El derecho penal sudafricano es el conjunto de leyes nacionales relacionadas con el delito en Sudáfrica . En la definición de Van der Walt et al. , un delito es "una conducta que el derecho consuetudinario o estatutario prohíbe y que está sujeta expresa o implícitamente a un castigo perdonable únicamente por el Estado y que el infractor no puede evitar por su propia acción una vez que ha sido condenado ". [1] El delito implica infligir daño a la sociedad. La función u objeto del derecho penal es proporcionar un mecanismo social con el que obligar a los miembros de la sociedad a abstenerse de una conducta que sea perjudicial para los intereses de la sociedad.
En Sudáfrica, como en la mayoría de los sistemas jurídicos adversariales , el estándar de prueba requerido para validar una condena penal es la prueba más allá de toda duda razonable . Las fuentes del derecho penal sudafricano se encuentran en el common law , la jurisprudencia y la legislación.
El derecho penal (que debe distinguirse de su contraparte civil) forma parte del derecho público de Sudáfrica, [2] así como del derecho sustantivo (a diferencia del procesal ). [3] El estudio del "derecho penal" generalmente se centra en el derecho sustantivo: es decir, los principios del derecho según los cuales se determina la responsabilidad penal (culpabilidad o inocencia), mientras que el derecho de procedimiento penal, junto con el derecho de la prueba , generalmente se centra en los procedimientos utilizados para decidir la responsabilidad penal y las teorías del castigo. [4] Un estudio del derecho penal sustantivo puede dividirse en dos grandes secciones:
También es necesario distinguir entre el derecho penal nacional y el internacional . El término "derecho penal" suele referirse al derecho penal interno o nacional, que se rige por el sistema jurídico del país de que se trate. El término "derecho penal internacional", que designa una rama más reciente del derecho, es considerado por algunos como una rama del derecho internacional público, mientras que otros sostienen que es, "al menos en el sentido material (y cada vez más también en el sentido institucional y procesal), una disciplina por derecho propio". [4]
El sistema de justicia penal de Sudáfrica tiene por objeto hacer cumplir la ley, enjuiciar a los infractores y castigar a los condenados. Es la parte o subsistema del sistema jurídico nacional que determina las circunstancias y los procedimientos según los cuales el Estado puede castigar a las personas y a las entidades jurídicas por conducta delictiva.
El castigo es la imposición autoritaria de sufrimiento por parte del Estado a causa de un delito penal. El "objetivo esencial del derecho penal es proporcionar un mecanismo para castigar al delincuente". [5] Existen numerosas teorías sobre el castigo, cuyos dos objetivos principales son
Las distintas teorías del castigo buscan responder a la pregunta: “¿Por qué el sistema de justicia penal castiga a los individuos? En otras palabras, ¿cuál es el propósito del castigo ?” [6]
En el derecho penal se han identificado diversas teorías del castigo, que normalmente se agrupan o clasifican en tres grandes apartados:
Las teorías retributivas o absolutas del castigo, “quizás las más conocidas y con raíces antiguas”, [6] tienen como objetivo restablecer el equilibrio legal alterado por el delito; también se las conoce como “justo merecimiento”. [6] Las antiguas nociones de justicia, incluida la idea de “ ojo por ojo ” (la antigua lex talionis ), “claramente informaron esta teoría del castigo”. [6]
En el derecho penal moderno, "hay que tener cuidado de no confundir la retribución con la venganza ". [7] El foco ahora no está en la venganza, privada o de otro tipo; es, más bien, "un intento más matizado e ilustrado de restaurar el equilibrio que fue perturbado por la conducta criminal". [7] Se ha argumentado, en consecuencia, que sería más apropiado referirse a este enfoque como " justicia restaurativa ". [7] Un punto o premisa importante a tener en cuenta, al considerar la teoría retributiva del castigo, es la noción fundamental del derecho penal de que los individuos son personalmente responsables de sus propias malas acciones. Esta es la idea del autodeterminismo o libre albedrío . [7]
Las teorías retributivas generalmente tienen en cuenta la proporcionalidad y consideran el historial de faltas previas del autor. No buscan justificar el castigo con referencia a algún beneficio futuro que pueda lograrse con él; de hecho, es incorrecto describir la retribución como un "propósito del castigo". La retribución, según esta teoría, es la característica esencial del castigo. [8]
Existen tres tipos de teorías utilitaristas o relativas del castigo:
Los dos primeros, disuasión y prevención, están conectados, en el sentido de que el objetivo de la disuasión es prevenir la reincidencia o la reincidencia.
Según la teoría preventiva del castigo, el propósito del castigo es la prevención del delito. Esta teoría puede superponerse con sus contrapartes disuasorias y reformadoras, ya que tanto la disuasión como la reforma pueden considerarse simplemente métodos de prevención del delito. Entre los "ejemplos menos drásticos del enfoque preventivo" se encuentran "el encarcelamiento (preventivo) y la pérdida del permiso de conducir ". [7]
Por otra parte, existen otras formas de castigo (como la pena capital y la cadena perpetua , y la castración de los delincuentes sexuales ) que están en línea con el propósito preventivo, pero que no necesariamente sirven también a los objetivos de reforma y disuasión. [9] Estas formas son "la manifestación más extrema" de la teoría preventiva: "El delincuente queda permanentemente incapacitado y ya no puede representar un riesgo para la sociedad". [7] La pena capital "también puede verse como la forma máxima de retribución". [7]
De todas las teorías relativas, la teoría de que el castigo debe servir como disuasivo "es posiblemente la más popular". [7] Hay que hacer una distinción importante entre
Se puede decir que la disuasión individual está dirigida principalmente a la prevención de la reincidencia , aunque la tasa de reincidencia en Sudáfrica es de alrededor del noventa por ciento, [10] lo que parecería sugerir que no está teniendo éxito.
Si el castigo impuesto al infractor individual es "desproporcionadamente severo" en su función de advertencia al resto de la sociedad, "el castigo ya no puede ser descrito como un 'merecido justo' (en términos de la teoría retributiva) y, en el contexto sudafricano, también podría haber una objeción constitucional". [7] En consecuencia, "el enfoque disuasorio general del castigo es [...] menos atractivo (al menos no tanto como la teoría retributiva, que ofrece la posibilidad de una mejor proporcionalidad)". [7]
La tercera de las teorías utilitaristas o relativas del castigo es la teoría reformadora, que se resume en la sentencia en S v Shilubane , [11] donde el tribunal encontró "abundante evidencia empírica " —no citó ninguna, sin embargo— de que la justicia retributiva había "fallado en detener la ola cada vez mayor de delincuencia" en Sudáfrica. [12] Los tribunales, decidió, deben por lo tanto "considerar seriamente" sentencias alternativas, como el servicio comunitario, como alternativas viables al encarcelamiento directo. [13] Un enfoque reformador, concluyó el tribunal, "beneficiaría enormemente a nuestra sociedad al excluir la posibilidad de que se impongan sentencias distorsionadas de manera rutinaria a personas que no las merecen". [13]
"Este enfoque", escriben Kemp et al. , "es, a primera vista, bastante atractivo, ya que pretende ser sofisticado y no apunta a la retribución, sino a la reforma (lo que connota impresiones positivas de la mejora de los individuos y la sociedad)". [7] Sin embargo, hay "muchas objeciones prácticas y teóricas". [7] Todas ellas se reducen, en esencia, a la afirmación de que la reforma "en realidad no funciona en la práctica: el sistema de justicia penal simplemente no es bueno para 'reformar' a las personas". [7] Además, "también hay una objeción teórica/moral: si el enfoque se centra únicamente en el delincuente individual que necesita ser reformado, entonces no hay justicia en términos de las víctimas o la sociedad en general. Eso deja la impresión o percepción muy real de que 'no se hizo justicia'". [7]
Dado que “las diversas teorías del castigo contienen aspectos positivos y negativos” [14], un “enfoque obvio debería ser una combinación bien equilibrada de los elementos que sean más adecuados en términos de los intereses de la sociedad, el delincuente individual y la naturaleza del delito”. [14] En derecho penal, esto se conoce como “la teoría de la combinación del castigo”. [14]
La teoría de combinación más citada y generalmente aceptada es la expuesta en S v Zinn , [15] donde Rumpff JA estableció una tríada básica de consideraciones de sentencia:
Esta sentencia se ha interpretado como una "confirmación de la teoría de la combinación como el mejor enfoque" en el derecho sudafricano. [14]
En S v Makwanyane , [17] que eliminó la pena capital en Sudáfrica , Chaskalson P proporcionó una combinación más clara de las otras teorías del castigo, haciendo hincapié en la disuasión, la prevención y la retribución. [18] S v Rabie , [19] Aunque se reconoce como un objeto legítimo del castigo, la retribución no debería, según el tribunal, tener un peso indebido, dado el espíritu de derechos humanos de Sudáfrica y el papel que debe desempeñar el ubuntu en la sociedad; el objeto principal del castigo debería ser la prevención y la rehabilitación, no la venganza. El tribunal sostuvo que "el castigo debe adaptarse tanto al criminal como al delito, ser justo para la sociedad y combinarse con una medida de misericordia según las circunstancias". [20]
En el caso S v Salzwedel [21], el tribunal sostuvo que entre los factores agravantes que se debían considerar al dictar sentencia figuraba la motivación racial en la comisión de un delito grave, porque el racismo subvertía las premisas fundamentales del ethos de los derechos humanos que ahora, después del acuerdo negociado, permeaban los procesos de interpretación y discreción judiciales de Sudáfrica. El tribunal decidió que una pena de prisión sustancial, por un asesinato cometido por racismo, daría expresión a los legítimos sentimientos de indignación de la comunidad. También enviaría un mensaje contundente de que los tribunales no tolerarán —y tratarán con severidad— los delitos graves perpetrados como consecuencia de valores racistas e intolerantes incompatibles con el ethos de la Constitución .
En S v Combrink [22], el tribunal sostuvo que, dada la ira pública por las sentencias que parecen favorecer a un grupo particular de la sociedad, el tribunal debe ejercer sensibilidad judicial en los casos que parecen tener connotaciones raciales o discriminatorias. El interés público contra la discriminación no radica necesariamente en la discriminación entre negros y blancos, sino más bien entre personas en general que perciben a los demás, con prejuicios, como diferentes o inferiores a ellos. Para combatir adecuadamente los delitos motivados por el odio , los encargados de tomar decisiones en el sistema de justicia penal deben estar atentos al hecho de que los efectos van mucho más allá de las víctimas, y contribuyen a traumatizar a comunidades enteras y dañar a la sociedad sudafricana.
Según el principio de legalidad , el Estado puede infligir castigo solo por contravenciones de un delito designado creado por una ley que, antes de la contravención, estaba en vigor, era válida y aplicable. [23] [24] Es un corolario del estado de derecho : una idea desarrollada, principalmente durante los siglos XVII y XVIII, por filósofos políticos como Montesquieu y Beccaria , "como reacción a la dureza y arbitrariedad de los sistemas políticos de su época". [24] La doctrina del estado de derecho sostiene que las personas deben ser gobernadas por y de acuerdo con la ley (un cuerpo de reglas establecidas e imparciales), en lugar de por "los caprichos arbitrarios de los que están en el poder", [24] y que todos, incluidos los que están en el poder, deben estar sujetos a la ley. Nadie debe estar "por encima de la ley".
El principio de legalidad se resume en el dictum nullum crimen sine lege , "no hay delito sin ley". Este principio, "básico para la responsabilidad penal en nuestro derecho", como lo expresó el tribunal en S v Smit , [25] [26] se complementa con el de nullum crimen sine poena , "no hay delito sin castigo". [27] [28] En R v Zinn , [29] aunque el tribunal no asumió que, si una ley ha de crear un delito, debe prever expresamente o por referencia un castigo, se pensó que "es improbable que si el legislador hubiera tenido la intención de que el Besluit creara un delito, no hubiera tomado la precaución de insertar una pena, más particularmente porque esto es lo que parece haberse hecho en general". [30] El tribunal en R v Carto sostuvo que "para que cualquier acto sea criminal en nuestra ley, debe haber algún castigo fijado para la comisión del acto", y que "donde no existe una ley que fije tal castigo no hay delito en la ley". [31]
Otro principio importante es el de nulla poena sine lege : “no hay castigo sin ley”. Para aplicar el principio de legalidad, es importante que las definiciones de los delitos de derecho consuetudinario y de los delitos tipificados en la ley sean razonablemente precisas y establecidas. Las leyes penales deben interpretarse estrictamente; la ley debe ser accesible. [32] Por último, está el dictum nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali : “las leyes y los castigos no operan retrospectivamente”.
La Constitución sudafricana consagra el principio de legalidad. En su preámbulo se afirma que Sudáfrica se funda en la supremacía de la Constitución y el imperio de la ley. [33] Por su parte, la Carta de Derechos dispone que "toda persona acusada tiene derecho a un juicio justo , lo que incluye el derecho a:
En términos del principio de ius certum (principio de certeza), el delito no debe, tal como está formulado, ser vago o poco claro. El sujeto debe entender exactamente lo que se espera de él. La definición de un delito debe ser razonablemente precisa y establecida, de modo que las personas no tengan que vivir con el temor de infringir la ley inadvertidamente. Aunque la Constitución no prevé expresamente que las disposiciones penales vagas o poco claras puedan ser derogadas, es "bastante posible e incluso probable", según Snyman, [35] que la primera disposición mencionada se interprete de tal manera que los delitos legales vagamente definidos puedan ser declarados nulos y sin valor. Esta regla de "nulo por vaguedad" puede basarse en el derecho a un juicio justo en general o en el principio de que, si una norma penal en la legislación es vaga e incierta, no se puede afirmar que el acto u omisión en cuestión constituyó realmente un delito antes de la interpretación de la legislación por un tribunal.
También es posible basar el funcionamiento de la disposición de ius certum en el artículo 35(3)(a) {{ de la Constitución, que dispone que el derecho a un juicio justo incluye el derecho a ser informado de la acusación con suficiente detalle para responder a ella. En S v Lavhengwa [36] se sostuvo que el derecho creado en el artículo 35(3)(a) implica que la acusación en sí debe ser clara e inequívoca. Esto, según el tribunal, solo sería el caso si la naturaleza del delito fuera lo suficientemente clara e inequívoca para cumplir con el derecho constitucional a ser suficientemente informado de la acusación. Se sostuvo además que, para cumplir con el requisito de suficiente claridad, uno debe tener en cuenta
No sólo las disposiciones penales legales pueden, por su vaguedad, ser declaradas nulas y sin valor en términos de la Constitución, sino también las disposiciones del common law que son vagas e inciertas. En S v Friedman [41] se argumentó en nombre del acusado que la norma relativa al delito de fraude (según la cual el perjuicio no tiene por qué ser real ni de naturaleza patrimonial) era inconstitucional por su vaguedad. Aunque el tribunal rechazó el argumento, cabe destacar que en ningún lugar de su sentencia cuestionó el principio de que las normas del common law pueden ser declaradas nulas y sin valor por su vaguedad.
Probablemente el principio más importante de responsabilidad penal se recoge en el dictum actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea , o "un acto no es ilícito a menos que haya una mente culpable". Para establecer la responsabilidad penal, el Estado debe probar, más allá de toda duda razonable, que el acusado ha cometido
Aunque en teoría se podrían empezar a estudiar los principios generales de la responsabilidad penal con cualquiera de estos tres elementos, el punto de partida habitual es considerar la conducta del acusado. Si el Estado no puede probar la conducta ilícita del acusado, éste no puede ser penalmente responsable, y las investigaciones sobre la capacidad y la culpa penales se vuelven redundantes. La capacidad y la culpa penales nunca se determinan de forma aislada; deben determinarse en relación con la conducta ilícita particular del acusado en cuestión. Por estas razones, un tribunal de primera instancia normalmente comenzará su sentencia considerando si el Estado ha probado el actus reus , antes de pasar a considerar los otros dos elementos de la responsabilidad.
Dado que cada delito tiene su propia definición, el actus reus varía según el delito en cuestión. Sin embargo, hay ciertos requisitos esenciales que deben cumplirse invariablemente para satisfacer la parte de la investigación sobre conducta ilícita. Burchell enumera los elementos de la conducta ilícita como
Para Snyman es lo siguiente:
La ley violada por la conducta puede ser de derecho consuetudinario o de derecho estatutario. Sin embargo, cuando la conducta imputada al acusado no se ajusta a la definición de delito, o cuando ese delito no existía en el momento en que se produjo la conducta, no se ha satisfecho el principio de legalidad y el acusado no puede ser considerado responsable. Tiene derecho a objetar la acusación sobre la base de que no revela un delito. [43]
La conducta debe
El derecho penal se ocupa de castigar los actos de seres humanos. Por tanto, el acto debe ser un acto humano; debe ser cometido o llevado a cabo por un ser humano. Esto se explica por sí solo. El sistema de justicia penal no se utiliza para castigar a los animales por su mala conducta. Sin embargo, si un ser humano utiliza un animal para llevar a cabo un acto delictivo (por ejemplo, si incita a un perro a morder a alguien), esto no exonera al autor: es el acto humano, la incitación del perro, lo que es punible.
El derecho penal se ocupa de castigar únicamente la conducta que el acusado tiene el poder de impedir o evitar si así lo desea. Por lo tanto, para que exista responsabilidad penal, la conducta del acusado debe ser, en primer lugar, voluntaria. El término "voluntario", tal como se utiliza en esta parte de la investigación, tiene un significado especial y restringido. No tiene nada que ver con lo que el acusado pretendía o deseaba hacer; [44] se ocupa simplemente de si las acciones del acusado estaban o no controladas por su voluntad consciente, en el sentido de que el acusado era físicamente capaz de dirigirlas, impedirlas o detenerlas, si así lo decidía. Si el acto u omisión en cuestión es involuntario, la regla general es que el acusado no es penalmente responsable.
El Estado tiene la carga de probar que la conducta del acusado fue voluntaria. Sin embargo, si el acusado alega que actuó involuntariamente, debe aportar pruebas que sirvan de base a esa defensa. No basta con que simplemente plantee la cuestión en disputa y la deje ahí. Además, incluso si la acción u omisión del acusado fue involuntaria, puede ser considerado penalmente responsable si la conducta involuntaria fue posible gracias a alguna conducta voluntaria previa de su parte.
Las acciones involuntarias no se consideran conductas a efectos de responsabilidad penal. Lo mismo se aplica a las omisiones involuntarias, que son casos en los que el acusado no actuó como lo exige la ley, porque carecía de la capacidad física para controlar sus acciones en el momento pertinente. Por lo tanto, los siguientes ejemplos no suelen considerarse como ejemplos de conducta voluntaria a efectos del derecho penal:
Como se describe en el caso inglés de Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland , [49] el automatismo es cualquier acto que se realiza por los músculos sin ningún control de la mente. Los ejemplos incluyen un espasmo , reflejo o convulsión , o un acto de una persona que está inconsciente porque está dormida . Bratty, en este caso , había estrangulado a un pasajero en su coche. Su defensa fue que había sufrido un desmayo y no podía recordar los eventos críticos. Lord Denning, en apelación, desestimó esta defensa como "el primer refugio de una mente culpable". Añadió: "Un acto no es involuntario simplemente porque no se recuerda; la amnesia no es igual al automatismo".
La palabra "automatismo" se deriva de " autómata ", que se refiere a un dispositivo mecánico sin pensamiento ni voluntad propios. Una persona puede realizar lo que parece ser una acción consciente y dirigida a un objetivo, pero en realidad puede no tener el control consciente de esa acción, o incluso no ser consciente de lo que está haciendo. En algunos casos, esa persona comete actos que, si se cometieran voluntariamente, constituirían delitos. Sin embargo, como su conducta es involuntaria, no puede ser considerada penalmente responsable de esos actos o sus consecuencias.
Los casos de automatismo genuino son poco comunes y pueden ser difíciles de probar. El automatismo a veces se clasifica según sea o no
Anteriormente, los tribunales establecían una distinción entre automatismo "cuerdo" y "demente". Cuando el automatismo se debe a una enfermedad o defecto mental (ya sea psicógeno u orgánico), se denomina automatismo demente. En tales casos, el acusado debe alegar la defensa de la enfermedad o defecto mental. Esta defensa excluye la capacidad criminal, no la conducta ilícita. Tiene dos consecuencias importantes para el acusado:
En S v Stellmacher , un caso que ilustra la diferencia entre el automatismo sano y el loco, Stellmacher era un epiléptico que, mientras se encontraba en un estado de automatismo, disparó y mató a alguien. Antes del incidente, había estado a dieta estricta durante algunas semanas. El día en cuestión, no comió nada y realizó un trabajo físico duro. Alrededor de las 18:00, fue al bar del hotel local y bebió media botella de brandy . Llevaba una pistola consigo. Allí, en el bar, según su testimonio, "cayó en un estado de automatismo, como resultado del fuerte reflejo en sus ojos del sol poniente a través de una botella vacía". Luego se vio involucrado en un altercado con alguien en el bar, sacó su arma, disparó algunos tiros y luego, sin razón aparente, procedió a disparar al fallecido, que acababa de entrar al bar para preguntar si podía pedir una bebida.
En el juicio, se presentó la prueba pericial de que Stellmacher sufría de "amnesia y automatismo" debido a una hipoglucemia o epilepsia, posiblemente provocada por su ayuno y su consumo de alcohol. La cuestión central no era si debía ser condenado por asesinato (se aceptó que no era responsable), sino si había sufrido o no un trastorno mental temporal que requiriera un veredicto especial. El tribunal sostuvo que el automatismo de Stellmacher, en este caso, se debía a factores físicos, no a ninguna anomalía física, por lo que no era necesario un veredicto especial. Fue declarado inocente y absuelto de plano.
Entre las formas y causas más comunes del automatismo sano se encuentran las siguientes:
En los últimos años se ha producido un alejamiento de la distinción entre automatismo sano y automatismo insano, debido a la confusión que genera, dado que la defensa del "automatismo insano" no es en realidad nada más ni menos que la defensa de la enfermedad mental.
Un ejemplo de automatismo se puede encontrar en casos de epilepsia , cuyo síntoma principal son las convulsiones repetidas , generalmente convulsivas . Las causas exactas de la epilepsia no se conocen ni se comprenden por completo, pero se cree que se debe a un desequilibrio químico en el cerebro, que hace que algunas células nerviosas se vuelvan hiperactivas y emitan señales aleatorias y descontroladas. Esto da lugar a las convulsiones.
Los movimientos que se realizan durante un ataque epiléptico son involuntarios, por lo que, en general, no pueden dar lugar a responsabilidad penal. Sin embargo, como la causa de la epilepsia se centra en el cerebro, durante algún tiempo hubo dudas sobre si tal vez se la debería considerar una enfermedad o un defecto mental. En tal caso, habría que plantear la defensa de la locura, basándose en la Ley de Procedimiento Penal de 1977. [53] Sin embargo, en última instancia se estableció que la epilepsia en el derecho sudafricano no es una enfermedad o un defecto mental, por lo que no se requiere un veredicto especial.
Un caso en el que la defensa basada en la epilepsia tuvo éxito es R v Mkize . [54] Mkize era epiléptico. Un día, mientras cortaba carne con un cuchillo afilado , sufrió un episodio que el experto que testificó en el juicio describió como un "equivalente epiléptico": "un ataque en el que el ataque ordinario es reemplazado por un período de confusión". Durante este episodio, sin razón aparente, apuñaló y mató repentinamente a su hermana, que estaba de pie junto a él. Fue acusado de su asesinato. Su defensa fue que su conducta fue involuntaria. El tribunal concluyó, sobre la base de un balance de probabilidades, que efectivamente había sufrido un "equivalente epiléptico". Había estado inconsciente, sin "juicio, voluntad, propósito ni razonamiento". El apuñalamiento fue el resultado de una "actividad refleja ciega". No hubo intención de matar. Sus acciones, por lo tanto, no podían constituir una conducta ilegal a los efectos de la responsabilidad penal. El veredicto fue "no culpable".
Aunque los actos y omisiones involuntarios no pueden, por sí mismos, dar lugar a responsabilidad penal, una situación que requiere especial consideración es cuando el acusado es responsable no sobre la base de su acto u omisión involuntarios finales, sino sobre la base de alguna conducta voluntaria previa, junto con la forma requerida de culpa (generalmente negligencia), donde dicha conducta está causalmente conectada con el acto u omisión involuntarios posteriores.
En R v Victor , [55] el apelante sabía que era propenso a sufrir ataques epilépticos (lo había sido desde los catorce o quince años), pero aun así conducía un automóvil en contra del consejo médico. Un día, sufrió un ataque mientras conducía y chocó contra un peatón y otro automóvil. Alguien resultó gravemente herido. Fue acusado y condenado por conducción imprudente o negligente, no porque fuera epiléptico, sino porque había elegido conducir cuando una persona razonable habría previsto la probabilidad de un ataque y sus consecuencias. En esas circunstancias, no debería haber conducido en absoluto. Aunque su conducta fue involuntaria en el momento del accidente, no podía usar su discapacidad para eludir la responsabilidad. Fue condenado sobre la base de su conducta voluntaria negligente previa.
El conductor del caso R v Schoonwinkel , [56] también epiléptico, fue acusado de homicidio culposo por haber chocado con el conductor de otro coche y haberle causado la muerte. El acusado había sufrido un ataque epiléptico en el momento del accidente, lo que le había dejado la mente en blanco y no le había dado tiempo a tomar medidas evasivas. A diferencia de Víctor, Schoonwinkel sólo había sufrido dos ataques previos menores, el último mucho tiempo antes del accidente. El tribunal aceptó que la naturaleza de su epilepsia era tal que normalmente no se habría dado cuenta ni habría previsto los peligros de conducir. Esta prueba, que distingue este caso del de Víctor , lo exculpó de responsabilidad penal. Su conducta anterior no había sido negligente.
Otro ejemplo de automatismo puede encontrarse en casos de intoxicación . Cuando una persona está extremadamente borracha, o intoxicada de otra manera, esto puede llevar a una pérdida temporal de la conciencia y, a veces, a un comportamiento automático. La ley sudafricana, como principio general de responsabilidad penal, no distingue entre el automatismo como resultado de la intoxicación y otras formas de automatismo sano, independientemente de si la intoxicación es voluntaria o involuntaria. La División de Apelaciones reiteró en S v Johnson [57] que solo la conducta voluntaria es punible. Esto incluye la embriaguez voluntaria que no da lugar a una enfermedad mental: no es una defensa con respecto a un delito cometido durante dicha embriaguez.
En S v Chretien [58] , la autoridad principal en materia de defensa por intoxicación, la División de Apelaciones sostuvo que la intoxicación voluntaria puede constituir una defensa absoluta, que conduce a una absolución total, cuando, entre otras cosas , el acusado bebe tanto que carece de capacidad penal. En particular, el tribunal distinguió entre tres etapas diferentes de intoxicación y su efecto sobre la responsabilidad penal:
El caso de Chetrien explica por qué la intoxicación figura como una defensa en el caso de conducta ilícita, en el caso de capacidad criminal y en el caso de culpa. Sin embargo, para los fines que nos ocupan, debe tenerse en cuenta que sólo la intoxicación extrema puede dar lugar a una conducta involuntaria.
Los principios generales relacionados con la intoxicación voluntaria han sido modificados, en primer lugar por un principio de larga data del derecho romano-holandés, conocido como la regla actio libera in causa , y más recientemente por las disposiciones de la Ley de modificación del derecho penal. [59]
Si una persona se emborracha deliberadamente para cometer un delito "que de otra manera no habría tenido el coraje de cometer", [60] la regla de actio libera in causa establece que será culpable de ese delito, incluso si su conducta no fue voluntaria en el momento de su comisión, porque la causa original de esa conducta (emborracharse) estaba bajo su control consciente en el momento en que lo hizo.
Chetrien provocó "una protesta pública" [60] , que dio lugar, siete años después, a la intervención de la legislatura para limitar las consecuencias destructivas de la decisión. El Parlamento promulgó el artículo 1(1) de la Ley de modificación del derecho penal [59] en "un vano intento de reflejar el sentimiento público sobre la intoxicación". Al hacerlo, "la legislatura simplemente agravó los problemas". [61] Basada en el código penal alemán, esta disposición creó el delito legal especial de cometer un acto prohibido mientras se está en un estado de incapacidad criminal inducido por el consumo voluntario de alcohol. En otras palabras, es un delito penal en sí mismo cometer un acto delictivo mientras la capacidad criminal de uno está deteriorada por el uso voluntario de una sustancia intoxicante, si uno sabe que la sustancia es una que tiende a tener un efecto intoxicante, y si uno es declarado no responsable del delito en cuestión debido a la falta de capacidad criminal. Esto requiere que la fiscalía pruebe, más allá de toda duda razonable, que el acusado no es responsable de un delito de derecho común (aunque puede ser sometido al mismo castigo) debido a la falta de capacidad resultante de esta intoxicación autoinducida, "lo que requiere que la fiscalía emprenda un cambio radical poco habitual ". Como explica Burchell,
Si la intoxicación, que conduce a la absolución del delito de derecho consuetudinario, es sólo suficiente para perjudicar la intención (como en los hechos de Chretien ), en lugar de ser suficiente para perjudicar la capacidad, entonces no puede resultar responsabilidad en virtud del artículo 1(1), ya que la falta de capacidad resultante de la intoxicación debe probarse para una condena en virtud del artículo 1(1). El artículo necesita urgentemente una reforma o reemplazo por un artículo redactado de manera más apropiada. [62]
Otra defensa es la fuerza, que puede adoptar la forma de vis absoluta (fuerza absoluta) o vis compulsiva (fuerza relativa). En S v Goliath , [63] la División de Apelaciones determinó que, en el caso de un cargo de asesinato, la coacción puede constituir una defensa completa. El momento en que se pueda dictar una sentencia absolutoria sobre esta base dependerá de las circunstancias particulares de cada caso. Todo el complejo fáctico debe examinarse cuidadosamente y decidirse sobre él con el mayor cuidado.
La conducta ilícita suele adoptar la forma de un acto o conducta positiva, pero hay ocasiones en que una omisión se considerará ilícita y dará lugar a responsabilidad penal.
En muchos casos, la conducta del acusado adoptará la forma de la comisión efectiva de un acto prohibido por la ley. Este tipo de conducta ilícita "es probablemente el que más se corresponde con la concepción popular de un delito". [64] La mayoría de los delitos de derecho consuetudinario entran en esta categoría. Por ejemplo,
Esta forma de conducta ilícita es “generalmente fácil de identificar y comprender”. [64]
La conducta ilícita también puede adoptar la forma de una omisión, una falta de acción. La situación en este caso es menos sencilla. La regla general es que una persona no será penalmente responsable por no proteger o rescatar a otra persona, porque no existe un deber general de ninguna persona de impedir que se produzca un daño a otra, incluso si pudiera hacerse fácilmente e incluso si fuera lo moralmente correcto. Esta regla se basa en el reconocimiento
Sin embargo, hay ciertas situaciones en las que tal deber existe, porque las convicciones jurídicas de la comunidad exigen que, en esas situaciones, la falta de protección o rescate se considere ilegal.
Una omisión es punible sólo si existe un deber legal de alguien de realizar un determinado tipo de conducta activa. Ministro de Policía v Ewels , [65] aunque es un caso delictivo, expresa la regla general, con su prueba amplia y flexible para la responsabilidad que surge de las omisiones: Una omisión debe considerarse una conducta ilegal cuando las circunstancias del caso son de tal naturaleza
Para determinar si existe o no ilegalidad, la cuestión no es si se produjo la "negligencia" habitual del bonus paterfamilias ; la cuestión es si, habida cuenta de todos los hechos, existía un deber legal de actuar razonablemente. En Ewels , un ciudadano fue agredido en una comisaría por un agente fuera de servicio en presencia de otros agentes. El tribunal sostuvo, sobre la base de los hechos de este caso, que un policía de servicio, si presencia una agresión, tiene el deber de acudir en ayuda de la persona agredida. El incumplimiento de la policía de hacerlo hizo responsable al Ministro de Policía de los daños y perjuicios.
La prueba flexible en Ewels fue adoptada en el derecho penal en S v Gaba . [67]
En deferencia al principio de legalidad, los autores y comentaristas del derecho penal suelen basarse en las categorías establecidas de responsabilidad que han surgido de la jurisprudencia a lo largo de los años. Estas categorías de responsabilidad pueden considerarse como las convicciones jurídicas cristalizadas de la comunidad a las que se hace referencia en Ewels . Puede existir un deber jurídico de actuar
En S v Russell , [71] Russell era un empleado del Departamento de Asuntos Hídricos . Junto con su supervisor y compañeros de trabajo, estaba descargando tuberías en un camión en una estación de tren . Los trabajadores estaban usando una grúa aérea , estacionada debajo de las líneas eléctricas del ferrocarril . Debido al peligro, se había cortado la energía. Mientras el supervisor y los compañeros de trabajo de Russell estaban almorzando , se volvió a conectar la energía. Un empleado del ferrocarril le dijo a Russell que advirtiera al operador de la grúa sobre esto, es decir, sobre el peligro de operar una grúa debajo de un cable eléctrico con corriente, cuando los trabajadores regresaran. Russell aceptó esta instrucción sin señalar que no era el supervisor y no transmitió la advertencia cuando se reanudó la carga. Esta omisión, que constituye negligencia, provocó una muerte, ya que la grúa tocó la línea eléctrica y el operador se electrocutó. Russell fue condenado por homicidio culposo y apeló ante el Tribunal Superior (entonces el Tribunal Supremo), que sostuvo que la forma en que Russell aparentemente había aceptado la advertencia había creado una situación potencialmente peligrosa. En ese caso, tenía la obligación legal de transmitir la advertencia. Al no cumplir con su deber de manera culpable, cometió una clara negligencia. Su condena por homicidio culposo fue confirmada.
En S v Fernandez , [72] el tribunal sostuvo que el apelante había sido negligente al reparar una jaula de la que se había escapado posteriormente un babuino feroz , que mordió a un niño, que posteriormente murió. El apelante debe haber previsto la probabilidad de un ataque en caso de que el babuino escapara; el tribunal sostuvo que fue condenado correctamente por homicidio culposo por no tomar medidas para evitarlo: es decir, por no mantener la puerta de la jaula en buen estado.
En el caso Minister of Police v Skosana [73], se produjo una demora negligente en la prestación de asistencia médica al fallecido, cuya viuda demostró, basándose en un balance de probabilidades, que de otro modo no habría muerto. Se le concedió una indemnización por daños y perjuicios. El tribunal sostuvo que el deber de proteger a los detenidos se extiende más allá de la mera prevención de que sean agredidos. También existe, por ejemplo, el deber de obtener tratamiento médico para ellos cuando sea necesario.
En el caso Minister of Law & Order v Kadir [74], la policía no recabó información que hubiera permitido al demandado gravemente herido presentar una demanda civil contra el conductor del otro vehículo. El Ministro planteó una excepción, alegando que la policía no tenía ninguna obligación legal de recabar dicha información. El tribunal a quo desestimó este argumento, al considerar que la comunidad consideraría lo contrario. Sin embargo, en apelación, la SCA sostuvo que la sociedad entendía que las funciones de la policía se relacionaban principalmente con asuntos penales, el mantenimiento de la ley y el orden, y la prevención, detección e investigación de delitos. La policía no está diseñada para ayudar a los litigantes civiles. La sociedad se resistiría a la idea de responsabilizar personalmente a los policías de los daños derivados de una negligencia relativamente insignificante. El demandado no había demostrado la existencia de una obligación legal.
En cuanto al deber del Estado de proteger a las personas de los delitos violentos, hay varios casos delictivos sugerentes.
El Tribunal Constitucional, en Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security [75] , determinó que el Estado podía ser considerado responsable delictivamente de los daños derivados de las omisiones ilegales de sus funcionarios. En este caso , la conducta de la policía y de un fiscal había dado lugar a la liberación bajo palabra de una persona acusada de violación. Esta persona había agredido posteriormente a la denunciante. Snyman, por ejemplo, ha señalado el énfasis del tribunal en el artículo 39(2) de la Constitución, que dispone que "todo tribunal [...] debe promover el espíritu, el propósito y los objetivos de la Carta de Derechos". Esto, sostiene, "quizás algún día abra el camino para responsabilizar a un agente de policía individual por un delito como el homicidio culposo que se derive de su omisión negligente de proteger a una persona de la posibilidad real de sufrir daño". [76]
En el caso Minister of Safety & Security v Van Duivenboden [77] , el Tribunal Supremo de Apelaciones sostuvo que, si bien los ciudadanos privados pueden tener derecho a permanecer pasivos cuando se amenazan los derechos constitucionales de otros ciudadanos, el Estado tiene un deber constitucional positivo, impuesto por la sección 7 de la Constitución, de actuar en protección de los derechos de la Carta de Derechos. La existencia de este deber implica necesariamente rendición de cuentas. Cuando el Estado, representado por personas que desempeñan sus funciones, actúa en conflicto con la sección 7, la norma de rendición de cuentas debe asumir necesariamente un papel importante a la hora de determinar si se debe reconocer o no un deber legal en un caso particular. [78] Esta norma no siempre tiene que traducir los deberes constitucionales en deberes de derecho privado, exigibles mediante una acción por daños y perjuicios; existen otros recursos disponibles para exigir cuentas al Estado. Sin embargo, cuando el incumplimiento por parte del Estado de sus deberes constitucionales ocurre en circunstancias que no ofrecen otro recurso efectivo que una acción por daños y perjuicios, la norma de rendición de cuentas exigirá normalmente el reconocimiento de un deber legal, a menos que haya otras consideraciones que afecten al interés público que prevalezcan sobre dicha norma. [79]
En el caso Minister of Safety & Security v Hamilton [80], la policía actuó de manera negligente al examinar y aprobar una solicitud de licencia de armas de fuego, y aceptó la exactitud de la información proporcionada por el solicitante. Tenían el deber legal de "ejercer un cuidado razonable al examinar, investigar, recomendar y, en última instancia, conceder" dichas solicitudes. Su falta de ejercicio adecuado de este deber dio lugar a la expedición de una licencia de armas de fuego a una persona no apta, que posteriormente disparó contra el demandado. Se consideró que el Estado era responsable de los daños resultantes.
En Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security , [81] la apelante fue atacada, violada y robada por un conocido delincuente peligroso que había escapado de la custodia policial. El tribunal sostuvo que el Estado estaba obligado a proteger a las personas adoptando medidas activas para prevenir violaciones del derecho constitucional a la libertad y seguridad de la persona: entre otras cosas , protegiendo a todos de los delitos violentos. También estaba obligado en virtud del derecho internacional a proteger específicamente a las mujeres de los delitos violentos. [ cita requerida ] A la luz de estos imperativos, el tribunal ya no podía apoyar el requisito de una relación especial entre el demandante y el demandado para la imposición de un deber legal: La policía tiene el deber de proteger al público en general de los delincuentes peligrosos conocidos bajo su custodia.
Una vez establecido que el acusado tenía el deber legal de prevenir el daño, será responsable por su incumplimiento sólo si tenía los medios y la oportunidad necesarios para evitar que ocurriera, y si el daño ocurrido es directamente atribuible a su omisión ilícita.
Los delitos de consecuencia deben distinguirse de los delitos de circunstancia:
La causalidad no es un elemento general de la responsabilidad. [83] La causalidad describe la forma en que se cumplen los elementos definitorios de algunos delitos. [84]
En todos los delitos de consecuencia, incumbe al Estado probar, más allá de toda duda razonable, que existe un vínculo suficiente entre la conducta inicial del acusado y la consecuencia prohibida. Si no existe un vínculo causal, o si el vínculo es demasiado tenue, el acusado no será culpable del delito, aunque tal vez pueda ser culpable de la tentativa de cometerlo o de algún otro delito.
Hay dos formas de causalidad que deben probarse y que forman parte de una investigación de causalidad en dos etapas:
La investigación en dos etapas puede dividirse en dos elementos: un elemento fáctico (la primera etapa) y un elemento jurídico o de política (la segunda).
La primera etapa de la investigación tiene por objeto determinar si la conducta del acusado fue la causa real o “científica” de la consecuencia, en el sentido de que ésta no se habría producido, ni en ningún momento ni en el momento en que se produjo, de no haber sido por la conducta del acusado. Para decidir esto, el tribunal aplicará la prueba de la condictio sine qua non , también conocida como teoría del “but-for”. Una condictio sine qua non es una condición sin la cual algo –es decir, la situación prohibida– no se habría materializado: literalmente, “la condición sin la cual… no”. [85]
En el caso de un acto positivo, la prueba del contra-por sostiene que, de no haber sido por ese acto, la consecuencia ilícita no se habría producido. La pregunta que debe hacerse es la siguiente: ¿puede el acto eliminarse nocional o hipotéticamente, sin que desaparezca la consecuencia (en el momento de la consecuencia), de la secuencia de eventos que llevaron a la consecuencia?
En el caso de una omisión, la teoría de la condición sine qua non analiza si, de no ser por la omisión, la consecuencia no se habría producido. En otras palabras, insertamos nocional o hipotéticamente el acto positivo correspondido en la secuencia de eventos, en lugar de la inacción del acusado, y luego analizamos si la consecuencia en cuestión se habría producido o no cuando ocurrió:
En S v Van As , [86] Van As era un oficial de policía. Una noche, él y otros policías arrestaron a un hombre por conducir ebrio y lo pusieron bajo custodia. Mientras la policía encerraba al sospechoso en una patrulla, los cinco niños pequeños que lo acompañaban desaparecieron. El detenido rogó a la policía que los buscara. La policía realizó una búsqueda rápida, pero no los encontró. Tres de los niños lograron llegar a casa, pero a la mañana siguiente dos de ellos fueron encontrados muertos por exposición al sol. La policía, incluido Van As, fue acusada y condenada por homicidio culposo. Sin embargo, en apelación, la División de Apelaciones revocó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia. Sostuvo que, si bien habría sido razonable continuar la búsqueda y realizar más averiguaciones, no se había probado, más allá de toda duda razonable, que los niños habrían sido encontrados mediante una búsqueda adecuada si se hubiera realizado. Tampoco se había probado que la falta de realización de dicha búsqueda fuera responsable de las muertes de los niños. El Estado, entonces, no pudo demostrar que las muertes habían sido causadas factualmente por la omisión de la policía.
En el caso Minister of Police v Skosana (mencionado anteriormente), se produjo una demora negligente en la prestación de tratamiento médico a un preso que había resultado herido en un accidente de tráfico y que luego fue detenido por conducir ebrio. Finalmente, el preso murió a causa de sus heridas. Su viuda presentó una demanda por daños y perjuicios derivados de su muerte por negligencia y pudo demostrar, basándose en un balance de probabilidades, que no habría muerto "de no ser por" esa demora. En otras palabras, había pruebas suficientes de que el fallecido probablemente habría sobrevivido si hubiera recibido tratamiento médico antes. Habiendo demostrado así que la demora era una condición sine qua non del fallecimiento de su marido, se determinó que la viuda tenía derecho a una indemnización por daños y perjuicios.
Los pasos a seguir o preguntas a plantear para intentar establecer la causalidad son los siguientes:
Por una parte, la ley no pretende que los individuos eludan la responsabilidad por las consecuencias naturales y probables de su conducta. Por otra parte, la ley no pretende responsabilizar a los individuos por consecuencias que están demasiado alejadas de su conducta original, pues de lo contrario la red de responsabilidad penal se extendería demasiado.
Para determinar si sería razonable y justo considerar el acto de Andrew como la causa de la muerte de Susy, por ejemplo, el tribunal puede invocar la ayuda de una o más teorías específicas de causalidad legal:
En términos del criterio de causa próxima, el acto del acusado puede ser visto como la causa legal de un resultado particular sólo si el resultado surgió directamente de la conducta del acusado. La conducta no será considerada como tal si algún nuevo acto o evento intervino, entre la conducta del acusado y la consecuencia en cuestión, para alterar el curso natural y probable de los acontecimientos de tal manera que la conducta del acusado, aunque puede haber sido la causa original (y por lo tanto la fáctica) de la consecuencia, ya no puede ser considerada como su causa directa o próxima, es decir, su más cercana. Si esto sucede, decimos que la "cadena" de causalidad se ha roto. El acusado, en consecuencia, queda absuelto de responsabilidad.
El caso S v Daniels ofrece lo que Synman describe como el rechazo "más claro" de la teoría de la causa próxima en el derecho sudafricano. [87] Dos jueces de apelación se negaron expresamente a aceptar que sólo un acto que sea una causa próxima de muerte pueda calificar como su causa. [88] [89] [90]
Sin embargo, en S v Tembani , [91] la División Local de Witwatersrand consideró "de suma importancia que la herida original infligida por el acusado fuera una causa operativa y sustancial de la muerte del fallecido".
La idea de una causa próxima fue expresada negativamente en R v Mubila , [92] con la afirmación de que no debe haber novus actus interveniens entre la conducta de X y la muerte de Y, [93] así como positivamente, en la afirmación de que la muerte de Y debe resultar directamente de la conducta de X. [94]
Snyman, respaldando a Daniels , describe la causa próxima como "demasiado vaga y arbitraria para servir como criterio satisfactorio" para la causalidad legal. [87]
En términos de la teoría de la causalidad adecuada, un acto es la causa legal de una situación si, según la experiencia humana, en el curso normal de los acontecimientos, el acto tiene la tendencia a generar ese tipo de situación. Esta teoría, como se señaló anteriormente, fue invocada en Daniels . [95]
Hay una serie de consideraciones basadas en el conocimiento:
En R v Loubser , [96] el Juez Rumpff declaró que, a los ojos de la ley, un acto es la causa de una situación si, según la experiencia humana, la situación se derivará del acto.
Un novus actus interveniens (o nova causa interveniens ) es un nuevo acto interviniente, o una nueva causa interviniente: es decir, una interposición o evento anormal que rompe la cadena de causalidad. Según Burchell [97] , varios factores son importantes para determinar qué tipo de acto o evento interviniente rompe la cadena causal. Es importante tener en cuenta que esta etapa de la investigación implica fuertes consideraciones de política. No se trata simplemente de una investigación sobre si hubo o no algún tipo de factor adicional o externo que contribuyó a la consecuencia en cuestión; la investigación es sobre si ese factor es de tal naturaleza y magnitud que debería exonerar al acusado de responsabilidad por las consecuencias reales de su conducta.
Si, a la luz de la experiencia humana, es poco probable que un acto o acontecimiento siga al acto del acusado, es más probable que se considere que se trata de un novus actus interveniens .
Si el acto del acusado es de un tipo que es poco probable que cause la muerte, es considerablemente más probable que el acto o evento interviniente sea considerado como un novus actus interveniens .
El acusado no necesita ser la única causa de la consecuencia.
Es más probable que la conducta voluntaria (es decir, la conducta que es libre e informada) sea considerada un novus actus interveniens que la conducta involuntaria.
Un acontecimiento anormal, que de otro modo constituiría un novus actus interveniens , no se considerará como tal si fue previsto por el acusado (o, en casos de negligencia, si razonablemente debió haber sido previsto) o si fue planeado por él.
Las susceptibilidades físicas preexistentes de la víctima nunca son, por definición lógica, una causa interviniente. Por lo tanto, cuando la víctima padecía una afección física, como un corazón débil, hemofilia, un aneurisma cerebral o una lesión anterior, que la hacía particularmente susceptible a sufrir daños y, por lo tanto, contribuía a su muerte, la máxima del derecho sudafricano es que "se toma a la víctima tal como la encuentras", con todas sus debilidades y susceptibilidades. Esta regla, conocida comúnmente como la regla del "cráneo delgado" o "cráneo en cáscara de huevo", proviene de una serie de casos ingleses antiguos en los que se descubrió que las víctimas tenían cráneos anormalmente delgados, lo que las hacía especialmente vulnerables a sufrir daños en casos de lesiones relativamente menores.
Para determinar si una intervención médica se considera o no un novus actus interveniens , es importante determinar si la intervención fue negligente o indebida de algún otro modo. Cuando el fallecido murió como resultado de un tratamiento médico (posiblemente riesgoso), necesario debido a la lesión infligida por el acusado, y que se administró de buena fe, no se trata de un novus actus interveniens . Lo mismo se aplica si el acusado murió como resultado de complicaciones, como una infección, que surgieron directamente de esa lesión.
También está claro que la incapacidad de un médico para salvar la vida de una víctima que ya está moribunda o muriendo no es un novus actus interveniens . La cuestión de si la retirada de un sistema de soporte vital por parte de un médico puede considerarse un novus actus surgió en S v Williams , donde se sostuvo que dicha conducta médica no rompió la secuencia causal puesta en marcha por Williams, quien había disparado a la fallecida, infligiéndole así las heridas iniciales que habían hecho necesaria su conexión al respirador en primer lugar. En el plazo de 48 horas, se la había declarado con muerte cerebral y el respirador fue debidamente desconectado. Cuando Williams fue juzgado por su asesinato, afirmó que él no había sido la causa de su muerte; fue, más bien, la conducta de los médicos al desconectar el respirador. Tras ser condenado, apeló ante la Sala de Apelaciones, donde el tribunal distinguió entre "poner fin a un intento infructuoso de salvar la vida" y un acto positivo que causa la muerte, y sostuvo que, dado que la lesión infligida por Williams había sido mortal o había puesto en peligro la vida, y dado que la fallecida se mantenía con vida únicamente por medios artificiales, los médicos no causaron su muerte cuando desconectaron el respirador. Simplemente estaban poniendo fin a un intento infructuoso de salvarle la vida. Por lo tanto, se confirmó la condena de Williams.
En S v Counter , [98] la apelante había disparado a la fallecida, alojándole una bala en la nalga. Sin que ella ni sus médicos lo supieran, la bala había penetrado en su canal anal , causándole una septicemia virulenta y dando lugar a la neumonía de la que, dos semanas después, murió. Le correspondió a la SCA decidir si fue el disparo o más bien la negligencia médica lo que había causado su muerte:
La secuencia de los hechos desde el ingreso de la fallecida hasta su muerte no fue interrumpida por ningún factor causal que afectara o cambiara el orden natural de los acontecimientos, más particularmente no hubo intervención u omisión de las personas encargadas de su cuidado [...]. Es inconcebible en estas circunstancias que el apelante no sea considerado responsable de las consecuencias de sus actos, que llevaron directamente a la muerte de su esposa por etapas enteramente previsibles y de acuerdo con la experiencia humana.
Por último, en diversas decisiones se ha sostenido que, cuando X alienta a Y a suicidarse (el suicidio, en sí mismo, no es punible en la legislación sudafricana) o cuando X proporciona a Y los medios para suicidarse, la conducta voluntaria posterior de Y al suicidarse no necesariamente rompe la cadena causal de eventos puesta en marcha por X. La conducta de Y, en otras palabras, no equivale a un novus actus interveniens . Si el suicidio de Y fue previsto, X puede ser culpable de asesinato; si su suicidio fue imprevisto, pero razonablemente previsible, X será culpable de homicidio culposo.
En R v Motomane [99] (que Snyman desaprueba), el acusado, acusado de asesinato, había apuñalado a una mujer, hiriéndole así una vena. La hemorragia se detuvo, pero se formó un coágulo. La mujer probablemente se habría recuperado en el curso normal de los acontecimientos, pero este curso se interrumpió cuando un médico decidió operarla: una decisión prudente pero no estrictamente necesaria. El coágulo se alteró durante la operación; la mujer se desangró hasta morir. El tribunal sostuvo que se había roto la cadena causal y que la Corona no había podido demostrar que la acusada fuera responsable de la muerte.
El tribunal en S v Tembani , [91] respaldó el enfoque del derecho inglés: Si, en el momento de la muerte, la herida original sigue siendo una causa operativa y sustancial de la muerte, la muerte es resultado de la herida, incluso si otra causa también estaba operando. La muerte no es el resultado de la herida original si es solo el contexto en el que opera otra causa. Solo si la segunda causa es tan abrumadora como para hacer que la herida original sea simplemente parte de la historia se puede decir que la muerte no surge de la herida.
En S v Tembani , [100] se sostuvo que la inflicción deliberada de una herida intrínsecamente peligrosa, de la cual la víctima probablemente moriría sin intervención médica, generalmente debe conducir a responsabilidad por una muerte subsiguiente, independientemente de si la herida era fácilmente tratable o no, e incluso si el tratamiento médico brindado posteriormente fue deficiente o negligente, a menos que la víctima se hubiera recuperado de tal manera que en el momento del tratamiento negligente la lesión original ya no representara un peligro para su vida.
Existe una situación en la que un acto o evento interviniente que ordinariamente calificaría como un novus actus interveniens no será considerado como tal. Esto ocurre cuando el acto o evento interviniente fue realmente planeado, pretendido o previsto por el acusado, en el sentido de que fue una parte calculada de la secuencia causal. Como lo expresan algunas autoridades, las consecuencias previstas nunca pueden (casi por definición) ser "demasiado remotas" para fundar la responsabilidad. El principio relevante ha sido explicado por la División de Apelaciones, que falló en Ex parte die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Grotjohn [101] que, cuando el acto es una parte calculada de la cadena de causalidad que el autor inició, y es una eventualidad que el autor prevé como una posibilidad, y que desea emplear para obtener su objetivo, sería contrario a los principios aceptados de derecho, y a todo sentido de justicia, permitirle refugiarse en el acto como un novus actus interveniens . [102]
En S v Daniels , [103] X disparó a Y dos veces por la espalda con un arma de fuego, tras lo cual Y cayó al suelo. Aún con vida, habría muerto de todos modos a menos que hubiera recibido tratamiento médico en aproximadamente media hora. Esto era muy poco probable, ya que el incidente había ocurrido en un camino solitario en el campo. Luego, X arrojó el arma de fuego al suelo cerca de Y. Poco después apareció Z, recogió el arma de fuego y mató a Y de un tiro en la oreja.
De los cinco jueces de apelación, dos sostuvieron que X y Z habían actuado con un propósito común y que, por lo tanto, su propósito conjunto era la causa de la muerte. Sin embargo, según la interpretación de las pruebas por los otros tres jueces, X y Z habían actuado de forma independiente. Ninguno de los jueces dudó de que el acto de Z fuera una causa de muerte. La cuestión que debían decidir los tres jueces era si, suponiendo que hubiera independencia, el acto de X también constituía una causa de muerte.
Dos de los tres sostuvieron que efectivamente había un vínculo causal, y que las consideraciones de política no exigían que el acto de Z calificara como un novus actus interveniens , rompiendo la cadena de causalidad entre el acto de X y la muerte de Y. Esta sentencia es preferida por Snyman, [104] ya que los dos disparos que X disparó en la espalda de Y en cualquier caso habrían causado su muerte, incluso si Z no hubiera disparado también un tiro a Y. La experiencia humana mostró que los disparos de X tendrían la tendencia, en el curso normal de los acontecimientos, a resultar en muerte. [95]
Aunque la mayoría de las autoridades coinciden en la necesidad de una segunda etapa de la investigación de la causalidad, no hay unanimidad en cuanto a lo que exactamente debería implicar. Los tribunales se han mostrado reacios a reducir la investigación a una simple y mecanicista. Por ejemplo, nunca han adoptado el enfoque de la causa única ni han concedido demasiado peso a factores tan simplistas como la proximidad en términos de tiempo y espacio.
En S v Mokgethi , [105] la División de Apelaciones (por orden del Juez de Apelación Hennie van Heerden ) analizó los diversos enfoques de la causalidad legal y sostuvo que es incorrecto identificar sólo una de estas teorías como la correcta, que se debe aplicar en todos los casos, y al hacerlo excluir de la consideración las otras teorías de causalidad legal. Se podrían utilizar todas las teorías disponibles para ayudar en la investigación principal, que es simplemente si existe o no "un vínculo suficientemente estrecho" entre la conducta inicial del acusado y la consecuencia resultante, o si la consecuencia es "demasiado remota" para los fines de fundar la responsabilidad penal. Se debería aplicar un criterio flexible: la consideración primordial son las exigencias de lo que es justo y equitativo. Al tratar de determinar qué es una conclusión justa y equitativa, un tribunal puede tomar en consideración las diferentes teorías de causalidad legal mencionadas anteriormente y utilizarlas como guías para llegar a una conclusión.
El problema con una prueba flexible, sin embargo, "es que proporciona poca orientación a un tribunal, y por lo tanto no ayuda a crear la certeza razonable del resultado que necesitamos en el derecho penal para satisfacer el principio de legalidad". [106] Esta es la razón por la que, por razones prácticas, y a pesar del dictamen en Mokgethi , se encontrará que la preponderancia de la jurisprudencia sudafricana todavía tiende a favorecer el enfoque directo o de causa próxima.
Snyman señala que, incluso una vez que se han establecido la conducta y el cumplimiento de los aspectos definitorios del delito, todavía hay dos requisitos más muy importantes para la responsabilidad: primero la ilicitud y luego la culpabilidad. [31]
La constatación de ilegalidad se basa en el criterio de razonabilidad objetiva, que se basa a su vez en las buenas costumbres o convicciones jurídicas de la comunidad.
Excluirán la ilicitud, entre otras, las siguientes defensas o causas de justificación:
Una persona actúa en defensa privada si emplea la fuerza para repeler un ataque ilícito de otra persona contra su persona, su propiedad o cualquier otro bien jurídico reconocido. En estas circunstancias, el daño o perjuicio infligido al agresor no es ilícito.
Los requisitos relacionados con el ataque son los siguientes: Debe haber
En R v K , [107] el tribunal sostuvo que no es necesario que la agresión se cometa de manera culpable. También es posible actuar en defensa privada contra alguien que carece de capacidad penal, como una persona con trastornos mentales.
En la mayoría de los casos, se actúa en defensa privada para proteger la vida o la integridad física de una persona, pero no hay ninguna razón en principio por la que no se pueda actuar en defensa privada para proteger también otros intereses, como la propiedad propia. La División de Apelaciones en S v Jackson [108] sostuvo que una persona está justificada en matar en defensa propia no sólo cuando teme que su vida esté en peligro, sino también cuando teme sufrir daños corporales graves. En R v Patel [109] , el tribunal dictaminó que una persona tiene el mismo derecho a usar la fuerza en defensa de otra persona ante un peligro amenazado que el que tendría para defenderse a sí misma si fuera la persona amenazada.
La defensa debe ser
En R v Zikalala , [110] donde el acusado apuñaló y mató al fallecido en una cervecería llena de gente, afirmó que el fallecido lo había atacado con un cuchillo y que estaba actuando en defensa propia. Fue declarado culpable de asesinato y apeló. La División de Apelaciones sostuvo:
La prueba es que la sala estaba repleta y que era difícil moverse en ella, pero la observación impone al apelante un riesgo que no estaba obligado a asumir. No se le exigió que apostara su vida a cambio de "una posibilidad razonable de escapar". Si lo hubiera hecho, bien podría haber figurado como el fallecido en el juicio, en lugar de como el acusado. Además, no se debe atribuir a una persona que de repente se convierte en el objeto de un ataque homicida esa calma mental y esa capacidad para razonar ex post facto formas de evitar el asalto sin tener que recurrir a la violencia. [111]
Nadie está obligado a huir si la huida no ofrece una vía segura de escape: por ejemplo, si sólo implica exponerse a una puñalada por la espalda. En tales circunstancias, una persona tiene derecho a mantenerse firme y defenderse. La condena de Zikalala fue revocada.
La prueba de la defensa privada es objetiva. Si X cree que está en peligro, pero en realidad no lo está, o si cree que alguien lo está atacando ilegalmente, pero en realidad el ataque es legal, sus medidas defensivas no constituyen defensa privada.
Cuando un acusado es imputado de asesinato, el tribunal sostuvo en S v Ntuli , [112] pero es condenado por homicidio culposo por exceder los límites de la legítima defensa razonable, se habrá producido una agresión si se descubre que el acusado se dio cuenta de que estaba aplicando más fuerza de la necesaria.
En cuanto a la proporcionalidad de los medios de defensa con el peligro amenazado, el tribunal en Ntsomi v Minister of Law & Order [113] determinó que debía aplicar una prueba objetiva ex post facto . Cuando un policía es atacado durante el cumplimiento de su deber, debe aplicarse el criterio de un policía razonable, obligado a actuar en las mismas circunstancias. Un policía que intenta efectuar un arresto legal no está obligado a huir de una agresión ilegal: la víctima de una agresión de ese tipo tiene derecho, si no tiene una alternativa razonable, a defenderse con cualquier arma que tenga a mano.
Si el acusado cree, erróneamente pero honestamente, que su persona o sus bienes están en peligro, su conducta en defensa de ellos no constituye defensa privada. Sin embargo, su error puede eliminar el elemento de intención.
El acusado en S v De Oliveira [114] , que vivía en una casa segura y a prueba de robos en una zona peligrosa, se despertó una tarde por la presencia de varios hombres fuera de la casa en la entrada de su casa. Tomó su pistola, abrió la ventana y disparó seis tiros. Dos de ellos alcanzaron a los hombres, uno mató y el otro hirió. No había ninguna indicación de que un ataque a la casa fuera inminente. El acusado no testificó; su defensa de supuesta defensa privada fracasó. Fue declarado culpable de asesinato y de dos cargos de intento de asesinato.
Esta defensa está disponible cuando una persona usa la fuerza para defender un interés en la propiedad: por ejemplo,
Los requisitos para la defensa privada de la propiedad son similares en muchos aspectos a los de la defensa privada de las personas, pero existen ciertas diferencias. Las siguientes son condiciones relacionadas con el ataque. Debe haber evidencia de que:
La defensa de la propiedad debe ser
En Ex parte Die Minister van Justisie: in re S v Van Wyk , [115] la División de Apelaciones sostuvo que la carga de refutar la defensa privada de la propiedad recae sobre el Estado, al igual que tiene la carga de refutar la defensa privada de la persona.
La propiedad no debe ser de valor insignificante. En S v Mogohlwane , [116] Mogohlwane había sido robado por el fallecido, que estaba armado con un tomahawk, de una bolsa que contenía su ropa, zapatos y comida. Mogohlwane luego fue a su casa, cercana, fue a buscar un cuchillo y regresó para recuperar su propiedad. Cuando Mogohlwane intentó recuperar su bolsa, el fallecido se resistió y nuevamente lo amenazó con el tomahawk. Mogohlwane luego lo apuñaló con el cuchillo, causándole la muerte. Mogohlwane fue acusado de asesinato. El tribunal sostuvo que, al determinar si la propiedad es o no de valor trivial, podría tenerse en cuenta que el acusado (como fue el caso en casu ) podría no estar ricamente dotado de posesiones terrenales. Lo que puede ser de poco valor para una persona rica puede ser de gran valor para una persona pobre. Dadas las circunstancias financieras de Mogohlwane, los artículos robados eran de valor para él. La conducta de Mogohlwane estaba justificada, ya que su intento de recuperar su propiedad se produjo lo suficientemente cerca en el tiempo del robo como para formar parte de la misma cadena de acontecimientos. El Estado no había demostrado que el acusado tuviera un medio o método menos peligroso y más eficaz al alcance razonable para defenderse del acto de robo, por lo que se decidió que Mogohlwane había actuado en defensa privada y, por lo tanto, de manera legal.
Una persona actúa por necesidad y, por lo tanto, su acto es lícito si actúa para proteger su propia vida, integridad física, propiedad o cualquier otro interés reconocido legalmente o el de otra persona, que se encuentra en peligro por una amenaza de daño que ha comenzado o es inminente y que no puede evitarse de ninguna otra manera, siempre que la persona no esté legalmente obligada a soportar el peligro y que el interés protegido no sea desproporcionado con respecto al interés necesariamente lesionado por el acto de protección. Es irrelevante que la amenaza de daño adopte la forma de coacción o emane de un agente no humano, como la fuerza de las circunstancias.
La defensa privada y el estado de necesidad están estrechamente relacionados: ambos permiten a una persona proteger intereses valiosos para ella, como la vida, la integridad física y la propiedad, contra un peligro inminente. También existen diferencias entre ellos:
La necesidad puede surgir de la compulsión o de un mal inevitable.
Un ejemplo de compulsión es cuando Craig ordena a Richman que cometa un acto punible, como prender fuego al automóvil de Helena, y amenaza con matar a Richman si no cumple. Richman cumple debidamente. La emergencia aquí es el resultado de una conducta humana ilegal; el acto (de incendio provocado) está dirigido contra una tercera persona inocente, es decir, Helena.
En el caso de un mal inevitable, la situación de emergencia es el resultado de una intervención no humana, como un acto de la naturaleza (una inundación, por ejemplo) o alguna otra circunstancia fortuita como un naufragio. Si se declara un incendio en la casa de Y y X, para escapar, tiene que romper una ventana, puede responder a una acusación de daño malicioso a la propiedad con una defensa de necesidad. Si el bebé de X consigue un frasco de pastillas y se las traga todas, y X, al llevarla rápidamente al hospital, excede el límite de velocidad, también puede invocar la necesidad.
En S v Bailey , [117] la División de Apelaciones determinó que una persona es culpable de un delito respecto del cual la intención es un requisito cuando se prueba que
El mero peligro de perder el trabajo no da derecho a actuar por necesidad, sostuvo el tribunal en S v Canestra . [118] [119] Si uno no puede ejercer su profesión sin contravenir la ley, debe buscar otra profesión.
En S v Mtewtwa , [120] el tribunal sostuvo que, para que la defensa del estado de necesidad sea aplicable, la amenaza o el peligro que se pretende evitar debe seguir existiendo; no debe haber terminado todavía. Si hubiera terminado, no habría nada que evitar. [121]
Una regla fundamental del derecho sudafricano es que nadie puede sacar provecho de sus propias faltas. Nadie puede utilizar su negligencia o mala conducta previa para justificar sus acciones posteriores y eludir la responsabilidad. Según esta regla, un acusado no podría invocar la defensa del estado de necesidad si él mismo causa la amenaza o el peligro mediante su propia conducta culpable.
No está claro, sin embargo, hasta qué punto esta regla es válida, al menos cuando se expresa en términos absolutistas: "Un enfoque calificado y más matizado parece más apropiado". [122] La opinión de Snyman es que la regla sólo se aplica a los casos en los que el acusado era realmente consciente de que estaba creando un riesgo de peligro a través de su conducta anterior, pero persistió en esa conducta de todos modos, pero no se aplica a los casos en los que el acusado, aunque negligente, no era consciente del riesgo que estaba creando.
Como decidió la SCA en el caso S v Lungile , [123] "Una persona que se une voluntariamente a una banda o grupo criminal y participa en la ejecución de un delito penal no puede plantear con éxito la defensa de la compulsión cuando, en el curso de dicha ejecución, uno de los miembros de la banda le ordena realizar un acto para promover dicha ejecución". [124]
En S v Bradbury , [125] un miembro de una banda desempeñó a regañadientes un papel menor en un asesinato por temor a represalias si se negaba. La División de Apelaciones consideró que era necesario un elemento disuasorio para este tipo de gangsterismo. Por lo tanto, la decisión del juez de primera instancia de imponer la pena de muerte no era tan irrazonable como para justificar la intervención del tribunal de apelación. "Como proposición general", escribió Holmes JA, "un hombre que voluntaria y deliberadamente se convierte en miembro de una banda criminal con conocimiento de su código disciplinario de venganza no puede invocar la coacción como defensa ni el miedo como atenuante". [126]
Tanto en Bradbury como en Lungile, el acusado era consciente de que estaba creando un riesgo de peligro a través de su conducta anterior.
La conducta del acusado debe haber sido necesaria para evitar el daño o peligro amenazado. Esto no significa que literalmente no haya habido ninguna alternativa, sino simplemente que no había otra forma práctica de evitar el daño o peligro amenazado. La prueba aquí es objetiva: si, a la luz de todas las circunstancias, cabía esperar o no que una persona razonable resistiera la amenaza.
La División de Apelaciones en R v Mahomed , [127] que cita algunas de las antiguas autoridades en la materia, [128] sostuvo que las acciones del acusado y los medios utilizados deben ser una respuesta razonable al peligro amenazado. Esto significa
En S v Malan , [129] el acusado (un granjero) había sufrido durante muchos años problemas con animales callejeros que causaban daños a su tierra. Tras haber agotado todos los recursos, desde incautar los animales hasta enviar mensajes a su dueño, sin éxito, el acusado disparó y mató a los animales cuando volvieron a extraviarse en su tierra. El tribunal consideró que dicha conducta no era irrazonable en las circunstancias; por lo tanto, era legal.
En el caso delictivo de Peterson v Minister of Safety & Security , [130] el tribunal citó [131] a Midgley y Van der Walt en el siguiente sentido:
Los medios empleados y las medidas adoptadas para evitar el peligro de daño no deben haber sido excesivos, habida cuenta de todas las circunstancias del caso. [1]
En S v Pretorius , [132] en el que Pretorius excedió el límite de velocidad al llevar a toda prisa al hospital a una persona gravemente enferma, el tribunal sostuvo que la carga de la prueba en una defensa de necesidad recae sobre el Estado, que debe descartar la posibilidad razonable de un acto de necesidad. No le corresponde al acusado demostrar al tribunal que actuó por necesidad.
En S v Mtewtwa , como hemos visto, el tribunal sostuvo que, cuando la defensa de un acusado es la de la coacción, recae sobre el Estado la carga de demostrar que un hombre razonable habría resistido la coacción. El acusado no tiene la carga de demostrar al tribunal que actuó bajo coacción.
Las antiguas autoridades consideraban que nunca se justificaba que una persona matara a una persona inocente para salvar su propia vida. Se pensaba que una persona debería someterse a la muerte, aunque la amenaza a su propia vida pudiera considerarse un factor atenuante. Este enfoque prevaleció hasta tiempos relativamente recientes, como lo ilustra el importante caso penal inglés de R v Dudley & Stephens [133] , que sentó un precedente, en todo el mundo del common law, de que la necesidad no es una defensa ante una acusación de asesinato. Se trataba del canibalismo de supervivencia después de un naufragio y su supuesta justificación sobre la base de una costumbre del mar. Dudley y Stephens se vieron involucrados en un naufragio y quedaron a la deriva en un bote abierto con otras dos personas: un hombre llamado Brooks y un camarero de diecisiete años llamado Parker. Después de diecisiete días en el mar, ocho de ellos sin comida y seis sin agua, quedó claro que era poco probable que sobrevivieran mucho más tiempo. Dudley y Stephens acordaron que Dudley debía matar a Parker para poder comérselo, argumentando que, al ser más joven y más débil, sería el primero en morir de todos modos. Brooks no estuvo de acuerdo con el plan. Dudley siguió adelante y mató a Parker. Los tres se comieron sus restos durante los siguientes cuatro días. Fueron rescatados el quinto. Dudley y Stephens, acusados de asesinato, plantearon la defensa del estado de necesidad. El tribunal rechazó esta defensa y los condenó, sosteniendo que la ley espera que el hombre medio sacrifique su propia vida por la de una víctima inocente.
En R v Werner [134] y S v Bradbury , la División de Apelaciones siguió esencialmente el mismo enfoque que en R v Dudley and Stephens. En Werner, un asesinato había sido cometido por prisioneros de guerra que actuaban bajo las órdenes de un oficial superior. El tribunal sostuvo que el asesinato de una persona inocente por compulsión nunca es legalmente justificable. En cuanto a Bradbury, miembro de una pandilla peligrosa, había desempeñado a regañadientes un papel menor en un asesinato planeado, influenciado por el miedo a represalias de naturaleza grave contra él o su familia si se negaba. El juez de primera instancia le había impuesto la pena de muerte. En una apelación contra esta sentencia, la División de Apelaciones sostuvo que, sopesando la influencia del miedo frente a la necesidad de un elemento disuasorio para este tipo de gangsterismo, no había nada tan irrazonable en la decisión del juez de primera instancia como para justificar una constatación de que su discreción no se había ejercido judicialmente.
En S v Goliath , [63] sin embargo, el tribunal adoptó una opinión diferente de la sostenida en S v Bradbury y R v Dudley and Stephens. Goliath y otra persona (el primer acusado en el juicio) se acercaron al fallecido, y el primer acusado comenzó a robarle. El primer acusado sacó un cuchillo y le dijo a Goliath que atara al fallecido. Goliath se opuso. El primer acusado dijo que apuñalaría a Goliath si no obedecía. Goliath ató entonces al fallecido. El primer acusado apuñaló al fallecido hasta matarlo. El primer acusado le dijo a Goliath que le quitara los zapatos al fallecido y, cuando Goliath dudó, amenazó de nuevo con matarlo. Goliath obedeció. Ambos fueron acusados de asesinato, Goliath como cómplice. El tribunal de primera instancia condenó al primer acusado, pero absolvió a Goliath sobre la base de que había actuado bajo coacción. El Estado, sin embargo, reservó ciertas cuestiones de derecho para la decisión de la División de Apelaciones. La más pertinente de ellas era si la defensa de la coacción podía constituir alguna vez una defensa contra el asesinato. En respuesta, la Sala de Apelaciones confirmó que Goliath había sido absuelto correctamente, es decir, aceptó que la necesidad, en forma de coacción, puede ser una defensa completa contra el asesinato de una tercera persona inocente. Sin embargo, no es una defensa que se acepte a la ligera; dependerá de todas las circunstancias circundantes. Todo el complejo fáctico debe examinarse cuidadosamente y juzgarse con el mayor cuidado. En el caso de Goliath, el factor decisivo fue que el primer acusado tenía los medios y la voluntad de llevar a cabo su amenaza de matar a Goliath allí mismo si Goliath no cumplía con sus exigencias. También pesó mucho para el tribunal que Goliath no fuera ni el instigador ni el principal autor, sino simplemente un cómplice renuente; y que tampoco se benefició en modo alguno del crimen.
La defensa de la necesidad en un cargo de asesinato fue confirmada en S v Peterson , [135] ya que el Estado no había probado que una persona razonable ficticia en la posición del acusado hubiera ofrecido resistencia a la compulsión, incluida una amenaza contra su vida, que había sido ejercida por un coacusado.
La máxima lex non cogit ad impossibilia puede traducirse en el sentido de que la ley no obliga a nadie a hacer lo imposible. La imposibilidad es la defensa adecuada (excluyendo la ilegalidad) en los casos en que la ley impone a una persona el deber legal de realizar un acto positivo y la persona no puede cumplir con ese deber. La lógica política de esta justificación es que sería injusto castigar a un individuo que contraviniera la ley en condiciones en las que no podría actuar de otra manera. En este sentido, la imposibilidad podría considerarse como "la otra cara de la necesidad", [136] pero los requisitos de las dos defensas no se corresponden exactamente.
Debe existir una obligación positiva impuesta por la ley, que con ella debe ser absolutamente imposible de cumplir físicamente, no meramente difícil o inconveniente. En R v Jetha , [137] el apelante había zarpado hacia la India el 11 de octubre de 1926; su patrimonio fue embargado provisionalmente el 13 de octubre de 1926. En marzo de 1929, después de su regreso, fue condenado por contravenir la sección 142(a) de la Ley de Insolvencia, [138] al no haber asistido a la primera reunión de sus acreedores el 11 de noviembre de 1926. El tribunal, en apelación, sostuvo que, como el apelante no sabía ni podía haber sabido la fecha de la reunión hasta después de que se celebró, y como le habría sido físicamente imposible asistir incluso si hubiera sabido la fecha, no había fundamento para la condena.
La imposibilidad no debe ser culpa del acusado. En R v Korsten , [139] un acusado llevó a su ganado a bañar en un baño municipal, pero el capataz municipal le impidió hacerlo porque no había cumplido con una ordenanza que disponía que nadie podía utilizar el baño excepto si presentaba cupones, previamente comprados, que le dieran derecho a hacerlo. La excusa del acusado para no haber comprado dichos cupones fue que no sabía que esto era necesario. El tribunal sostuvo que, en la medida en que la Ley de Enfermedades Animales [140] impuso al acusado una obligación absoluta de bañar a su ganado, estos hechos no ofrecían defensa alguna.
La cuestión aquí es si un acto por lo demás ilícito puede o no justificarse por el hecho de que el acusado simplemente estaba obedeciendo las órdenes de un superior. Los romanos lo expresaron así: "Está libre de culpa quien está obligado a obedecer". [141] [142]
Para tener éxito en una defensa de órdenes superiores, se debe demostrar
Estos requisitos se establecen en S v Banda [143] , donde el tribunal sostuvo que la defensa de la obediencia a las órdenes superiores era una forma de defensa de la compulsión, en el sentido de que el subordinado estaba obligado a seguir las órdenes de su oficial superior. Por lo tanto, se considera injusto responsabilizar penalmente a un soldado simplemente por seguir órdenes. El fundamento de la defensa es que la disciplina militar exige una obediencia inmediata e incuestionable a las órdenes, respaldada por un castigo severo por la desobediencia.
En el caso Queen v Albert , [144] el tribunal sostuvo que se presume que un niño menor de catorce años que ayuda a su padre a cometer un delito lo hace en obediencia a las órdenes de su padre, y no es punible, incluso si sabía que estaba realizando un acto prohibido, a menos que, en el caso de un niño mayor de siete años, el delito sea "atroz", [145] o tan "atroz como para absolver obviamente a la persona a la que se le ordenó cometerlo del deber de obediencia". [146] [147]
En S v Banda (un juicio por traición celebrado después del fallido golpe militar en Bophuthatswana), el juez Friedman estableció una distinción entre una orden ilegal y una manifiestamente ilegal. Cuando las órdenes son tan manifiesta y palpablemente ilegales que un hombre razonable en las circunstancias del acusado (un soldado en este caso ) sabría que lo son, el deber de obedecer está ausente y el acusado será responsable de los actos cometidos en cumplimiento de dichas órdenes. Por lo tanto, si un soldado obedece una orden que es ilegal, pero no "manifiesta y palpablemente ilegal", aún podría invocar la defensa de la obediencia a órdenes superiores. Sin embargo, si a un soldado se le ordena masacrar civiles o violar y saquear, no podría invocar esta defensa, ya que una conducta de esta naturaleza sería manifiesta y palpablemente ilegal.
En S v Mostert [148] , que se ocupó de la aplicabilidad de la defensa a las órdenes de los agentes de tráfico, el tribunal sostuvo que la orden debía haber emanado de alguien legítimamente colocado en autoridad sobre el acusado, y que el acusado debía haber tenido el deber de obedecer la orden dada; finalmente, el acusado no debía haber causado más daño del necesario para cumplir la orden. Si el acusado excede los límites de una orden, no puede alegar que estaba actuando bajo las órdenes de un superior.
Cuando los funcionarios de los tribunales, o de la ley o del Estado en general, y en ciertas circunstancias incluso personas privadas, como instrumentos debidamente autorizados del Estado, cometen delitos en el ejercicio adecuado de dicha autoridad (incluidos actos de agresión a la vida, la persona y la propiedad), pueden ser inmunes al castigo. [149]
Esta defensa se encuentra en la Ley de Inmunidades y Privilegios Diplomáticos [150], que establece las inmunidades y privilegios de las misiones diplomáticas y puestos consulares, y de los miembros de dichas misiones y puestos. El artículo 3 establece que la Convención de Viena sobre Relaciones Diplomáticas de 1961 es aplicable a las misiones diplomáticas y a los miembros de dichas misiones; la Convención de Viena sobre Relaciones Consulares de 1961 es aplicable a los puestos consulares y a los miembros de dichos puestos.
El artículo 4 dispone que los jefes de Estado, los enviados especiales o los representantes de otro Estado, o de otro gobierno u organización, gozan de inmunidad ante la jurisdicción penal y civil de los tribunales. Gozan de los privilegios que les reconoce el derecho internacional consuetudinario , que extiende su inmunidad también a sus familias, a los miembros de su personal y a sus familias. El Ministro debe llevar un registro de todas las personas protegidas por dicha inmunidad. [151]
Los cónsules, sean de carrera u honorarios, no son agentes diplomáticos. No obstante, según el derecho internacional, gozan de inmunidad de procedimiento civil y penal respecto de sus actos oficiales. [152]
La persona oficialmente autorizada para ejecutar la sentencia civil o penal de un tribunal no comete ningún delito al hacerlo. Esta exención no se extiende a los casos en los que el tribunal no tiene jurisdicción. [153] [154] [155] [156] Si los funcionarios del tribunal actúan más allá de su jurisdicción, sus acciones son ilegales, pero pueden eludir la responsabilidad si realmente creen que están actuando legalmente. [157] En S v Madihlaba , [158] se sostuvo que la exención de la autoridad del tribunal no se aplicará a una situación en la que un tribunal no tenía jurisdicción.
En un delito en el que la negligencia es suficiente para generar responsabilidad, y si la creencia del funcionario no sólo era genuina, sino también razonable, [159] [160] no será responsable.
El hecho de que una persona trabaje como funcionario judicial puede indicar que debería conocer la ley relacionada con su esfera de actividad, [161] y, por lo tanto, es negligente. [157]
La prueba de la intención es subjetiva, por lo que la razonabilidad o no de la creencia del acusado es en principio irrelevante. Sin embargo, si esa creencia es manifiestamente irrazonable, especialmente porque la ocupación del acusado requiere que sepa más, esto podría constituir un factor del cual el tribunal puede llegar a la conclusión de que puede inferirse que se conocía la ilicitud. [157] [162]
Las facultades de los funcionarios públicos y de los ciudadanos privados para detener, con o sin orden judicial, están establecidas en la Ley de Procedimiento Penal (CPA). [163] Siempre que los que realizan la detención actúen dentro de los límites de estas facultades, no serán responsables de ninguna agresión u otro delito cometido necesariamente para efectuar, o intentar efectuar, la detención. [157]
El antiguo artículo 49 de la CPA distinguía entre
No se exigía un equilibrio de derecho consuetudinario; no era necesario considerar medios alternativos. Se permitía el uso de la fuerza letal en el caso de los delitos del Anexo 1.
El antiguo artículo 49 ha sido modificado por el artículo 7 de la Ley de Segunda Enmienda de Asuntos Judiciales, [164] que entró en vigor en 2003. Un caso importante requirió el cambio. En Govender v Minister of Safety & Security , [165] la SCA redefinió el artículo 49(1), específicamente las palabras "utilizar la fuerza que en las circunstancias sea razonablemente necesaria [...] para impedir que la persona en cuestión huya", [166] de modo de excluir el uso de un arma de fuego o arma similar, a menos que la persona autorizada para arrestar a un sospechoso que huye, o para ayudar a arrestarlo, tenga motivos razonables para creer que
Al aplicar el criterio de razonabilidad, la naturaleza y el grado de fuerza utilizados deben ser proporcionales a la amenaza que representa el acusado a la seguridad de los agentes de policía y otras personas.
En el caso Ex parte Minister of Safety & Security: In re S v Walters , [167] el Tribunal Constitucional aceptó como constitucionalmente correcta la interpretación del artículo 49(1)(b) en Govender . Esto salvó al artículo 49(1) de la invalidez.
Sin embargo, el artículo 49(2) autoriza a los agentes de policía a utilizar la fuerza en el ejercicio de sus funciones cuando no sea necesaria o razonablemente proporcionada, lo que, según el tribunal, es socialmente indeseable y constitucionalmente inadmisible. El tribunal declaró que el artículo 49(2) es incompatible con la Constitución y, por lo tanto, inválido, ya que viola los derechos a la dignidad, la vida y la seguridad de la persona.
El tribunal continuó explicando la ley relativa al arresto de un sospechoso:
El nuevo artículo 49(2) dice lo siguiente:
Si cualquier arrestador intenta arrestar a un sospechoso y el sospechoso se resiste al intento, o huye, o se resiste al intento y huye, cuando es claro que se está intentando arrestarlo y el sospechoso no puede ser arrestado sin el uso de la fuerza, el arrestador puede, para efectuar el arresto, usar la fuerza que sea razonablemente necesaria y proporcional a las circunstancias para superar la resistencia o para impedir que el sospechoso huya.
Esta es una articulación legal de la prueba de lo razonable o proporcional. La subsección continúa diciendo que "el arrestador está justificado en términos de esta sección al usar fuerza letal que tenga la intención o sea probable que cause la muerte o daño corporal grave a un sospechoso, solo si cree, con motivos razonables,
Estos límites se suman a los comentados anteriormente.
El consentimiento es sólo un motivo de justificación respecto de algunos delitos. No es un motivo de justificación respecto de otros.
Es un motivo de justificación respecto de
En ocasiones constituye un motivo de justificación en materia de agresión.
In R v Peverett,[168] the accused and one "S," at the latter's suggestion, decided to commit suicide by introducing into a closed motor car poisonous fumes from the exhaust pipe of the car. The accused made the necessary arrangements. He and "S" then sat in the car; the accused started the engine. They both lost consciousness but were later removed from the car and eventually recovered. The accused was convicted of attempted murder; his appeal was dismissed. The court held that the fact that "S" was free to breathe the poisonous gas or not, as she pleased, did not free the accused from criminal responsibility for his acts. The accused had contemplated and expected that, as a consequence of his acts, "S" would die; he therefore intended to kill her, however little he may have desired her death.
In determining legal liability for terminating a patient's life, in Clarke v Hurst,[169] the court held that there is no justification for drawing a distinction between
Just as, in the case of an omission to institute life-sustaining procedures, legal liability would depend on whether there was a duty to institute them, so in the case of their discontinuance liability would depend on whether or not there was a duty not to discontinue such procedures once they have been instituted. A duty not to discontinue life-sustaining procedures cannot arise if the procedures instituted have proved to be unsuccessful. The maintenance of life in the form of certain biological functions, such as the heartbeat, respiration, digestion and blood circulation, but unaccompanied by any cortical and cerebral functioning of the brain, cannot be equated with "living" in the human or animal context. If the resuscitative measures were successful in restoring only these biological functions, they were in reality unsuccessful. Artificial measures, such as naso-gastric feeding, could consequently also be discontinued. It is appropriate in cases of this nature, and not in conflict with public policy, to make an evaluation of the quality of life remaining to the patient and to decide on that basis whether life-sustaining measures ought to be taken or continued.
A participant in sport may validly consent only to those injuries which are normally to be expected in that particular sport. Voluntary participation in sport may also imply that the participant consents to injuries sustained as a result of acts which contravene the rules of the game—but only if such incidents are normally to be expected in that particular game.
Injuries inflicted in the course of initiation or religious ceremonies may be justified by consent only if they are of a relatively minor nature and do not conflict with generally accepted concepts of morality.
Sexual assault may be committed with or without the use of force or the infliction of injuries. Consent may operate as a justification for the act if no injuries are inflicted. Where injuries are inflicted, it has been held that consent may not be pleaded as a defence. Snyman has averred, however, that in such cases it would "seem to be more realistic" to enquire into whether the act is contra bonos mores or not. If the injury is slight, it is conceivable that the law may recognise consent to the act as a defence.
Where consent is obtained by means of fraud or deception, it is not genuine consent. Fraud or deception may take the form
However, not all forms of fraud or deception will necessarily vitiate consent. Essentially, fraud or deception will only vitiate consent if it is material in nature: in other words, if the complainant would not have consented at all if he had known the truth, or would only have consented on substantially different terms.
In the case of sexual acts, it has long been the accepted rule that consent will only be vitiated by a fraud or deception that induces either error in negotio or error in personae:
To consent to an otherwise unlawful act, the person consenting must have the ability to understand the nature of the act and to appreciate its consequences. This ability may be lacking due to
In Du Preez v Conradie,[170] the court held that a parent has the right and the power to chastise minor children. This includes the right to impose moderate and reasonable corporal punishment. A step-parent (to whom a divorced parent of the children is married) may exercise the same rights if requested to do so by the other parent, subject to the same limitations as on that parent. The parent and step-parent are not entitled to molest their children or to exceed the bounds of moderate and reasonable chastisement.
Section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution provides expressly that the rights entrenched in it, including section 10—"every person shall have the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity"—and section 11(2)—no "person shall be subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"—shall be interpreted in accordance with the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. In determining, then, whether punishment is cruel, inhuman or degrading within the meaning of the Constitution, the punishment in question must be assessed in the light of the values which underlie the Constitution. The simple message to be taken from this, according to the Constitutional Court, in S v Williams,[171] is that the State, in imposing punishment, must do so in accordance with certain standards; these will reflect the values which underpin the Constitution. In the present context, this means that punishment must respect human dignity and be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. The caning of juveniles in casu was accordingly ruled unconstitutional.
The Abolition of Corporal Punishment Act[172] abolished judicial corporal punishment. The South African Schools Act[173] abolished corporal punishment in schools. In Christian Education v Minister of Education,[174] a private Christian organisation administered a private school and believed that, in terms of its Christian principles, the physical chastisement of children at school was lawful. The organisation applied for an order exempting the school from section 10 of the Schools Act, arguing that the constitutional right to religious freedom allowed it to be so exempted. The Constitutional Court held that the requested order could not be granted. Even if one assumed that section 10 infringed upon parents' right to religious freedom, such infringement was justified, since even private schools exercise their functions for the benefit of the public interest.
The requirements for the lawful parental chastisement of children are laid out R v Janke & Janke.[175] It must be
Relevant considerations in adjudicating on the chastisement of children were laid out in Du Preez v Conradie:[170]
The test for determining criminal capacity is whether the accused had
A defence in this area may relate to
The common-law position is that a minor
In R v K,[107] a charge of murder was brought against a child of thirteen. The presumption, which applies for adults, that he had intended the probable consequences of his actions was not here applicable. The State failed to prove that the child knew that his act (stabbing and thereby killing his mentally ill mother) was unlawful.
In Director of Public Prosecutions, KZN v P,[178] the respondent, a fourteen-year-old girl, had been convicted of the murder of her grandmother. The passing of sentence was postponed for a period of 36 months, on the condition that the respondent complied with the conditions of a sentence of 36 months' correctional supervision in terms of section 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act.[163] On appeal, the State argued that the sentence was too lenient, considering the gravity of the offence. It contended that, despite the young age of the respondent, direct imprisonment should have been imposed.
The test for interference by an appeal court is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is vitiated by irregularity or misdirection or is disturbingly inappropriate. The strongest mitigating factor in favour of the respondent in casu was her youthfulness: She had been twelve years and five months old at the time of the offence. A second factor was that she had no previous conviction. The aggravating factors, however, were overwhelming. The postponement of the passing of sentence was therefore inappropriate in the circumstances, and caused a sense of shock and a feeling that justice was not done.
The Child Justice Act[179] was assented to on 7 May 2009, and commenced on 1 April 2010. Among the purposes of the Act is
Part 2 of the Act deals with the criminal capacity of children under the age of fourteen years.
In terms of section 7, dealing with the minimum age of criminal capacity,
The common law pertaining to the criminal capacity of children under the age of fourteen years was thereby amended.[182]
In terms of section 11, dealing with proof of criminal capacity, the State must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that a child who is ten years or older, but under the age of fourteen years, had the capacity
Section 8 provides for review of the minimum age of criminal capacity:
In order to determine whether or not the minimum age of criminal capacity as set out in section 7(1) should be raised, the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must, not later than five years after the commencement of this section, submit a report to Parliament.
Section 9 deals with the manner of dealing with a child under the age of ten years.
Until 1977, the "defence of insanity" had its roots in English law, in particular the M'Naghten rules.
The CPA replaced these, however, with sections 77 to 79, which were implemented largely on the recommendation of the Rumpff Commission: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons & Related Matters.[184]
There are two questions to consider in respect of mental incapacity:
The meaning or definition of "mental illness" or "mental defect" is provided in S v Stellmacher,[186] discussed above. It is "a pathological disturbance of the accused's mental capacity, not a mere temporary mental confusion which is [...] attributable to [...] external stimuli such as alcohol, drugs or provocation."[187][188]
An affliction or disturbance is pathological if it is the product of a disease.
The criterion in Stellmacher identifies as mental illnesses (as opposed to mental defects) only those disorders which are
To be endogenous is to be of internal origin.[189]
Section 78(1) of the CPA provides that a person whose act or omission constitutes an offence, and who suffers at the time from a mental illness or defect which makes him incapable
will not be criminally responsible for that act or omission.
The difference between the first contingency and the second is between the cognitive and the conative respectively:
S v Mahlinza[191] lays out the general principles relating to criminal capacity and mental illness. One night, the accused in casu, a devoted mother, had taken off her clothing and placed it on a fire. She had then placed her baby and her six-year-old daughter on the fire, and stood at the door of the kitchen to prevent them from escaping. The baby was burnt to death; the six-year-old escaped with burns. The psychiatrist who examined the accused reported that she was laughing and was generally very rowdy, and could not give an account of herself or of her behaviour; she was disorientated and had no insight into her condition. The psychiatrist diagnosed a state of hysterical dissociation. She was charged with murder but found to be insane, and thus not guilty.
Rumpff JA (of the eponymous report) held in Mahlinza that, whenever the issue of the accused's mental faculties is raised (be it in respect of the trial or in respect of her criminal capacity), an investigation into her mental faculties is of primary and decisive importance. Should the investigation show that she did not have criminal capacity, the necessity for an investigation as to fault in the technical sense, and as to the voluntariness with which the offence was committed, falls away. The decision in each case depends on the particular facts and the medical evidence.[192] Rumpff warned that it is both impossible and dangerous to attempt to lay down any general symptoms by which a mental disorder may be recognised as a mental "disease" or "defect."
Burchell lays out a number of types of mental disorder:
The Interim Report of the Booysen Commission of Enquiry into the Continued Inclusion of Psychopathy as Certifiable Mental Illness and the Dealing with Psychopathic and Other Violent Offenders found that the "retention of psychopathy as a mental illness in the Mental Health Act is not only scientifically untenable, but it is also not effective in practice."
In accordance with the recommendations of the Commission, section 286A of the CPA now provides for the declaration of certain persons as dangerous criminals, and section 286B for the imprisonment, for an indefinite period, of such persons.
Even before the Booysen Commission, however, the courts were not prepared to accept psychopathy, in and of itself, as exempting an accused from criminal liability, or even as warranting a lesser sentence on account of diminished responsibility.
In S v Mnyanda,[196] the accused was convicted of murder. In an appeal, he argued that his psychopathy should have been regarded as a mental illness, and thus as a mitigating factor. The court found that the mere fact that an accused may be regarded as clinically a psychopath is not a basis on which he may be found to have diminished responsibility. Only when, in respect of a particular misdeed, it can be said that the psychopathic tendency was of such a degree as to diminish the capacity for self-control to such a point that, according to a moral judgment, he is less blameworthy, will the law recognise his diminished responsibility.
Originally, South Africa followed English law, using the "guilty but insane" formula, but in 1977 the verdict was changed to "not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental defect." Section 78(8)(a) of the CPA allows an appeal against such a finding. Whether or not the verdict in insanity cases is tantamount to an acquittal, from which no appeal is allowed, and whether the State may appeal against a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness or defect—these conundrums have not yet been answered by the courts.
In the past, if a court found an accused to be "not guilty but insane," it had to "direct that the accused be detained in a mental hospital or prison pending the signification of the decision of a Judge in chambers."[197] These provisions were regarded as peremptory; there was no option but to commit the accused to an institution. It is not difficult to see how the inevitable committal to an institution of a person who was found to be insane at the time of the offence, but who subsequently recovered, could lead to "great injustice."[198]
In S v McBride,[199] the accused had been capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his act, but he was unable, because of "an endogenous depression" resulting in "impaired judgment," to act in accordance with that appreciation. The court held that he was not criminally responsible for the killing. Although the accused had since recovered from his illness, to the extent of obtaining employment and "performing a function as a useful member of society," the court considered itself bound to order his detention in a mental hospital.
In Burchell's words, then, "we have the curious contradiction that a sane person is detained in a mental institution (or a prison) because he committed a crime for which, in law, he is not responsible and has accordingly been found 'not guilty.'"[200]
The South African Law Commission, recognising this injustice, proposed that such a person be committed to an institution only if he has not recovered or continues to pose a danger to himself or to society. The legislature addressed the issue with the Criminal Matters Amendment Act,[201] giving the court a discretion, if "it considers it to be necessary in the public interest," in cases involving serious crimes, to order either detention in an institution, or release, conditional or unconditional.
Sections 46 to 48 of the Mental Health Care Act[202] provide for periodic review of the mental-health status of State patients, application for their discharge and various provisions governing conditional discharge.
The range of orders that a judge may issue are set out in section 47(6):
South African law has adopted English law on the onus of proof in these matters: "Every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved." Section 78(1A) of the CPA reiterates that every person is presumed not to suffer from a mental illness or mental defect so as not to be criminally responsible in terms of section 78(1), until the contrary is proved on a balance of probabilities.
In terms of section 78(1B), whenever the criminal responsibility of an accused is in issue, with reference to a commission or omission which constitutes an offence, the burden of proof will be on the party who raises the issue.
Almost always, therefore, it will be on the accused.
In S v Kalogoropoulos,[203] the court held that an accused person who relies on non-pathological causes in support of a defence of criminal incapacity is required in evidence to lay a factual foundation for it, sufficient at least to create a reasonable doubt on that point. It is, ultimately, for the court to decide the issue of the accused's criminal responsibility for his actions, having regard to the expert evidence and to all the facts of the case, including the nature of the accused's actions during the relevant period.
Section 78(7) of the CPA provides that, if the court finds that the accused, at the time of the commission of the offence, was criminally responsible, but that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act, or to act in accordance with an appreciation of that wrongfulness, was diminished by reason of mental illness or mental defect, the court may take that fact into account when sentencing him.
The accused acted with diminished responsibility in S v Mnisi.[204] On seeing his wife in an adulterous embrace with the deceased, the accused had lost control of his inhibitions and shot him. On appeal, the SCA held that the trial court had not accorded sufficient weight to the accused's diminished criminal responsibility. The fact that he had acted with dolus indirectus had also not been taken into account. Deterrence was of lesser importance in this case, the SCA held, because the evidence did not suggest that the accused had a propensity for violence; he was unlikely to commit such an offence again. In view of the accused's diminished criminal responsibility, general deterrence was also of lesser importance. His sentence of eight years' imprisonment was reduced to five.
Non-pathological criminal incapacity must be distinguished from mental illness. A person may suffer from mental illness, and nevertheless be able to appreciate the wrongfulness of certain conduct, and to act in accordance with that appreciation.[205]
Intoxication may affect
There are four types of intoxication:
In R v Bourke,[207] the accused was charged with rape; he was acquitted as a result of intoxication.[208] The court noted three broad propositions in Roman-Dutch law:
The court held that absolute drunkenness is not equivalent to insanity. The essential difference is that the drunk person, as a rule, voluntarily induces his condition, whereas the mentally ill person is the victim of a disease: "It is therefore not unreasonable to consider that the person who voluntarily becomes drunk is responsible for all such acts as flow from his having taken an excess of liquor."
"To allow drunkenness to be pleaded as an excuse," wrote Wessels J, "would lead to a state of affairs repulsive to the community. It would follow that the regular drunkard would be more immune from punishment than the sober man." For another case, see S v B.[210]
In S v Johnson,[57] the leading decision on intoxication prior to S v Chretien,[58] an accused was found guilty of culpable homicide despite the fact that the court accepted the psychiatric evidence that the accused was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing at the time of the offence. This case therefore reaffirmed the principle in Bourke that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse.
In Chetrien, the Appellate Division reconsidered Bourke and Johnson, and eradicated the traditional approach to voluntary intoxication. It firmly adopted a course based on legal principle. The facts were these: While under the influence of alcohol, Chetrien had driven his car into a crowd of people standing in the street. One was killed; five were injured. On charges of murder and attempted murder, the trial court found the accused guilty of culpable homicide, but acquitted him of attempted murder.
The issue on appeal was whether, on the facts, the trial judge, Friedman J, had been correct in law to hold that the accused, on a charge of attempted murder, could not be convicted of common assault where the necessary intention for the offence had been influenced by the voluntary consumption of liquor. Friedman J had accepted that, in his drunken state, the accused had expected that the people would move out of his way. There was some doubt, therefore, as to whether he had the requisite intention for common assault. Friedman J found that he was bound by Johnson. By confining that decision to the issue of culpable homicide, however, and by categorising common assault as a crime requiring "specific intent," he was able to avoid the effect of Johnson in respect of non-specific-intent crimes. Friedman J thus brought to issue the question of whether, subjectively, the accused had the requisite intention for common assault of the five injured persons.
The State's argument was that the trial court should have applied Johnson and found the accused guilty of common assault, even if he lacked mens rea on account of his intoxication. The majority of the Appellate Division concluded that even common assault requires intention to assault. If this intention is lacking due to voluntary intoxication, there can be no conviction. It was found that Chetrien had had no such intention. Rumpff CJ held that the rule in Johnson was juridically impure, and that voluntary intoxication could be a complete defence to criminal liability. Rumpff stressed the importance of the degree of the accused's intoxication:
The latter would have no defence; the former would be acquitted if he was so drunk that his conduct was involuntary, making him unable to distinguish right from wrong, or unable to act in accordance with that appreciation.
Voluntary intoxication was thus removed from the direct influence of policy considerations, and placed firmly on the basis of legal principle. The result is that it can now affect criminal liability in the same way, and to the same extent, as youth, insanity, involuntary intoxication and provocation. Intoxication of a sufficient degree, therefore, can serve to exclude the voluntariness of conduct, criminal capacity or intention.
"While Chetrien cannot be faulted on grounds of logic or conformity with general principles," writes Burchell, "the judgment might well have miscalculated the community's attitude to intoxication. Should a person who commits a prohibited act while extremely intoxicated escape all criminal liability?"[211] In 1982, the Minister of Justice requested the Law Commission to consider the matter. In January 1986, after receiving extensive comment on a working paper, the Commission published a report and a draft Bill. Eventually the Criminal Law Amendment Bill was tabled in Parliament. After its passage, it came into operation on 4 March 1988. The Act[212] contains two short sections, the first of which provides that
any person who consumes or uses any substance which impairs his or her faculties to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her acts or to act in accordance with that appreciation, while knowing that such substance has that effect, and who [...] thus impaired commits any act prohibited by law [...], but is not criminally liable because his or her faculties were impaired [...], shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to the penalty [...] which may be imposed in respect of the commission of that act.[213]
The elements of the offence of contravening the Act are as follows:
There are two main components:
In S v Vika,[214] the appellant was convicted in a regional court on two counts of contravening this section. The prohibited acts were murder and attempted murder. Regarding the appropriate punishment, the magistrate applied the provision that such a contravention could attract the same penalty as that which might be imposed for the unlawful act itself. He found that no substantial and compelling circumstances existed to justify a sentence of less than the fifteen years' imprisonment stipulated in section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.
When the appellant appealed against the sentence, arguing that it was startlingly inappropriate, the High Court held that the magistrate seemed not to have appreciated the difference between the offences of which the appellant had been convicted, and the offences of murder and attempted murder. These amounted to misdirections, and entitled the court to interfere with the sentence. The appeal was thus upheld, the sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment set aside and a sentence of seven years' and four years' imprisonment, running concurrently, imposed.
It is important to remember, therefore, that to be convicted of an offence in terms of section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act is to be convicted of a unique statutory offence, described in detail above, and not of the ordinary common-law offence.
Section 1(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act provides that, if in any prosecution of any offence it is found that the accused is not criminally liable, because his faculties were impaired by the consumption or use of any substance, he "may be found guilty of a contravention of subsection (1), if the evidence proves the commission of such contravention." This subsection provides, in essence, that a contravention of section 1(1) will be regarded as a competent verdict on a charge of another offence.
Section 2 of the Act provides that, whenever it is proved that the faculties of a person were impaired by the consumption or use of a substance when he committed an offence, the court may, in determining an appropriate sentence, regard as an aggravating circumstance the fact that his faculties were so impaired. The Law Commission was not in favour of this provision. As Burchell points out, "a court always has a discretion to impose an appropriate punishment and intoxication can be taken into account either as a mitigating or as an aggravating circumstance." The section does indicate, with the word "may," that the court retains its discretion, but Burchell thinks this superfluous.[215]
Section 1(1) does not specify voluntary consumption. The Bill drafted by the Law Commission did, however, and therefore would have protected from a liability a person who has his drink "spiked" by another. Under the Act, such a person would escape liability on the basis that he did not know that the substance he was drinking would have the effect it did. The Law Commission's Bill, however, has "the advantage of also clearly leading to the acquittal of a person who was forced to drink an alcoholic or other concoction, which he knew would have the effect of impairing his faculties, but who had no control over his actions."[216] Burchell suggests that the courts "interpret the words 'consumes or uses' as implying conduct directed by the consumer's or user's will and therefore importing voluntary intoxication".[217]
Another problem is that the Act refers only to a lack of criminal capacity. What about involuntary conduct and intention? "The wording of the draft bill prepared by the Law Commission," writes Burchell, "is surely preferable,"[217] since it refers simply to an impairment of "mental faculties," without any restriction as to the consequence of this impairment. Chetrien had criminal capacity, but he was acquitted on the ground that there was reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite intention to commit the crimes wherewith he was charged. He would also escape liability under the Act, because his intoxication did not lead to lack of criminal capacity, but rather to lack of mens rea.
There is, finally, a problem in respect of onus. According to general principles, the burden of proving the presence of all the elements of the crime, beyond reasonable doubt, rests on the State. One of the elements that the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt, for a contravention of section 1(1), is that the accused is not criminally liable for his act, committed while intoxicated, "because his faculties were impaired," or better say because he lacked capacity at the time he committed the act. "This," as Snyman points out, "leads to the unusual situation that, in order to secure a conviction of contravening this section, the state must do that which X [the accused] normally does at a trial, namely try and persuade the court that X is not guilty of a crime. The state thus bears the burden of proving the opposite of what it normally has to prove."[218]
The problem in practical terms, Snyman observes, is that "it is difficult for the state to prove beyond reasonable doubt that because of incapacity resulting from intoxication, X cannot be held criminally liable for his act."[218] The courts have warned on multiple occasions that they will not easily conclude that the accused lacked capacity.
The difficulty arises when the two offences are used in the alternative. Snyman posits the following:
If X is charged with assault and the evidence shows that he was only slightly drunk at the time of the act, he will not escape the clutches of the criminal law, because he will then be convicted of assault and the only role the intoxication will play will be to serve as a ground for the mitigation of punishment. If the evidence shows that at the time of the act he was very drunk [...], so drunk that he lacked capacity, he would likewise not escape the clutches of criminal law, because he would then be convicted of contravening this section. However, if the evidence reveals that at the time of the act he happened to fall into the grey area between 'slightly drunk' and very drunk', he will completely escape the clutches of criminal law; he will then 'fall' between the proverbial 'two chairs' and it would then be impossible to convict him of any crime. In this way the section could undoubtedly lose much of its effectiveness.[219]
In S v Mbele,[220] the accused was charged with theft in a magistrate's court. He contended that he had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offence; the State witness testified to the effect that he was "not quite all there." The magistrate could not find on the evidence that the accused had the necessary criminal responsibility, and gave him the benefit of the doubt that his version could possibly be true. Since he was "not criminally liable" for the crime, the magistrate found him guilty of a contravention of section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. On review, the Witwatersrand Local Division held that, for a contravention of section 1(1), the State was required to prove that the accused's faculties were impaired at the time he performed the act, and that, as a result, he was not criminally liable. It was insufficient, therefore, for the State to take matters only so far as uncertainty as to whether his faculties were impaired to the necessary degree. The court found that the State had not proven impairment of the accused's faculties. He could not be convicted, therefore, of the offence of contravening section 1(1). The conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside.
In S v September,[221] the appellant stood trial in a Provincial Division on charges of murder, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, theft and malicious injury to property. The trial court found
On appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence was indeed of such a nature as to cast doubt on his criminal capacity, and that the trial court had correctly found that he could not be convicted of the charges laid against him. It was, however, further argued that positive proof was absent of a lack of criminal capacity, and that the appellant ought accordingly not to have been convicted on section 1(1). The court stressed the fact that it was the task of the trial court, in every case, to decide whether the accused indeed lacked the requisite criminal capacity. Three psychiatrists had testified as to the appellant's alleged state of intoxication. They differed widely in their opinions. The trial court had accepted, without furnishing reasons for so doing, the evidence of the psychiatrist whose opinion it was that the appellant had lacked criminal capacity. This indicated that the trial court had not examined the question of the appellant's criminal capacity to the requisite extent. The evidence as a whole, therefore, had to be assessed anew. After reassessing the evidence, the court found that no reasonable doubt had been cast on the appellant's criminal capacity. The evidence was furthermore sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt, was guilty of contravening the original counts. The court therefore set aside the convictions on section 1(1), and substituted convictions on the original charges.
Provocation may be a complete defence in South African law, and may exclude:
Roman and Roman-Dutch law did not regard anger, jealousy or other emotions as defences for any criminal conduct; they were only factors in mitigation of sentence, and even then only if they could be justified by provocation.
Section 141 of the Transkei Penal Code of 1886 influenced the adoption by the courts of the view that provocation could never be a never be a complete defence to a charge of murder; at most it could be a partial defence. The Code provided that killing which would otherwise have constituted murder could be reduced to culpable homicide if the person responsible acted in the heat of the moment, as a result of passion occasioned by sudden provocation. The decision to reduce a charge of murder to one of culpable homicide depended on an application of the criterion of the ordinary person's power of self-control; the test was objective, in other words.
S v Mokonto[223] saw a change from the objective to a subjective test. The accused believed that the death of his two brothers had been brought about by the evil powers of a witch. When he confronted her, she declared that he would not "see the setting of the sun today," whereupon he struck her with a cane-knife, almost cutting off her head. He was convicted of murder. On appeal, Holmes JA held that he had been provoked to anger by the deceased's threat, and that, therefore, the appropriate verdict should be one of culpable homicide. Holmes considered section 141 of the Transkeian Code, with its provision that "homicide which would otherwise be murder may be reduced to culpable homicide, if the person who causes death does so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation." The Code continues,
Any wrongful act of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive any ordinary person of the power of self-control may be provocation, if the offender acts upon it on the sudden, and before there has been time for his passion to cool.
This did not correlate, Holmes found, with the Roman-Dutch notion that provocation is not a defence. Holmes held that the objective "reasonable person" criterion is not in harmony with modern subjective judicial thinking. It is judicially recognised that intention to kill is purely a subjective matter. Since the test of criminal intention was now subjective, and since earlier cases of provocation applied a degree of objectivity, it might be necessary, he thought, to consider afresh the whole question of provocation. On the other hand, he noted, the facts of a particular case might show that the provocation, far from negativing an intention to kill, had actually caused it. The crime would then be murder, not culpable homicide.
The test for intention being subjective, it seemed to Holmes that provocation, which bears upon intention, must also be judged subjectively. In crimes of which specific intention is an element, therefore, the question of the existence of such intention is a subjective one: What was going on in the mind of the accused? Provocation, Holmes held, is relevant to the question of the existence of such intention. Subjectively considered, it is also relevant to mitigation.
S v Laubscher[224] dealt with the defence of temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity. Laubscher, a medical student, shot and killed his father-in-law, and attempted also to shoot his mother-in-law and his estranged wife one day at his in-laws' home. He was charged with and convicted of murder and attempted murder. His defence was that he had acted involuntarily, since he had lacked criminal capacity at the time of the commission. This was due to a total but temporary "psychological breakdown," or temporary "disintegration of his personality." In order to address the issue of the appellant's mental faculties at the time of the crime, the court had to look at the role of the defence in South African law. To be criminally liable, a perpetrator must, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, have criminal liability. The doctrine of criminal capacity is an independent subdivision of the concept of mens rea. Therefore, to be criminally liable, a perpetrator's mental faculties must be such that he is legally to blame for his conduct.
The court set out the two psychological characteristics of criminal capacity:
In the present case, the defence was one of non-pathological incapacity. Where a defence of non-pathological incapacity succeeds, the accused is not criminally liable; he may not be convicted of the alleged offence. He must be acquitted. Because he does not suffer from a mental illness, or from a defect of a pathological nature, he may not be declared a State patient either.
Laubscher had experienced a considerable amount of stress in the period leading up to the incident. He was an emotionally sensitive 23-year-old with the intelligence of a genius. He and his wife had married young, when she was pregnant, and had struggled financially; he was still a student. Her parents had contributed R80 per month toward their rent, and had taken every opportunity thus afforded them to meddle in the couple's affairs. Laubscher and his parents-in-law did not get along; he feared his father-in-law. Nor did things improve when the baby was born.
The parents took his wife to their farm and made arrangements, without the appellant's consent, to christen the baby. The wife did not return to the appellant afterwards—nor did the baby—and, upon reaching majority, began to institute divorce proceedings. One weekend, the appellant made arrangements with his wife to go away to his parents' home for the weekend with the child, and to some spend time together. She agreed. When he arrived at the farm to pick them up, however, she had apparently changed her mind, so he made arrangements to see his family the following week.
The appellant travelled with a loaded gun, since he was driving alone. He arrived at the farm to be told, again, that he would not be leaving with his wife and child. He went to a hotel, checked in, misspelled his name and other words on the necessary forms, and did not have dinner, although he did have a rum and coke. He went back his in-laws' house and demanded to see his child. His mother-in-law told him he could not. The appellant could recollect nothing after this point. He was woken up the following morning in hospital, with no recollection of what he had done.
The appeal court agreed with the convictions on the first four counts. The defence of involuntary conduct (owing to psychological breakdown or disintegration of personality) had to fail, because Laubscher's behaviour, according to his own version of events, did not support such a finding. His actions were goal-directed and purposeful—before, during and after the shooting. Altogether he had fired some 21 shots into various rooms of the house, requiring him to reload his gun at least twice. He had also managed to drive away from the house immediately afterwards, in an attempt to escape. This was not consistent with automatic behaviour. The trial court's conviction was accordingly upheld. It was in Laubscher that the court first adopted the term "temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity," using it to distinguish between lack of criminal capacity due to mental illness or defect, and lack of criminal capacity due to other factors, such as intoxication, provocation and severe emotional stress.
As to the fifth count (attempted murder), the court held that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Laubscher had the necessary intention, in the form of dolus eventualis, to kill his child—especially in view of the fact that the whole object of his visit to the farm that evening had been to collect his child. As regards sentence, the court held that the appellant had without doubt been suffering from severe stress, and so his sentence was mitigated.
The defence of psychogenic sane automatism was first raised successfully in the Cape Provincial Division, in S v Arnold,[225] where Arnold had shot and killed his wife, Tina, one day at their home. At his trial for murder, it emerged that, like Laubscher, he had been under severe emotional stress at the time of the incident. Apart from long-standing financial and marital problems, he was deeply distressed at parting from his disabled son, whom he had just delivered to a children's home. He had placed the boy there at Tina's insistence. Having taken a gun with him for protection, he returned home and went into the living room to put it away. Tina was in the living room; an argument broke out between them. At one point, Arnold banged his gun on the back of the sofa. It went off accidentally, but no-one was harmed.[226] Tina informed Arnold that she wished to resume her former occupation as a stripper, and bared her breasts to him. At this, he fired upon and killed her. He claimed later that he had no recollection of aiming and pulling the trigger. The psychiatrist who gave evidence for the defence testified that, at the time of the shooting, Arnold's "conscious mind was so 'flooded' by emotions that it interfered with his capacity to appreciate what was right or wrong and, because of his emotional state, he may have lost the capacity to exercise control over his actions."[227] The court, however, identified the legal issues in dispute as follows:
In answer to these questions, the court held that it was not satisfied that the State had passed the first hurdle: It had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Arnold's conduct was voluntary. Even if it had, though, the court was not satisfied that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Arnold had criminal capacity at the relevant time. He was therefore acquitted.
After Arnold, there were a number of murder trials in which the accused claimed that he, too, had acted involuntarily or had lacked criminal capacity as a result of severe emotional stress, coupled with provocation. Although the defence enjoyed a measure of temporary success in the then-Supreme Court,[228] there has thus far been only one case in which it has succeeded in the Appellate Division or in the Supreme Court of Appeal: that of S v Wiid.[229] The accused was also acquitted in the lower court in S v Nursingh[230] and S v Moses.[231]
S v Campher,[232] together with Wiid, makes it clear that provocation may exclude not only the accused's intention to murder, but in certain extreme cases also his criminal capacity. In S v Potgieter,[233] the Appellate Division cautioned that, if the accused's version of events is unreliable, the psychiatric or psychological evidence adduced in favour of the defence of non-pathological incapacity (inevitably based on the accused's version of events) would also be of doubtful validity.
For a long time it was unclear that the defence of temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity was at all different from the defence of sane automatism, and (if so) what the difference was. This question was finally resolved by the SCA in S v Eadie.[234] Eadie had battered a fellow motorist to death with a broken hockey stick in a fit of purported road rage. He had been drinking heavily. He raised the defence of temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity, but this defence was rejected. On conviction, he appealed to the SCA. In a judgment "long and very thorough,"[235] Navsa JA comprehensively reviewed the jurisprudence on provocation and emotional stress, and the historical development of the defences of temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity and sane automatism. He concluded that they are one and the same thing. He went on to hold that a normal person can only lack self-control, and hence criminal capacity, if he is acting in a state of automatism. He also indicated that, although the test of capacity might still remain, in principle, essentially subjective, the application of this test is to be approached with caution. The courts must not too readily accept the ipse dixit of the accused regarding provocation or emotional stress. A court is entitled to draw a legitimate inference from what "hundreds of thousands" of other people would have done under the same circumstances: that is, by looking at the objective circumstances. Drawing such an inference could result in the court's disbelieving an accused who says simply, without adducing any further evidence, that he lacked capacity or acted involuntarily under provocation or emotional stress.
Eadie thus affirmed the High Court's finding that the accused could not successfully raise the defence of non-pathological incapacity on the facts. Both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal drew a pragmatic distinction between loss of control and loss of temper. Eadie
signals a warning that in future the defence of non-pathological incapacity will be scrutinised most carefully. Persons who may in the past have been acquitted in circumstances where they had killed someone who had insulted them will find that courts will scrupulously evaluate their ipse dixit in the context of objective standards of acceptable behaviour.[236]
On this interpretation of Eadie, capacity remains subjectively tested in principle, but the practical implementation of the test must accommodate the reality that the policy of the law, with regard to provoked killings, "must be one of reasonable restraint."[236] It may, writes Burchell,
be difficult for the courts in future not to blur the subtle distinction between, on the one hand, drawing legitimate inferences of individual subjective capacity from objective, general patterns of behaviour, and, on the other hand, judicially converting the current subjective criterion for judging capacity into an objective one.[237]
It is possible to place a more radical interpretation on the judgment of Navsa JA in Eadie—not just as emphasising the court's ability to draw legitimate inferences as to capacity from objective circumstances, but as going further and explicitly requiring the defence of provocation to result in automatism and changing the essence of the test from a subjective to an objective inquiry.
"However," writes Burchell,
the court would neither simply have overturned, by implication, a considerable body of judicial precedent on the nature of capacity nor would it have reached a sweeping conclusion that could possibly alter other aspects of the law where the test of capacity is in issue, without full argument on these issues. Rather than suggesting that the Court replaced the subjective inquiry into capacity with an objective evaluation it is possible to suggest an interpretation of the Eadie case that involves a middle course: Capacity should be both subjectively and objectively assessed.[237]
In the subsequent case of S v Marx,[238] the court held that the binding effect of Eadie was to conflate sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity,[239] "because a person who is deprived of self-control is both incapable of a voluntary act and at the same time lacks criminal capacity."[240]
Shannon Hoctor has bemoaned Eadie's "potentially ruinous effect on the concept of non-pathological incapacity," and hopes that the judgment will be ignored by the courts, becoming "a derelict on the waters of the law," although he concedes that this is unlikely "in the light of courts such as the Eastern Cape High Court in Marx increasingly giving effect to the inevitable doctrinal aftermath [.... M]ere passivity will not be enough. Strong judicial action is required."[241]
Fault is an element of every crime. It may take one of two forms: • intention (dolus); or • negligence (culpa).
All common-law crimes require intention (except for culpable homicide and contempt of court committed by an editor of a newspaper for which negligence is sufficient). Statutory crimes require either intention or negligence. Fault refers to the legal blameworthiness of the reprehensible state of mind or careless conduct of a criminally accountable person who has acted unlawfully.
It is a firmly established principle of criminal justice that there can be no liability without fault, a principle generally expressed in the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (the act is not wrongful unless the mind is guilty). In other words, the general rule is that, in order for an accused to be held liable, in addition to unlawful conduct (or actus reus) and capacity, there must be fault (or mens rea) on the part of the accused. The requirement of fault as an element of liability means, among other things, that fault must exist in respect of each and every element of the crime with which the accused has been charged. This is so whether fault is in the form of intention or of negligence. The only exception to the rule is where the Legislature expressly provides that fault need not exist in respect of each element of a crime but, even in this eventuality, there is a presumption of statutory interpretation that the Legislature intended some form of fault to be required. Murder, by way of illustration, is the unlawful, intentional killing of a human being. In terms of the rule, a person who kills another will be guilty only if he knows or at least foresees the possibility that what he has done is unlawfully to kill a human being. Fault must exist in respect of each of the elements of the crime; if it is absent for any one of them (as where the killer believes he is acting lawfully, or does not know or foresee that death will be the consequence of his conduct, or does not know or foresee that what he is killing is a human being), there can be no fault. The accused must know, therefore, • that he may be acting unlawfully; • that his actions may bring about a death; and • that it is a human being he is killing.
Intention, as a form of fault, has three principal elements:
Intention generally takes one of three forms:
These three forms of intention may be general (indeterminatus).
Dolus directus, or direct intention, is intention in its ordinary grammatical sense: The accused meant to perpetrate the prohibited conduct, or to bring about the criminal consequence. This type of intention will be present where the accused's aim and object was to perpetrate the unlawful conduct or to cause the consequence, even though the chance of its resulting was small.
Dolus indirectus, or indirect intention, exists where, although the unlawful conduct or consequence was not the accused's aim and object, he foresaw the unlawful conduct or consequence as certain, 'substantially certain', or 'virtually certain'.
For instance, the accused in R v Kewelram[242] set fire to certain stock in a store. His objective was the destruction of the stock (dolus directus) in order to obtain the insurance money, but he foresaw the destruction of the store as a substantially certain, or inevitable, consequence of the burning of the stock (dolus indirectus).
Dolus eventualis exists where the accused does not mean to bring about the unlawful circumstance, or cause the unlawful consequence which follows from his conduct, but foresees the possibility of the circumstance's existence or the consequence's ensuing, and nonetheless proceeds with his conduct. In brief, the accused directs his will towards an event or result, but foresees that, in so doing, he may cause another event to ensue. Nevertheless he proceeds with his conduct. Intention in this sense is sometimes called "legal intention."
The facts of R v Jolly[243] provide a clear illustration of the meaning of dolus eventualis. The appellants had unlawfully and deliberately derailed a train. No-one was seriously injured. The appellants argued that there was no desire to injure anyone; they had chosen a spot where the train was moving slowly up a rising gradient with banks on either side of the line. Innes CJ held, despite this, that they had intended to kill:
Now the derailment of a train, even upon a slightly rising grade, must be attended by terrible possibilities of danger to those travelling upon it. Jolly recognised this, for he said in his evidence that he contemplated risk of life. But he and his associates were content to cause that risk in the interests of their larger design.[244]
On Snyman's definition, there are two requirements for existence of dolus eventualis:
The first may be described as the cognitive part of the test; the second is the conative or volitional part.
The first requirement deals with what the accused conceives to be the circumstances or possible consequences of his actions. There cannot be dolus eventualis if he does not envisage those circumstances or consequences. Dolus eventualis differs from dolus indirectus in that the accused foresees the prohibited result not as one which necessarily will flow from his act, but only as a possibility.
"In spite of an objective formulation of dolus eventualis in some earlier cases relating principally to the doctrine of common purpose,"[246] since the early 1950s the courts have favoured a subjective test for intention, which was ultimately adopted by the Appellate Division in R v Nsele. Since Nsele, the subjective test for criminal intention has been consistently applied by South African courts. It is now settled law that
intention, and more particularly dolus eventualis, cannot be established through the application of an objective criterion. It must be proved that the accused subjectively foresaw the possible occurrence of the consequence in question.[246]
The subjective test takes account only of the state of mind of the accused, the issue being whether the accused himself foresaw the consequences of his act. The test may be satisfied by inferential reasoning: that is to say, if it can be reasoned that, in the particular circumstances, the accused "ought to have foreseen" the consequences, and thus "must have foreseen," and therefore, by inference, "did foresee" them.
In S v Sigwahla, Holmes JA expressed the degree of proof in the following terms:
Subjective foresight, like any other factual issue, may be proved by inference. To constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt the inference must be the only one which can reasonably be drawn. It cannot be so drawn if there is a reasonable possibility that subjectively the accused did not foresee, even if he ought reasonably to have done so, and even if he probably did do so.
The inference, then, must be the only one that can reasonably be drawn from the proved facts.
In S v Van Aardt,[247] having regard to the "sustained" and "vicious" assault upon the deceased by the appellant, the SCA found that "the appellant subjectively foresaw the possibility of his conduct causing the death of the deceased and was plainly reckless as to such result ensuing." He was therefore guilty of murder on the basis of dolus eventualis. This finding rendered irrelevant the question of whether or not the appellant owed a duty to the deceased of obtaining medical assistance for him. In the court a quo, however, Pickering J had accepted "that the State was required to prove that the appellant subjectively foresaw the reasonable possibility that his failure to obtain medical assistance for the deceased would lead to the death of the deceased." "This," argues Shannon Hoctor, "is the correct approach, in that in the face of any possible interpretive confusion the interpretation most favourable to the accused should be adopted."
Some consequences of an action will certainly occur; others will probably occur; while it is only a possibility that yet another consequence may occur. The question to be considered is whether all consequences, however remote the possibility of their occurrence, may be said to have been intended, or whether there is some point, in the scale of probability, at which foresight ceases to qualify as intention.
"After some uncertainty in older cases,"[246] this question was settled in part by the decision of the Appellate Division in R v Horn.[248] Prior to this case, it was unclear whether dolus eventualis required foresight on the part of the accused that the consequences in question would probably result from his act, or whether it was sufficient if he foresaw that the consequences might possibly result. The Appellate Division decided that realisation of the possibility of the consequences is sufficient for criminal intention.
In earlier cases, the test for liability had been stated to be whether or not the consequence was "likely" to occur. It was argued in Horn that "likely" "connotes a degree of probability, something more than a mere possibility." Since in this case the evidence showed that the risk of harming the deceased was "one chance in a thousand," and that the risk of killing her was "one chance in many thousands," counsel argued that in the circumstances a fatal wounding was not a likely or probable occurrence, and so could not be said to have been intended by the appellant. Having examined earlier cases, Beyers JA was sceptical of this contention, observing,
No doubt, an accused may, in appropriate circumstances, be heard to say "That which has happened was so improbable that I did not appreciate that there was a risk of it happening." But that is not to say that a person who does foresee a risk of death is entitled, because the risk is slight, to "take a chance" and, as it were, gamble with the life of another.
On this point, the judge went on:
It would be incongruous to limit a wrongdoer's constructive intent to cases where the result which he had foreseen was likely to cause death and not to infer such intent where the result he had foreseen was, although possible, not likely.
It is only in proving the wrongdoer's appreciation of death as a possible result that it becomes relevant whether death was "likely" for the more likely death was, the stronger is the inference that he in fact appreciated the risk to life.
In short, if the accused foresaw the consequences or circumstances in question not as a probable result of his act, but considered that there was even a possibility[249] that they could result (and if he reconciled himself to this possibility), he will have had intention in the sense of dolus eventualis. On the other hand, if he did not actually foresee the possibility, but as a reasonable man ought to have foreseen it, he lacked intention; at most he was negligent.
The view that foresight of only the possibility of the consequences resulting from an accused's act is sufficient for dolus eventualis "can now be regarded as settled law."[250]
The courts have usually spoken simply of foresight of "possibility," or of "risk," unqualified by any adjective. Given that foresight of a possibility will constitute intention in the form of dolus eventualis, does it follow, then, that even the most remote and unlikely possibility, if foreseen, must be taken to have been intended?
The Southern African courts waver between,
A further possibility is that the distinction between real and remote possibility is not relevant to foresight, but rather to the enquiry into recklessness.
In S v De Bruyn, Holmes JA stated obiter that dolus eventualis is present if the accused "foresees the possibility, however remote, of his act resulting in death to another."[251] Later in his judgment he added (also obiter), "If, under cross-examination, an accused were to admit that he foresaw the possibility of death, on the footing that anything is possible, that would contribute to a conviction of murder." In S v Beukes, in contrast, Van Heerden JA accepted that dolus eventualis would normally be present only where the accused foresaw the occurrence of the unlawful consequence or the existence of the unlawful circumstance as a "reasonable" possibility.
In S v Ngubane, Jansen JA stated,
In principle it should not matter in respect of dolus eventualis whether the agent foresees (subjectively) the possibility as strong or faint, as probable or improbable provided his state of mind in regard to that possibility is "consenting," "reconciling" or "taking [the foreseen possibility] into the bargain." However, the likelihood in the eyes of the agent of the possibility eventuating must obviously have a bearing on the question whether he did consent to that possibility.
According to Jansen JA, "if the agent persists in his conduct despite foreseeing such a consequence as a real or concrete possibility, the inference could well be drawn that he 'reconciled' himself to that consequence, that he was reckless of that consequence." Jansen JA states that it does not matter, in determining foresight, whether the accused foresaw a real or merely a remote possibility of a consequence or circumstance. The relevance of this distinction between real and remote possibility arises in determining whether the accused accepted the foreseen possibility into the bargain.
Despite the views of certain South African writers,[citation needed] the Appellate Division in S v Goosen adopted the approach that has found favour among German criminal theorists: that the intention element (in consequence crimes) is not satisfied if the consequence occurs in a manner that differs markedly from the way in which the accused foresaw the causal sequence.
In other words, for intention in the form of dolus eventualis to exist, there not only has to be at least foresight of the possibility of the consequence occurring, and not only must the accused proceed with his conduct despite such foresight, but there has to be a substantial correlation between the foreseen way in which the consequence might have occurred and the actual way in which it did.
The appellant in Goosen foresaw the gun held by another in the gang being discharged intentionally, but he did not foresee, or it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that he did foresee, the gun going off involuntarily or accidentally.
Van Heerden JA, delivering the unanimous judgment of the Appellate Division in Goosen, took the view that statements by Rumpff JA in S v Masilela, and of Jansen JA in S v Daniels—to the effect that the accused's mistake as regards the actual way in which death occurs cannot avail him—must be confined to the factual situations in those cases: in particular to instances when there was dolus directus in regard to the causing of death.
Van Heerden JA took the approach that where the accused's aim and objective was to bring about the death of the deceased, in general his mistake as regards the actual way in which death occurs would be irrelevant. Van Heerden JA nevertheless accepted that, even where dolus directus was present, there might be exceptions to this rule. Referring, however, to the judgment of Steyn CJ in S v Nkombani, he held that, where dolus eventualis is alleged, the accused's foresight of the way in which death might occur must not differ markedly from the actual way in which the death occurs. The meaning of "differ markedly" ("wesenlike afwyking") would have to be elucidated by the courts in future cases, Van Heerden JA said.
The facts in Goosen were as follows: The appellant had participated in a robbery. It was found that, at the time, he had foreseen the possibility that one of his fellow robbers might intentionally shoot the deceased with a hand carbine, and thereby kill him.[252] The robbers had waited for the deceased in a car outside his place of work. The deceased had got into his car and driven off; they followed him. When the deceased's car stopped at a stop sign, the robbers jumped out of their car and confronted him. One of the robbers, Mazibuko, held the hand carbine while another member of the group struck the deceased. The deceased's car (which had automatic transmission) started moving forward towards Mazibuko when the deceased's foot slipped off the brake. As the car moved towards Mazibuko, the carbine went off and the deceased was fatally shot.
Mazibuko claimed that he had pulled the trigger of the carbine by accident, or involuntarily. The trial Court and the Appellate Division accepted that there was a possibility that the trigger of the carbine had been pulled involuntarily. Mazibuko was found guilty of culpable homicide, in that he had negligently caused the deceased's death. The appellant, who had neither carried the carbine nor struck the deceased, but had nevertheless accompanied the gang, had on the insistent advice of counsel pleaded guilty to murder and was duly found guilty.
On appeal, the Appellate Division set aside the appellant's conviction of murder (and the imposition of the death sentence), and found him guilty of culpable homicide. The court held that the causing of death by intentional conduct (which the appellant was held to have foreseen) was markedly different from causing death by involuntary conduct (the way in which the death in fact occurred). The court accepted that death caused by the involuntary discharge of the firearm might have been foreseen by another individual, but the appellant, who had failed Standard 6, and was of low intelligence, had not been proved to have foreseen this sequence of events. The court therefore found the appellant guilty only of culpable homicide (on the basis that a reasonable person in the place of the appellant would have foreseen the possibility of death resulting from the involuntary discharge of the firearm). The appellant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.
Van Heerden JA gave the following hypothetical example to support his conclusion on the question of mistake regarding the causal sequence: Imagine that a robber plans to rob a café owner. He takes a revolver with him and, although he fervently hopes that he will not have to use the weapon, he foresees as a reasonable possibility that he may have to kill the café owner to achieve his object. In the hope that the victim will hand over his money without the need for force, he hides the revolver in his pocket. As he is about to confront the café owner, he slips on the floor, the loaded revolver in his pocket goes off, and the café owner is killed by the bullet. Is the robber guilty of murder?
According to Van Heerden JA, he is not, because he made a fundamental mistake regarding the causal sequence which resulted in death. "However," writes Burchell,
could it not be argued that an acquittal on a murder charge could have resulted on the basis that the robber's conduct in entering the café with a loaded revolver in his pocket, although the factual cause of the deceased's death, was not the legal cause of such death, since his slipping, falling and the gun going off constituted a substantially unusual event which was not foreseen as a real possibility and which served to break the causal chain?[253]
If this alternative, causal approach to Van Heerden JA's hypothetical example is correct, asks Burchell,
why is it necessary to invoke the theory of mistake as regards the causal sequence? Perhaps the answer may lie in the fact that in common-purposes cases (such as Goosen) the courts have specifically followed an approach which imputes the act of the perpetrator to the other participants in the common purpose, irrespective of whether the latter have contributed causally to the unlawful consequence or not. Their active participation in the common purpose coupled with the requisite guilty mind or fault is enough—either factual or legal causation between their association and the unlawful consequence is not required. The theory of mistake as regards the causal sequence, which is an aspect of mens rea, may thus be an important limiting device in cases of common-purpose liability, excluding liability for murder where death was foreseen by the participants in a common purpose, but death in fact occurred in an unexpected, or even bizarre, way.[254]
Subjective foresight of the possibility of the occurrence of a consequence, or the existence of circumstances, is apparently not in itself sufficient for dolus eventualis. In addition, the accused's state of mind in regard to that possibility, it has been held, must be one of "consenting" to the materialisation of the possibility, "reconciling" himself to it, "taking [the foreseen possibility] into the bargain," or "recklessness" in regard to that possibility. Jansen JA, in S v Ngubane, used all of these apparently interchangeable terms to describe the additional element of dolus eventualis.
The issue of whether an accused person who foresees the possibility of a consequence, or the existence of a circumstance, may be said to consent or reconcile himself or herself to, or accept the consequence or circumstance into the bargain, is referred to as the "volitional" component of dolus eventualis.
In S v Beukes, Van Heerden JA acknowledged that no decision has in fact turned on the question of recklessness, and that normally recklessness would only be satisfied where the accused foresaw a consequence as a "reasonable" possibility. Nevertheless, Van Heerden JA noted that recklessness is of value as an additional element of dolus eventualis.
Van Heerden JA was of the view that, as an accused would seldom admit this element, the court had to draw an inference regarding an accused's state of mind from facts indicating, objectively assessed, a reasonable possibility that the result would ensue. From the mere fact that he acted, it could be inferred that he had reconciled himself to the result. Van Heerden JA held that this second element of dolus eventualis, the volitional element, would normally only be satisfied where the perpetrator had foreseen the result as a reasonable possibility. The Judge of Appeal gave two circumstances in which the volitional element is useful:
In the latter case, Van Heerden JA says that the perpetrator would be reckless as to the result if he should take no steps to terminate the chain of events. He gives a hypothetical example: X, a party to a common purpose, initially does not foresee that another in the group is armed, but later finds out that he is. "Surely," writes Burchell, "this second situation mentioned by the Judge of Appeal could be seen as a case where, once he finds out the truth, he then has foresight of the real (reasonable) possibility of a firearm being used."[256]
The subjective test of intention is based on the accused's state of mind. The question is not whether the accused should have foreseen, but whether he actually foresaw.
The requirements of dolus eventualis are substantially the same whether a consequence or circumstance is involved. However, since a causal sequence is never in issue in a circumstance crime, the rules about mistake regarding the causal sequence enunciated in Goosen obviously do not apply.
Furthermore, the element of "recklessness," in the context of circumstance crimes, has been expressed in terms of a deliberate abstention from making inquiries which might lead to the truth.
"However," observes Burchell, "if the difference between motive and intention is borne in mind, the purpose of abstention from making inquiries need not be to avoid having one's suspicions confirmed. Thus X would have the dolus eventualis required for the common-law offence of receiving stolen property, knowing the goods to be stolen, if he actually foresees as a real possibility that the goods have been stolen and nevertheless receives them, whatever his motive for abstaining from making further inquiries may be."[257]
The following defences exclude intention:
"Putative" means "supposed." The following are putative defences:
Negligence is the term used in law to indicate that the conduct of a person has not conformed to a prescribed standard: that of the reasonable person (more specifically, what a reasonable person would have foreseen in the circumstances, and the care that would have been exercised by a reasonable person in such circumstances). The failure to ensure that conduct does conform to the standard is reprehensible. Negligence is therefore regarded as a form of fault.
Intention is conceptually different from negligence. Jansen JA, in Ngubane, stated that "culpa as opposed to dolus, is an aliud and not a minus."[260] In other words, negligence is different and distinct from intention; it is not merely a lesser form of intention.
Intention involves a course of action purposefully chosen, with the knowledge that it is unlawful. The test of intention is simply what the accused knew or foresaw. It is an enquiry into the actual state of mind of the actor. The test is "subjective."
The test of negligence, on the other hand, is not necessarily what the actor thought or foresaw, but rather what a reasonable person would have foreseen and done in the circumstances. The enquiry is thus not as to the actual state of the actor's mind but rather as to whether his or her conduct measured up to that of the reasonable person. The test is "objective."
Jansen JA observed in S v Ngubane that "some of our writers have propounded a 'subjective test' for negligence.[261] It is also said that recent cases disclose a swing to the subjective approach [...] and that the case of S v Van As confirms this. It is, however, unnecessary for present purposes to express any opinion on this view, save for mentioning that there may be some doubt as to whether the phrase "redelikerwyse kon en moes voorsien het," used in S v Van As, connotes anything more than the conventional objective standard, albeit somewhat individualised."
These comments clearly favour an essentially objective test of negligence. "Although," as Burchell comments, "future courts will have to grapple with the rather enigmatic phrase 'somewhat individualised,'"[262] it is apparent that the Appellate Division in certain post-Ngubane decisions emphasised the objective nature of the negligence criterion.
This simple conceptual distinction is subject, however, to two qualifications. The first qualification is that negligence does not always involve inadvertence, so the distinction between intention as foreseeing and negligence as not foreseeing sometimes breaks down. Burchell argues "that the concept of conscious negligence is also recognised in our law."[263]
The second, although related, qualification is that proof of intention does not necessarily exclude a finding of negligence.
In determining liability in a criminal prosecution in which the fault of the accused allegedly constitutes negligence, the South African courts have traditionally applied the following test to determine whether the accused had been negligent:
The reasonable person is
In other words, the reasonable person is the average person, of ordinary knowledge and intelligence.
The criterion of the reasonable person was described by Holmes JA in S v Burger as follows:
One does not expect of a diligens paterfamilias any extremes such as Solomonic wisdom, prophetic foresight, chameleonic caution, headlong haste, nervous timidity, or the trained reflexes of a racing driver. In short, a diligens paterfamilias treads life's pathway with moderation and prudent common sense."[264]
The first limb of the traditional test is this: Would a reasonable person, in the same circumstances as the accused, have foreseen the reasonable possibility of the occurrence of the consequence or the existence of the circumstance in question, including its unlawfulness?
Mere carelessness does not automatically entail criminal liability for the consequences. In other words, "negligence in the air" or "abstract negligence" is not enough. The accused's negligence must relate to the consequences or circumstances in issue.
This relationship between negligence and the consequences or circumstances in issue is expressed in terms of reasonable foreseeability: Would a reasonable person in the position of the accused have foreseen the possibility of the occurrence of that consequence or the existence of that circumstance?
In the light of the Appellate Division decisions in S v Van der Mescht, S v Bernardus and S v Van As, it is now clear that, on a charge of culpable homicide, the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a reasonable person in the position of the accused would have foreseen the possibility of death; reasonable foreseeability of bodily injury, short of death, will not suffice.
In S v Van der Mescht, the accused and "G" had melted gold amalgam on a stove for the purposes of extracting the gold. As a result of the heating, the amalgam emitted mercurial gas which resulted in the death of G and four of the children who were in the house at the time. The trial court convicted the accused of culpable homicide. The conviction was, however, set aside by the Appellate Division, the majority holding that the prosecution had failed to prove that the deaths were attributable to the accused's negligence. In other words, it had not been proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that a reasonable person in the position of the accused would have foreseen that the heating of gold amalgam might lead to the death of someone.
The Appellate Division in S v Bernardus had to answer the following question of law: Is a person guilty of culpable homicide if he unlawfully assaults another and, in so doing, causes his death, but under circumstances in which he could not reasonably have foreseen the death? Steyn CJ, delivering the judgment of the court, answered this question in the negative: Death—not merely bodily injury short of death—must be reasonably foreseeable. Holmes JA did, however, point out that where an accused assaults another in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have foreseen the possibility of causing him serious injury, he ought also to have foreseen "the possibility of death hovering in attendance: the two are sombrely familiar as cause and effect in the walks of human experience."
Holmes JA's observation in no way detracts from the principle that, in culpable homicide cases, death must be reasonably foreseeable. The observation underscores the principle, but emphasises that in practice reasonable foreseeability of death might be inferred from reasonable foreseeability of serious bodily injury.
Rumpff CJ in S v Van As restated the general principle as follows: "In criminal law, when death follows upon an unlawful assault, it must be proved, before there can be a finding of culpable homicide, that the accused could and must reasonably have foreseen that death could intervene as a result of the assault. The expression "must have foreseen" is used in the sense of "ought to have foreseen". If it is proved that the accused ought reasonably to have foreseen that death was a possible result and that the causation requirement has been satisfied the case is concluded [....] The question is, however, [...] could and should the accused reasonably have foreseen that the deceased could have died as a result [of the assault?] That foreseeability of serious bodily harm usually, but not always, goes hand in hand with foreseeability of death is correct, but it will certainly depend on the nature of the injuries inflicted in a particular case whether there was a reasonable foreseeability of death or not." In Van As, the accused gave "D's" cheek a hard slap during an altercation. As a result D, who was a very fat man, lost his balance, fell backwards and hit his head on the cement floor. He fell unconscious and later died. The trial court convicted the accused of culpable homicide, but on appeal the verdict was altered to one of guilty of assault only, since it had not been proved that, in all the circumstances, the accused could and should reasonably have foreseen D's death.
CAN NEGLIGENCE & INTENTION OVERLAP? In S v Ngubane, Jansen JA stated that "dolus postulates foreseeing, but culpa does not necessarily postulate not foreseeing. A man may foresee the possibility of harm and yet be negligent in respect of that harm ensuing." Prior to Ngubane, there had been a conflict in both academic and judicial opinion about whether dolus (intention) and culpa (negligence) were mutually exclusive concepts. Jansen JA in Ngubane has resolved the matter authoritatively by concluding that proof of dolus does not necessarily exclude a finding of culpa: "Dolus connotes a volitional state of mind; culpa connotes a failure to measure up to a standard of conduct. Seen in this light it is difficult to accept that proof of dolus excludes culpa. The facts of the present case illustrate this. The appellant, somewhat under the influence of liquor, without premeditation and as a result of some provocation, stabbed the deceased five times, the fatal injury penetrating the heart. The inference drawn by the Court a quo that he foresaw the possibility of death ensuing and that he killed intentionally (dolus eventualis) is clear. This, however, does not preclude the matter being viewed from a different angle: did not the appellant, foreseeing the possibility of death ensuing by failing to curb his emotions and failing to desist from attacking the deceased, fall short of the standard of the reasonable man (or, if the subjective approach were to be applied, to measure up to the standard of his own capabilities)? The existence of dolus does not preclude the answering of this question in the affirmative.'" In reaching this conclusion, Jansen JA categorically rejected definitions of negligence (culpa) that specifically require the absence of intention (dolus).
NEGLIGENCE & MISTAKE If the accused is charged with committing an offence for which negligence is sufficient for liability, then, if the accused genuinely and reasonably did not know that what he was doing was unlawful, he must be acquitted. In R v Mbombela 1933 AD 269, the accused was tried by jury and found guilty of the murder of a nine-year-old child. The accused, between eighteen and twenty years of age, living in a rural area, was described by the court as of "rather below the normal" intelligence. On the day in question, some children were outside a hut they supposed to be empty. They saw "something that had two small feet like those of a human being." They were frightened and called the accused, who apparently thought the object was a "tikoloshe," an evil spirit that, according to a widespread superstitious belief, occasionally took the form of a little old man with small feet. According to this belief, it would be fatal to look the "tikoloshe" in the face. The accused went to fetch a hatchet and, in the half-light, struck the form a number of times with the hatchet. When he dragged the object out of the hut, he found that he had killed his young nephew. Mbombela's defence was bona fide mistake: He believed he was killing a "tikoloshe," not a human being. A jury in the trial court found him guilty of murder. Applying a standard of reasonableness that ignored the "race or the idiosyncracies [sic], or the superstitions, or the intelligence of the person accused," the Appellate Division held that, although his belief was unreasonable, it was based on a bona fide mistake of fact, so the killing fell within the Native Territories Penal Code definition of culpable homicide rather than murder.
ATTEMPT & ACCOMPLICES
Actus reus and mens rea: the contemporaneity rule
Where fault (mens rea) is an element of the crime charged, the unlawful conduct and the fault must exist contemporaneously. In other words, the wrongdoer must intend to commit or be negligent in the commission of the crime at the time that the crime is being committed. Thus a person will not be guilty of murder if, "whilst he is driving to Y's house in order to kill him there, he negligently runs over somebody, and it later transpires that the deceased is Y." Likewise, it is not murder if a person kills another accidentally and "later expresses his joy at having killed him." The contemporaneity rule has been in issue in cases where the accused intends to kill another and, having inflicted what he thinks is a fatal wound on that other person, he then disposes of the body or sets alight to the building in which the body lies. In fact, the victim does not die from the initial assault, but from the subsequent conduct of disposing of the body, or from carbon monoxide poisoning caused by the fumes from the fire, as in S v Masilela 1968 (2) SA 558 (A). In these cases, the initial assault is accompanied by the intent to kill but, technically, the unlawful consequence of death is not present at that time, because death only results later. Similarly, when death results, technically, there is no intent to kill because the accused believes his victim is already dead. The Appellate Division has refused to exculpate the accused of murder in such a case. In S v Masilela, the appellants assaulted their victim by striking him over the head and throttling him with a tie. Although the assault caused the victim serious injuries which rendered him unconscious, it did not kill him. After throwing the victim on the bed and covering him with a blanket, the appellants proceeded to ransack the house. Then, believing the victim to be already dead, they set the bed alight, as well as the house, and made off. The victim died, not from the assault, but as a result of carbon-monoxide poisoning caused by the fumes from the fire. In an appeal from a conviction of murder, it was contended that at most the appellants were guilty of attempted murder on the ground that, in respect of the assault, the intention (mens rea) for murder had been present, but not the unlawful consequence of death; and, with regard to the burning, there had been the unlawful consequence required for murder but not the intention (mens rea), since the appellants believed the victim to be already dead. The Appellate Division held that the appellants were guilty of murder. Ogilvie Thompson JA refused to regard the assault and the subsequent burning as two separate and disconnected acts. Rumpff JA took the view that, in this kind of case, where the accused and nobody else causes death, the accused's mistake as to the precise manner in which and time when death occurred is not a factor on which he may rely.
PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES PERSONS INVOLVED IN A CRIME There are three types of person who may be involved in the commission of a crime, and therefore liable for it: • perpetrators; • accomplices; and • accessories after the fact. See S v Williams 1980 (1) SA 60 (A). Perpetrators and accomplices are participants in the crime; an accessory after the fact is not a participant. Perpetrators and accomplices participate before completion of the crime; accessories after the fact are involved after completion of the crime.
From Snyman:
PARTICIPATION BEFORE COMPLETION OF THE CRIME In the case of participation before completion of the crime, a perpetrator is one who, with the necessary fault (mens rea), commits the unlawful conduct, and thereby satisfies the definitional elements of the crime in question. Where there is more than one perpetrator, we speak of co-perpetrators. According to contemporary South African criminal theory, a person may be liable as a perpetrator in three separate situations: • where he personally satisfies the definitional elements of the crime, and is therefore a perpetrator in his or her own right (since his liability is in no way accessory to or dependent on the conduct of another person); • where he or she, although possessing the requisite capacity and the fault element (mens rea) for the crime in question, does not personally comply with all of the elements of the unlawful conduct in question, and the conduct of the perpetrator is "attributed" or "imputed" to him or her, by virtue of his or her prior agreement or active association in a common purpose to commit the crime in question; or • where a person procures another person, who may be an innocent or unwilling agent, to commit a crime.
COMMON PURPOSE Where two or more people agree to commit a crime or actively associate in a joint unlawful enterprise, each will be responsible for the specific criminal conduct committed by one of their number which falls within their common design. Liability arises from their "common purpose" to commit the crime. If the participants are charged with having committed a "consequence crime," it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that each participant committed conduct which contributed causally to the ultimate unlawful consequence. It is sufficient to establish • a prior agreement by the participants to commit a crime; or • no such prior agreement, but an active association by the participants in its commission. This usually happens when the number of people partaking in the crime is large—a mob, that is to say. If this is established, then the conduct of the participant who actually causes the consequence is imputed or attributed to the other participants. It is not necessary to establish precisely which member of the common purpose caused the consequence, provided that it is established that one of the group brought about this result. In respect of both of the above forms of common purpose, the following elements are essential: • fault (mens rea), which may take the form either of intention or of negligence, the central question being when the common purpose was formulated; • unlawful conduct, which refers participation in the unlawful act, rather than the act itself; and • causation, in terms of which the conduct of the person who actually causes the consequence is imputed or attributed to the other participants. The common-purpose doctrine is a departure from the general principles of criminal law. Its rationale is one of crime control. The doctrine has been much criticised over the years, most recently in the aftermath of the Marikana massacre, when it was incorrectly claimed in media circles that it had its origins in apartheid-era legislation.[citation needed] It has survived such criticism, however, and remains a valuable tool for the courts.[citation needed]
Common Purpose: Active Association The common-purpose rule originated in English law and was introduced into South Africa via the Native Territories' Penal Code. The much-publicised murder conviction of the "Sharpeville Six" in terms of the common-purpose doctrine, in S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868 (A), highlighted the significance of the common-purpose doctrine in the context of the administration of criminal justice in South Africa. The controversial imposition of the death penalty on the Six also played a significant role in strengthening the call for the abolition or reassessment of the death penalty in South Africa. Evidence of the specific participation of the Sharpeville Six in the murder of the deputy-mayor of Lekoa was meagre, aside from the fact that they had joined the crowd of about a hundred persons that attacked the deceased's house in Sharpeville. It was not possible to determine which members of the mob had been personally responsible for killing the mayor. Nevertheless, there was some evidence to implicate the Six in the subsequent killing of the deceased. He was killed by stoning and burning perpetrated by some members of the crowd, but it was not possible to determine which specific members had participated directly in the killing. Accused number 1 had grabbed hold of the deceased, wrestled with him for possession of his pistol, and thrown the first stone at the deceased, which felled him. Accused number 2 had thrown stones at the deceased and at his house. After the deceased's house had been set alight, accused number 2 had thrown a stone at the deceased which had struck him on his back. Accused number 3 had grabbed the deceased, wrestled with him for possession of his pistol, and succeeded in dispossessing him of the weapon. Accused number 4 was part of the crowd which converged on the deceased's house; she had shouted repeated exhortations to the crowd to kill the deceased (since the deceased was shooting at them) and had slapped a woman who had remonstrated with the crowd not to burn the deceased. Accused numbers 5 and 6 had been part of the vanguard of the crowd which had converged on the deceased's house and stoned it, but they were not seen to have thrown any stones themselves, and were ultimately acquitted on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that they shared the requisite intent to kill at the relevant time. Accused number 7 had made petrol bombs, set the deceased's house alight, and pushed the deceased's car into the street and set it alight. Accused number 8 had also made petrol bombs and handed them out with instructions, had commanded the mob to set the deceased's house on fire, and had assisted in pushing the car into the street. The Appellate Division, in a unanimous judgment, approved the conviction of the Six on the basis of the doctrine of common purpose. The court pointed out that the intention of each participant must be considered, together with the question of whether or not each had the requisite dolus in respect of the death. The court traced the historical development of the doctrine, and found that "it would constitute a drastic departure from a firmly established practice to hold now that a party to a common purpose cannot be convicted of murder unless a causal connection is proved between his conduct and the death of the deceased. I can see no good reason for warranting such a departure." In S v Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 687 (A), the Appellate Division drew a distinction between common-purpose liability • where there is a prior agreement, expressed or implied, to commit a crime (the mandate situation); and • where there is no such prior agreement. In the latter situation, certain additional requirements have to be satisfied before the principle of imputation, which is the characteristic of common-purpose liability, can arise. In S v Mgedezi, the court held that, in the absence of proof of a prior agreement, an accused who was not shown to have contributed causally to the killing or wounding of the victims could be held liable for those events on the basis of Safatsa only if certain prerequisites were satisfied: • he must have been present at the scene where the violence was being committed; • he must have been aware of the assault on the victims; • he must have intended to make common cause with those who were actually perpetrating the assault; • he must have manifested his sharing of a common purpose with the perpetrators by himself performing some act of association with the conduct of the others; and • there must be the requisite mens rea. In respect, therefore, of the killing of the deceased, he must have intended them to be killed, or must have foreseen the possibility of their being killed and performed his own act of association with recklessness as to whether or not death was to ensue. In S v Thebus, the Constitutional Court considered the active-association form of common purpose. The court held that, in its then-current form, the doctrine violated a number of constitutional rights. The formulation in Mgedezi, however, passed constitutional muster. It can no longer be said, then, that common-purpose doctrine is part of the old order, since it has been ratified as constitutional in the new one. Thebus has been criticised, though, for having dispensed with the causation element, and for its infringement on the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the prosecution prove each element of the crime. See Burchell 580-588; Snyman 263-272.
WHEN DOES A COMMON PURPOSE ARISE? Differences of opinion about the precise moment when a common purpose arises were resolved by the Appellate Division in its unanimous judgment in S v Motaung 1990 (4) SA 485 (A), delivered by Hoexter JA who concluded that the matter must be decided with reference to legal principle. Hoexter JA held that a distinction should be drawn between "participation in a common purpose to kill which begins before the deceased has been fatally wounded and such participation which begins thereafter but while the deceased is still alive." Hoexter JA reached the conclusion that, where there is a reasonable possibility that a joiner-in (or late-comer) acceded to a common purpose to kill only after the deceased had been fatally injured by another, and that the joiner-in had done nothing to expedite the death of the deceased, he could not be found guilty of murder but only of attempted murder. Of course, if the joiner-in does perpetrate conduct which expedites the death of the deceased then he may be liable as a co-perpetrator in his own right.
DISSOCIATION / WITHDRAWAL FROM A COMMON PURPOSE See: Snyman at 270-272 • clear & unambiguous intention to withdraw. • some positive act of withdrawal. • voluntary. • before course of events have reached "commencement of execution". • type of act required will depend on circumstances
S v Singo 1993 (2) SA 765 (A) S v Lungile 1999 (2) SACR 597 (SCA) Musingadi & others v S 2005 (1) SACR 395 (SCA) or [2004] 4 All SA 274 (SCA) esp. par 33 onward
ACCOMPLICES S v Williams: • An accomplice is not a perpetrator or a co-perpetrator; he lacks actus reus of the perpetrator. This is the most important defining element of an accomplice. • associates himself wittingly with the crime – knowingly affords perpetrator / co-perpetrator opportunity, means or info which furthers commission of crime. See Joubert J in this case on the frequent confusion between accomplices and perps.
Elements of accomplice liability: • Accomplice liability is accessory in nature. Someone else must have first initiated the unlawful act or acts. • Unlawful conduct here may take various forms, such as facilitating. See textbooks. • Accomplices must intentionally facilitate the completion of the crime; there's no such thing as a negligent accomplice. S v Williams sets the above out in detail. Consult it. PUNISHMENT OF ACCOMPLICES: same as perpetrator but extent may differ. So not necessarily a lighter sentence.
PARTICIPATION AFTER COMPLETION OF THE CRIME ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT This person didn't facilitate the commission of the crime; he arrives after the crime has been committed and helps, usually, to cover it up, or more generally to help the perpetrators to escape justice. • association approach: broad • Unlawfully and intentionally assists perpetrator after completion of crime by associating himself with its commission • defeating or obstructing the course of justice: narrow • Specific objective – e.g. disposing of evidence
Problem: It's an essential, for there to be an accessory, that there be also a perpetrator. This gives rise to the following problem: • A, B and C are charged with the murder of D. • There's no doubt that one or two of them killed D, but it's impossible to determine which of them did it, and it is clear that there was no common purpose to kill D. • After the murder they all helped to conceal the body. • If none of them can be convicted of murder, can all three be convicted as accessories after the fact? This conundrum was dealt with in the following cases: • S v Gani 1957 (2) SA 212 (A) • S v Jonathan 1987 (1) SA 633 (A) • S v Morgan 1993 (2) SACR 134 (A)
INCOMPLETE (INCHOATE) CRIMES Attempt • Common Law • s.18(1) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956: Any person who attempts to commit any offence against a statute or a statutory regulation shall be guilty of an offence and, if no punishment is expressly provided thereby for such an attempt, be liable on conviction to the punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence would be liable. • Persons can be convicted of attempting to commit a crime if: • they have completed such an attempt, • if the attempt has not been completed. R v Schoombie 1945 AD 541 at 545-6: "Attempts seem to fall naturally into 2 classes: • those in which the wrongdoer, intending to commit a crime, has done everything which he set out to do but has failed in his purpose either through lack of skill, or of foresight, or through the existence of some unexpected obstacle or otherwise, (= completed attempt) • those in which the wrongdoer has not completed all that he has set out to do, because the completion of his unlawful acts has been prevented by the intervention of some outside agency." (= uncompleted attempt)
Types of attempt: • Completed attempt Uncompleted Attempts: • Interrupted attempt • Attempt to commit the impossible • Voluntary withdrawal
COMPLETED ATTEMPTS: • R v Nlhovo 1921 AD 485 • S v Laurence 1974 (4) SA 825 (A)
UNCOMPLETED ATTEMPTS: • Must examine proximity of accused's conduct to commission of crime
Interrupted Attempts: A distinction is drawn between: • an act of preparation and one of • execution or consummation: • If the act merely amounted to a preparation for the crime: no attempt. • But if the acts were more than acts of preparation, and were in fact acts of consummation: guilty of attempt. S v Schoombie 1945 AD 541 • Commencement of consummation test: Proximity of consummation to crime relates to: • Time • Place • Natural order of things / course of events • Retention of control over events by accused • State of mind of accused • Practical common sense See: Burchell 627-631. R v Katz 1959 (3) SA 408 (C)
Attempt to Commit the Impossible • No longer an act of preparation – has passed the boundary line into "commencement of consummation" • Crime may be physically or legally impossible • R v Davies 1956 (3) SA 52 (A): relates to physical (factual impossibility)
Change of mind & voluntary withdrawal • Voluntary withdrawal after commencement of consummation but before completion of crime seems to be no defence. • R v Hlatwayo 1933 TPD 441
Proximity: • Completed Attempts: Proximity / Remoteness not relevant • Uncompleted Attempts: Proximity or Remoteness of attempt to completion of crime = essential enquiry
Intention • There must be intention to commit the completed crime. • Dolus eventualis is sufficient. • Remember: cannot negligently attempt to do something.
Punishment
Assault with intent to grievous bodily harm
The common-law definition of "treason," found in S v Banda,[143] is "any overt act committed by a person, within or without the State, who, owing allegiance to the State, having majestas," has the intention of
This definition would appear to be the one most frequently relied upon in South African courts.[265]
A person commits arson if he unlawfully and intentionally sets fire to
The elements of the crime are the following: (a) setting fire to (b) immovable property (c) unlawfully and (d) intentionally.
Arson is only a particular form of the crime of malicious injury to property.[266] The crime can be committed only in respect of immovable property:[267][268][269] that is, "buildings and other immovable property."[270] If movable property is set alight, the crime of malicious injury to property may be committed, provided that the other requirements are met. The crime is completed only at the moment that the property has been set alight.[271][272] If the arsonist is caught at a stage before the property has been set alight, he is guilty of attempted arson only, provided that his conduct has, according to the general rules governing liability for attempt, proceeded beyond mere acts of preparation.[273]
As in malicious injury to property, one cannot in principle commit arson in respect of one's own property. The courts, however, including the appellate division, in R v Mavros,[274] have held that a person commits arson if he sets fire to his own property to claim its value from the insurer.[275] In the estimation of Snyman, "It would have been better to punish this type of conduct as fraud instead of arson, but the courts will in all probability not depart from the appeal court's view."[276]
Intention, and more particularly the intention to damage property by setting fire to it, thereby causing patrimonial harm to somebody, is also required.[277][278][279] Dolus eventualis in this regard is sufficient.