Zhou Enlai ( chino :周恩来; pinyin : Zhōu Ēnlái ; Wade–Giles : Chou 1 Ên 1 -lai 2 ; 5 de marzo de 1898 - 8 de enero de 1976) fue un estadista, diplomático y revolucionario chino que se desempeñó como primer primer ministro de la República Popular China desde septiembre de 1954 hasta su muerte en enero de 1976. Zhou sirvió bajo el presidente Mao Zedong y ayudó al Partido Comunista a llegar al poder, ayudando más tarde a consolidar su control, formar su política exterior y desarrollar la economía china .
Como diplomático, Zhou se desempeñó como ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de China entre 1949 y 1958. Abogando por la coexistencia pacífica con Occidente después de la Guerra de Corea , participó en la Conferencia de Ginebra de 1954 y la Conferencia de Bandung de 1955 y ayudó a orquestar la visita de Richard Nixon a China en 1972. Ayudó a diseñar políticas con respecto a las disputas con los Estados Unidos, Taiwán, la Unión Soviética ( después de 1960 ), India, Corea y Vietnam.
Zhou sobrevivió a las purgas de otros altos funcionarios durante la Revolución Cultural . Si bien Mao dedicó la mayor parte de sus últimos años a la lucha política y al trabajo ideológico, Zhou fue una de las principales fuerzas impulsoras de los asuntos de Estado durante gran parte de la Revolución Cultural. Sus intentos de mitigar el daño causado por los Guardias Rojos y sus esfuerzos por proteger a otros de su ira lo hicieron inmensamente popular en las últimas etapas de la Revolución Cultural.
La salud de Mao comenzó a declinar en 1971, y Lin Biao cayó en desgracia y luego murió en un accidente aéreo . En medio de estos eventos, Zhou fue elegido para el puesto vacante de Primer Vicepresidente del Partido Comunista por el X Comité Central en 1973 y, por lo tanto, designado como sucesor de Mao (la tercera persona en ser designada así después de Liu Shaoqi y Lin Biao), pero aún luchaba internamente contra la Banda de los Cuatro por el liderazgo de China. Su última aparición pública importante fue en la primera reunión del IV Congreso Nacional del Pueblo el 13 de enero de 1975, donde presentó el informe de trabajo del gobierno. Luego desapareció de la vista del público para recibir tratamiento médico y murió un año después. La masiva manifestación pública de dolor que su muerte provocó en Beijing se convirtió en ira contra la Banda de los Cuatro, lo que llevó al Incidente de Tiananmen de 1976 . Aunque Zhou fue sucedido por Hua Guofeng como primer vicepresidente y sucesor designado, el aliado de Zhou, Deng Xiaoping, fue capaz de superar políticamente a la Banda de los Cuatro y tomó el lugar de Hua como líder supremo en 1978.
Zhou Enlai nació en Huai'an , provincia de Jiangsu , el 5 de marzo de 1898, el primer hijo de su rama de la familia Zhou. La familia Zhou era originaria de Shaoxing , en la provincia de Zhejiang . Durante la última parte de la dinastía Qing , Shaoxing era famosa por ser el hogar de familias como la de Zhou, cuyos miembros trabajaban como "empleados" del gobierno (師爷, shiye) generación tras generación. [1] Para ascender en la función pública, los hombres de estas familias a menudo tenían que ser transferidos, y en los últimos años de la dinastía Qing, la rama de la familia de Zhou Enlai se mudó a Huai'an. Sin embargo, incluso después de la mudanza, la familia continuó considerando a Shaoxing como su hogar ancestral. [2]
El abuelo de Zhou, Zhou Panlong, y su tío abuelo, Zhou Jun'ang, fueron los primeros miembros de la familia en mudarse a Huai'an. Al parecer, Panlong aprobó los exámenes provinciales y, posteriormente, Zhou Enlai afirmó que Panlong se desempeñó como magistrado que gobernaba el condado de Huai'an. [3] El padre de Zhou, Zhou Yineng, fue el segundo de los cuatro hijos de Zhou Panlong. La madre biológica de Zhou, de apellido Wan, era hija de un destacado funcionario de Jiangsu. [nota 1]
Como muchos otros, la fortuna económica de la gran familia de funcionarios académicos de Zhou se vio diezmada por una gran recesión económica que sufrió China a finales del siglo XIX. Zhou Yineng tenía reputación de ser honesto, gentil, inteligente y preocupado por los demás, pero también era considerado "débil" y "falto de disciplina y determinación". No tuvo éxito en su vida personal y vagó por China desempeñando diversas ocupaciones, trabajando en Pekín , Shandong , Anhui , Shenyang , Mongolia Interior y Sichuan . Zhou Enlai más tarde recordó que su padre siempre estaba lejos de casa y, en general, no podía mantener a su familia. [5]
Poco después de nacer, Zhou Enlai fue adoptado por el hermano menor de su padre, Zhou Yigan, que estaba enfermo de tuberculosis. Al parecer, la adopción se organizó porque la familia temía que Yigan muriera sin un heredero. [nota 2] Zhou Yigan murió poco después de la adopción, y Zhou Enlai fue criado por la viuda de Yigan, cuyo apellido era Chen. Madame Chen también provenía de una familia de eruditos y recibió una educación literaria tradicional. Según el propio relato de Zhou, era muy cercano a su madre adoptiva y adquirió su interés duradero en la literatura y la ópera chinas de ella. Madame Chen le enseñó a Zhou a leer y escribir a una edad temprana, y Zhou afirmó más tarde haber leído la famosa novela vernácula Viaje al Oeste a la edad de seis años. [6] A la edad de ocho años, estaba leyendo otras novelas tradicionales chinas, incluyendo La orilla del agua , El romance de los tres reinos y El sueño del pabellón rojo . [4]
La madre biológica de Zhou, Wan, murió en 1907 cuando Zhou tenía 9 años, y su madre adoptiva, Chen, en 1908, cuando Zhou tenía 10. El padre de Zhou estaba trabajando en Hubei, lejos de Jiangsu, por lo que Zhou y sus dos hermanos menores regresaron a Huai'an y vivieron con el hermano menor restante de su padre, Yikui, durante los siguientes dos años. [7] En 1910, el tío de Zhou, Yigeng, el hermano mayor de su padre, se ofreció a cuidar de Zhou. La familia en Huai'an estuvo de acuerdo, y Zhou fue enviado a quedarse con su tío en Manchuria en Fengtian (ahora Shenyang ), donde Zhou Yigeng trabajaba en una oficina gubernamental. [nota 3]
En Fengtian, Zhou asistió a la Academia Modelo de Dongguan, una escuela de estilo moderno. Su educación anterior consistió completamente en educación en casa. Además de nuevas materias como inglés y ciencias, Zhou también estuvo expuesto a los escritos de reformadores y radicales como Liang Qichao , Kang Youwei , Chen Tianhua , Zou Rong y Zhang Binglin . [8] [9] A la edad de catorce años, Zhou declaró que su motivación para seguir la educación era "convertirse en un gran hombre que asumirá las pesadas responsabilidades del país en el futuro". [10] En 1913, el tío de Zhou fue transferido a Tianjin, donde Zhou ingresó en la famosa Escuela Secundaria Nankai .
La escuela secundaria Nankai fue fundada por Yan Xiu , un destacado erudito y filántropo, y dirigida por Zhang Boling , uno de los educadores chinos más importantes del siglo XX. [11] Los métodos de enseñanza de Nankai eran inusuales para los estándares chinos contemporáneos. Cuando Zhou comenzó a asistir, había adoptado el modelo educativo utilizado en la Academia Phillips en los Estados Unidos. [12] La reputación de la escuela, con su rutina diaria "altamente disciplinada" y su "estricto código moral", [13] atrajo a muchos estudiantes que más tarde se hicieron destacados en la vida pública. Los amigos y compañeros de clase de Zhou allí iban desde Ma Jun (uno de los primeros líderes comunistas ejecutado en 1927) hasta KC Wu (más tarde alcalde de Shanghái y gobernador de Taiwán bajo el partido nacionalista). [14] Los talentos de Zhou también atrajeron la atención de Yan Xiu y Zhang Boling. Yan, en particular, tenía una gran opinión de Zhou, ayudándolo a pagar sus estudios en Japón y más tarde en Francia. [15]
Yan quedó tan impresionado con Zhou que lo animó a casarse con su hija, pero Zhou se negó. Zhou más tarde expresó las razones de su decisión de no casar a la hija de Yan con su compañero de clase, Zhang Honghao. Zhou dijo que rechazó el matrimonio porque temía que sus perspectivas financieras no fueran prometedoras y que Yan, como su suegro, dominara su vida más adelante. [16]
Zhou se desempeñó bien en sus estudios en Nankai; se destacó en chino, ganó varios premios en el club de oratoria de la escuela y se convirtió en editor del periódico escolar en su último año. Zhou también fue muy activo en la actuación y producción de dramas y obras de teatro en Nankai; muchos estudiantes que no lo conocían de otra manera lo conocieron a través de su actuación. [17] Nankai conserva una serie de ensayos y artículos escritos por Zhou en esta época, y estos reflejan la disciplina, la formación y la preocupación por el país que los fundadores de Nankai intentaron inculcar a sus estudiantes. En la décima ceremonia de graduación de la escuela en junio de 1917, Zhou fue uno de los cinco estudiantes graduados que fueron homenajeados en la ceremonia, y uno de los dos estudiantes que dieron el discurso de despedida. [18]
Cuando se graduó en Nankai, las enseñanzas de Zhang Boling sobre el gong (espíritu público) y el neng (habilidad) le habían causado una gran impresión. Su participación en debates y representaciones teatrales contribuyó a su elocuencia y sus habilidades de persuasión. Zhou dejó Nankai con un gran deseo de dedicarse al servicio público y adquirir las habilidades necesarias para ello. [19]
En julio de 1917, Zhou viajó a Japón siguiendo a muchos de sus compañeros de clase para continuar sus estudios. Durante los dos años que pasó en Japón, pasó la mayor parte del tiempo en la Escuela Preparatoria Superior de Asia Oriental, una escuela de idiomas para estudiantes chinos. Sus tíos y, al parecer, también el fundador de Nankai, Yan Xiu, financiaron sus estudios, pero sus fondos eran limitados; durante este período, Japón sufrió una severa inflación. [20] En un principio, Zhou planeó ganar una de las becas ofrecidas por el gobierno chino; sin embargo, estas becas exigían que los estudiantes chinos aprobaran exámenes de ingreso en universidades japonesas. Zhou se presentó a exámenes de ingreso en al menos dos escuelas, pero no logró ser admitido. [21] Las ansiedades que se decían de Zhou se vieron agravadas por la muerte de su tío, Zhou Yikui, su incapacidad para dominar el japonés y el agudo chovinismo cultural japonés que discriminaba a los chinos. Cuando Zhou regresó a China en la primavera de 1919, estaba profundamente desencantado con la cultura japonesa, rechazaba la idea de que el modelo político japonés fuera relevante para China y desdeñaba los valores de elitismo y militarismo que observaba. [22]
Los diarios y cartas de Zhou de su tiempo en Tokio muestran un profundo interés en la política y los acontecimientos actuales, en particular, la Revolución rusa de 1917 y las nuevas políticas de los bolcheviques. Comenzó a leer con avidez la revista progresista y de izquierdas de Chen Duxiu , New Youth . [23] Leyó las primeras obras japonesas sobre Marx, y se ha afirmado que incluso asistió a las conferencias de Kawakami Hajime en la Universidad de Kioto. Kawakami fue una figura importante en la historia temprana del marxismo japonés, y sus traducciones y artículos influyeron en una generación de comunistas chinos. [24] Sin embargo, ahora parece poco probable que Zhou lo conociera o escuchara alguna de sus conferencias. [25] Los diarios de Zhou también muestran su interés en las protestas estudiantiles chinas en oposición al Acuerdo de Defensa Conjunta Sino-Japonés en mayo de 1918, pero no participó activamente en ellas ni regresó a China como parte del "Movimiento de Retorno a Casa". [26] Su papel activo en los movimientos políticos comenzó después de su regreso a China.
Zhou regresó a Tianjin en algún momento de la primavera de 1919. Los historiadores no están de acuerdo sobre su participación en el Movimiento del Cuatro de Mayo (de mayo a junio de 1919). La biografía china "oficial" de Zhou afirma que fue un líder de las protestas estudiantiles de Tianjin en el Movimiento del Cuatro de Mayo, [27] pero muchos académicos modernos creen que es muy poco probable que Zhou participara en absoluto, basándose en la total falta de evidencia directa entre los registros sobrevivientes de la época. [27] [28] Sin embargo, en julio de 1919, Zhou se convirtió en editor del Boletín de la Unión de Estudiantes de Tianjin, aparentemente a petición de su compañero de clase de Nankai, Ma Jun, uno de los fundadores de la Unión. [29] Durante su breve existencia desde julio de 1919 hasta principios de 1920, el Boletín fue ampliamente leído por grupos estudiantiles de todo el país y suprimido en al menos una ocasión por el gobierno nacional por ser "perjudicial para la seguridad pública y el orden social". [30]
Cuando Nankai se convirtió en universidad en agosto de 1919, Zhou estaba en la primera clase, pero era un activista a tiempo completo. Sus actividades políticas continuaron expandiéndose y en septiembre, él y varios otros estudiantes acordaron establecer la "Sociedad del Despertar", un grupo pequeño, que nunca superó los 25 miembros. [31] Al explicar los objetivos y el propósito de la Sociedad del Despertar, Zhou declaró que "todo lo que sea incompatible con el progreso en los tiempos actuales, como el militarismo, la burguesía, los señores del partido, los burócratas, la desigualdad entre hombres y mujeres, las ideas obstinadas, la moral obsoleta, la vieja ética... debe ser abolido o reformado", y afirmó que el propósito de la Sociedad era difundir esta conciencia entre el pueblo chino. Fue en esta sociedad donde Zhou conoció a su futura esposa, Deng Yingchao . [32] En algunos aspectos, la Sociedad del Despertar se parecía al grupo de estudio marxista clandestino de la Universidad de Pekín encabezado por Li Dazhao , con los miembros del grupo usando números en lugar de nombres para "mantener el secreto". (Zhou era "el número cinco", un seudónimo que continuó usando en años posteriores.) [33] De hecho, inmediatamente después de que se estableció el grupo, éste invitó a Li Dazhao a dar una conferencia sobre marxismo.
Zhou asumió un papel activo más destacado en las actividades políticas durante los meses siguientes. [34] La mayor de estas actividades fueron manifestaciones en apoyo de un boicot nacional a los productos japoneses. A medida que el boicot se hizo más efectivo, el gobierno nacional, bajo presión de Japón, intentó reprimirlo. El 23 de enero de 1920, una confrontación por las actividades de boicot en Tianjin condujo al arresto de varias personas, incluidos varios miembros de la Sociedad del Despertar, y el 29 de enero Zhou encabezó una marcha hacia la Oficina del Gobernador en Tianjin para presentar una petición pidiendo la liberación de los arrestados. Zhou y otros tres líderes fueron arrestados. Los arrestados estuvieron detenidos durante más de seis meses; durante su detención, Zhou supuestamente organizó debates sobre el marxismo. [35] En su juicio en julio, Zhou y otros seis fueron condenados a dos meses; el resto fueron declarados inocentes. Todos fueron liberados de inmediato porque ya habían estado detenidos durante más de seis meses.
Después de la liberación de Zhou, él y la Sociedad del Despertar se reunieron con varias organizaciones de Beijing y acordaron formar una "Federación Reformista"; durante estas actividades, Zhou se familiarizó más con Li Dazhao y conoció a Zhang Shenfu, quien era el contacto entre Li en Beijing y Chen Duxiu en Shanghai. Ambos hombres estaban organizando células comunistas clandestinas en cooperación con Grigori Voitinsky , [36] un agente de la Comintern, pero Zhou aparentemente no conoció a Voitinsky en este momento.
Poco después de su liberación, Zhou decidió ir a estudiar a Europa (fue expulsado de la Universidad de Nankai durante su detención). Aunque el dinero era un problema, recibió una beca de Yan Xiu . [37] Para obtener una mayor financiación, se acercó con éxito a un periódico de Tianjin, Yishi bao (literalmente, Periódico de Actualidad), para trabajar como "corresponsal especial" en Europa. Zhou salió de Shanghái hacia Europa el 7 de noviembre de 1920 con un grupo de 196 estudiantes que trabajaban para estudiar, incluidos amigos de Nankai y Tianjin. [38]
Las experiencias de Zhou después del incidente del 4 de mayo parecen haber sido cruciales para su carrera comunista. [ Aclaración necesaria ] Los amigos de Zhou en la Sociedad del Despertar se vieron afectados de manera similar. 15 de los miembros del grupo se volvieron comunistas durante al menos un tiempo, y el grupo siguió siendo unido más adelante. Zhou y otros seis miembros del grupo viajaron a Europa en los siguientes dos años, y Zhou finalmente se casó con Deng Yingchao , el miembro más joven del grupo.
El grupo de Zhou llegó a Marsella el 13 de diciembre de 1920. A diferencia de la mayoría de los estudiantes chinos que iban a Europa en programas de trabajo y estudio, la beca de Zhou y su puesto en Yishi Bao le permitieron estar bien provisto y no tener que trabajar durante su estancia. Gracias a su situación económica, pudo dedicarse a tiempo completo a actividades revolucionarias. [38] En una carta a su primo del 30 de enero de 1921, Zhou dijo que sus objetivos en Europa eran estudiar las condiciones sociales en países extranjeros y sus métodos para resolver los problemas sociales, con el fin de aplicar esas lecciones en China tras su regreso. En la misma carta, Zhou le dijo a su primo que, en lo que respecta a su adopción de una ideología específica, "todavía tengo que decidirme". [39]
Durante su estancia en Europa, Zhou, también conocido como John Knight, estudió los diferentes enfoques adoptados por las distintas naciones europeas para resolver los conflictos de clases. En enero de 1921, en Londres, Zhou fue testigo de una gran huelga de mineros y escribió una serie de artículos para el periódico Yishi bao (que en general simpatizaba con los mineros) en los que examinaba el conflicto entre trabajadores y empleadores y su resolución. Tras cinco semanas en Londres, se trasladó a París, donde había un gran interés por la Revolución de Octubre de 1917 en Rusia. En una carta a su primo, Zhou identificó dos grandes caminos de reforma para China: la "reforma gradual" (como en Inglaterra) o los "medios violentos" (como en Rusia). Zhou escribió que "no tengo preferencia ni por el método ruso ni por el británico... preferiría algo intermedio, en lugar de uno de estos dos extremos". [39]
Zhou, que seguía interesado en los programas académicos, viajó a Gran Bretaña en enero de 1921 para visitar la Universidad de Edimburgo . Preocupado por los problemas financieros y los requisitos lingüísticos, no se matriculó y regresó a Francia a finales de enero. No hay registros de que Zhou hubiera entrado en ningún programa académico en Francia. En la primavera de 1921, se unió a una célula comunista china. [nota 4] Zhou fue reclutado por Zhang Shenfu , a quien había conocido en agosto del año anterior en relación con Li Dazhao . También conocía a Zhang a través de la esposa de Zhang, Liu Qingyang, miembro de la Sociedad del Despertar. En esta época, Zhou ha sido retratado a veces como inseguro en su política, [40] pero su rápido paso al comunismo sugiere lo contrario. [nota 5]
La célula a la que pertenecía Zhou tenía su base en París; [41] además de Zhou, Zhang y Liu, incluía a otros dos estudiantes, Zhao Shiyan y Chen Gongpei. Durante los meses siguientes, este grupo acabó formando una organización unida con un grupo de radicales chinos de Hunan, que vivían en Montargis, al sur de París. Este grupo incluía a figuras más destacadas como Cai Hesen , Li Lisan , Chen Yi , Nie Rongzhen , Deng Xiaoping y también Guo Longzhen, otro miembro de la Sociedad del Despertar. A diferencia de Zhou, la mayoría de los estudiantes de este grupo participaban en el programa de trabajo y estudio. Una serie de conflictos con los administradores chinos del programa por los bajos salarios y las malas condiciones de trabajo dieron lugar a que más de cien estudiantes ocuparan las oficinas del programa en el Instituto Sino-Francés de Lyon en septiembre de 1921. Los estudiantes, incluidas varias personas del grupo de Montargis, fueron arrestados y deportados. Zhou aparentemente no era uno de los estudiantes ocupantes y permaneció en Francia hasta febrero o marzo de 1922, cuando se mudó con Zhang y Liu de París a Berlín. El traslado de Zhou a Berlín se debió quizás a que la atmósfera política relativamente "indulgente" en Berlín la hacía más favorable como base para la organización europea en general. [42] Además, el Secretariado de Europa Occidental del Comintern estaba ubicado en Berlín y está claro que Zhou tenía importantes conexiones con el Comintern, aunque la naturaleza de estas es discutida. [43] Después de trasladar las operaciones a Alemania, Zhou viajó regularmente entre París y Berlín.
Zhou participó en el Movimiento de Trabajo Diligente-Estudio Frugal . [44] : 37
Zhou regresó a París en junio de 1922, donde fue uno de los veintidós participantes presentes en la organización de la Liga de la Juventud Comunista de China , establecida como la rama europea del Partido Comunista Chino. [nota 6] Zhou ayudó a redactar la carta del partido y fue elegido para el comité ejecutivo de tres miembros como director de propaganda. [45] También escribió y ayudó a editar la revista del partido, Shaonian (Juventud), más tarde rebautizada como Chiguang (Luz roja). Fue en su calidad de editor general de esta revista que conoció por primera vez a Deng Xiaoping , de solo diecisiete años, a quien Zhou contrató para operar una máquina mimeográfica (copiadora). [46] El partido pasó por varias reorganizaciones y cambios de nombre, pero Zhou siguió siendo un miembro clave del grupo durante su estancia en Europa. Otras actividades importantes que realizó Zhou incluyeron el reclutamiento y transporte de estudiantes para la Universidad de los Trabajadores del Este en Moscú y el establecimiento de la rama europea del Partido Nacionalista Chino ( Kuomintang o KMT).
En junio de 1923, el Tercer Congreso del Partido Comunista Chino aceptó las instrucciones de la Comintern de aliarse con el KMT, dirigido en ese momento por Sun Yat-sen . Estas instrucciones exigían que los miembros del PCCh se unieran al Partido Nacionalista como "individuos", aunque conservando su asociación con el PCCh. Después de unirse al KMT, trabajarían para liderarlo y dirigirlo, transformándolo en un vehículo de la revolución. En pocos años, esta estrategia se convertiría en la fuente de un serio conflicto entre el KMT y el PCCh. [47]
Además de unirse al KMT, Zhou ayudó a organizar la fundación de la rama europea del Partido Nacionalista en noviembre de 1923. Bajo la influencia de Zhou, la mayoría de los funcionarios de la rama europea eran de hecho comunistas. Los amplios contactos y las relaciones personales que Zhou estableció durante este período fueron fundamentales para su carrera. Líderes importantes del partido, como Zhu De y Nie Rongzhen , fueron admitidos por primera vez en el partido por Zhou.
En 1924, la alianza soviético-nacionalista se estaba expandiendo rápidamente y Zhou fue convocado de regreso a China para continuar su trabajo. Probablemente abandonó Europa a fines de julio de 1924 y regresó a China como uno de los miembros más importantes del Partido Comunista Chino en Europa.
Zhou regresó a China a fines de agosto o principios de septiembre de 1924 para unirse al Departamento Político de la Academia Militar de Whampoa , probablemente a través de la influencia de Zhang Shenfu, quien había trabajado allí anteriormente. [48] Zhou era el principal oficial político de Whampoa. [49] : 55 Mientras servía en Whampoa, Zhou también fue nombrado secretario del Partido Comunista de Guangdong-Guangxi y sirvió como representante del PCCh con el rango de mayor general. [50]
La isla de Whampoa, a diez millas río abajo de Guangzhou, estaba en el corazón de la alianza entre el Partido Nacionalista y la Unión Soviética. Concebida como centro de entrenamiento del Ejército del Partido Nacionalista, debía proporcionar la base militar desde la que los nacionalistas lanzarían su campaña para unificar China, que estaba dividida en docenas de satrapías militares . Desde sus inicios, la escuela fue financiada, armada y parcialmente dotada de personal por los soviéticos. [51]
El Departamento Político, donde trabajaba Zhou, era responsable del adoctrinamiento y control político. Como resultado, Zhou era una figura destacada en la mayoría de las reuniones de la Academia, a menudo dirigiéndose a la escuela inmediatamente después del comandante Chiang Kai-shek . Fue extremadamente influyente en el establecimiento del sistema de departamento político/representante del partido (comisario) que fue adoptado en las fuerzas armadas nacionalistas en 1925. [52]
Al mismo tiempo que fue nombrado en Whampoa, Zhou se convirtió en secretario del Comité Provincial de Guangdong del Partido Comunista y, en algún momento, en miembro de la Sección Militar del Comité Provincial. [nota 8] Zhou extendió vigorosamente la influencia comunista en la academia. Pronto hizo arreglos para que otros comunistas prominentes se unieran al Departamento Político, incluidos Chen Yi , Nie Rongzhen , Yun Daiying y Xiong Xiong. [53] Zhou jugó un papel importante en el establecimiento de la Asociación de Jóvenes Soldados, un grupo juvenil dominado por los comunistas, y Sparks, un grupo de fachada comunista de corta duración. De este modo, reclutó a numerosos nuevos miembros del partido comunista de las filas de cadetes y, finalmente, estableció una rama encubierta del Partido Comunista en la academia para dirigir a los nuevos miembros. [54] Cuando los nacionalistas, preocupados por el creciente número de miembros y organizaciones comunistas en Whampoa, establecieron una "Sociedad para el Sun Yat-senismo ", Zhou intentó sofocarla; el conflicto entre estos grupos de estudiantes sentó las bases para la expulsión de Zhou de la academia. [55]
Zhou participó en dos operaciones militares llevadas a cabo por el régimen nacionalista en 1925, más tarde conocidas como la primera y la segunda Expedición Oriental. La primera fue en enero de 1925, cuando Chen Jiongming , un importante líder militar cantonés previamente expulsado de Cantón por Sun Yat-sen, intentó recuperar Cantón. La campaña del régimen nacionalista contra Chen consistió en fuerzas del Ejército de Guangdong bajo el mando de Xu Chongzhix, y dos regimientos de entrenamiento del Ejército del Partido Nacionalista, dirigidos por Chiang Kai-shek y atendidos por oficiales y cadetes de la Academia. [56] [nota 9] La lucha duró hasta mayo de 1925, con la derrota, pero no la destrucción, de las fuerzas de Chen. [57] Zhou acompañó a los cadetes Whampoa en la expedición como oficial político.
Cuando Chen se reagrupó y atacó Guangzhou nuevamente en septiembre de 1925, los nacionalistas lanzaron una segunda expedición. Para entonces, las fuerzas nacionalistas se habían reorganizado en cinco cuerpos (o ejércitos) y habían adoptado el sistema de comisarios con departamentos políticos y representantes del partido nacionalista en la mayoría de las divisiones. El Primer Cuerpo, formado por el Ejército del Partido Nacionalista, estaba dirigido por graduados de Whampoa y comandado por Chiang Kai-shek, quien nombró personalmente a Zhou director del Departamento Político del Primer Cuerpo. [58] Poco después, el Comité Ejecutivo Central del Partido Nacionalista nombró a Zhou representante del partido del Partido Nacionalista, convirtiéndolo en comisario jefe del Primer Cuerpo. [59] La primera gran batalla de la expedición vio la captura de la base de Chen en Huizhou el 15 de octubre. Shantou fue tomada el 6 de noviembre y, a fines de 1925, los nacionalistas controlaban toda la provincia de Guangdong.
El nombramiento de Zhou como comisario jefe del Primer Cuerpo le permitió nombrar a comunistas como comisarios en cuatro de las cinco divisiones del Cuerpo. [60] Tras la conclusión de la Expedición, Zhou fue nombrado comisionado especial para el Distrito del Río Este, lo que le colocó en control administrativo temporal de varios condados; aparentemente utilizó esta oportunidad para establecer una rama del partido comunista en Shantou y fortalecer el control del PCCh sobre los sindicatos locales. [61] Esto marcó el punto culminante del tiempo de Zhou en Whampoa.
En términos personales, 1925 también fue un año importante para Zhou. Zhou había mantenido contacto con Deng Yingchao , a quien había conocido en la Sociedad del Despertar mientras estuvo en Tianjin; y, en enero de 1925, Zhou solicitó y recibió permiso de las autoridades del PCCh para casarse con Deng. Los dos se casaron en Guangzhou el 8 de agosto de 1925. [62]
El trabajo de Zhou en Whampoa llegó a su fin con el Incidente del Buque de Guerra Zhongshan del 20 de marzo de 1926, en el que un cañonero con una tripulación mayoritariamente comunista se trasladó de Whampoa a Cantón sin el conocimiento ni la aprobación de Chiang. Este suceso llevó a que Chiang excluyera a los comunistas de la academia en mayo de 1926 y a la destitución de numerosos comunistas de altos cargos en el Partido Nacionalista. En sus memorias, Nie Rongzhen sugirió que el cañonero se había trasladado en protesta por el (breve) arresto de Zhou Enlai. [54]
El tiempo que Zhou pasó en Whampoa fue un período importante en su carrera. Su trabajo pionero como oficial político en el ejército lo convirtió en un importante experto del Partido Comunista en esta área clave; gran parte de su carrera posterior se centró en el ámbito militar. El trabajo de Zhou en la Sección Militar del Comité Regional de Guangdong del PCCh fue un ejemplo típico de sus actividades encubiertas en ese período. La Sección era un grupo secreto que constaba de tres miembros del Comité Central Provincial y fue el primero en ser responsable de organizar y dirigir los núcleos del PCCh en el propio ejército. Estos núcleos, organizados a nivel de regimiento y superior, eran "ilegales", lo que significa que se formaron sin el conocimiento o la autorización nacionalistas. La Sección también fue responsable de organizar núcleos similares en otros grupos armados, incluidas sociedades secretas y servicios clave como ferrocarriles y vías navegables. Zhou realizó un trabajo extenso en estas áreas hasta la separación final de los partidos nacionalista y comunista y el fin de la alianza soviético-nacionalista en 1927. [63]
Las actividades de Zhou inmediatamente después de su destitución de sus puestos en Whampoa son inciertas. Un biógrafo anterior afirma que Chiang Kai-shek puso a Zhou a cargo de "un centro de entrenamiento avanzado para los miembros del PCCh y comisarios retirados del ejército". [64] Fuentes comunistas chinas más recientes afirman que Zhou tuvo un papel importante en ese momento al asegurar el control comunista del Regimiento Independiente de Ye Ting . El regimiento y Ye Ting más tarde desempeñaron un papel destacado en la primera acción militar importante de los comunistas, la Rebelión de Nanchang . [54]
En julio de 1926, los nacionalistas comenzaron la Expedición del Norte , un intento militar masivo de unificar China. La Expedición estaba dirigida por Chiang Kai-shek y el Ejército Nacional Revolucionario (NRA), una amalgama de fuerzas militares anteriores con una guía significativa de asesores militares rusos y numerosos comunistas como comandantes y oficiales políticos. Con los primeros éxitos de la Expedición, pronto hubo una carrera entre Chiang Kai-shek, que lideraba el "ala derecha" del Partido Nacionalista, y los comunistas, que competían dentro del "ala izquierda" de los nacionalistas, por el control de las principales ciudades del sur, como Nanjing y Shanghái. En este punto, la parte china de Shanghái estaba controlada por Sun Chuanfang , uno de los militaristas que estaban en la mira de la Expedición del Norte. Distraído por los combates con el NRA y las deserciones de su ejército, Sun redujo sus fuerzas en Shanghai, y los comunistas, cuya sede del partido estaba situada en Shanghai, hicieron tres intentos de tomar el control de la ciudad, más tarde llamados "los tres levantamientos de Shanghai", en octubre de 1926, febrero de 1927 y marzo de 1927.
Zhou fue transferido a Shanghái para ayudar en estas actividades, probablemente a fines de 1926. Parece que no estuvo presente en el primer levantamiento del 23 y 24 de octubre, [65] pero ciertamente estuvo en Shanghái en diciembre de 1926. Los primeros relatos atribuyen a Zhou actividades de organización laboral en Shanghái después de su llegada o, de manera más creíble, trabajar para "fortalecer el adoctrinamiento de los trabajadores políticos en los sindicatos y contrabandear armas para los huelguistas". [66] Los informes de que Zhou "organizó" u "ordenó" el segundo y tercer levantamientos del 20 de febrero y el 21 de marzo exageran su papel. Las decisiones importantes durante este período fueron tomadas por el líder comunista en Shanghái, Chen Duxiu , el secretario general del Partido, con un comité especial de ocho funcionarios del partido que coordinaban las acciones comunistas. El comité también consultó estrechamente sobre las decisiones con los representantes del Comintern en Shanghái, encabezados por Grigori Voitinsky . [67] La documentación parcial disponible para este período muestra que Zhou encabezó la Comisión Militar del Comité Central del Partido Comunista en Shanghái. [68] Participó en las acciones de febrero y marzo, pero no fue la mano guía en ninguno de los dos eventos, sino que trabajó con AP Appen, el asesor militar soviético del Comité Central, entrenando a los piquetes de la Unión General del Trabajo, la organización laboral controlada por los comunistas en Shanghái. También trabajó para hacer más eficaces los escuadrones de mano dura de los sindicatos cuando los comunistas declararon un "Terror Rojo" después del levantamiento fallido de febrero; esta acción resultó en el asesinato de veinte figuras "antisindicales" y el secuestro, golpiza e intimidación de otras personas asociadas con actividades antisindicales. [69]
El tercer levantamiento comunista en Shanghái tuvo lugar entre el 20 y el 21 de marzo. Aproximadamente 600.000 trabajadores amotinados cortaron las líneas eléctricas y telefónicas y tomaron la oficina de correos, la sede de la policía y las estaciones de tren de la ciudad, a menudo después de duros combates. Durante este levantamiento, los insurrectos recibieron órdenes estrictas de no hacer daño a los extranjeros, las cuales obedecieron. Las fuerzas de Sun Chuanfang se retiraron y el levantamiento tuvo éxito, a pesar del reducido número de fuerzas armadas disponibles. Las primeras tropas nacionalistas entraron en la ciudad al día siguiente. [70]
Cuando los comunistas intentaron instalar un gobierno municipal soviético, comenzó un conflicto entre los nacionalistas y los comunistas, y el 12 de abril las fuerzas nacionalistas, que incluían tanto a miembros de la Banda Verde como a soldados bajo el mando del general nacionalista Pai Ch'ung-hsi, atacaron a los comunistas y rápidamente los vencieron. En vísperas del ataque nacionalista, Wang Shouhua, que era a la vez jefe del Comité Laboral del PCCh y presidente del Comité Laboral General, aceptó una invitación a cenar de "Du el Orejudo" (un gánster de Shanghai) y fue estrangulado a su llegada. El propio Zhou estuvo a punto de morir en una trampa similar, cuando fue arrestado tras llegar a una cena celebrada en el cuartel general de Si Lie, un comandante nacionalista del Vigésimo Sexto Ejército de Chiang. A pesar de los rumores de que Chiang había puesto un alto precio a la cabeza de Zhou, las fuerzas de Pai Ch'ung-hsi lo liberaron rápidamente. Las razones de la repentina liberación de Zhou pueden haber sido que Zhou era entonces el comunista de mayor rango en Shanghai, que los esfuerzos de Chiang por exterminar a los comunistas de Shanghai eran altamente secretos en ese momento y que su ejecución habría sido considerada como una violación del acuerdo de cooperación entre el PCCh y el KMT (que técnicamente todavía estaba en vigor). Zhou fue finalmente liberado sólo después de la intervención de un representante del Vigésimo Sexto Ejército, Zhao Shu, quien pudo convencer a sus comandantes de que el arresto de Zhou había sido un error. [71]
Tras huir de Shanghái, Zhou se dirigió a Hankou (hoy parte de Wuhan ) y participó en el 5.º Congreso Nacional del PCCh que se celebró allí del 27 de abril al 9 de mayo. Al final del Congreso, Zhou fue elegido miembro del Comité Central del Partido, y volvió a dirigir el departamento militar. [72] Tras la represión de los comunistas por parte de Chiang Kai-shek, el Partido Nacionalista se dividió en dos: el "ala izquierda" del Partido Nacionalista (dirigida por Wang Jingwei ) controlaba el gobierno en Hankou y el "ala derecha" del partido (dirigido por Chiang Kai-shek) establecía un gobierno rival en Nanjing. Siguiendo aún las instrucciones del Comintern, los comunistas permanecieron como un "bloque dentro" del Partido Nacionalista, con la esperanza de seguir expandiendo su influencia a través de los nacionalistas. [73] Tras ser atacado por un señor de la guerra amigo de Chiang, el gobierno izquierdista de Wang se desintegró más tarde, en mayo de 1927, y las tropas de Chiang comenzaron una purga organizada de comunistas en territorios anteriormente controlados por Wang. [74] A mediados de julio, Zhou se vio obligado a pasar a la clandestinidad. [73]
Presionados por sus asesores del Comintern y convencidos de que la "marea alta revolucionaria" había llegado, los comunistas decidieron lanzar una serie de revueltas militares. [75] La primera de ellas fue la Revuelta de Nanchang . Zhou fue enviado para supervisar el evento, pero las figuras en movimiento parecen haber sido Tan Pingshan y Li Lisan , mientras que las principales figuras militares fueron Ye Ting y He Long . En términos militares, la revuelta fue un desastre, con las fuerzas comunistas diezmadas y dispersas. [76]
El propio Zhou contrajo malaria durante la campaña y Nie Rongzhen y Ye Ting lo enviaron en secreto a Hong Kong para que recibiera tratamiento médico . Después de llegar a Hong Kong, Zhou se disfrazó de un hombre de negocios llamado "Li" y fue confiado al cuidado de los comunistas locales. En una reunión posterior del Comité Central del PCCh, Zhou fue culpado por el fracaso de la campaña de Nanchang y degradado temporalmente a miembro suplente del Politburó. [77]
Tras el fracaso del Levantamiento de Nanchang, Zhou abandonó China y se dirigió a la Unión Soviética para asistir al Sexto Congreso Nacional del Partido Comunista Chino (PCCh) en Moscú, en junio-julio de 1928. [78] El Sexto Congreso tuvo que celebrarse en Moscú porque las condiciones en China se consideraban peligrosas. El control del KMT era tan estricto que muchos delegados chinos que asistían al Sexto Congreso se vieron obligados a viajar disfrazados: el propio Zhou se disfrazó de anticuario. [79]
En el VI Congreso, Zhou pronunció un largo discurso en el que insistió en que las condiciones en China eran desfavorables para una revolución inmediata y que la principal tarea del PCCh debía ser desarrollar el impulso revolucionario ganándose el apoyo de las masas en el campo y estableciendo un régimen soviético en el sur de China, similar al que Mao Zedong y Zhu De ya estaban estableciendo en torno a Jiangxi. El Congreso en general aceptó la evaluación de Zhou como correcta. Xiang Zhongfa fue nombrado secretario general del Partido, pero pronto se lo encontró incapaz de cumplir su papel, por lo que Zhou emergió como el líder de facto del PCCh. Zhou tenía sólo treinta años. [79]
Durante el VI Congreso, Zhou fue elegido Director del Departamento de Organización del Comité Central. Su aliado, Li Lisan, se hizo cargo del trabajo de propaganda. Zhou finalmente regresó a China, después de más de un año en el extranjero, en 1929. En el VI Congreso en Moscú, Zhou había dado cifras que indicaban que, en 1928, quedaban menos de 32.000 miembros sindicales leales a los comunistas, y que solo el diez por ciento de los miembros del Partido eran proletarios. En 1929, solo el tres por ciento del Partido eran proletarios. [80]
A principios de 1930, Zhou empezó a mostrarse en desacuerdo con la estrategia de Li Lisan de favorecer a los campesinos ricos y concentrar las fuerzas militares para atacar los centros urbanos. Zhou no rompió abiertamente con estas nociones más ortodoxas, e incluso intentó implementarlas más tarde, en 1931, en Jiangxi. [81] Cuando el agente soviético Pavel Mif llegó a Shanghái para dirigir el Comintern en China en diciembre de 1930, Mif criticó la estrategia de Li como "aventurerismo de izquierda", y criticó a Zhou por comprometerse con Li. Zhou "reconoció" sus errores al comprometerse con Li en enero de 1931 y ofreció renunciar al Politburó, pero fue retenido mientras que otros líderes superiores del PCCh, incluidos Li Lisan y Qu Qiubai, fueron removidos. Como Mao reconoció más tarde, Mif entendió que los servicios de Zhou como líder del Partido eran indispensables, y que Zhou cooperaría voluntariamente con quienquiera que estuviera en el poder. [82]
Tras regresar a Shanghái en 1929, Zhou comenzó a trabajar en la clandestinidad, estableciendo y supervisando una red de células comunistas independientes. El mayor peligro para Zhou en su trabajo clandestino era la amenaza de ser descubierto por la policía secreta del KMT, que se había establecido en 1928 con la misión específica de identificar y eliminar a los comunistas. Para evitar ser detectados, Zhou y su esposa cambiaban de residencia al menos una vez al mes y utilizaban una variedad de alias. Zhou a menudo se disfrazaba de hombre de negocios, a veces con barba. Zhou tenía cuidado de que sólo dos o tres personas supieran su paradero. Zhou disfrazó todas las oficinas urbanas del Partido, se aseguró de que las oficinas del PCCh nunca compartieran los mismos edificios cuando estuvieran en la misma ciudad y exigió a todos los miembros del Partido que utilizaran contraseñas para identificarse entre sí. Zhou restringió todas sus reuniones a antes de las 7 de la mañana o después de las 7 de la tarde. Zhou nunca utilizó el transporte público y evitaba que lo vieran en lugares públicos. [83]
En noviembre de 1928, el PCCh también estableció su propia agencia de inteligencia (la "Sección de Servicios Especiales del Comité Central", o "Zhongyang Teke" ( chino :中央特科), a menudo abreviada como "Teke" ), que Zhou posteriormente llegó a controlar. Los principales lugartenientes de Zhou eran Gu Shunzhang , que tenía fuertes vínculos con las sociedades secretas chinas y se convirtió en miembro suplente del Politburó, y Xiang Zhongfa . Teke tenía cuatro secciones operativas: una para la protección y seguridad de los miembros del Partido; una para la recopilación de inteligencia; una para facilitar las comunicaciones internas; y una para llevar a cabo asesinatos, un equipo que se conoció como el "Escuadrón Rojo" (红队). [84]
La principal preocupación de Zhou al dirigir Teke era establecer una red eficaz contra el espionaje dentro de la policía secreta del KMT. En poco tiempo, el jefe de la sección de inteligencia de Teke , Chen Geng , logró implantar una gran red de topos dentro de la Sección de Investigación del Departamento Central de Operaciones en Nanjing, que era el centro de inteligencia del KMT. Los tres agentes más exitosos utilizados por Zhou para infiltrarse en la policía secreta del KMT fueron Qian Zhuangfei , Li Kenong y Hu Di , a quienes Zhou se refirió como "los tres trabajadores de inteligencia más distinguidos del Partido" en la década de 1930. Los agentes implantados en varias oficinas del KMT fueron más tarde críticos para la supervivencia del PCCh, ayudando al Partido a escapar de las Campañas de Cerco de Chiang . [85]
A fines de abril de 1931, el principal asistente de Zhou en asuntos de seguridad, Gu Shunzhang , fue arrestado por el KMT en Wuhan. Gu era un ex organizador laboral con fuertes conexiones con la mafia y débiles compromisos con el PCCh. Bajo amenaza de fuertes torturas, Gu le dio a la policía secreta del KMT informes detallados de las organizaciones clandestinas del PCCh en Wuhan, lo que llevó al arresto y ejecución de más de diez altos líderes del PCCh en la ciudad. Gu se ofreció a proporcionar al KMT detalles de las actividades del PCCh en Shanghai, pero solo si podía darle la información directamente a Chiang Kai-shek. [86]
One of Zhou's agents working in Nanjing, Qian Zhuangfei, intercepted a telegram requesting further instructions from Nanjing on how to proceed, and abandoned his cover to personally warn Zhou of the impending crackdown. The two days before Gu arrived in Nanjing to meet with Chiang gave Zhou time to evacuate Party members and to change the communication codes used by Teke, all of which were known to Gu. After meeting briefly with Chiang in Nanjing, Gu arrived in Shanghai and assisted the KMT secret police in raiding CCP offices and residences, capturing members who could not be evacuated in time. The summary executions of those suspected of Communist sympathies resulted in the largest death-toll since the Shanghai massacre of 1927.[87]
Zhou's reaction to Gu's betrayal was extreme. More than fifteen members of Gu's family, some of whom worked for Teke, were murdered by the Red Squad and buried in quiet residential areas of Shanghai. The Red Squad then assassinated Wang Bing, a leading member of the KMT secret police who was known for moving around Shanghai in rickshaws, without the protection of bodyguards. Most surviving CCP members were relocated to the Communist base in Jiangxi. Because most senior staff had become exposed by Gu, most of its best agents were also relocated. Zhou's most senior aide not yet under suspicion, Pan Hannian, became Teke's director.[88]
The night before he was scheduled to leave Shanghai in June 1931, Xiang Zhongfa, who was one of Zhou's most senior agents, decided to spend the night in a hotel with his mistress, ignoring Zhou's warnings about the danger. In the morning, a KMT informant who had been trailing Xiang spotted him as he was leaving the hotel. Xiang was immediately arrested and imprisoned within the French Concession. Zhou attempted to prevent Xiang's expected extradition to KMT-controlled China by having his agents bribe the chief of police in the French Concession, but the KMT authorities appealed directly to the authorities of the French Concession, ensuring that the chief of police could not intervene. Zhou's hopes that Xiang would be transferred to Nanjing, giving him an opportunity to kidnap Xiang, also came to naught. The French agreed to transfer Xiang to the Shanghai Garrison Headquarters, under the command of General Xiong Shihui, who subjected Xiang to relentless torture and interrogation. Once he became convinced that Xiang had given his torturers all the information that they requested, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Xiang to be executed.[89]
Zhou Enlai later succeeded in secretly purchasing a copy of Xiang's interrogation records. The records showed that Xiang had disclosed everything to the KMT authorities before his execution, including the location of Zhou's residence. Another round of arrests and executions followed Xiang's capture, but Zhou and his wife were able to escape capture because they had abandoned their apartment on the morning of Xiang's arrest. After establishing a new Politburo Standing Committee in Shanghai, Zhou and his wife relocated to the Communist base in Jiangxi near the end of 1931.[89] By the time Zhou left Shanghai, he was one of the most wanted men in China.[90]
Following the failed Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings of 1927, the Communists began to focus on establishing a series of rural bases of operation in southern China. Even before moving to Jiangxi, Zhou had become involved in the politics of these bases. Mao, claiming the need to eliminate counterrevolutionaries and Anti-Bolsheviks operating within the CCP, began an ideological purge of the populace inside the Jiangxi Soviet. Zhou, perhaps due to his own success planting moles within various levels of the KMT, agreed that an organized campaign to uncover subversion was justified, and supported the campaign as de facto leader of the CCP.[91]
Mao's efforts soon developed into a ruthless campaign driven by paranoia and aimed not only at KMT spies, but at anyone with an ideological outlook different from Mao's. Suspects were commonly tortured until they confessed to their crimes and accused others of crimes, and wives and relatives who inquired of those being tortured were themselves arrested and tortured even more severely. Mao's attempts to purge the Red Army of those who might potentially oppose him led Mao to accuse Chen Yi, the commander and political commissar of the Jiangxi Military Region, as a counterrevolutionary, provoking a violent reaction against Mao's persecutions that became known as the "Futian Incident" in January 1931. Mao was eventually successful in subduing the Red Army, reducing its numbers from forty thousand to less than ten thousand. The campaign continued throughout 1930 and 1931. Historians estimate the total number who died due to Mao's persecution in all base areas to be approximately one hundred thousand.[92]
The entire campaign occurred while Zhou was still in Shanghai. Although he had supported the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, Zhou actively suppressed the campaign when he arrived in Jiangxi in December 1931, criticizing the "excess, the panic, and the oversimplification" practiced by local officials. After investigating those accused of anti-Bolshevism, and those persecuting them, Zhou submitted a report criticizing the campaign for focusing on the narrow persecution of anti-Maoists as anti-Bolsheviks, exaggerating the threat to the Party, and condemning the use of torture as an investigative technique. Zhou's resolution was passed and adopted on 7 January 1932, and the campaign gradually subsided.[93]
Zhou moved to the Jiangxi base area and shook up the propaganda-oriented approach to revolution by demanding that the armed forces under Communist control actually be used to expand the base, rather than just to control and defend it. In December 1931, Zhou replaced Mao Zedong as Secretary of the First Front Army with Xiang Ying, and made himself political commissar of the Red Army, in place of Mao. Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai all criticized Mao's tactics at the October 1932 Ningdu Conference.[94][95]
After moving to Jiangxi, Zhou met Mao for the first time since 1927, and began his long relationship with Mao as his superior. In the Ningdu conference, Mao was demoted to being a figurehead in the Soviet government. Zhou, who had come to appreciate Mao's strategies after the series of military failures waged by other Party leaders since 1927, defended Mao, but was unsuccessful. After achieving power, Mao later purged or demoted those who had opposed him in 1932, but remembered Zhou's defense of his policies.[96]
In early 1933, Bo Gu arrived with the German Comintern advisor Otto Braun and took control of party affairs. Zhou at this time, apparently with strong support from Party and military colleagues, reorganized and standardized the Red Army. Under Zhou, Bo, and Braun, the Red Army defeated four attacks by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops.[97] The military structure that led the Communists to victory was:
Chiang's fifth campaign, launched in September 1933, was much more difficult to contain. Chiang's new use of "blockhouse tactics" and larger numbers of troops allowed his army to advance steadily into Communist territory, and they succeeded in seizing several major Communist strongholds. Bo Gu and Otto Braun adopted orthodox tactics to respond to Chiang, and Zhou, although personally opposed to them, directed these. Following their subsequent defeat, he and other military leaders were blamed.[98]
Although Zhou's subsequently cautious military approach was distrusted by hardliners, he was again appointed to the position of vice chairman of the Military Commission. Zhou was accepted as leader largely because of his organizational talent and devotion to work, and because he had never shown any overt ambition to pursue supreme power within the Party. Within months, the continuing orthodox tactics of Bo and Braun led to a serious defeat for the Red Army, and forced the leaders of the CCP to seriously consider abandoning their bases in Jiangxi.[99]
After the decision to abandon Jiangxi was announced, Zhou was placed in charge of organizing and supervising the logistics of the Communist withdrawal. Making his plans in absolute secrecy and waiting till the last moment to inform even senior leaders of the group's movements, Zhou's objective was to break through the enemy encirclement with as few casualties as possible, and before Chiang's forces were able to completely occupy all Communist bases. It is not known what criteria were used to determine who would stay and who would go, but 16,000 troops and some of the Communists' most notable commanders at the time (including Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, and Qu Qiubai) were left to form a rear guard to divert the main force of Nationalist troops from noticing the Communists' general withdrawal.[100]
The withdrawal of 84,000 soldiers and civilians began in early October 1934. Zhou's intelligence agents were successful in identifying a large section of Chiang's blockhouse lines that were manned by troops under General Chen Jitang, a Guangdong warlord who Zhou identified as being likely to prefer preserving the strength of his troops over fighting. Zhou sent Pan Hannian to negotiate for safe passage with General Chen, who subsequently allowed the Red Army to pass through the territory that he controlled without fighting.[101]
After passing through three of the four blockhouse fortifications needed to escape Chiang's encirclement, the Red Army was finally intercepted by regular Nationalist troops, and suffered heavy casualties. Of the 86,000 Communists who attempted to break out of Jiangxi, only 36,000 successfully escaped. This loss demoralized some Communist leaders (particularly Bo Gu and Otto Braun), but Zhou remained calm and retained his command.[101]
During the Communists' subsequent Long March, there were numerous high-level disputes over the direction that the Communists should take, and on the causes of the Red Army's defeats. During the power struggles that ensued, Zhou consistently backed Mao Zedong against the interests of Bo Gu and Otto Braun. Bo and Braun were later blamed for the Red Army's defeats, and were eventually removed from their positions of leadership.[102] The Communists eventually succeeded in re-establishing a base in northern Shaanxi on 20 October 1935, arriving with only 8,000–9,000 remaining members.[103]
Zhou's position within the CCP changed numerous times throughout the Long March. By the early 1930s, Zhou was recognized as the de facto leader of the CCP, and exercised superior influence over other members of the CCP even when sharing power with Bo and Braun.[104] In the months following the January 1935 Zunyi Conference, in which Bo and Braun were removed from senior positions, Zhou mostly retained his position because he displayed a willingness to display responsibility, because his tactics in defeating Chiang's Fourth Encirclement Campaign were recognized as being successful, and because he supported Mao Zedong, who was gaining influence inside the Party: after the Zunyi Conference, Mao became Zhou's assistant.[105] After the Communists reached Shaanxi and completed the Long March, Mao officially took over Zhou Enlai's leading position in the CCP, while Zhou took a secondary position as vice-chairman. Mao and Zhou would retain their positions within the CCP until their deaths in 1976.[106]
During the seventh congress of the Comintern, held in August 1936, Wang Ming issued an anti-Fascist manifesto, indicating that the CCP's previous policy of "opposing Chiang Kai-shek and resisting Japan" was to be replaced by a policy of "uniting with Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan". Zhou was instrumental in carrying out this policy. Zhou made contact with one of the most senior KMT commanders in the northwest, Zhang Xueliang. By 1935, Zhang was well known for his anti-Japanese sentiments and his doubts about Chiang's willingness to oppose the Japanese. Zhang's disposition made him easily influenced by Zhou's indications that the CCP would cooperate to fight against the Japanese.[107]
Zhou established a "northeast working committee" for the purpose of promoting cooperation with Zhang. The committee worked to persuade Zhang's Northeast Army to unite with the Red Army to fight Japan and retake Manchuria. The committee also created new patriotic slogans, including "Chinese must not fight Chinese", to promote Zhou's goals. Using his network of secret contacts, Zhou arranged a meeting with Zhang in Yan'an, then controlled by Zhang's "Northeast Army".[108]
The first meeting between Zhou and Zhang occurred inside a church on 7 April 1936. Zhang showed a great interest in ending the civil war, uniting the country, and fighting the Japanese, but warned that Chiang was firmly in control of the national government, and that these goals would be difficult to pursue without Chiang's cooperation. Both parties ended their meeting with an agreement to find a way to secretly work together. At the same time that Zhou was establishing secret contacts with Zhang, Chiang was growing suspicious of Zhang, and became increasingly dissatisfied with Zhang's inaction against the Communists. In order to deceive Chiang, Zhou and Zhang deployed mock military units in order to give the impression that the Northeast Army and the Red Army were engaged in battle.[108]
In December 1936, Chiang Kai-shek flew to the Nationalist headquarters in Xi'an in order to test the loyalty of local KMT military forces under Marshal Zhang Xueliang, and to personally lead these forces in a final attack on Communist bases in Shaanxi, which Zhang had been ordered to destroy. Determined to force Chiang to direct China's forces against the Japanese (who had taken Zhang's territory of Manchuria and were preparing a broader invasion), on 12 December Zhang and his followers stormed Chiang's headquarters, killed most of his bodyguards, and seized the Generalissimo in what became known as the Xi'an Incident.[109]
Reactions to Chiang's kidnapping in Yan'an were mixed. Some, including Mao Zedong and Zhu De, viewed it as an opportunity to have Chiang killed. Others, including Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian, saw it as an opportunity to achieve a united-front policy against the Japanese, which would strengthen the overall position of the CCP.[110] Debate within Yan'an ended when a long telegram from Joseph Stalin arrived, urging the CCP to work towards Chiang's release, explaining that a united front was the best position from which to resist the Japanese, and that only Chiang had the prestige and authority to carry out such a plan.[111]
After initial communications with Zhang on the fate of Chiang, Zhou Enlai reached Xi'an on 16 December, on a plane specifically sent for him by Zhang Xueliang, as the chief Communist negotiator. At first, Chiang was opposed to negotiating with a CCP delegate, but withdrew his opposition when it became clear that his life and freedom were largely dependent on Communist goodwill towards him. On 24 December, Chiang received Zhou for a meeting, the first time that the two had seen each other since Zhou had left Whampoa over ten years earlier. Zhou began the conversation by saying, "In the ten years since we have met, you seem to have aged very little." Chiang nodded and said: "Enlai, you were my subordinate. You should do what I say." Zhou replied that if Chiang would halt the civil war and resist the Japanese instead, the Red Army would willingly accept Chiang's command. By the end of this meeting, Chiang promised to end the civil war, to resist the Japanese together, and to invite Zhou to Nanjing for further talks.[110]
On 25 December 1936, Zhang released Chiang and accompanied him to Nanjing. Subsequently, Zhang was court-martialed and sentenced to house arrest, and most of the officers who participated in the Xi'an Incident were executed. Although the KMT formally rejected collaboration with the CCP, Chiang ended active military activity against Communist bases in Yan'nan, implying that he had implicitly given his word to change the direction of his policies. Following the end of KMT attacks, the CCP was able to consolidate its territories and to prepare to resist the Japanese.[112]
After news arrived that Zhang had been betrayed and arrested by Chiang, Zhang's old officer corps became very agitated, and some of them murdered a Nationalist general, Wang Yizhe, who was seen as largely responsible for the military's lack of response. While Zhou was still in Xi'an, he himself was surrounded in his office by a number of Zhang's officers, who accused the Communists of instigating the Xi'an Incident and of betraying Zhang by convincing the general to travel to Nanjing. At gunpoint, they threatened to kill Zhou. Ever the diplomat, Zhou maintained his composure and eloquently defended his position. In the end, Zhou succeeded in calming the officers, and they departed, leaving him unharmed.
In a series of negotiations with the KMT that lasted until June 1937 (when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred), Zhou attempted to gain Zhang's release, but failed.[113]
When the Nationalist capital of Nanjing fell to the Japanese on 13 December 1937, Zhou accompanied the Nationalist government to its temporary capital of Wuhan. As the chief representative of the CCP in the nominal KMT-CCP cooperation agreement, Zhou established and headed the official KMT-CCP liaison office. While running the liaison office, Zhou established the Yangtze Bureau of the Central Committee. Under cover of its association with the Eighth Route Army, Zhou used the Yangtze Bureau to conduct clandestine operations within southern China, secretly recruiting Communist operatives and establishing Party structures throughout KMT-controlled areas.[114]
In August 1937, the CCP secretly issued orders to Zhou that his united front work was to focus on Communist infiltration and organization at all levels of the government and society. Zhou agreed to these orders, and applied his considerable organizational talents to completing them. Shortly after Zhou's arrival in Wuhan, he convinced the Nationalist government to approve and fund a Communist newspaper, the "New China Daily", justifying it as a tool to spread anti-Japanese propaganda. This newspaper became a major tool for spreading Communist propaganda, and the Nationalists later viewed its approval and funding as one of their "biggest mistakes".[115]
Zhou was successful in organizing large numbers of Chinese intellectuals and artists to promote resistance against the Japanese. The largest propaganda event that Zhou staged was a week-long celebration in 1938, following the successful defense of Taierzhuang. In this event, between 400,000 and 500,000 people took part in parades, and a chorus of over 10,000 people sung songs of resistance. Fundraising efforts during the week raised over a million yuan. Zhou himself donated 240 yuan, his monthly salary as deputy director of the Political Department.[115]
While he was working in Wuhan, Zhou was the CCP's main contact person with the outside world, and worked hard to reverse the public perception of the Communists as a "bandit organization". Zhou established and maintained contacts with over forty foreign journalists and writers, including Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong and Rewi Alley, many of whom became sympathetic to the Communist cause and wrote about their sympathies in foreign publications. In sympathy with his efforts to promote the CCP to the outside world, Zhou arranged for a Canadian medical team, headed by Norman Bethune, to travel to Yan'an, and assisted the Dutch film director Joris Ivens in producing a documentary, 400 Million People.[116]
Zhou was unsuccessful in averting the public defection of Zhang Guotao, one of the founders of the CCP, to the KMT. Zhang was prepared to defect due to a disagreement with Mao Zedong over the implementation of the united front policy, and because he resented Mao's authoritarian leadership style. Zhou, with the aid of Wang Ming, Bo Gu and Li Kenong, intercepted Zhang after he arrived in Wuhan, and engaged in extensive negotiations through April 1938, in order to convince Zhang not to defect, but these negotiations were unsuccessful. In the end, Zhang refused to compromise and placed himself under the protection of the KMT secret police. On 18 April, the CCP Central Committee expelled Zhang from the Party, and Zhang himself issued a statement accusing the CCP of sabotaging efforts to resist the Japanese. The entire episode was a serious setback for Zhou's attempts to improve the prestige of the Party.[117]
In January 1938, the Nationalist government appointed Zhou as the deputy director to the Political Department of the Military Committee, working directly under General Chen Cheng. As a senior Communist statesman holding the rank of lieutenant-general, Zhou was the only Communist to hold a high-level position within the Nationalist government. Zhou used his influence within the Military Committee to promote Nationalist generals that he believed were capable, and to promote cooperation with the Red Army.[114]
In the Tai'erzhuang campaign, Zhou used his influence to ensure that the most capable Nationalist general available, Li Zongren be appointed overall commander, despite Chiang's reservations about Li's loyalty. When Chiang was hesitant to commit troops to the defense of Tai'erzhuang, Zhou convinced Chiang to do so by promising that the Communist Eighth Route Army would simultaneously attack the Japanese from the north, and that the New Fourth Army would sabotage the Tianjin-Pukou railroad, cutting off Japanese supplies. In the end, the defense of Tai'erzhuang was a major victory for the Nationalists, killing 20,000 Japanese soldiers and capturing a large quantity of supplies and equipment.[114]
While serving as the CCP ambassador to the KMT, the childless Zhou met and befriended numerous orphans. While in Wuhan Zhou adopted a young girl, Sun Weishi, in 1937. Sun's mother had taken her to Wuhan after Sun's father was executed by the KMT in 1927, during the White Terror. Zhou came upon the sixteen-year-old Sun crying outside of the Eighth Route Army Liaison Office because she had been refused permission to travel to Yan'an, due to her youth and lack of political connections. After Zhou befriended and adopted her as his daughter, Sun was able to travel to Yan'an. She pursued a career in acting and direction, and later became the first female director of spoken drama (huaju) in the PRC.[118]
Zhou also adopted Sun's brother, Sun Yang.[119] After accompanying Zhou to Yan'an, Sun Yang became Zhou's personal assistant. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Sun Yang became the president of Renmin University.[118]
In 1938, Zhou met and befriended another orphan, Li Peng. Li was only three when, in 1931, his father was also killed by the Kuomintang. Zhou subsequently looked after him in Yan'an. After the war, Zhou systematically groomed Li for leadership and sent him to be educated in energy-related engineering in Moscow. Zhou's placement of Li within the powerful energy bureaucracy shielded Li from Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, and Li's eventual rise to the level of Premier surprised no one.[120]
When the Japanese army approached Wuhan in the fall of 1938, the Nationalist Army engaged the Japanese in the surrounding regions for over four months, allowing the KMT to withdraw farther inland, to Chongqing, bringing with them important supplies, assets, and many refugees. While he was en route to Chongqing, Zhou was nearly killed in the "fire of Changsha", which lasted for three days, destroyed two thirds of the city, killed twenty thousand civilians, and left hundreds of thousands of people homeless. This fire was deliberately caused by the retreating Nationalist army in order to prevent the city from falling to the Japanese. Due to an organizational error (it was claimed), the fire was begun without any warning to the residents of the city.[121]
After escaping from Changsha, Zhou took refuge in a Buddhist temple in a nearby village and organized the evacuation of the city. Zhou demanded that the causes of the fire be thoroughly investigated by authorities, that those responsible be punished, that reparations be given to the victims, that the city be thoroughly cleaned up, and that accommodations be provided for the homeless. In the end, the Nationalists blamed three local commanders for the fire and executed them. Newspapers across China blamed the fire on (non-KMT) arsonists, but the blaze contributed to a nationwide loss of support for the KMT.[122]
Zhou Enlai reached Chongqing in December 1938, and resumed the official and unofficial operations that he had been conducting in Wuhan in January 1938. Zhou's activities included those required by his formal positions within the Nationalist government, his running of two pro-Communist newspapers, and his covert efforts to form reliable intelligence networks and increase the popularity and organization of CCP organizations in southern China. At its peak, the staff working under him in both official and covert roles totaled several hundred people.[123] After finding that his father, Zhou Shaogang, was unable to support himself, Zhou looked after his father in Chongqing until his father's death in 1942.[124]
Soon after arriving in Chongqing, Zhou successfully lobbied the Nationalist government to release Communist political prisoners. After their release, Zhou often assigned these former prisoners as agents to organize and lead Party organizations throughout southern China. The efforts of Zhou's covert activities were extremely successful, increasing CCP membership across southern China tenfold within months. Chiang was somewhat aware of these activities and introduced efforts to suppress them but was generally unsuccessful.[125]
In July 1939, while in Yan'an to attend a series of Politburo meetings, Zhou had an accident horseback riding in which he fell and fractured his right elbow. Because there was little medical care available in Yan'an, Zhou traveled to Moscow for medical treatment, using the occasion to brief the Comintern on the status of the united front. Zhou arrived in Moscow too late to mend the fracture, and his right arm remained bent for the rest of his life. Joseph Stalin was so displeased with the CCP's refusal to work more closely with the Nationalists that he refused to see Zhou during his stay.[126] Zhou's adopted daughter, Sun Weishi, accompanied Zhou to Moscow. She remained in Moscow after Zhou left in order to study for a career in theater.[118]
On 4 May 1939, the Politburo accepted Zhou's assessment that Zhou should focus his efforts on creating a network of secret CCP agents working covertly and for long periods. Communists were directed to join the KMT, if doing so would increase the ability of agents to infiltrate the KMT administrative, educational, economic, and military establishments. Under the cover of the Office of the Eighth Route Army (moved to a stately building on the outskirts of Chongqing), Zhou adopted a series of measures to expand the CCP intelligence network.[127]
By the time that Zhou returned to Chongqing in May 1940, a serious rift had formed between the KMT and the CCP. Over the course of the next year, the relationship between the two parties degenerated into arrests and executions of Party members, covert attempts by agents of both sides to eliminate each other, propaganda efforts attacking each other, and major military clashes. The united front was officially abolished after the Anhui Incident in January 1941, when 9,000 Communist soldiers of the New Fourth Army were ambushed, and their commanders either killed or imprisoned by government troops.[128]
Zhou responded to the rift between the KMT and CCP by directing Party leaders to conduct their operations more secretly. He maintained propaganda efforts via the newspapers that he directed and kept in close contact with foreign journalists and ambassadors. Zhou increased and improved CCP intelligence efforts within the KMT, Wang Jingwei's Nanjing government, and the Empire of Japan, recruiting, training, and organizing a large network of Communist spies. Yan Baohang, a secret Party member active in Chongqing diplomatic circles, informed Zhou that German dictator Adolf Hitler was planning to attack the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Under Zhou's signature, this information reached Stalin on 20 June, two days before Hitler attacked, though Stalin did not yet believe that Hitler would actually carry through with the attack.[129]
Despite worsening relations with Chiang Kai-shek, Zhou operated openly in Chongqing, befriending Chinese and foreign visitors and staging public cultural activities, especially Chinese theater. Zhou cultivated a close personal friendship with General Feng Yuxiang, making it possible for Zhou to circulate freely among the officers of the Nationalist Army. Zhou befriended the General He Jifeng, and convinced He to secretly become a member of the CCP during an official visit to Yan'an. Zhou's intelligence agents penetrated the Sichuanese army of General Deng Xihou, resulting in Deng's secret agreement to supply ammunition to the Communist New Fourth Army. Zhou convinced another Sichuanese general, Li Wenhui, to covertly install a radio transmitter that facilitated secret communication between Yan'an and Chongqing. Zhou befriended Zhang Zhizhong and Nong Yun, commanders in the Yunnan armed forces, who became secret CCP members, agreed to cooperate with the CCP against Chiang Kai-shek, and established a clandestine radio station that broadcast Communist propaganda from the provincial government building in Kunming.[130]
Zhou remained the primary CCP representative to the outside world during his time in Chongqing. Zhou and his aides Qiao Guanhua, Gong Peng and Wang Bingnan enjoyed receiving foreign visitors and made a favorable impression among American, British, Canadian, Russian, and other foreign diplomats. Zhou struck visitors as charming, urbane, hard-working, and living a very simple lifestyle. In 1941, Zhou received a visit from Ernest Hemingway and his wife, Martha Gellhorn. Gellhorn later wrote that she and Ernest were extremely impressed with Zhou (and extremely unimpressed with Chiang), and they became convinced that the Communists would take over China after meeting him.[131]
Because Yan'an was incapable of funding Zhou's activities, Zhou partially funded his efforts through donations from sympathetic foreigners, overseas Chinese, and the China Defense League (supported by Sun Yat-sen's widow, Soong Ching-ling). Zhou also undertook to start and run a number of businesses throughout KMT- and Japanese- controlled China. Zhou's businesses grew to include several trading companies operating in several Chinese cities (primarily Chongqing and Hong Kong), a silk and satin store in Chongqing, an oil refinery, and factories for producing industrial materials, cloths, Western medicines, and other commodities.[132]
Under Zhou, Communist businessmen made great profits in currency trading and commodity speculation, especially in American dollars and gold. Zhou's most lucrative business was generated by several opium plantations that Zhou established in remote areas. Although the CCP had been engaged in the eradication of opium smoking since its establishment, Zhou justified opium production and distribution in KMT-controlled areas by the huge profits generated for the CCP, and by the debilitating effects that opium addiction might have on KMT soldiers and government officials.[132]
In 1943, Zhou's relationship with Chiang Kai-shek deteriorated, and he returned permanently to Yan'an. By then, Mao Zedong had emerged as the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and was attempting to have his political theories (literally "Mao Zedong Thought") accepted as the Party's dogma. Following his ascent to power, Mao organized a campaign to indoctrinate the members of the CCP. This campaign became the foundation of the Maoist personality cult that later dominated Chinese politics until the end of the Cultural Revolution.[133]
After returning to Yan'an, Zhou Enlai was strongly and excessively criticized in this campaign. Zhou was labelled, along with the generals Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, Ye Jianying, and Nie Rongzhen, as an "empiricist" because he had a history of cooperating with the Comintern and with Mao's enemy, Wang Ming. Mao publicly attacked Zhou as "a collaborator and assistant of dogmatism... who belittled the study of Marxism-Leninism". Mao and his allies then claimed that the CCP organizations that Zhou had established in southern China were in fact led by KMT secret agents, a charge which Zhou firmly denied, and which was only withdrawn after Mao became convinced of Zhou's loyalty in the latest period of the campaign.[133]
Zhou defended himself by engaging in a long series of public reflections and self-criticisms, and he gave a number of speeches praising Mao and Mao Zedong Thought and giving his unconditional acceptance of Mao's leadership. He also joined Mao's allies in attacking Peng Shuzhi, Chen Duxiu, and Wang Ming, who Mao viewed as enemies. The persecution of Zhou Enlai distressed Moscow, and Georgi Dimitrov wrote a personal letter to Mao indicating that "Zhou Enlai... must not be severed from the Party." In the end, Zhou's enthusiastic acknowledgement of his own faults, his praise for Mao's leadership, and his attacks on Mao's enemies eventually convinced Mao that Zhou's conversion to Maoism was genuine, a precondition for Zhou's political survival. By the seventh congress of the CCP in 1945, Mao was acknowledged as the overall leader of the CCP, and the dogma of Mao Zedong Thought was firmly entrenched among the Party's leadership.[133]
As United States began to plan for an invasion of Japan, which at that point they assumed would be based in China, American political and military leaders became eager to make contact with the Communists. In June 1944, Chiang Kai-shek reluctantly agreed to allow an American military observation group, known as the "Dixie mission", to travel to Yan'an. Mao and Zhou welcomed this mission and held numerous talks in the interests of gaining American aid. They pledged support for any future American military actions to attack the Japanese in China, and attempted to convince the Americans that the CCP was committed to a united KMT-CCP government. In a gesture of goodwill, communist guerrilla units were instructed to rescue downed American airmen. By the time the Americans left Yan'an, many had become convinced that the CCP was "a party seeking orderly democratic growth towards socialism", and the mission formally suggested greater cooperation between the CCP and the American military.[134]
In 1944, Zhou wrote to General Joseph Stilwell, the American commander of the China Burma India Theater of World War II, attempting to convince Stilwell of the need for the Americans to supply the Communists, and of the Communist's desire for a united Chinese government after the war. Stilwell's open disenchantment with the Nationalist government in general, and with Chiang Kai-shek specifically, motivated President Franklin D. Roosevelt to remove him that same year, before Zhou's diplomacy could be effective. Stilwell's replacement, Patrick J. Hurley, was receptive to Zhou's appeals, but ultimately refused to align the American military with the CCP unless the Party made concessions to the KMT, which Mao and Zhou found unacceptable. Soon after Japan surrendered in 1945, Chiang invited Mao and Zhou to Chongqing to take part in an American-endorsed peace conference.[135]
There was widespread apprehension in Yan'an that the invitation from Chiang was a trap, and that the Nationalists were planning to assassinate or imprison the two instead. Zhou took control over Mao's security detail, and his subsequent inspections of their plane and lodgings found nothing. Throughout the trip to Chongqing, Mao refused to enter his accommodations until they had been personally inspected by Zhou. Mao and Zhou traveled together to receptions, banquets, and other public gatherings, and Zhou introduced him to numerous local celebrities and statesmen that he had befriended during his earlier stay in Chongqing.[136]
During the forty-three days of negotiations, Mao and Chiang met eleven times to discuss the conditions of post-war China, while Zhou worked on confirming the details of the negotiations. In the end, the negotiations resolved nothing. Zhou's offer to withdraw the Red Army from southern China was ignored, and P.J. Hurley's ultimatum to incorporate the CCP into the KMT insulted Mao. After Mao returned to Yan'an on 10 October 1945, Zhou stayed behind to sort out the details of the conference's resolution. Zhou returned to Yan'an on 27 November 1945, when major skirmishes between the Communists and Nationalists made future negotiations pointless. Hurley himself subsequently announced his resignation, accusing members of the US embassy of undermining him and favoring the Communists.[137]
After Harry S. Truman became President of the United States, he nominated General George C. Marshall as his special envoy to China on 15 December 1945. Marshall was charged with brokering a ceasefire between the CCP and KMT, and to influence both Mao and Chiang to abide by the Chongqing agreement, which both had signed. The top leadership within the CCP, including Zhou, viewed Marshall's nomination as a positive development, and hoped that Marshall would be a more flexible negotiator than Hurley had been. Zhou arrived in Chongqing to negotiate with Marshall on 22 December.[138]
The first phase of talks went smoothly. Zhou represented the Communists, Marshall represented the Americans, and Zhang Qun (later replaced by Zhang Zhizhong) represented the KMT. In January 1946 both sides agreed to cease hostilities, and to reorganize their armies on the principle of separating the army from political parties. Zhou signed these agreements in the knowledge that neither side would be able to implement these changes. Chiang delivered a speech promising political freedom, local autonomy, free elections, and the release of political prisoners. Zhou welcomed Chiang's statements and expressed his opposition to civil war.[139]
The leadership of the CCP viewed these agreements optimistically. On 27 January 1946 the CCP Secretariat appointed Zhou as one of eight leaders to participate in a future coalition government (other leaders included Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhu De). It was suggested that Zhou be nominated as China's vice president. Mao expressed a desire to visit the United States, and Zhou received orders to manipulate Marshall in order to advance the peace process.[140]
Marshall's negotiations soon deteriorated, as neither the KMT nor the CCP were willing to sacrifice any of the advantages that they had gained, to depoliticize their armies, or to sacrifice any degree of autonomy in areas their side controlled. Military clashes in Manchuria became increasingly frequent in the spring and summer of 1946, eventually forcing Communist forces to retreat after a few major battles. Government armies increased their attacks in other parts of China.[141]
On 3 May 1946, Zhou and his wife left Chongqing for Nanjing, where the Nationalist capital returned. Negotiations deteriorated, and on 9 October Zhou informed Marshall that he no longer had the confidence of the CCP. On 11 October Nationalist troops seized the Communist city of Zhangjiakou in northern China. Chiang, confident in his ability to defeat the Communists, called the National Assembly into session without the participation of the CCP and ordered it to draft a constitution on 15 November. On 16 November Zhou held a press conference, in which he condemned the KMT for "tearing up the agreements from the political consultative conference". On 19 November Zhou and the entire CCP delegation left Nanjing for Yan'an.[142]
Following the failure of negotiations, the Chinese Civil War resumed in earnest. Zhou turned his focus from diplomatic to military affairs, while retaining a senior interest in intelligence work. Zhou worked directly under Mao as his chief aide, as the vice chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee, and as the general chief of staff. As the head of the Urban Work Committee of the Central Committee, an agency established to coordinate work inside KMT-controlled areas, Zhou continued to direct underground activities.[143]
A superior force of Nationalist troops captured Yan'an in March 1947, but Zhou's intelligence agents (primarily Xiong Xianghui) were able to provide Yan'an's commanding general, Peng Dehuai, with details of the KMT army's troop strength, distribution, positions, air cover, and dates of deployment. This intelligence allowed Communist forces to avoid major battles and to engage Nationalist forces in a protracted campaign of guerrilla warfare that eventually led to Peng achieving a series of major victories. By February 1948 over half the KMT troops in the northwest were either defeated or exhausted. On 4 May 1948, Peng captured 40,000 army uniforms and over a million pieces of artillery. By January 1949, Communist forces seized Beijing and Tianjin and were firmly in control of north China.[144]
On 21 January 1949, Chiang stepped down as president of the Nationalist government and was succeeded by General Li Zongren. On 1 April 1949, Li began a series of peace negotiations with a six-member CCP delegation. The CCP delegates were led by Zhou Enlai, and the KMT delegates were led by Zhang Zhizhong.[145]
Zhou began the negotiations by asking: "Why did you go to Xikou (where Chiang had retired) to see Chiang Kai-shek before leaving Nanjing?" Zhang responded that Chiang still had power, even though he had technically retired, and that his consent would be needed to finalize any agreement. Zhou responded that the CCP would not accept a bogus peace dictated by Chiang and asked whether Zhang had come with the necessary credentials to implement the terms desired by the CCP. Negotiations continued until 15 April, when Zhou produced a "final version" of a "draft agreement for internal peace", which was essentially an ultimatum to accept CCP demands. The KMT government did not respond after five days, signaling that it was not prepared to accept Zhou's demands.[146]
On 21 April, Mao and Zhou issued an "order to the army for country-wide advance". PLA troops captured Nanjing on 23 April and captured Li's stronghold of Guangdong in October, forcing Li to go into exile in America. In December 1949, PLA troops captured Chengdu, the last KMT-controlled city on mainland China, forcing Chiang to evacuate to Taiwan.[146]
Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949, Zhou was appointed both Premier of the Government Administration Council (later replaced by the State Council) and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Through the coordination of these two offices and his position as a member of the five-man standing committee of the Politburo, Zhou became the architect of early PRC foreign policy, presenting China as a new, yet responsible member of the international community. Zhou was an experienced negotiator and was respected as a senior revolutionary within China.[147]
By the early 1950s, China's international influence was extremely low. By the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, China's pretensions of universalism had been shattered by a string of military defeats and incursions by Europeans and Japanese. By the end of Yuan Shikai's reign and the subsequent Warlord Era, China's international prestige had declined to "almost nothing". In World War II, China's effective role was sometimes questioned by other Allied leaders. The 1950–1953 Korean War greatly exacerbated China's international position by fixing the United States in a position of animosity, ensuring that Taiwan would remain outside of PRC control and that the PRC would remain outside of the United Nations for the foreseeable future.[147]
Zhou's earliest efforts to improve the prestige of the PRC involved recruiting prominent Chinese politicians, capitalists, intellectuals, and military leaders who were not technically affiliated with the CCP. Zhou was able to convince Zhang Zhizhong to accept a position inside the PRC in 1949, after Zhou's underground network successfully escorted Zhang's family to Beijing. All of the other members of the KMT delegation that Zhou had negotiated with in 1949 accepted similar terms.[148]
Sun Yat-sen's widow, Soong Ching-ling, who was estranged from her family and who had opposed the KMT for many years, readily joined the PRC in 1949. Huang Yanpei, a prominent industrialist who had refused offers of a government post for many years, was persuaded to accept a position as vice premier in the new government. Fu Zuoyi, the KMT commander who had surrendered the Beijing garrison in 1948, was persuaded to join the PLA, and to accept a position as the minister of water conservation.[149]
Zhou's first diplomatic successes came as the result of successfully pursuing a warm relationship, based on mutual respect, with India's first post-independence prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Through his diplomacy, Zhou managed to persuade India to accept China's occupation of Tibet in 1950 and 1951. India was later persuaded to act as a neutral mediator between China and the United States during the many difficult phases of the negotiations settling the Korean War.[150]
When the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950, Zhou was in the process of demobilizing half of the PLA's 5.6 million soldiers, under the direction of the Central Committee. Zhou and Mao discussed the possibility of American intervention with Kim Il Sung in May and urged Kim to be cautious if he was to invade and conquer South Korea, but Kim refused to take these warnings seriously. On 28 June 1950, after the United States pushed through a UN resolution condemning North Korean aggression and sent the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait, Zhou criticized both the UN and US initiatives as "armed aggression on Chinese territory."[151]
Although Kim's early success led him to predict that he would win the war by the end of August, Zhou and other Chinese leaders were more pessimistic. Zhou did not share Kim's confidence that the war would end quickly and became increasingly apprehensive that the United States would intervene. To counter the possibility of an American invasion into North Korea or China, Zhou secured a Soviet commitment to have the USSR support Chinese forces with air cover and deployed 260,000 Chinese soldiers along the North Korean border, under the command of Gao Gang, but they were strictly ordered not to move into North Korea or engage UN or USA forces unless they engaged themselves. Zhou commanded Chai Chengwen to conduct a topographical survey of Korea, and directed Lei Yingfu, Zhou's military advisor in North Korea, to analyze the military situation there. Lei concluded that MacArthur would most likely attempt a landing at Incheon.[152]
On 15 September 1950 MacArthur landed at Incheon, met little resistance, and captured Seoul on 25 September. Bombing raids destroyed most North Korean tanks and much of its artillery. North Korean troops, instead of withdrawing north, rapidly disintegrated. On 30 September, Zhou warned the United States that "the Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists."[153]
On 1 October, on the first anniversary of the PRC, South Korean troops crossed the Thirty-Eighth Parallel into North Korea. Stalin refused to become directly involved in the war, and Kim sent a frantic appeal to Mao to reinforce his army. On 2 October, the Chinese leadership continued an emergency meeting at Zhongnanhai to discuss whether China should send military aid, and these talks continued until 6 October. At the meeting, Zhou was one of the few firm supporters of Mao's position that China should send military aid, regardless of the strength of American forces. With the endorsement of Peng Dehuai, the meeting concluded with a resolution to send military forces to Korea.[154]
In order to enlist Stalin's support, Zhou traveled to Stalin's summer resort on the Black Sea on 10 October. Stalin initially agreed to send military equipment and ammunition, but warned Zhou that the USSR's air force would need two or three months to prepare any operations and no ground troops were to be sent. In a subsequent meeting, Stalin told Zhou that he would only provide China with equipment on a credit basis, and that the Soviet air force would only operate over Chinese airspace after an undisclosed period of time. Stalin did not agree to send either military equipment or air support until March 1951.[155]
Immediately on his return to Beijing on 18 October 1950, Zhou met with Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang, and the group ordered the 200,000 Chinese troops along the border to enter North Korea, which they did on 25 October. After consulting with Stalin, on 13 November, Mao appointed Zhou the overall commander of the People's Volunteer Army, a special unit of the People's Liberation Army, China's armed forces that would intervene in the Korean War and coordinator of the war effort, with Peng as field commander of the PVA. Orders given by Zhou to the PVA were delivered in the name of the Central Military Commission.[156]
By June 1951, the war had reached a stalemate around the Thirty-eighth Parallel, and the two sides agreed to negotiate an armistice. Zhou directed the truce talks, which began on 10 July. Zhou chose Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua to head the Chinese negotiating team. The negotiations proceeded for two years before reaching a ceasefire agreement in July 1953, formally signed at Panmunjom.[157]
The Korean War was Zhou's last military assignment. In 1952, Peng Dehuai succeeded Zhou in managing the Central Military Commission (which Zhou had headed since 1947). In 1956, after the eighth Party Congress, Zhou formally relinquished his post in the Military Commission and focused on his work in the Standing Committee, the State Council, and on foreign affairs.[158]
After Stalin died on 5 March 1953, Zhou left for Moscow and attended Stalin's funeral four days later. Mao, curiously, decided not to travel to Moscow, possibly because no senior Soviet politician had yet travelled to Beijing, or because Stalin had rejected an offer to meet with Mao in 1948 (nevertheless, a huge memorial service in honor of Stalin was held in Beijing's Tiananmen Square with Mao and hundreds of thousands more in attendance). While in Moscow, Zhou was notably received with considerable respect by Soviet officials, being permitted to stand with the USSR's new leaders—Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikita Khrushchev, Georgy Malenkov, and Lavrentiy Beria—instead of with the other "foreign" dignitaries who attended. With these four leaders, Zhou walked directly behind the gun carriage bearing Stalin's coffin. Zhou's diplomatic efforts on his travel to Moscow were rewarded shortly after when, in 1954, Khrushchev himself visited Beijing to take part in the fifth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic.[145][159]
Throughout the 1950s, Zhou worked to tighten economic and political relations between China and other Communist states, coordinating China's foreign policy with Soviet policies promoting solidarity among political allies. In 1952, Zhou signed an economic and cultural agreement with the Mongolian People's Republic, giving de facto recognition of the independence of what had been known as "Outer Mongolia" in Qing times. Zhou also worked to conclude an agreement with Kim Il Sung in order to help the postwar reconstruction of North Korea's economy. Pursuing the goals of peaceful diplomacy with China's neighbor, Zhou held amicable talks with Myanmar's prime minister, U Nu, and promoted China's efforts to send supplies to Ho Chi Minh's Vietnamese rebels known as the Vietminh.[147]
In April 1954, Zhou traveled to Switzerland to attend the Geneva Conference, convened to settle the ongoing Franco-Vietnamese War. His patience and shrewdness were credited with assisting the major powers involved (the Soviets, French, Americans, and North Vietnamese) to iron out the agreement ending the war. According to the negotiated peace, French Indochina was to be partitioned into Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. Elections were agreed to be called within two years to create a coalition government in a united Vietnam, and the Vietminh agreed to end their guerilla activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.[160]
During one early meeting in Geneva, Zhou found himself in the same room with the staunchly anticommunist American secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. After Zhou politely offered to shake his hand, Dulles rudely turned his back and walked out of the room, saying "I cannot." Zhou was interpreted by onlookers as turning this moment of possible humiliation into a small victory by giving only a small, "Gallic-style" shrug to this behavior. Zhou was equally effective in countering Dulles' insistence that China not be given a seat at the sessions. Furthering the impression of Chinese urbanity and civility, Zhou had lunch with British actor Charlie Chaplin, who had been living in Switzerland since being blacklisted in the United States for his radical politics.[160]
In 1955, Zhou was a prominent participant in the Asian–African Conference held in Indonesia. The conference in Bandung was a meeting of twenty-nine African and Asian states, organized by Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and India, and was called largely to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or neocolonialism by either the United States or the Soviet Union in the Cold War. At the conference, Zhou skillfully gave the conference a neutral stance that made the United States appear as a serious threat to the peace and stability of the region. Zhou complained that, while China was working towards "world peace and the progress of mankind", "aggressive circles" within the United States were actively aiding the Nationalists in Taiwan and planning to rearm the Japanese. He was widely quoted for his remark that "the population of Asia will never forget that the first atom bomb was exploded on Asian soil." With the support of its most prestigious participants, the conference produced a strong declaration in favor of peace, the abolition of nuclear arms, general arms reduction, and the principle of universal representation at the United Nations.[161]
On his way to the Bandung conference, an assassination attempt was made against Zhou when a bomb was planted on the Air India plane Kashmir Princess, chartered for Zhou's trip from Hong Kong to Jakarta. Zhou avoided the attempt when he changed planes at the last minute, but all 11 of the flight's other passengers were killed, with only three crew members surviving the crash. A recent study has blamed the attempt on "one of the intelligence agencies of the KMT."[162] Journalist Joseph Trento has also alleged that there was a second attempt on Zhou's life at the Bandung conference involving "a bowl of rice poisoned with a slow-acting toxin."[163]
According to one account based on recent research, Zhou found out about the bomb on the Kashmir Princess after being warned of the plot by his own intelligence officers and did not attempt to stop it because he viewed those that died as disposable: international journalists and low-level cadres. After the crash, Zhou used the incident to warn the British about the KMT intelligence operatives active in Hong Kong and pressured Great Britain to disable the Nationalist intelligence network operating there (with himself playing a support role). He hoped that the incident would improve Britain's relationship with the PRC, and damage Britain's relationship with the ROC.[164] The official explanation for Zhou's absence on the flight, however, remains that Zhou was forced to change his schedule due to having had surgery for appendicitis.[165]
After the Bandung conference, China's international political situation began to gradually improve. With the help of many of the nonaligned powers who had taken part in the conference, the US-backed position economically and politically boycotting the PRC began to erode, despite continuing American pressure to follow its direction. In 1971 the PRC gained China's seat at the United Nations.[166]
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Premier Enlai, on his first official visit to Pakistan, arrived in Karachi on the morning of 21 December 1956.[167] He began by visiting the graves of the Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, where he laid floral wreaths. Following this, he arrived at PAF Station Mauripur, where he attended an air display by the Pakistan Air Force's F-86 Sabre's and T-33 jets.[168]
Station Commander Group Captain Nur Khan received him, and Zhou inspected an honor guard before being introduced to the pilots participating in the display. Joined by Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy and C-in-C of the PAF Arthur McDonald, Zhou Enlai watched a stunning display of precision flying. Four Sabre jets broke the sound barrier, generating shock waves at an altitude of 30,000 feet, followed by air-to-ground strafing led by Wing Commander FS Hussain.[168]
The jets also performed aerobatic maneuvers in close formation. The highlight of the event was Commander Hussain's solo aerobatics in a T-33 at 600 miles per hour, which received enthusiastic applause. After the demonstration, Premier Zhou asked Prime Minister Suhrawardy to meet Commander Hussain.[169] He congratulated Hussain on his performance, shook hands with him and posed for photos with the pilots. Speaking to local reporters afterward, Zhou remarked that he enjoyed the display "very well" and added, "Your pilots are very well trained."[168]
From December 1963 until January 1964, Zhou made diplomatic visitations to all of the North African countries. On 15 December, Zhou met with President Nasser of Egypt in an effort to further relations between the countries.[170] Then, on 21 December, Zhou visited Algeria. At their meeting, President Ahmed Ben Bella asked for a peaceful coexistence between the two nations.[171] On 27 December, the Tunisian government announced it intended to recognize the Chinese Communist Government after planning with the Tunisian ambassador to have Zhou visit the country for 2 days in January.[172] On 28 December, Zhou visited Morocco and met with King Hasan II. While unconfirmed, it is believed this meeting was more economic in nature, rather than attempting to garner support for communist China.[173]
It is also said he planned on meeting with leaders in Mali, Guinea, and Ghana.[171]
When the PRC was founded on 1 October 1949, Zhou notified all governments that any countries wishing to have diplomatic contact with the PRC must end their relationship with the leaders of the former regime on Taiwan, and support the PRC's claim to China's seat in the United Nations. This was the first foreign policy document issued by the new government. By 1950, the PRC was able to gain diplomatic relationships with other communist countries and with thirteen non-communist countries, but talks with most Western governments were unsuccessful.[174]
Zhou emerged from the Bandung conference with a reputation as a flexible and open-minded negotiator. Recognizing that the United States would back the de facto independence of ROC-controlled Taiwan with military force, Zhou persuaded his government to end the shelling of Kinmen and Matsu, and to search for a diplomatic alternative to the confrontation instead. In a formal announcement in May 1955, Zhou declared that the PRC would "strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is possible."[175] Whenever the question of Taiwan was raised with foreign statesmen, Zhou argued that Taiwan was part of China, and that the resolution of the conflict with the Taiwan authorities was an internal matter.[176]
In 1958 the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was passed to Chen Yi, a general with little prior diplomatic experience. After Zhou resigned his office in Foreign Affairs, the PRC diplomatic corps was reduced dramatically. Some of the staff were transferred to various cultural and educational departments to replace leading cadres who had been labelled "rightists" and sent to work in labor camps.[177]
By the early 1970s, Sino-American relations had begun to improve. Mao's workers in the petroleum industry, one of China's few growing economic sectors at the time, advized the chairman that, in order to consider growth at levels desired by the Party's leadership, large imports of American technology and technical expertise were essential. In January 1970, the Chinese invited the American ping-pong team to tour China, initiating an era of "ping-pong diplomacy".[178]
In 1971, Zhou Enlai met secretly with President Nixon's security advisor, Henry Kissinger, who had flown to China to prepare for a meeting between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong. During the course of these meetings, the United States agreed to allow the transfer of American money to China (presumably from relatives in the United States), to allow American-owned ships to conduct trade with China (under foreign flags), and to allow Chinese exports into the United States for the first time since the Korean War. At the time, these negotiations were considered so sensitive that they were concealed from the American public, the State Department, the American secretary of state, and all foreign governments.[178]
On the morning of 21 February 1972, Richard Nixon arrived in Beijing, where he was greeted by Zhou, and later met with Mao Zedong. The diplomatic substance of Nixon's visit was resolved on 28 February, in the Shanghai Communique, which summarized both sides' positions without attempting to resolve them. The "US side" reaffirmed the American position that America's involvement in the ongoing Vietnam War did not constitute "outside intervention" in Vietnam's affairs, and restated its commitment to "individual freedom", and pledged continued support for South Korea. The "Chinese Side" stated that "wherever there is oppression, there is resistance", that "all foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries", and that Korea should be unified according to the demands of North Korea. Both sides agreed to disagree on the status of Taiwan. The closing sections of the Shanghai Communique encouraged further diplomatic, cultural, economic, journalistic, and scientific exchanges, and endorsed both sides' intentions to work towards "the relaxation of tensions in Asia and the world." The resolutions of the Shanghai Communique represented a major policy shift for both the United States and China.[179]
In 1958, Mao Zedong began the Great Leap Forward, aimed at increasing China's production levels in industry and agriculture with unrealistic targets. As a popular and practical administrator, Zhou maintained his position through the Leap. Zhou has been described by Frank Dikötter as the "midwife" of the Great Leap Forward, who "transformed nightmares into reality".[180][181]
By the early 1960s, Mao's prestige was not as high as it had once been. Mao's economic policies in the 1950s had failed, and he had developed a lifestyle that was increasingly out of touch with many of his oldest colleagues. Among the activities that seemed contrary to his popular image were the swims in his private pool in Zhongnanhai, his many villas around China that he would travel to on a private train, his private, book-lined study, and the companionship of an ever-changing succession of enthusiastic young women whom he met either on weekly dances in Zhongnanhai or on his journeys by train. The combination of his personal eccentricities and industrialization policy failures produced criticism from such veteran revolutionaries as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Zhou Enlai, who seemed less and less to share an enthusiasm for his vision of continuous revolutionary struggle.[182]
To improve his image and power, Mao, with the help of Lin Biao, undertook a number of public propaganda efforts. Among the efforts of Mao and Lin to improve Mao's image in the early 1960s were Lin's publication of the Diary of Lei Feng and his compilation of Quotations from Chairman Mao.[183] The last and most successful of these efforts was the Cultural Revolution.
Whatever its other causes, the Cultural Revolution, declared in 1966, was overtly pro-Maoist, and gave Mao the power and influence to purge the Party of his political enemies at the highest levels of government. Along with closing China's schools and universities, it exhorted of young Chinese to destroy old buildings, temples, and art, and to attack their "revisionist" teachers, school administrators, party leaders, and parents.[184] After the Cultural Revolution was announced, many of the most senior members of the CCP who had shared Zhou's hesitation in following Mao's direction, including President Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, were removed from their posts almost immediately; they, along with their families, were subjected to mass criticism and humiliation.[184]
Soon after they had been removed, Zhou argued that President Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping "should be allowed to come back to work", but this was opposed by Mao, Lin Biao, Kang Sheng and Chen Boda. Chen Boda even suggested that Zhou himself might be "considered counter-revolutionary" if he did not toe the Maoist line.[185] Following the threats that he would share in the fate of his comrades if he did not support Mao, Zhou ceased his criticisms and began to work more closely with the chairman and his clique.
Zhou gave his backing to the establishment of radical Red Guard organizations in October 1966 and joined Chen Boda and Jiang Qing against what they considered "leftist" and "rightist" Red Guard factions. This opened the way for attacks on Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Tao Zhu in December 1966 and January 1967.[186] By September 1968, Zhou candidly described his strategy for political survival to Japanese LDP parliamentarians visiting Beijing: "one's personal opinions should advance or beat a retreat according to the direction of the majority."[187] When he was accused of being less than enthusiastic in following Mao's leadership, he accused himself of "poor understanding" of Mao's theories, giving the appearance of compromising with forces that he secretly loathed and referred to in private as his "inferno".[188] Following the logic of political survival, Zhou worked to aid Mao, and restricted his criticisms to private conversations.
Although Zhou escaped direct persecution, he was not able to save many of those closest to him from having their lives destroyed by the Cultural Revolution. Sun Weishi, Zhou's adopted daughter, died in 1968 after seven months of torture, imprisonment, and rape by Maoist Red Guards. In 1968, Jiang also had his adopted son (Sun Yang) tortured and murdered by Red Guards. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, Sun's plays were re-staged as a way of criticizing the Gang of Four, whom many thought were responsible for her death.[189]
Throughout the next decade, Mao largely developed policies while Zhou carried them out, attempting to moderate some of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, such as preventing Beijing from being renamed "East Is Red City" (Chinese: 东方红市; pinyin: Dōngfānghóngshì) and the Chinese guardian lions in front of Tienanmen Square from being replaced with statues of Mao.[190] Zhou also ordered a PLA battalion to guard the Forbidden City and protect its traditional artifacts from vandalism and destruction by Red Guards.[191] Zhou detested the yangbanxi.[192]: 167 Despite his best efforts, the inability to prevent many of the events of the Cultural Revolution were a great blow to Zhou. Over the last decade of his life, Zhou's ability to implement Mao's policies and keep the nation afloat during periods of adversity was so great that his practical importance alone was sufficient to save him (with Mao's assistance) whenever Zhou became politically threatened.[193] At the latest stages of the Cultural Revolution, in 1975, Zhou pushed for the "Four Modernizations" in order to undo the damage caused by Mao's policies.
During the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou became a target of political campaigns orchestrated by Chairman Mao and the Gang of Four. The "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" campaign of 1973 and 1974 was directed at Premier Zhou because he was viewed as one of the Gang's primary political opponents. In 1975, Zhou's enemies initiated a campaign named "Criticizing Song Jiang, Evaluating the Water Margin", which encouraged the use of Zhou as an example of a political loser.[194]
According to a biography of Zhou by Gao Wenqian, a former researcher at the CPC's Party Documents Research Office, Zhou was first diagnosed with bladder cancer in November 1972.[195] Zhou's medical team reported that with treatment, he had a high chance of recovery; however, medical treatment for the highest-ranking party members had to be approved by Mao. Mao ordered that Zhou and his wife should not be told of the diagnosis, no surgery should be performed, and no further examinations should be given.[196]
According to Ji Chaozhu, Zhou Enlai's personal interpreter, Henry Kissinger offered to send cancer specialists from the United States to treat Zhou, but that offer was eventually refused.[197] By 1974, Zhou was experiencing significant bleeding in his urine. After pressure by other Chinese leaders who had learned of Zhou's condition, Mao finally ordered a surgical operation to be performed in June 1974, but the bleeding returned a few months later, indicating metastasis of the cancer into other organs. A series of operations over the next year and a half failed to check the progress of the cancer.[198] Zhou continued to conduct work during his stays in the hospital, with Deng Xiaoping, as the First Deputy Premier, handling most of the important State Council matters. His last major public appearance was at the first meeting of the 4th National People's Congress on 13 January 1975, where he presented the government's work report. He then fell out of the public eye for more medical treatment.[199] Zhou Enlai died from cancer at 09:57 on 8 January 1976, aged 77.
After Zhou's death, Mao issued no statements acknowledging Zhou's achievements or contributions and sent no condolences to Zhou's widow, herself a senior Party leader.[200] Mao forbade his staff from wearing black mourning armbands.[201] Whether or not Mao would have attended Zhou's funeral, which was held in the Great Hall of the People, remains in question as Mao himself was in very poor health and unable to do so in any event.[201] Mao did, however, have a wreath sent to the funeral.[201]
Mao attacked a proposal to have Zhou publicly declared a great Marxist, and rejected a request that he make a brief appearance at Zhou's funeral, instructing his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, to explain that he could not attend because doing so would be seen as a public admission that he was being forced to "rethink the Cultural Revolution", as Zhou's later years had been closely associated with reversing and moderating its excesses. Mao worried that public expressions of mourning would later be directed against him and his policies and backed the "five nos" campaign (see below) to suppress public expressions of mourning for Zhou after the late Premier's death.[202]
Whatever Mao's opinion of Zhou may have been, there was general mourning among the public. Foreign correspondents reported that Beijing, shortly after Zhou's death, looked like a ghost town. There was no burial ceremony, as Zhou had willed his ashes to be scattered across the hills and rivers of his hometown, rather than stored in a ceremonial mausoleum. With Zhou gone, it became clear how the Chinese people had revered him, and how they had viewed him as a symbol of stability in an otherwise chaotic period of history.[203] Zhou's death also brought condolences from nations around the world.
Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping delivered the eulogy at Zhou's state funeral on 15 January 1976. Although much of his speech echoed the wording of an official statement by the Central Committee immediately following Zhou's death or consisted of a meticulous description of Zhou's remarkable political career, near the end of the eulogy he offered a personal tribute to Zhou's character, speaking from the heart while observing the rhetoric demanded of ceremonial state occasions.[204] Referring to Zhou, Deng stated that:
He was open and aboveboard, paid attention to the interests of the whole, observed Party discipline, was strict in "dissecting" himself and good at uniting the mass of cadres, and upheld the unity and solidarity of the Party. He maintained broad and close ties with the masses and showed boundless warmheartedness towards all comrades and the people.... We should learn from his fine style – being modest and prudent, unassuming and approachable, setting an example by his conduct, and living in a plain and hard-working way. We should follow his example of adhering to the proletarian style and opposing the bourgeois style of life[204]
Spence believed this statement was interpreted at the time as a subtle criticism of Mao and the other leaders of the Cultural Revolution, who could not possibly be viewed or praised as being "open and aboveboard", "good at uniting the mass of cadres", for displaying "warmheartedness", or for modesty, prudence, or approachability. Regardless of Deng's intentions, the Gang of Four, and later Hua Guofeng, increased the persecution of Deng shortly after he delivered this eulogy.[204]
After Zhou's single official memorial ceremony on 15 January, Zhou's political enemies within the Party officially prohibited any further displays of public mourning. The most notorious regulations prohibiting Zhou from being honored were the poorly observed and poorly enforced "five nos": no wearing black armbands, no mourning wreaths, no mourning halls, no memorial activities, and no handing out photos of Zhou. Years of resentment over the Cultural Revolution, the public persecution of Deng Xiaoping (who was strongly associated with Zhou in public perception), and the prohibition against publicly mourning Zhou became associated with each other shortly after Zhou's death, leading to popular discontent against Mao and his apparent successors (notably Hua Guofeng and the Gang of Four).[205]
Official attempts to enforce the "five nos" included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating his achievements. On 25 March 1976, a leading Shanghai newspaper, Wenhui Bao, published an article stating that Zhou was "the capitalist roader inside the Party [who] wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader [Deng] regain his power". This and other propaganda efforts to attack Zhou's image only strengthened the public's attachment to Zhou's memory.[206] Between March and April 1976, a forged document circulated in Nanjing that claimed itself to be Zhou Enlai's last will. It attacked Jiang Qing and praised Deng Xiaoping and was met with increased propaganda efforts by the government.[207]
Within several months after the death of Zhou, one of the most extraordinary spontaneous events in the history of the PRC occurred. On 4 April 1976, at the eve of China's annual Qingming Festival, in which Chinese traditionally pay homage to their deceased ancestors, thousands of people gathered around the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square to commemorate the life and death of Zhou Enlai. On this occasion, the people of Beijing honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument.[208] The most obvious purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan were also attacked for their alleged evil actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao himself, and his Cultural Revolution.[209]
Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on 4 April.[209] First-hand observations of the events in Tiananmen Square on 4 April report that all levels of society, from the poorest peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over the treatment of Zhou, revolt against Mao and his policies, apprehension for China's future, and defiance of those who would seek to punish the public for commemorating Zhou's memory. There is nothing to suggest that events were coordinated from any position of leadership: it was a spontaneous demonstration reflecting widespread public sentiment. Deng Xiaoping was notably absent, and he instructed his children to avoid being seen at the square.[210]
On the morning of 5 April, crowds gathering around the memorial arrived to discover that it had been completely removed by the police during the night, angering them. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a violent riot, in which police cars were set on fire and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square.[208]
By 6:00 pm, most of the crowd had dispersed, but a small group remained until 10:00 pm, when a security force entered Tiananmen Square and arrested them. (The reported figure of those arrested was 388 people but was rumored to be far higher.) Many of those arrested were later sentenced to "people's trial" at Peking University or were sentenced to prison work camps. Incidents similar to those which occurred in Beijing on 4 and 5 April occurred in Zhengzhou, Kunming, Taiyuan, Changchun, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Guangzhou. Possibly because of his close association with Zhou, Deng Xiaoping was formally stripped of all positions "inside and outside the Party" on 7 April, following this "Tiananmen Incident".[208]
After ousting Hua Guofeng and assuming control of China in 1980, Deng Xiaoping released those arrested in the Tiananmen Incident as part of a broader effort to reverse the effects of the Cultural Revolution.
By the end of his lifetime, Zhou was widely viewed as representing moderation and justice in Chinese popular culture.[205] Since his death, Zhou Enlai has been regarded as a skilled negotiator fluent in foreign languages, a master of policy implementation, a devoted revolutionary, and a pragmatic statesman with an unusual attentiveness to detail and nuance. He was also known for his tireless and dedicated work ethic, and his unusual charm and poise in public. He was reputedly the last Mandarin bureaucrat in the Confucian tradition. Zhou's political behavior should be viewed in light of his political philosophy as well as his personality. To a large extent, Zhou epitomized the paradox inherent in a Communist politician with traditional Chinese upbringing: at once conservative and radical, pragmatic and ideological, possessed of a belief in order and harmony as well as a faith, which he developed very gradually over time, in the progressive power of rebellion and revolution.
Though a firm believer in the Communist ideal on which the People's Republic was founded, Zhou is widely credited to have moderated the excesses of Mao's radical policies within the limits of his power.[211] It has been assumed that he successfully protected several imperial and religious sites of cultural significance (such as the Potala Palace in Lhasa and Forbidden City in Beijing) from the Red Guards, and shielded many top-level leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, as well as many officials, academics and artists from purges.[211] Deng Xiaoping was quoted as saying Zhou was "sometimes forced to act against his conscience in order to minimize the damage" stemming from Mao's policies.[211]
While many earlier Chinese leaders today have been subjected to criticism inside China, Zhou's image has remained positive and respected among contemporary Chinese. Many Chinese continue to venerate Zhou as possibly the most humane leader of the 20th century, and the CPC today promotes Zhou as a dedicated and self-sacrificing leader who remains a symbol of the Communist Party.[212] Even historians who list Mao's faults generally attribute the opposite qualities to Zhou: Zhou was cultured and educated whereas Mao was crude and simple; Zhou was consistent whereas Mao was unstable; Zhou was stoic whereas Mao was paranoid.[213] Following the death of Mao, Chinese press emphasized in particular his consultative, logical, realistic, and cool-headed leadership style.[214]
However, recent academic criticism of Zhou has focused on his late relationship with Mao, and his political activities during the Cultural Revolution, arguing that the relationship between Zhou and Mao may have been more complex than is commonly portrayed. Zhou has been depicted as unconditionally submissive and extremely loyal to Mao and his allies, going out of his way to support or permit the persecution of friends and relatives in order to avoid facing political condemnation himself. After the founding of the PRC, Zhou was unable or unwilling to protect the former spies that he had employed in the Chinese Civil War and the Second World War, who were persecuted for their wartime contacts with the enemies of the CCP. Early in the Cultural Revolution, he told Jiang Qing "From now on you make all the decisions, and I'll make sure they're carried out," and publicly declared that his old comrade, Liu Shaoqi, "deserved to die" for opposing Mao. In the effort to avoid being persecuted for opposing Mao, Zhou passively accepted the political persecution of many others, including his own brother.[213][215][216]
A popular saying within China once compared Zhou to a budaoweng (a tumbler), which can imply that he was a political opportunist. Li Zhisui, then one of Mao's personal physicians, characterized Zhou as such and was severely critical of Zhou in his book The Private Life of Chairman Mao, describing him as "Mao's slave, absolutely obsequiously obedient... Everything he did, he did to be loyal to Mao. Neither he nor [Deng Yingchao] had a shred of independent thought".[217] Li also described Mao's contradictory relationship with Zhou as one where he demanded total loyalty, "but because Zhou was so subservient and loyal, Mao held [Zhou] in contempt".[218] Some observers have criticized him as being too diplomatic: avoiding clear stands in complex political situations and instead becoming ideologically elusive, ambiguous, and enigmatic.[211][212] Several explanations have been offered to explain his elusiveness. Dick Wilson, the former chief editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, writes that Zhou's only option "was to go on pretending to support the [Cultural Revolution] movement, while endeavoring to deflect its successes, blunt its mischief and stanch the wounds it was inflicting."[219] This explanation for Zhou's elusiveness was also widely accepted by many Chinese after his death.[211] Wilson also writes that Zhou "would have been hounded out of his position of influence, removed from control of the Government" were he to "make a stand and demand that Mao call off the campaign or bring the Red Guards to heel."[219]
Zhou's involvement in the Cultural Revolution is thus defended by many on the grounds that he had no choice other than political martyrdom. Due to his influence and political ability, the entire government may have collapsed without his cooperation. Given the political circumstances of the last decade of Zhou's life, it is unlikely that he would have survived a purge without cultivating the support of Mao through active assistance.[193]
Zhou received a great deal of praise from American statesmen who met him in 1971. Henry Kissinger wrote that he had been extremely impressed with Zhou's intelligence and character, describing him as "equally at home in philosophy, reminiscence, historical analysis, tactical probes, humorous repartee... [and] could display an extraordinary personal graciousness." Kissinger called Zhou "one of the two or three most impressive men I have ever met,"[220] stating that "his commands of facts, in particular his knowledge of American events and, for that matter, of my own background, was stunning."[221] In his memoirs, Richard Nixon stated that he was impressed with Zhou's exceptional "brilliance and dynamism".[213]
"Mao dominated any gathering; Zhou suffused it. Mao's passion strove to overwhelm opposition; Zhou's intellect would seek to persuade or outmaneuver it. Mao was sardonic; Zhou penetrating. Mao thought of himself as a philosopher; Zhou saw his role as an administrator or a negotiator. Mao was eager to accelerate history; Zhou was content to exploit its currents."
—Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, On China (2011)[222]
After coming to power, Deng Xiaoping may have overemphasized Zhou Enlai's achievements to distance the Communist Party from Mao's Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, both of which had seriously weakened the Party's prestige. Deng observed that Mao's disastrous policies could no longer represent the Party's finest hour, but that the legacy and character of Zhou Enlai could. Furthermore, Deng received credit for enacting successful economic policies that Zhou initially proposed.[223] By actively associating itself with an already popular Zhou Enlai, Zhou's legacy may have been used (and possibly distorted) as a political tool of the Party after his death.[193]
Zhou remains a widely commemorated figure in China today. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Zhou ordered his hometown of Huai'an not to transform his house into a memorial and not to keep up the Zhou family tombs. These orders were respected within Zhou's lifetime, but today his family home and traditional family school have been restored, and are visited by a large number of tourists every year. In 1998, Huai'an, in order to commemorate Zhou's one hundredth birthday, opened a vast commemorative park with a museum dedicated to his life. The park includes a reproduction of Xihuating, Zhou's living and working quarters in Beijing.[124]
The city of Tianjin has established a museum to Zhou and his wife Deng Yingchao, and the city of Nanjing has erected a memorial commemorating Communist negotiations in 1946 with the Nationalist government which features a bronze statue of Zhou.[224] Stamps commemorating the first anniversary of Zhou's death were issued in 1977, and in 1998 to commemorate his 100th birthday.
The 2013 historical drama film The Story of Zhou Enlai features the trip of Zhou Enlai in May 1961 during the Great Leap Forward, when he investigated the rural situation in Huaxi of Guiyang and a former revolutionary base Boyan Township of Hebei.
Two rock songs refer to Zhou. In their 1969 song "How-Hi-the-Li", composed by bassist Ric Grech, Family, in a satire of political figures, ask "if Mr. Chou En-Lai, he gets high / With all the tea in China." Also, Zhou is one of many world figures mentioned in Billy Joel's 1989 hit song "We Didn't Start the Fire".
Cambodia:
Grand Cross of the Royal Order of Cambodia (1956)[225]
National Independence Medal (1964)[226].svg/1280px-Flag_of_the_United_Arab_Republic_(1958%E2%80%931971).svg.png){kind=small}
Egypt:
Order of the Republic (1963)[227]
Indonesia:
Star of the Republic of Indonesia, 2nd Class (1961)[228].svg/1280px-Flag_of_Burma_(1948%E2%80%931974).svg.png){kind=small}
Myanmar:.png/1280px-Ordine_della_Verit%C3%A0_-_divisione_civile_(Birmania).png){kind=small}
Grand Commander of the Most Glorious Order of the Truth (1961)[229].svg/1280px-Flag_of_Poland_(1928%E2%80%931980).svg.png){kind=small}
Polish People's Republic:
Grand Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta (1954)[230]
