egyptian Islamic analyst and lawyer Montasser el-Zayat said that if the Americans wished to avoid making a shrine to bin Laden, an unmarked grave on land would have accomplished the same goal.[201]
The Guardian also quoted a U.S. official explaining the anticipated difficulty of finding a country that would accept the burial of bin Laden in its soil.[205] A professor of Islamic Law at the University of Jordan stated burying at sea was permitted if there was nobody to receive the body and provide a Muslim burial,[206] but that "it's neither true nor correct to claim that there was nobody in the Muslim world ready to receive bin Laden's body."[201] On a similar note, Mohammed al-Qubaisi, Dubai's grand mufti, stated: "They can say they buried him at sea, but they cannot say they did it according to Islam. If the family does not want him, it's really simple in Islam: you dig up a grave anywhere, even on a remote island, you say the prayers and that's it. Sea burials are permissible for Muslims in extraordinary circumstances. This is not one of them."[201] Khalid Latif, an imam who serves as a chaplain and the director of the Islamic Center of New York University, argued that the sea burial was respectful.[207]
Leor Halevi, a professor at Vanderbilt University and the author of Muhammad's Grave: Death Rites and the Making of Islamic Society, explained that Islamic law does not prescribe ordinary funerals for those killed in battle, and pointed to controversy within the Muslim world over whether bin Laden was, as a "mass murderer of Muslims," entitled to the same respect as mainstream Muslims. At the same time, he suggested that the burial could have been handled with more cultural sensitivity.[208]
Omar bin Laden, son of Osama bin Laden, published a complaint on May 10, 2011, that the burial at sea deprived the family of a proper burial.[209]
After bin Laden's death, it was reported he had left a will written a short time after the September 11 attacks[210] in which he urged his children not to join al-Qaeda and not to continue the Jihad.[211]
CNN cited a senior U.S. official as saying three sets of photographs of bin Laden's body exist: photos taken at an aircraft hangar in Afghanistan, described as the most recognizable and gruesome; photos taken from the burial at sea on USS Carl Vinson before a shroud was placed around his body; and photos from the raid itself, which include shots of the interior of the compound as well as three of the others who died in the raid.[212]
CBS Evening News reported that the photo shows that the bullet which hit above bin Laden's left eye blew out his left eyeball and blew away a large portion of his frontal skull, exposing his brain.[213] CNN stated that the pictures from the Afghanistan hangar depict "a massive open head wound across both eyes. It's very bloody and gory."[212] U.S. Senator Jim Inhofe said the photos taken of the body on the Carl Vinson, which showed bin Laden's face after much of the blood and material had been washed away, should be released to the public.[214]
A debate on whether the military photos should be released to the public took place.[215] Those supporting the release argued that the photos should be considered public records,[216][217] that they are necessary to complete the journalistic record,[218] and that they would prove bin Laden's death and therefore prevent conspiracy theories. Those in opposition expressed concern that the photos would inflame anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.[219]
Obama decided not to release the photos.[220] In an interview aired on May 4 on 60 Minutes, he said: "We don't trot out this stuff as trophies. We don't need to spike the football." Obama said that he was concerned with ensuring that "very graphic photos of somebody who was shot in the head are not floating around as an incitement to additional violence, or as a propaganda tool. That's not who we are."[221] Among Republican members of Congress, Senator Lindsey Graham criticized the decision and said he wanted to see the photos released, while Senator John McCain and Representative Mike Rogers, the chair of the House Intelligence Committee, supported the decision.[222][223]
On May 11, selected members of Congress (the congressional leadership and those who serve on the House and Senate intelligence, homeland security, judiciary, foreign relations, and armed forces committees) were shown 15 bin Laden photos. In an interview with Eliot Spitzer, Senator Jim Inhofe said that three of the photos were of bin Laden alive for identification reference. Three other photos were of the burial-at-sea ceremony.[224]
The group Judicial Watch filed a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain access to the photos in May 2011, soon after the raid.[225][226] On May 9, the Department of Defense declined to process Judicial Watch's FOIA request, prompting Judicial Watch to file a federal lawsuit.[227] In 2012, Judge James Boasberg of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a ruling denying release of the photographs.[228] In May 2013, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consisting of Chief Judge Merrick Garland, Senior Judge Harry T. Edwards, and Judge Judith Rogers affirmed the ruling, holding that 52 post-mortem images were properly classified as "top secret" and exempt from disclosure.[229] Judicial Watch filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in August 2013, seeking U.S. Supreme Court review, but in January 2014 the Supreme Court declined to hear the case.[230][231][232]
The Associated Press filed a FOIA request for photographs and videos taken during the Abbottabad raid less than one day after bin Laden was killed.[233][234] The AP also requested "contingency plans for bin Laden's capture, reports on the performance of equipment during the mission and copies of DNA tests" confirming bin Laden's identity.[234] The Defense Department rejected the AP's request for expedited processing, a legal provision to shorten the amount of time to process FOIA requests. The Defense Department rejected the request, and the AP administratively appealed.[234]
A book published in November 2011, Seal Target Geronimo, by Chuck Pfarrer, a former SEAL, contradicted elements of the account as given by U.S. government sources.
Per Pfarrer, the primary helicopters used in the operation were designated Razor 1 and Razor 2.[235] These helicopters, which were only used by elite U.S. special-operations units (namely the U.S. Navy's DEVGRU and the U.S. Army's Delta Force), were colloquially called Ghost Hawks due to their advanced stealth functions.[235] The pilots of both Ghost Hawks each had at least a decade of experience flying stealth helicopters in combat.[235] Razor 1 carried 10 assaulters (including some specially trained as snipers), and two demolitionists with expertise in strategically deploying explosives. Razor 2 also carried a squad of 12 American commandos, including a two-man sniper team that had participated in resolving the 2009 Maersk Alabama hijacking, and a designated artillery observer who was responsible for directing the team's weaponsfire.[235] Pfarrer's account also suggests that the helicopter or helicopters heard hovering in Abbottabad that night were the Chinooks.[235] One, which would have been referred to as the command bird, carried the officers running the operation and all of the members of Red Squadron who were not already assigned to approach the compound via Razors 1 and 2. The second Chinook, which Pfarrer calls the gun platform, was equipped with three M134 Miniguns (Gatling gun-style cannons), which would be used to provide suppressive fire from the air if need be.[235]
According to Pfarrer, neither helicopter crashed at the beginning of the raid. Instead, the SEALs jumped onto the roof from the hovering Razor 1 helicopter and entered a third-floor hallway from the roof terrace. Osama's third wife, Khairah, was in the hallway, headed towards the SEALs. She was blinded by a strobe light and pushed to the floor as the SEALs went past her. Osama bin Laden stuck his head out of a bedroom door, saw the SEALs, and slammed the door closed. At the same time, Osama's son Khalid bin Laden ran up the stairs to the third floor and was killed with two shots.[236][237]
Two SEALs broke through the bedroom door. Bin Laden's wife Amal was on the edge of the bed shouting in Arabic at the SEALs, and Osama bin Laden dived across the bed, shoving Amal at the same time, for an AKS-74U kept by the headboard. The SEALs fired four shots at bin Laden; the first missed, the second grazed Amal in the calf also missing bin Laden, and the final two hit bin Laden in the chest and head, killing him instantly. In Pfarrer's account, the total time elapsed from jumping on the roof to Osama bin Laden's death was between 30 and 90 seconds.[236][237]
Around the same time, snipers in the hovering Razor 2 helicopter shot and killed Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti when he came to the door of the guest house firing an AK-47. One SEAL sniper fired two shots at al-Kuwaiti and the other fired two three-round bursts. Two of the snipers' bullets went through al-Kuwaiti and killed his wife who was standing behind him. The Razor 2 team cleared the guest house and then breached their way into the main house with explosives. As the Razor 2 team entered the main house, al-Qaeda courier Arshad Khan pointed his AK-47 gun and was killed with two shots. The SEAL team fired a total of 16 shots, killing Osama bin Laden, Khalid bin Laden, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, and al-Kuwaiti's wife, Arshad Khan, and wounding Osama bin Laden's wife Amal al-Sadah.[236][237]
Twenty minutes into the operation, Razor 1 took off from the roof of the main house to reposition to a landing spot outside the compound. As Razor 1 was crossing over the courtyard, both "green unit" flight deck control systems went off line. The helicopter settled slowly, bounced off the ground, and then broke apart as it hit the ground a second time. Both failed green units were removed for later examination.[236][237]
Media accounts had reported that the plan had been to fast rope to the inner courtyard and to clear the main house from the ground floor up. The helicopter crashed in the outer courtyard with the SEAL team still on board. The SEAL team exited and needed to breach two walls and then into the house. As a result, Osama bin Laden was killed several minutes into the operation.[54] Pfarrer's account differs in that he wrote that a SEAL team was inserted onto the roof of the main house, that Osama bin Laden was killed seconds into the operation, and that the main house was cleared from the top down.[237]
The Pentagon disputed Pfarrer's account of the raid, calling it "incorrect."[238] The U.S. Special Operations Command also disputed Pfarrer's account, saying, "It's just not true. It's not how it happened."[239][240]
Matt Bissonnette, a SEAL who participated in the raid, wrote an account of the mission in the book No Easy Day (2012), which significantly contradicts Pfarrer's account. Bissonnette wrote that the helicopter approach and landing matched the official version. According to Bissonnette, when bin Laden peered out at the Americans advancing on his third-floor room, the SEAL who fired upon him hit him on the right side of the head. Bin Laden stumbled into his bedroom, where the SEALs found him crumpled and twitching on the floor in a pool of blood and brain matter, with two women crying over his body. The other SEALs allegedly grabbed the women, moved them away, and shot several rounds into bin Laden's chest until he was motionless. According to Bissonnette, the weapons in the room—an AK-47 rifle and a Makarov pistol—were unloaded.[241]
Unlike the official account, Bissonnette's version alleges that bin Laden's wife Mariam was uninjured in the raid.[page needed] In addition, Bissonnette states that the report of bin Laden's daughter Safia having splintered wood striking her foot is false, as he explains that it was rather his wife Amal who was injured by such fragments.[241]
The author also asserted that one SEAL sat on bin Laden's chest in a cramped helicopter as his body was flown back to Afghanistan.[242][243]
Bissonnette stated that a search of bin Laden's room after his death uncovered a bottle of Just for Men hair dye.[244]
In February 2013, Esquire conducted an interview with an anonymous individual called "the shooter" who said that bin Laden placed one of his wives between himself and the commandos, pushing her towards them. "Shooter" then claimed bin Laden stood up and had a gun "within reach" and it was only then that he fired two shots into bin Laden's forehead, killing him.[119] Another member of SEAL Team Six said the story as presented in Esquire was false and "complete BS".[245] Then, in November 2014, former SEAL Robert O'Neill disclosed his identity as the shooter in a series of interviews with The Washington Post.[104][105]
In 2011 American intelligence analyst Raelynn Hillhouse wrote that according to U.S. intelligence sources, the U.S. had been tipped-off to bin Laden's location by an unnamed Pakistani intelligence insider collecting the $25 million reward. According to the sources, Pakistan purposely stood-down its armed forces to allow the U.S. raid, and the original plan was to kill—not capture—bin Laden. Hillhouse's sources stated that the Pakistanis had been keeping bin Laden under house arrest near their military headquarters in Abbottabad with money provided by the Saudis.[246] According to The Telegraph, Hillhouse's account might explain why U.S. forces encountered no resistance on their way to and in Abbottabad, and why some residents in Abbottabad were warned to stay in their houses the day before the raid.[246] Hillhouse later also said bin Laden's body had been thrown out of a helicopter over the Hindu Kush. Hillhouse's account was picked up and published internationally.[247]
In May 2015, a detailed article in the London Review of Books by journalist Seymour Hersh said that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had kept bin Laden under house arrest at Abbottabad since 2006, and that Pakistani Army chief Pervez Kayani and ISI director Ahmad Shuja Pasha aided the U.S. mission to kill, not capture bin Laden.[248][249] According to Hersh, Pakistani officials were always aware of bin Laden's location and were guarding the compound with their own soldiers. Pakistan decided to give up bin Laden's location to the U.S. because American aid was declining. Pakistani officials were aware of the raid, and assisted the U.S. in carrying it out. According to Hersh, bin Laden was basically an invalid.[250]
Hersh's U.S. and Pakistani intelligence sources stated that the U.S. had learned of bin Laden's location through a Pakistani walk-in seeking the $25 million reward, and not through tracking a courier.[248][251] NBC News and Agence France-Presse subsequently reported that their sources indicated a walk-in was an extremely valuable asset, though the sources disputed that the walk-in knew the location of bin Laden.[252][253] Pakistan-based journalist Amir Mir in the News International reported the walk-in's identity to be Usman Khalid, though that allegation was denied by Khalid's family.[254]
Although similar in claims, both Hillhouse's and Hersh's accounts of the bin Laden death appeared to be based on different sources which The Intercept concluded might corroborate the claims if their identities were known. After the Hersh story broke, NBC News also independently reported that a Pakistani intelligence officer was the source of the original bin Laden location report, and not the courier.[247]
The White House denied Hersh's report.[255][256] A former intelligence official who had direct knowledge of the operation speculated that the Pakistanis, who were furious that the operation took place without being detected by them, were behind the conflicting story as a way to save face.[257] Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid in The New York Review of Books finds the cooperation between the CIA and ISI that Hersh describes "inconceivable," in part because 2011 was "the worst year in U.S.-Pakistan relations since the late 1980s" and "hatred and mistrust" between the CIA and ISI was "acute"—something Hersh does not mention. Among the incidents that occurred in Pakistan in the months before the killing of bin Laden were the killing of two Pakistanis by CIA contractor Raymond Davis, numerous death threats against the Islamabad CIA station chief after his name was leaked (purportedly by the ISI), the cessation of the issuing of visas for U.S. officials (following which the U.S. consulate in Lahore was moved to Islamabad over concerns about security), increased U.S. anger over the refusal of Pakistan to exert pressure on the Taliban, the death of 40 Pakistanis including many civilians and later 24 Pakistani soldiers from U.S. drone strikes; and the cut-off of U.S. supplies to Afghanistan by Pakistan.[258] Peter Bergen countered Hersh's claim that the shots fired at bin Laden were the only ones fired that evening would ignore that bin Laden's bodyguards were also shot and that the building had a multitude of bullet holes. He stated the U.S. government had intercepted the communications of Generals Kayani and Pasha, and their response had shown that neither had any knowledge of bin Laden's whereabouts.[259][260] Nelly Lahoud, who analyzed the documents seized during the operation to kill bin Laden, disagrees with Hersh's assertion that bin Laden was an ISI hostage. He stated that even a casual reading of the documents would make it abundantly clear that bin Laden went to great lengths to hide from Pakistani authorities, and it would be inconceivable that bin Laden himself did not know he was being held hostage.[261]
In the publication No Easy Day, a map of the operation show the U.S. SEALs briefly crossed into Indian territory before its loop approaching Abbottabad in Pakistan, raising questions in India whether the U.S. violated Indian airspace, and if India had advance knowledge about the mission. The Indian Air Force dismissed claims that the U.S. crossed into Indian airspace.[262][263][264]
The reports of bin Laden's death on May 2, 2011, are not universally accepted[265] despite unreleased DNA testing confirming his identity,[34][139] bin Laden's twelve-year-old daughter witnessing his death,[113][266] and a May 6, 2011, al-Qaeda statement confirming his death.[10] The swift burial of bin Laden's body at sea, the speed of the DNA results, and the decision not to release pictures of the dead body have led to the rise of conspiracy theories that bin Laden had not died in the raid.[267] Some blogs suggested that the U.S. government feigned the raid, and some forums hosted debates over the alleged hoax.[268]
Pakistan came under intense international scrutiny after the raid. The Pakistani government denied that it had sheltered bin Laden, and said it had shared information with the CIA and other intelligence agencies about the compound since 2009.[269]
Carlotta Gall, in her 2014 book The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014, accuses the ISI, Pakistan's clandestine intelligence service, of hiding and protecting Osama bin Laden and his family after the September 11, 2001 attacks. She claims that she learned from a Pakistani official (with whom she later clarified that she did not speak, the information coming through a friend)[270] that a senior U.S. official had told him that the United States had direct evidence that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, knew of bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad, but ISI, Pasha and officials in Washington all deny this:[271] "C.I.A. and other Obama administration officials have said they possess no evidence—no intercepts, no unreleased documents from Abbottabad—that Kayani or Pasha or any other I.S.I. officer knew where bin Laden was hiding."[272]
After the raid, there was an unconfirmed report that Pakistan allowed Chinese military officials to examine the wreckage of the crashed helicopter.[273]
Abbottabad attracted refugees from fighting in the tribal areas and Swat Valley, as well as Afghanistan. "People don't really care now to ask who's there," said Gohar Ayub Khan, a former foreign minister and resident of the city. "That's one of the reasons why, possibly, he came in there."[274]
The city was home to at least one al-Qaeda leader before bin Laden. Operational chief Abu Faraj al-Libi reportedly moved his family to Abbottabad in mid-2003.[275] Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) raided the house in December 2003 but did not find him.[276] This account was contradicted by American officials who said that satellite photos show that in 2004 the site was an empty field.[277] A courier told interrogators that al-Libi used three houses in Abbottabad. Pakistani officials say they informed their American counterparts at the time that the city could be a hiding place for al-Qaeda leaders.[278] In 2009 officials began providing the U.S. with intelligence about bin Laden's compound without knowing who lived there.[276]
On January 25, 2011,[279] ISI arrested Umar Patek, an Indonesian wanted in connection with the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, while he was staying with a family in Abbottabad. Tahir Shehzad, a clerk at the post office, was arrested on suspicion of facilitating travel for al-Qaeda militants.[275]
Numerous allegations were made that the government of Pakistan had shielded bin Laden.[132][280][281] Critics cited the proximity of bin Laden's heavily fortified compound to the Pakistan Military Academy, that the U.S. chose to not notify Pakistani authorities before the operation, and the double standards of Pakistan regarding the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.[281][282][283] Leaked diplomatic cables disclosed that American diplomats had been told that Pakistani security services were tipping off bin Laden every time U.S. forces approached. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), also helped smuggle al-Qaeda militants into Afghanistan to fight NATO troops. According to the leaked files, in December 2009, the government of Tajikistan had also told U.S. officials that many in Pakistan were aware of bin Laden's whereabouts.[284]
CIA chief Leon Panetta said the CIA had ruled out involving Pakistan in the operation, because it feared that "any effort to work with the Pakistanis could jeopardize the mission. They might alert the targets."[285] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that "cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound in which he was hiding."[286] Obama echoed her sentiments.[287] John O. Brennan, Obama's chief counterterrorism advisor, said that it was inconceivable that bin Laden did not have support from within Pakistan. He said: "People have been referring to this as hiding in plain sight. We are looking at how he was able to hide out there for so long."[288]
The Indian Minister for Home Affairs, P. Chidambaram, said that bin Laden hiding "deep inside" Pakistan was a matter of grave concern for India, and showed that "many of the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks, including the controllers and the handlers of the terrorists who actually carried out the attack, continue to be sheltered in Pakistan." He called on Pakistan to arrest them.[289]
Pakistani-born British member of parliament Khalid Mahmood said he was "flabbergasted and shocked" after he learned that bin Laden was living in a city with thousands of Pakistani troops, reviving questions about alleged links between al-Qaeda and elements in Pakistan's security forces.[290]
On August 7, 2011, Raelynn Hillhouse, an American spy novelist and security analyst, posted "The Spy Who Billed Me" on her national security blog,[291] suggesting that Pakistan's ISI had sheltered bin Laden in return for a $25 million bounty; ISI and government officials have denied her allegations.[292]
Former Pakistani Army Chief, General Ziauddin Butt has said that, according to his knowledge, Osama bin Laden was kept in an Intelligence Bureau safe house in Abbottabad by the then Director-General of the Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan (2004–2008), Brigadier Ijaz Shah. This had occurred with the "full knowledge" of former army chief General Pervez Musharraf and possibly that of current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.[293] However the reporter who interviewed him, Riedel, noted that Butt had “a motive to speak harshly about Musharraf”. Ziauddin Butt would later deny making these claims about Musharraf and Shah.[294] Emails from the private American security firm, Stratfor, published by WikiLeaks on February 27, 2012, indicate that up to 12 officials in Pakistan's ISI knew of Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad safe house. Stratfor had been given access to the papers collected by American forces from bin Laden's Abbottabad house. The emails reveal that these Pakistani officers included "Mid to senior level ISI and Pak Mil with one retired Pak Mil General."[295] In 2014, British journalist Carlotta Gall revealed that she had been told by an undisclosed ISI source that the ISI "ran a special desk assigned to handle bin Laden." The desk was "led by an officer who made his own decisions and did not report to a superior [...] but the top military bosses knew about it, I was told."[271]
According to Steve Coll, as of 2019 there is no direct evidence showing Pakistani knowledge of bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad, even by a rogue or compartmented faction within the government, other than the circumstantial fact of bin Laden's compound being located near (albeit not directly visible from) the Pakistan Military Academy. Documents captured from the Abbottabad compound generally show that bin Laden was wary of contact with Pakistani intelligence and police, especially in light of Pakistan's role in the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; it has also been suggested that the $25 million U.S. reward for information leading to bin Laden would have been enticing to Pakistani officers given their reputation for corruption. The compound itself, although unusually tall, was less conspicuous than sometimes envisaged by Americans, given the common local habit of walling off homes for protection against violence or to ensure the privacy of female family members. Coll notes that a Pakistani Taliban cell had previously surveilled the army's General Headquarters in Rawalpindi out of a nearby house for two months prior to a deadly October 2009 attack on the facility—without detection.[296]
According to a Pakistani intelligence official, raw phone-tap data had been transferred to the U.S. without being analyzed by Pakistan. While the U.S. "was concentrating on this" information since September 2010, information regarding bin Laden and the compound's inhabitants had "slipped from" Pakistan's "radar" over the months. Bin Laden left "an invisible footprint" and he had not been contacting other militant networks. It was noted that much focus had been placed on a courier entering and leaving the compound. The transfer of intelligence to the U.S. was a regular occurrence according to the official, who also stated regarding the raid that "I think they came in undetected and went out the same day," and Pakistan did not believe that U.S. personnel were present in the area before the special operation occurred.[287]
According to the Pakistani high commissioner to the United Kingdom, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Pakistan had prior knowledge that an operation would happen. Pakistan was "in the know of certain things" and "what happened, happened with our consent. Americans got to know him—where he was first—and that's why they struck it and struck it precisely." Husain Haqqani, Pakistani ambassador to the U.S., had said that Pakistan would have pursued bin Laden had the intelligence of his location existed with them and Pakistan was "very glad that our American partners did. They had superior intelligence, superior technology, and we are grateful to them."[287]
Another Pakistani official stated that Pakistan "assisted only in terms of authorization of the helicopter flights in our airspace" and the operation was conducted by the United States. He also said that "in any event, we did not want anything to do with such an operation in case something went wrong."[287]
In June, the ISI arrested the owner of a safe house rented to the CIA to observe Osama bin Laden's compound and five CIA informants.[297]
Mark Kelton, then the CIA station chief for Pakistan, alleges that he was poisoned by the ISI in retaliation for the raid, forcing him to leave the country.[298][299]
Several officials who were present in the Situation Room, including the president,[221] told reporters that the code name for bin Laden was "Geronimo". They had watched Leon Panetta, speaking from CIA headquarters, while he narrated the action in Abbottabad. Panetta said, "We have a visual on Geronimo," and later, "Geronimo EKIA"—enemy killed in action.[57] The words of the commander on the ground were, "For God and country, Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo."[300] Officials subsequently explained that each step of the mission was labelled alphabetically in an "Execution Checklist," which is used to ensure all participants in a large operation are kept synchronized with a minimum of radio traffic. "Geronimo" indicated the raiders had reached step "G," the capture or killing of bin Laden.[77] Osama bin Laden was identified as "Jackpot," the general code name for the target of an operation.[300] ABC News reported that otherwise his regular code name was "Cakebread."[64] The New Yorker reported that bin Laden's code name was "Crankshaft."[54]
Many Native Americans were offended that Geronimo, the renowned 19th-century Apache leader, was irrevocably linked with bin Laden. The chairman of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe, the successor to Geronimo's tribe, wrote a letter to Obama asking him to "right this wrong."[301] The president of the Navajo Nation requested that the U.S. government change the code name retroactively.[302] Officials from the National Congress of American Indians said the focus should be on honoring the disproportionately high number of Native Americans who serve in the military, and they had been assured that "Geronimo" was not a code name for bin Laden.[303] The U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs heard testimony on the issue from tribal leaders, while the Defense Department had no comment except to say that no disrespect was intended.[302]
After the death of bin Laden, some officials from the Bush administration, such as former Bush Office of Legal Counsel attorney John Yoo[304][305] and former attorney general Michael Mukasey,[306][307] wrote op-eds stating that the enhanced interrogation techniques they authorized (since legally clarified as torture) yielded the intelligence that later led to locating bin Laden's hideout.[308][309] Mukasey said that the waterboarding of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed caused him to reveal the nickname of bin Laden's courier.[310]
U.S. officials[311] and legislators, including Republican John McCain[312] and Democrat Dianne Feinstein, chairwoman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, countered that those statements were false. They noted that a report by CIA Director Leon Panetta stated that the first mention of the courier's nickname did not come from Mohammed, but rather from another government's interrogation of a suspect who they said they "believe was not tortured".[313]
McCain called on Mukasey to retract his statements:[313]
I have sought further information from the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and they confirm for me that, in fact, the best intelligence gained from a CIA detainee—information describing Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's real role in Al-Qaeda and his true relationship to Osama bin Laden—was obtained through standard, non-coercive means, not through any 'enhanced interrogation technique.'[312]
— John McCain
Panetta had written a letter to McCain on the issue, saying: "Some of the detainees who provided useful information about the facilitator/courier's role had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Whether those techniques were the 'only timely and effective way' to obtain such information is a matter of debate and cannot be established definitively."[313][314] Although some information may have been obtained from detainees who were subjected to torture, Panetta wrote to McCain that:
We first learned about the facilitator/courier's nom de guerre from a detainee not in CIA custody in 2002. It is also important to note that some detainees who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques attempted to provide false or misleading information about the facilitator/courier. These attempts to falsify the facilitator/courier's role were alerting. In the end, no detainee in CIA custody revealed the facilitator/courier's full true name or specific whereabouts. This information was discovered through other intelligence means.[315]
In addition, other U.S. officials state that shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, detainees in CIA secret prisons told interrogators about the courier's pseudonym "al-Kuwaiti" and that when Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was later captured, he only confirmed the courier's pseudonym. After Abu Faraj al-Libbi was captured, he provided false or misleading information: he denied that he knew al-Kuwaiti and he made up another name instead.[21] Also, a group of interrogators asserted that the courier's nickname was not divulged "during torture, but rather several months later, when [detainees] were questioned by interrogators who did not use abusive techniques."[316]
Evidence seized from the compound is said to include ten cell phones, five to ten computers, twelve hard drives, at least 100 computer disks (including thumb drives and DVDs), handwritten notes, documents, weapons, and an assortment of personal items.[317][318] It was described by a senior Pentagon intelligence official as "the single largest collection of senior terrorist materials ever."[319] On November 1, 2017, the CIA released to the public approximately 470,000 files and a copy of bin Laden's diary.[320][321]
Intelligence analysts also studied call detail records from two phone numbers that were found to be sewn into bin Laden's clothing.[317] They helped over the course of several months to apprehend several al-Qaeda members in several countries and to kill several of bin Laden's closest associates by CIA drone attacks in Pakistan.[318]
The material gathered at the compound was stored at the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, where forensic experts analyzed fingerprints, DNA, and other trace evidence left on the material.[317] Copies of the material were provided to other agencies; officials want to preserve a chain of custody in case any of the information is needed as evidence in a future trial.
A special CIA team has been given the responsibility of combing through the digital material and documents removed from the bin Laden compound.[322] The CIA team is working in collaboration with other U.S. government agencies "to triage, catalog and analyze this intelligence."[citation needed]
Bin Laden's youngest wife told Pakistani investigators that the family lived in the feudal village of Chak Shah Muhammad, in the nearby district of Haripur, Pakistan, for two and a half years before moving to Abbottabad in late 2005.[160]
The material seized from the compound contained al-Qaeda's strategy for Afghanistan after America's withdrawal from the country in 2014,[323] as well as thousands of electronic memos and missives that captured conversations between bin Laden and his deputies around the world.[324] It showed that bin Laden stayed in touch with al-Qaeda's established affiliates and sought new alliances with groups such as Boko Haram from Nigeria.[323] According to the material, he sought to reassert control over factions of loosely affiliated jihadists from Yemen to Somalia, as well as independent actors whom he believed had sullied al-Qaeda's reputation and muddied its central message.[324] Bin Laden was worried at times about his personal security and was annoyed that his organization had not utilized the Arab Spring to improve its image.[324] He acted, according to The Washington Post, on the one hand as "chief executive fully engaged in the group's myriad crises, grappling with financial problems, recruitment, rebellious field managers, and sudden staff vacancies resulting from the unrelenting U.S. drone campaign,"[324] and on the other hand as "a hands-on manager who participated in the terrorist group's operational planning and strategic thinking while also giving orders and advice to field operatives scattered worldwide."[324] The material also described Osama bin Laden's relation with Ayman al-Zawahiri and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman.[324]
Seventeen documents seized during the Abbottabad raid, consisting of electronic letters or draft letters dating from September 2006 to April 2011, were released by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point one year and one day after bin Laden's death.[318] and made available at The Washington Post homepage.[325] The documents covered subjects such as the news media in America, affiliate organization, targets, America, security, and the Arab Spring.[326] In the documents, bin Laden said al-Qaeda's strength was limited and therefore suggested that the best way to attack the U.S., which he compared to a tree, "is to concentrate on sawing the trunk."[318] He refused the promotion of Anwar al-Awlaki when this was requested by Nasir al-Wuhayshi, leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. "We here become reassured of the people when they go to the line and get examined there,"[318] bin Laden said. He told al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand operations in the U.S. in the wake of the 2009 Christmas Day bomb plot by writing "We need to extend and develop our operations in America and not keep it limited to blowing up airplanes."[318]
The seized material shed light on al-Qaeda's relationship with Iran, which detained jihadis and their relatives in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, including members of bin Laden's family. Al-Qaeda's relationship with Iran was, according to the Combating Terrorism Center, an "unpleasant byproduct of necessity, fueled by mutual distrust and antagonism."[318] An explicit reference to any institutional support from Pakistan for al-Qaeda wasn't mentioned in the documents; instead, bin Laden instructed his family members how to avoid detection so that members of Pakistani intelligence couldn't track them to find him.[327] According to the seized material, former commander of the international forces in Afghanistan David Petraeus and US President Barack Obama should be assassinated during any of their visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan, if there was an opportunity to do so. Bin Laden opined that U.S. Vice President Joe Biden should not be a target because "Biden is totally unprepared for that post [of president], which will lead the US into a crisis."[327] Bin Laden was also against one-person suicide attacks and was of the opinion that at least two persons should undertake these attacks instead.[327] He planned to reform in a way so that al-Qaeda's central leadership would have a greater say in the naming of the al-Qaeda branch leaders and their deputies. He expressed his opinion that killing Muslims has weakened his organization and not helped al-Qaeda, writing that it "cost the mujahedeen no small amount of sympathy among Muslims. The enemy has exploited the mistakes of the mujahedeen to mar their image among the masses."[328]
The United States Department of Justice released a further eleven documents in March 2015.[329] The documents were part of the trial against Abid Naseer, who was convicted of plotting to bomb a Manchester shopping mall in 2009.[330] They included letters to and from Osama bin Laden in the year before his death, and showed the extent of the damage the CIA drone program had done to Al-Qaeda.[331]
In addition to information and data recovered that were of intelligence interest, the documents and computer items also contained personal files, including family correspondence and a large stash of pornography. US officials have refused to characterize the type of pornography found other than to say that it was "modern" in nature.[332][333][334] The most likely explanation for the pornography on bin Laden's hard drive is that he bought a poorly refurbished computer since bin Laden did not have internet access and the computer was also infected with viruses.[335]
The tail section of the secret helicopter survived demolition and lay just outside the compound wall.[336] Pakistani security forces put up a cloth barrier at first light to hide the wreckage.[337] Later, a tractor hauled it away hidden under a tarp.[338] Journalists obtained photographs that revealed the previously undisclosed stealth technology. Aviation Week said the helicopter appeared to be a significantly modified MH-60 Black Hawk. Serial numbers found at the scene were consistent with an MH-60 built in 2009.[339] Its performance during the operation confirmed that a stealth helicopter could evade detection in a militarily sensitive, densely populated area. Photos showed that the Black Hawk's tail had stealth-configured shapes on the boom and the fairings, swept stabilizers and a "hubcap" over the noise-reducing five- or six-blade tail rotor. It appeared to have a silver-loaded infrared suppression finish similar to some V-22 Ospreys.[336] The crash of the Black Hawk may have been, at least in part, caused by the aerodynamic deficiencies introduced to the airframe by the stealth technology add-ons[340] (an unrelated possible cause of the crash was that the rehearsal mock-ups of the compound had used a chain-link fence rather than a solid wall for the perimeter and thus had not reproduced the airflows that the helicopter would face).[53]
The U.S. requested return of the wreckage and the Chinese government also expressed interest, according to Pakistani officials. Pakistan had custody of the wreckage for over two weeks before its return was secured by U.S. Senator John Kerry.[341][342] Experts disagreed as to how much information could have been gleaned from the tail fragment. Stealth technology was already operational on several fixed-wing aircraft and the cancelled RAH-66 Comanche helicopter; the modified Black Hawk was the first confirmed operational "stealth helicopter." It is likely that the most valuable information obtainable from the wreckage was the composition of the radar-absorbing paint used on the tail section.[336][343] Local children were seen picking up pieces of the wreckage and selling them as souvenirs.[156] In August 2011, Fox News reported that Pakistan had allowed Chinese scientists to examine the helicopter's tail section and were especially interested in its radar-absorbing paint.[344] Pakistan and the PRC denied these claims.[345]
The leaks were so voluminous, according to a book by The New York Times reporter David Sanger, that then-secretary of Defense Robert Gates told the White House that officials should "shut the fuck up" about the raid.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link){{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)This effort included purging the combatant command's system of all records related to the operation and providing these records to another Government Agency.
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