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Guerra entre Irán e Irak

La guerra entre Irán e Irak , también conocida como la Primera Guerra del Golfo , fue un conflicto armado entre Irán e Irak que duró desde septiembre de 1980 hasta agosto de 1988. Las hostilidades activas comenzaron con la invasión iraquí de Irán y duraron casi ocho años, hasta la aceptación de la Resolución 598 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas por ambas partes. La razón principal de Irak para el ataque contra Irán citó la necesidad de evitar que Ruhollah Khomeini —que había encabezado la Revolución iraní en 1979— exportara la nueva ideología iraní a Irak. También hubo temores entre los líderes iraquíes de Saddam Hussein de que Irán, un estado teocrático con una población compuesta predominantemente por musulmanes chiítas , explotara las tensiones sectarias en Irak al unir a la mayoría chiíta de Irak contra el gobierno baazista , que era oficialmente secular y dominado por musulmanes sunitas . Irak también deseaba reemplazar a Irán como actor poderoso en el Golfo Pérsico , lo que no era visto como un objetivo alcanzable antes de la Revolución Islámica debido a la superioridad económica y militar del Irán de Pahlavi, así como a sus estrechas relaciones con Estados Unidos e Israel .

La guerra entre Irán e Irak siguió a una larga historia de disputas fronterizas territoriales entre los dos estados , como resultado de las cuales Irak planeó recuperar la orilla oriental del Shatt al-Arab que había cedido a Irán en el Acuerdo de Argel de 1975. El apoyo iraquí a los separatistas árabes en Irán aumentó después del estallido de hostilidades; es discutible que Saddam haya deseado anexar la provincia iraní de Juzestán , de mayoría árabe .

Aunque los dirigentes iraquíes esperaban sacar ventaja del caos posrevolucionario en Irán y esperaban una victoria decisiva frente a un Irán severamente debilitado, el ejército iraquí sólo avanzó durante tres meses y, en diciembre de 1980, la invasión iraquí se había estancado. El ejército iraní comenzó a ganar impulso contra los iraquíes y recuperó todo el territorio perdido en junio de 1982. Después de hacer retroceder a las fuerzas iraquíes hasta las líneas fronterizas anteriores a la guerra, Irán rechazó la Resolución 514 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y lanzó una invasión de Irak. La posterior ofensiva iraní dentro del territorio iraquí duró cinco años, y a mediados de 1988 Irak recuperó la iniciativa y posteriormente lanzó una serie de importantes contraofensivas que finalmente llevaron a la conclusión de la guerra en un punto muerto.

Los ocho años de agotamiento por la guerra, devastación económica, disminución de la moral, estancamiento militar, inacción de la comunidad internacional hacia el uso de armas de destrucción masiva por parte de las fuerzas iraquíes contra soldados y civiles iraníes , así como el aumento de las tensiones militares entre Irán y Estados Unidos culminaron en la aceptación por parte de Irán de un alto el fuego negociado por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas . En total, alrededor de 500.000 personas murieron durante la guerra Irán-Irak, y Irán sufrió la mayor parte de las bajas, excluyendo las decenas de miles de civiles muertos en la campaña simultánea de Anfal que tuvo como objetivo el Kurdistán iraquí . El final del conflicto no resultó en reparaciones ni cambios fronterizos, y se cree que las pérdidas financieras combinadas sufridas por ambos combatientes superaron el billón de dólares estadounidenses . [54] Hubo varias fuerzas proxy que operaban para ambos países: Irak y las milicias separatistas árabes proiraquíes en Irán fueron apoyadas principalmente por el Consejo Nacional de Resistencia de Irán ; Mientras que Irán restableció una alianza con los kurdos iraquíes , siendo apoyado principalmente por el Partido Democrático del Kurdistán y la Unión Patriótica del Kurdistán . Durante el conflicto, Irak recibió una abundante ayuda financiera, política y logística de los Estados Unidos , el Reino Unido , la Unión Soviética , Francia , Italia , Yugoslavia y la abrumadora mayoría de los países árabes . Si bien Irán estuvo comparativamente aislado en gran medida, recibió una cantidad significativa de ayuda de Siria , Libia , China , Corea del Norte , Israel , Pakistán y Yemen del Sur .

El conflicto ha sido comparado con la Primera Guerra Mundial en términos de las tácticas utilizadas por ambos bandos, incluyendo la guerra de trincheras a gran escala con alambre de púas tendido a lo largo de líneas defensivas fortificadas, puestos de ametralladoras tripulados, cargas con bayonetas , ataques iraníes con oleadas humanas , el uso extensivo de armas químicas por parte de Irak y ataques deliberados contra objetivos civiles. Los discursos sobre el martirio formulados en el contexto islámico chiita iraní llevaron al uso generalizado de ataques con oleadas humanas y, por lo tanto, tuvieron un impacto duradero en la dinámica del conflicto. [55]

Fondo

Relaciones entre Irán e Irak

Una reunión de Mohammad Reza Pahlavi , Houari Boumédiène y Saddam Hussein (de izquierda a derecha) durante el Acuerdo de Argel en 1975

En abril de 1969, Irán derogó el tratado de 1937 sobre el Shatt al-Arab y los barcos iraníes dejaron de pagar peajes a Irak cuando utilizaban el Shatt al-Arab. [56] El Sha argumentó que el tratado de 1937 era injusto para Irán porque casi todas las fronteras fluviales del mundo discurrían a lo largo del thalweg , y porque la mayoría de los barcos que utilizaban el Shatt al-Arab eran iraníes. [57] Irak amenazó con la guerra por la maniobra iraní, pero el 24 de abril de 1969, un petrolero iraní escoltado por buques de guerra iraníes ( Operación Conjunta Arvand ) navegó por el Shatt al-Arab, e Irak, al ser el estado militarmente más débil, no hizo nada. [58] La derogación iraní del tratado de 1937 marcó el comienzo de un período de aguda tensión iraquí-iraní que vería un derramamiento de sangre significativo y duraría hasta el Acuerdo de Argel de 1975. [ 58]

Las relaciones entre los gobiernos de Irán e Irak mejoraron brevemente en 1978, cuando agentes iraníes en Irak descubrieron planes para un golpe de Estado prosoviético contra el gobierno iraquí. Cuando se enteró de este complot, Saddam ordenó la ejecución de docenas de oficiales de su ejército y, en señal de reconciliación, expulsó de Irak a Ruhollah Khomeini , un líder exiliado de la oposición clerical al Sha. [59] [60]

Después de la revolución iraní

Las tensiones entre Irak e Irán fueron alimentadas por la revolución islámica de Irán y su apariencia de ser una fuerza panislámica , en contraste con el nacionalismo árabe de Irak . [61] A pesar del objetivo de Irak de recuperar el Shatt al-Arab [nota 5] , el gobierno iraquí inicialmente pareció dar la bienvenida a la Revolución iraní , que derrocó al Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi , quien era visto como un enemigo común. [62] Hubo enfrentamientos frecuentes a lo largo de la frontera entre Irán e Irak a lo largo de 1980, con Irak quejándose públicamente de al menos 544 incidentes e Irán citando al menos 797 violaciones de su frontera y espacio aéreo. [63]

Ruhollah Khomeini llegó al poder después de la Revolución iraní .

El ayatolá Ruhollah Jomeini hizo un llamamiento a los iraquíes para que derrocaran al gobierno del Baaz, lo que fue recibido con considerable ira en Bagdad. [62] El 17 de julio de 1979, a pesar del llamamiento de Jomeini, Saddam pronunció un discurso en el que elogiaba la revolución iraní y pidió una amistad entre Irak e Irán basada en la no interferencia en los asuntos internos de cada uno. [62] Cuando Jomeini rechazó la propuesta de Saddam llamando a la revolución islámica [59] en Irak, Saddam se alarmó. [62] La nueva administración islámica de Irán era considerada en Bagdad como una amenaza irracional y existencial para el gobierno del Baaz, especialmente porque el partido Baaz, al tener una naturaleza secular, discriminaba y representaba una amenaza para el movimiento fundamentalista chií en Irak, cuyos clérigos eran aliados de Irán dentro de Irak y a quienes Jomeini veía como oprimidos. [62]

El interés principal de Saddam en la guerra puede haber surgido también de su deseo de corregir el supuesto "error" del Acuerdo de Argel , además de lograr finalmente su deseo de convertirse en la superpotencia regional. [59] [64] El objetivo de Saddam era suplantar a Egipto como el "líder del mundo árabe" y lograr la hegemonía sobre el Golfo Pérsico. [65] [66] Vio la creciente debilidad de Irán debido a la revolución, las sanciones y el aislamiento internacional. [67] Saddam había invertido mucho en el ejército de Irak desde su derrota contra Irán en 1975, comprando grandes cantidades de armamento de la Unión Soviética y Francia. Entre 1973 y 1980 solamente, Irak compró aproximadamente 1.600 tanques y APC y más de 200 aviones de fabricación soviética. [68]

En 1980, Irak contaba con 242.000 soldados, el segundo mayor número de soldados del mundo árabe después de Egipto , [69] 2.350 tanques [70] y 340 aviones de combate. [71] Al observar la desintegración del poderoso ejército iraní que lo frustró en 1974-1975, vio una oportunidad para atacar, utilizando la amenaza de la Revolución Islámica como pretexto. [72] [73] La inteligencia militar iraquí informó en julio de 1980 que, a pesar de la retórica belicosa de Irán, "está claro que, en la actualidad, Irán no tiene poder para lanzar amplias operaciones ofensivas contra Irak, o para defenderse a gran escala". [74] [75] Días antes de la invasión iraquí y en medio de escaramuzas transfronterizas que se intensificaban rápidamente, la inteligencia militar iraquí reiteró nuevamente el 14 de septiembre que "la organización del despliegue enemigo no indica intenciones hostiles y parece estar adoptando un modo más defensivo". [76]

Algunos académicos que escribieron antes de la apertura de los archivos iraquíes anteriormente clasificados, como Alistair Finlan, argumentaron que Saddam se vio arrastrado a un conflicto con Irán debido a los enfrentamientos fronterizos y la intromisión iraní en los asuntos internos iraquíes. Finlan afirmó en 2003 que la invasión iraquí pretendía ser una operación limitada para enviar un mensaje político a los iraníes para que se mantuvieran al margen de los asuntos internos iraquíes, [77] mientras que Kevin M. Woods y Williamson Murray afirmaron en 2014 que el balance de la evidencia sugiere que Saddam estaba buscando "una excusa conveniente para la guerra" en 1980. [73]

El 8 de marzo de 1980, Irán anunció que retiraba a su embajador de Irak, degradó sus relaciones diplomáticas al nivel de encargado de negocios y exigió que Irak hiciera lo mismo. [62] Al día siguiente, Irak declaró al embajador de Irán persona non grata y exigió su retirada de Irak antes del 15 de marzo. [78]

Preparaciones militares iraníes

En Irán, las severas purgas de oficiales, incluidas numerosas ejecuciones ordenadas por Sadegh Khalkhali , el nuevo juez del Tribunal Revolucionario , y la escasez de piezas de repuesto para el equipo iraní de fabricación estadounidense y británica habían paralizado al otrora poderoso ejército iraní . Entre febrero y septiembre de 1979, el gobierno iraní ejecutó a 85 generales de alto rango y obligó a todos los generales de división y a la mayoría de los generales de brigada a jubilarse anticipadamente. [62]

El presidente iraní , Abolhassan Banisadr , quien también era comandante en jefe, inspecciona un cañón antitanque sin retroceso de 106 mm montado en un Jeep

En septiembre de 1980, el gobierno revolucionario había purgado a unos 12.000 oficiales de todos los niveles del ejército. [62] Estas purgas dieron lugar a una drástica disminución de la capacidad operativa del ejército iraní. [62]

En vísperas de la revolución de 1978, los expertos internacionales en ciencia militar habían evaluado que las fuerzas armadas de Irán eran las quintas más poderosas del mundo. [79] Sin embargo, en vísperas de la guerra con Irak, el recientemente formidable ejército iraní era en muchos aspectos cruciales una sombra de lo que fue, habiendo sido severamente debilitado por pérdidas de personal experimentado. La tasa de deserción había alcanzado el 60%, el cuerpo de oficiales estaba devastado y sus soldados y aviadores más altamente calificados habían sido exiliados, encarcelados o ejecutados. Cuando ocurrió la invasión, muchos pilotos y oficiales fueron liberados de prisión, o vieron sus ejecuciones conmutadas para combatir a los iraquíes. A lo largo de la guerra, Irán nunca logró recuperarse completamente de esta fuga de capital humano . [80]

Muchos oficiales subalternos fueron promovidos a generales, lo que resultó en que el ejército estuviera más integrado como parte del régimen al final de la guerra. [80] Mientras tanto, una nueva organización paramilitar ganó prominencia en Irán, el Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica . [81] Creado para proteger al nuevo régimen y servir como contrapeso al ejército, la Guardia Revolucionaria [g] (CGRI) había sido entrenada para actuar solo como una milicia y luchó para adaptarse según fuera necesario después de la invasión iraquí, negándose inicialmente a luchar junto al ejército regular, lo que resultó en muchas derrotas. No fue hasta 1982 que los dos grupos comenzaron a llevar a cabo operaciones combinadas. [82]

En respuesta a la invasión se fundó una milicia paramilitar adicional, el "Ejército de los 20 millones", comúnmente conocido como Basij . [83] Los Basij estaban mal armados y tenían miembros desde jóvenes de 12 años hasta mayores de 70. A menudo actuaban en conjunto con la Guardia Revolucionaria, lanzando los llamados ataques de oleadas humanas y otras campañas contra los iraquíes. [83] Estaban subordinados a la Guardia Revolucionaria y constituían la mayor parte de la mano de obra que se utilizaba en los ataques de la Guardia Revolucionaria. [59]

Stephen Pelletiere escribió en su libro de 1992 La guerra Irán-Irak: Caos en el vacío :

La oleada humana ha sido ampliamente malinterpretada tanto por los medios de comunicación populares en Occidente como por muchos académicos. Los iraníes no se limitaban a reunir masas de individuos, dirigirlas hacia el enemigo y ordenar una carga. Las oleadas estaban formadas por los escuadrones de 22 hombres mencionados anteriormente [en respuesta al llamado de Jomeini para que el pueblo saliera en defensa de Irán, cada mezquita organizó a 22 voluntarios en un escuadrón]. A cada escuadrón se le asignó un objetivo específico. En la batalla, avanzaban a toda velocidad para cumplir sus misiones, y así daban la impresión de una oleada humana que se lanzaba contra las líneas enemigas. [84]

A pesar de la negligencia del nuevo régimen, al comienzo del conflicto, Irán todavía tenía al menos 1.000 tanques operativos y varios cientos de aviones funcionales y podía canibalizar equipos para obtener piezas de repuesto. [h] [82] Las sanciones continuas limitaron en gran medida la adquisición por parte de Irán de muchas armas pesadas adicionales, incluidos tanques y aviones. [80]

Preparativos militares iraquíes

La ubicación de la provincia de Juzestán en Irán, que Irak planeaba anexar

Además, la zona alrededor del río Shatt al-Arab no representaba ningún obstáculo para los iraquíes, ya que poseían equipo para cruzar el río. Irak dedujo correctamente que las defensas iraníes en los puntos de cruce alrededor de los ríos Karkheh y Karoun estaban escasas de personal y que los ríos podían cruzarse fácilmente. La inteligencia iraquí también fue informada de que las fuerzas iraníes en la provincia de Khuzestan , que constaban de dos divisiones antes de la revolución, ahora sólo constaban de varios batallones mal equipados y con poca fuerza . Sólo un puñado de unidades de tanques del tamaño de una compañía seguían operativas. [60]

Los únicos reparos que tenían los iraquíes eran sobre la Fuerza Aérea de la República Islámica de Irán (anteriormente la Fuerza Aérea Imperial Iraní ). A pesar de la purga de varios pilotos y comandantes clave, así como la falta de piezas de repuesto, la fuerza aérea mostró su poder durante los levantamientos y rebeliones locales. También estuvieron activos después del fallido intento estadounidense de rescatar a sus rehenes , la Operación Garra de Águila . Basándose en estas observaciones, los líderes iraquíes decidieron llevar a cabo un ataque aéreo sorpresa contra la infraestructura de la fuerza aérea iraní antes de la invasión principal. [60]

Juzestán

Es ampliamente aceptado entre los eruditos [¿ quiénes? ] que Irak estaba tratando de anexar [85] , o al menos establecer soberanía sobre [23] la provincia iraní de Juzestán , pero Saddam Hussein lo negó públicamente en noviembre de 1980. [86]

Conflictos fronterizos que condujeron a la guerra

El Shatt al-Arab en la frontera entre Irán e Irak

El 10 de septiembre de 1980, el Iraq recuperó por la fuerza territorios en Zain al-Qaws y Saif Saad que le habían sido prometidos en virtud de los términos del Acuerdo de Argel de 1975 , pero que el Irán nunca había entregado, lo que llevó a que tanto el Irán como el Iraq declararan el tratado nulo y sin valor, el 14 y el 17 de septiembre, respectivamente. Como resultado, la única disputa fronteriza pendiente entre el Irán y el Iraq en el momento de la invasión iraquí del 22 de septiembre era la cuestión de si los barcos iraníes enarbolarían banderas iraquíes y pagarían a Iraq tasas de navegación por un tramo del río Shatt al-Arab que se extendía por varios kilómetros. [87] [88]

Curso de la guerra

1980: invasión iraquí

Explosión en la base aérea de Mehrabad en Teherán después de que las fuerzas iraquíes atacaran Teherán el 22 de septiembre de 1980
El Skytrain iraní C-47 fue destruido

El 22 de septiembre de 1980, Irak lanzó una invasión a gran escala de Irán. La Fuerza Aérea iraquí lanzó ataques aéreos sorpresa sobre diez aeródromos iraníes con el objetivo de destruir la Fuerza Aérea iraní . [62] El ataque no logró paralizar a la Fuerza Aérea iraní: si bien dañó parte de la infraestructura de la base aérea de Irán, no destruyó una cantidad significativa de aeronaves. La Fuerza Aérea iraquí solo pudo atacar en profundidad con unos pocos aviones MiG-23BN , Tu-22 y Su-20 , [89] e Irán había construido refugios reforzados para aeronaves donde se almacenaban la mayoría de sus aviones de combate.

Al día siguiente, Irak lanzó una invasión terrestre, organizando tres ataques simultáneos a lo largo de un frente de 644 km (400 mi). [62] Saddam esperaba que un ataque a Irán causara un golpe tal al prestigio de Irán que llevara a la caída del nuevo gobierno, o al menos pusiera fin a los llamados de Irán a su derrocamiento. [62]

De las seis divisiones iraquíes que invadieron por tierra, cuatro fueron enviadas a Juzestán, que estaba ubicada cerca del extremo sur de la frontera, para aislar a Shatt al-Arab [nota 5] del resto de Irán y establecer una zona de seguridad territorial. [62] : 22  Las otras dos divisiones invadieron a través de la parte norte y central de la frontera para evitar un contraataque iraní. [62] Dos de las cuatro divisiones iraquíes, una mecanizada y otra blindada, operaron cerca del extremo sur y comenzaron un asedio de las ciudades portuarias estratégicamente importantes de Abadán y Khorramshahr . [62] : 22 

Las dos divisiones blindadas aseguraron el territorio delimitado por las ciudades de Khorramshahr , Ahvaz , Susangerd y Musian . [62] : 22  En el frente central, los iraquíes ocuparon Mehran , avanzaron hacia las estribaciones de los montes Zagros y pudieron bloquear la ruta tradicional de invasión de Teherán-Bagdad asegurando territorio por delante de Qasr-e Shirin , Irán. [62] : 23  En el frente norte, los iraquíes intentaron establecer una fuerte posición defensiva frente a Suleimaniya para proteger el complejo petrolero iraquí de Kirkuk . [62] : 23  Las esperanzas iraquíes de un levantamiento de los árabes étnicos de Khuzestan no se materializaron, ya que la mayoría de los árabes étnicos permanecieron leales a Irán. [62]

Las tropas iraquíes que avanzaron hacia Irán en 1980 fueron descritas por Patrick Brogan como "mal dirigidas y carentes de espíritu ofensivo". [90] : 261  El primer ataque conocido con armas químicas por parte de Irak contra Irán probablemente tuvo lugar durante los combates en torno a Susangerd. [91] Adnan Khayr Allah sirvió como Ministro de Defensa iraquí durante toda la guerra entre Irán e Irak, y fue nombrado Comandante Supremo Adjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, sólo superado por Saddam Hussein. [92] [93] En este puesto, jugó un papel crucial en la reconstrucción y modernización del ejército iraquí. [92]

Los F-14A Tomcat iraníes están equipados con misiles AIM-54A , AIM-7 y AIM-9

Aunque la invasión aérea iraquí sorprendió a los iraníes, la fuerza aérea iraní tomó represalias al día siguiente con un ataque a gran escala contra las bases aéreas iraquíes y la infraestructura en la Operación Kaman 99. Grupos de aviones de combate F-4 Phantom y F-5 Tiger atacaron objetivos en todo Irak, como instalaciones petroleras, represas, plantas petroquímicas y refinerías de petróleo, e incluyeron la base aérea de Mosul , Bagdad y la refinería de petróleo de Kirkuk. Irak fue tomado por sorpresa por la fuerza de la represalia, que causó grandes pérdidas a los iraquíes y trastornos económicos, pero los iraníes sufrieron grandes pérdidas, además de perder muchos aviones y tripulaciones a causa de las defensas aéreas iraquíes.

Los helicópteros artillados AH-1 Cobra de la aviación del ejército iraní comenzaron a atacar a las divisiones iraquíes que avanzaban, junto con los F-4 Phantom armados con misiles AGM-65 Maverick ; [59] destruyeron numerosos vehículos blindados e impidieron el avance iraquí, aunque no lo detuvieron por completo. [94] [95] Mientras tanto, los ataques aéreos iraquíes contra Irán fueron repelidos por los aviones de combate interceptores F-14A Tomcat de Irán , utilizando misiles AIM-54A Phoenix , que derribaron una docena de cazas de fabricación soviética de Irak en los primeros dos días de batalla. [94] [ dudosodiscutir ]

El ejército regular iraní, las fuerzas policiales, los voluntarios Basij y la Guardia Revolucionaria llevaron a cabo sus operaciones por separado; por lo tanto, las fuerzas invasoras iraquíes no enfrentaron una resistencia coordinada. [62] Sin embargo, el 24 de septiembre, la Armada iraní atacó Basora , Irak, destruyendo dos terminales petroleras cerca del puerto iraquí de Al-Faw , lo que redujo la capacidad de Irak para exportar petróleo. [62] Las fuerzas terrestres iraníes, principalmente compuestas por la Guardia Revolucionaria, se retiraron a las ciudades, donde establecieron defensas contra los invasores. [96]

El 30 de septiembre, la fuerza aérea iraní lanzó la Operación Espada Abrasadora , atacando y dañando gravemente el reactor nuclear de Osirak, casi completo, cerca de Bagdad. [62] Para el 1 de octubre, Bagdad había sido objeto de ocho ataques aéreos. [62] : 29  En respuesta, Irak lanzó ataques aéreos contra objetivos iraníes. [62] [94]

La montañosa frontera entre Irán e Irak hizo casi imposible una invasión terrestre profunda, [97] y en su lugar se utilizaron ataques aéreos. Las primeras oleadas de la invasión fueron una serie de ataques aéreos dirigidos contra aeródromos iraníes. Irak también intentó bombardear Teherán, la capital y centro de mando de Irán, para someterla. [62] [89]

Primera batalla de Khorramshahr

La resistencia de los iraníes, superados en número y armamento en Khorramshahr, frenó a los iraquíes durante un mes.

El 22 de septiembre comenzó una prolongada batalla en la ciudad de Jorramshahr, que acabó dejando unos 7.000 muertos en cada bando. [62] Como reflejo de la naturaleza sangrienta de la lucha, los iraníes llegaron a llamar a Jorramshahr "Ciudad de Sangre". [62]

La batalla comenzó con ataques aéreos iraquíes contra puntos clave y divisiones mecanizadas que avanzaban hacia la ciudad en una formación en forma de medialuna. Fueron ralentizados por ataques aéreos iraníes y tropas de la Guardia Revolucionaria con rifles sin retroceso , granadas propulsadas por cohetes y cócteles molotov . [98] Los iraníes inundaron las zonas pantanosas alrededor de la ciudad, obligando a los iraquíes a atravesar estrechas franjas de tierra. [98] Los tanques iraquíes lanzaron ataques sin apoyo de infantería, y muchos tanques se perdieron ante los equipos antitanque iraníes. [98]

El 30 de septiembre, los iraquíes habían logrado expulsar a los iraníes de las afueras de la ciudad. Al día siguiente, los iraquíes lanzaron ataques de infantería y blindados contra la ciudad. Después de intensos combates casa por casa , los iraquíes fueron repelidos. El 14 de octubre, los iraquíes lanzaron una segunda ofensiva. Los iraníes iniciaron una retirada controlada de la ciudad, calle por calle. [98] El 24 de octubre, la mayor parte de la ciudad fue capturada y los iraníes fueron evacuados a través del río Karun. Algunos partisanos permanecieron y los combates continuaron hasta el 10 de noviembre.

El avance iraquí se estanca

Combates durante el asedio de Abadán

Aunque Khorramshahr fue capturada, la batalla había retrasado a los iraquíes lo suficiente como para permitir el despliegue a gran escala del ejército iraní. [62] En noviembre, Saddam ordenó a sus fuerzas avanzar hacia Dezful y Ahvaz , y sitiar ambas ciudades. Sin embargo, la ofensiva iraquí había sido gravemente dañada por las milicias iraníes y el poder aéreo. La fuerza aérea de Irán había destruido los depósitos de suministros del ejército iraquí y los suministros de combustible, y estaba estrangulando a Irak mediante un asedio aéreo. [94]

Los suministros de Irán no se habían agotado, a pesar de las sanciones, y los militares a menudo canibalizaban piezas de repuesto de otros equipos y comenzaban a buscarlas en el mercado negro. El 28 de noviembre, Irán lanzó la Operación Morvarid (Perla), un ataque aéreo y marítimo combinado que destruyó el 80% de la marina iraquí y todos sus emplazamientos de radar en la parte sur del país. Cuando Irak puso sitio a Abadán y atrincheró a sus tropas en torno a la ciudad, no pudo bloquear el puerto, lo que permitió a Irán reabastecer Abadán por mar. [99]

Las reservas estratégicas de Irak se habían agotado y, hasta casi el final de la guerra, el país carecía de poder para emprender grandes ofensivas. [62] El 7 de diciembre, Hussein anunció que Irak pasaría a la defensiva. [62] A finales de 1980, Irak había destruido unos 500 tanques iraníes construidos en Occidente y capturado otros 100. [100] [101]

1981: Punto muerto

Durante los siguientes ocho meses, ambos bandos estuvieron a la defensiva, con la excepción de la Batalla de Dezful , ya que los iraníes necesitaban más tiempo para reorganizar sus fuerzas después del daño infligido por la purga de 1979-80. [62] Durante este período, los combates consistieron principalmente en duelos de artillería e incursiones. [62] Irak había movilizado 21 divisiones para la invasión, mientras que Irán respondió con solo 13 divisiones del ejército regular y una brigada . De las divisiones regulares, solo siete fueron desplegadas en la frontera. La guerra se estancó en una guerra de trincheras al estilo de la Primera Guerra Mundial con tanques y armas modernas de finales del siglo XX. Debido al poder de las armas antitanque como el RPG-7 , la maniobra blindada de los iraquíes fue muy costosa y, en consecuencia, atrincheraron sus tanques en posiciones estáticas. [59] [82]

Irak también comenzó a disparar misiles Scud a Dezful y Ahvaz , y utilizó bombardeos terroristas para llevar la guerra a la población civil iraní. [99] Irán lanzó docenas de "ataques de oleadas humanas".

Batalla de Dezful

El presidente iraní, Abulhassan Banisadr, durante una visita al frente

El 5 de enero de 1981, Irán había reorganizado sus fuerzas lo suficiente como para lanzar una ofensiva a gran escala, la Operación Nasr (Victoria). [98] [102] [103] Los iraníes lanzaron su principal ofensiva blindada desde Dezful en dirección a Susangerd , compuesta por brigadas de tanques de las 16.ª Divisiones Blindadas de Qazvin , 77.ª de Khorasan y 92.ª de Khuzestan , [103] y rompieron las líneas iraquíes. [62] : 32  Sin embargo, los tanques iraníes habían atravesado las líneas iraquíes con sus flancos desprotegidos y sin apoyo de infantería; [59] como resultado, fueron cortados por los tanques iraquíes. [62]

En la batalla de Dezful, las divisiones blindadas iraníes fueron casi aniquiladas en una de las mayores batallas de tanques de la guerra. [62] Cuando los tanques iraníes intentaron maniobrar, se quedaron atascados en el barro de los pantanos y muchos tanques fueron abandonados. [98] Los iraquíes perdieron 45 tanques T-55 y T-62 , mientras que los iraníes perdieron entre 100 y 200 tanques Chieftain y M-60 . Los reporteros contaron aproximadamente 150 tanques iraníes destruidos o abandonados, y también 40 tanques iraquíes. [62] 141 iraníes murieron durante la batalla. [103]

La batalla había sido ordenada por el presidente iraní Abulhassan Banisadr , que esperaba que una victoria pudiera apuntalar su deteriorada posición política; en cambio, el fracaso aceleró su caída. [62] : 71  Muchos de los problemas de Irán se produjeron debido a las luchas políticas internas entre el presidente Banisadr, que apoyaba al ejército regular, y los partidarios de la línea dura que apoyaban al CGRI. Una vez que fue destituido y la competencia terminó, el desempeño del ejército iraní mejoró.

El gobierno de la República Islámica de Irán se vio aún más distraído por los combates internos entre el régimen y el Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) en las calles de las principales ciudades de Irán en junio de 1981 y nuevamente en septiembre. [90] : 250–251  En 1983, el MEK inició una alianza con Irak tras una reunión entre el líder del MEK Massoud Rajavi y el viceprimer ministro iraquí Tariq Aziz . [104] [105] [106] [107]

En 1984, Banisadr abandonó la coalición debido a una disputa con Rajavi . En 1986, Rajavi se trasladó de París a Irak y estableció una base en la frontera iraní. [nota 6] La batalla de Dezful se convirtió en una batalla crítica en el pensamiento militar iraní. Se hizo menos hincapié en el ejército con sus tácticas convencionales, y más en la Guardia Revolucionaria con sus tácticas no convencionales. [98] [108]

Ataque a H3

El ataque sorpresa a la base aérea H-3 se considera una de las operaciones aéreas más sofisticadas de la guerra.

La Fuerza Aérea iraquí, gravemente dañada por los iraníes, fue trasladada a la base aérea H-3 en el oeste de Irak, cerca de la frontera jordana y lejos de Irán. Sin embargo, el 3 de abril de 1981, la fuerza aérea iraní utilizó ocho cazabombarderos F-4 Phantom, cuatro F-14 Tomcat, tres aviones cisterna de reabastecimiento Boeing 707 y un avión de mando Boeing 747 para lanzar un ataque sorpresa contra la base H3 , destruyendo entre 27 y 50 aviones de combate y bombarderos iraquíes. [109]

A pesar del exitoso ataque a la base aérea H-3 (además de otros ataques aéreos), la Fuerza Aérea iraní se vio obligada a cancelar su exitosa ofensiva aérea de 180 días. Además, abandonaron su intento de control del espacio aéreo iraní . Se habían visto seriamente debilitados por las sanciones y las purgas previas a la guerra y aún más dañados por una nueva purga después de la crisis de destitución del presidente Banisadr . [110] La Fuerza Aérea iraní no pudo sobrevivir a un mayor desgaste y decidió limitar sus pérdidas, abandonando los esfuerzos por controlar el espacio aéreo iraní . De ahí en adelante, la fuerza aérea iraní lucharía a la defensiva, tratando de disuadir a los iraquíes en lugar de enfrentarlos. Si bien durante 1981-1982 la fuerza aérea iraquí seguiría siendo débil, en los próximos años se rearmarían y se expandirían nuevamente, y comenzarían a recuperar la iniciativa estratégica. [111]

Introducción de ataques de oleadas humanas

Los iraníes sufrían de escasez de armas pesadas, [82] : 225  pero tenían un gran número de tropas voluntarias devotas, por lo que comenzaron a usar oleadas de ataques humanos contra los iraquíes. Por lo general, un asalto iraní comenzaba con un Basij mal entrenado que lanzaba las oleadas humanas primarias para inundar en masa las partes más débiles de las líneas iraquíes (en algunas ocasiones incluso limpiando físicamente los campos minados). [82] [112] A esto le seguía la infantería de la Guardia Revolucionaria, más experimentada, que abría brechas en las líneas iraquíes debilitadas, [82] [96] y seguida por el ejército regular utilizando fuerzas mecanizadas, que maniobraban a través de la brecha e intentaban rodear y derrotar al enemigo. [82] [98]

Un soldado iraní herido sostiene una bolsa de suero intravenoso

Según el historiador Stephen C. Pelletiere, la idea de los "ataques de oleadas humanas" iraníes era un error. [113] En cambio, las tácticas iraníes consistían en utilizar grupos de escuadrones de infantería de 22 hombres , que avanzaban para atacar objetivos específicos. A medida que los escuadrones avanzaban para ejecutar sus misiones, eso daba la impresión de un "ataque de oleadas humanas". Sin embargo, la idea de los "ataques de oleadas humanas" siguió siendo prácticamente sinónimo de cualquier asalto frontal de infantería a gran escala que Irán llevara a cabo. [113] Se utilizarían grandes cantidades de tropas, con el objetivo de abrumar las líneas iraquíes (normalmente la parte más débil, normalmente ocupada por el Ejército Popular Iraquí ), independientemente de las pérdidas. [82]

Según el ex general iraquí Ra'ad al-Hamdani , las oleadas humanas iraníes estaban formadas por "civiles" armados que llevaban ellos mismos la mayor parte del equipo necesario a la batalla y a menudo carecían de mando, control y logística . [114] Las operaciones se llevaban a cabo a menudo durante la noche y las operaciones de engaño, infiltraciones y maniobras se hicieron más comunes. [99] Los iraníes también reforzaban las fuerzas infiltradas con nuevas unidades para mantener su impulso. Una vez que se encontraba un punto débil, los iraníes concentraban todas sus fuerzas en esa zona en un intento de abrirse paso con ataques de oleadas humanas. [114]

Los ataques de oleadas humanas, aunque extremadamente sangrientos (decenas de miles de soldados murieron en el proceso), [112] cuando se utilizaron en combinación con la infiltración y la sorpresa, causaron importantes derrotas iraquíes. A medida que los iraquíes atrincheraban sus tanques e infantería en posiciones estáticas y atrincheradas, los iraníes lograban atravesar las líneas y rodear divisiones enteras. [82] El mero hecho de que las fuerzas iraníes utilizaran la guerra de maniobras con su infantería ligera contra las defensas iraquíes estáticas fue a menudo el factor decisivo en la batalla. [96] Sin embargo, la falta de coordinación entre el ejército iraní y el CGRI y la escasez de armamento pesado desempeñaron un papel perjudicial, ya que a menudo la mayor parte de la infantería no contaba con el apoyo de artillería y blindados. [82] [96]

Operación Octavo Imán

Después de que la ofensiva iraquí se estancara en marzo de 1981, hubo pocos cambios en el frente, salvo que Irán retomó el terreno elevado sobre Susangerd en mayo. A fines de 1981, Irán volvió a la ofensiva y lanzó la Operación Samen-ol-A'emeh  (El Octavo Imán), [115] poniendo fin al asedio iraquí de Abadán del 27 al 29 de septiembre de 1981. [62] : 9  Los iraníes utilizaron una fuerza combinada de artillería del ejército regular con pequeños grupos de blindados, apoyados por Pasdaran (CGRI) e infantería Basij. [110] El 15 de octubre, después de romper el asedio, un gran convoy iraní fue emboscado por tanques iraquíes, y durante la batalla de tanques que siguió, Irán perdió 20 Chieftains y otros vehículos blindados y se retiró del territorio previamente ganado. [116]

Operación Tariq al-Quds

El 29 de noviembre de 1981, Irán inició la Operación Tariq al-Quds con tres brigadas del ejército y siete brigadas de la Guardia Revolucionaria. Los iraquíes no lograron patrullar adecuadamente sus áreas ocupadas y los iraníes construyeron una carretera de 14 km (14.000 m; 8,7 mi) a través de las dunas de arena sin vigilancia, lanzando su ataque desde la retaguardia iraquí. [98] La ciudad de Bostan fue recuperada de manos de las divisiones iraquíes el 7 de diciembre. [62] : 10  En ese momento, el ejército iraquí estaba experimentando serios problemas de moral, [62] agravados por el hecho de que la Operación Tariq al-Quds marcó el primer uso de las tácticas iraníes de "ola humana", donde la infantería ligera de la Guardia Revolucionaria cargó repetidamente contra posiciones iraquíes, a menudo sin el apoyo de blindados o poder aéreo. [62] La caída de Bostan agravó los problemas logísticos de los iraquíes, obligándolos a utilizar una ruta indirecta desde Ahvaz hacia el sur para reabastecer a sus tropas. [62] 6.000 iraníes y más de 2.000 iraquíes murieron en la operación. [62]

1982: retirada iraquí, ofensiva iraní

Avión iraní Northrop F-5 durante la guerra

Los iraquíes, al darse cuenta de que los iraníes planeaban atacar, decidieron adelantarse a ellos con la Operación al-Fawz al-'Azim (Éxito Supremo) [117] el 19 de marzo. Utilizando un gran número de tanques, helicópteros y aviones de combate, atacaron la concentración iraní alrededor del paso de Roghabiyeh. Aunque Saddam y sus generales asumieron que habían tenido éxito, en realidad las fuerzas iraníes permanecieron completamente intactas. [59] Los iraníes habían concentrado gran parte de sus fuerzas llevándolas directamente desde las ciudades y pueblos de todo Irán a través de trenes, autobuses y automóviles privados. La concentración de fuerzas no se parecía a una concentración militar tradicional, y aunque los iraquíes detectaron una concentración de población cerca del frente, no se dieron cuenta de que se trataba de una fuerza atacante. [114] Como resultado, el ejército de Saddam no estaba preparado para las ofensivas iraníes que se avecinaban. [59]

Operación Fatal-Mobin

La siguiente gran ofensiva iraní, dirigida por el entonces coronel Ali Sayad Shirazi , fue la Operación Fath ol-Mobin . El 22 de marzo de 1982, Irán lanzó un ataque que tomó por sorpresa a las fuerzas iraquíes: utilizando helicópteros Chinook , aterrizaron detrás de las líneas iraquíes, silenciaron su artillería y capturaron un cuartel general iraquí. [59]

La Guardia Revolucionaria y el ejército regular siguieron rodeando a las divisiones blindadas 9 y 10 y a la 1.ª mecanizada iraquíes que habían acampado cerca de la ciudad iraní de Shush . Los iraquíes lanzaron un contraataque utilizando a su 12.ª división blindada para romper el cerco y rescatar a las divisiones rodeadas. Los tanques iraquíes fueron atacados por 95 aviones de combate iraníes F-4 Phantom y F-5 Tiger, destruyendo gran parte de la división. [118]

La operación Fath ol-Mobin fue una victoria iraní; las fuerzas iraquíes fueron expulsadas de Shush, Dezful y Ahvaz. Las fuerzas armadas iraníes destruyeron entre 320 y 400 tanques y vehículos blindados iraquíes en un éxito costoso. Sólo en el primer día de batalla, los iraníes perdieron 196 tanques. [59] Para entonces, la mayor parte de la provincia de Khuzestan había sido recuperada. [62]

Operación Beit ol-Moqaddas

Restos del tanque iraquí T-62 en la provincia de Juzestán, Irán

En preparación para la Operación Beit ol-Moqaddas , los iraníes habían lanzado numerosos ataques aéreos contra bases aéreas iraquíes, destruyendo 47 aviones (incluidos los nuevos aviones de combate Mirage F-1 de Francia); esto dio a los iraníes superioridad aérea sobre el campo de batalla al tiempo que les permitía monitorear los movimientos de tropas iraquíes. [59]

El 29 de abril, Irán lanzó la ofensiva. 70.000 miembros de la Guardia Revolucionaria y del Basij atacaron en varios ejes: Bostan, Susangerd, la orilla oeste del río Karun y Ahvaz. El Basij lanzó oleadas de ataques humanos, que fueron seguidos por el apoyo del ejército regular y la Guardia Revolucionaria junto con tanques y helicópteros. [59] Bajo una fuerte presión iraní, las fuerzas iraquíes se retiraron. Para el 12 de mayo, Irán había expulsado a todas las fuerzas iraquíes del área de Susangerd. [62] : 36  Los iraníes capturaron varios miles de tropas iraquíes y una gran cantidad de tanques. [59]

Los iraquíes se retiraron al río Karun, y sólo Jorramshahr y algunas áreas periféricas permanecieron en su poder. [82] Saddam ordenó que se desplegaran 70.000 tropas alrededor de la ciudad de Jorramshahr. Los iraquíes crearon una línea de defensa construida apresuradamente alrededor de la ciudad y las áreas periféricas. [59] Para desalentar los desembarcos de comandos aerotransportados, los iraquíes también colocaron clavos de metal y destruyeron automóviles en áreas que probablemente se usarían como zonas de desembarco de tropas. Saddam Hussein incluso visitó Jorramshahr en un gesto dramático, jurando que la ciudad nunca sería abandonada. [59] Sin embargo, el único punto de reabastecimiento de Jorramshahr estaba al otro lado del Shatt al-Arab [nota 5] , y la fuerza aérea iraní comenzó a bombardear los puentes de suministro a la ciudad, mientras su artillería apuntaba a la guarnición sitiada.

Segunda batalla de Khorramshahr
Soldados iraquíes se rinden tras la liberación de Khorramshahr

En las primeras horas de la mañana del 23 de mayo de 1982, los iraníes comenzaron el avance hacia Khorramshahr a través del río Karun . [62] Esta parte de la Operación Beit ol-Moqaddas fue encabezada por la 77.ª división Khorasan con tanques junto con la Guardia Revolucionaria y Basij. Los iraníes atacaron a los iraquíes con destructivos ataques aéreos y bombardeos masivos de artillería, cruzaron el río Karun, capturaron cabezas de puente y lanzaron ataques de oleadas humanas hacia la ciudad. La barricada defensiva de Saddam se derrumbó; [59] en menos de 48 horas de combate, la ciudad cayó y 19.000 iraquíes se rindieron a los iraníes. Un total de 10.000 iraquíes murieron o resultaron heridos en Khorramshahr, mientras que los iraníes sufrieron 30.000 bajas. [119] Durante toda la Operación Beit ol-Moqaddas, 33.000 soldados iraquíes fueron capturados por los iraníes. [59]

Estado de las fuerzas armadas iraquíes

Los combates habían golpeado duramente al ejército iraquí: su fuerza cayó de 210.000 a 150.000 soldados; más de 20.000 soldados iraquíes murieron y más de 30.000 fueron capturados; dos de cada cuatro divisiones blindadas activas y al menos tres divisiones mecanizadas cayeron a menos de la fuerza de una brigada; y los iraníes habían capturado más de 450 tanques y vehículos blindados de transporte de personal. [120]

La Fuerza Aérea iraquí también quedó en mal estado: después de perder hasta 55 aviones desde principios de diciembre de 1981, sólo contaba con 100 cazabombarderos e interceptores intactos . Un desertor que voló su MiG-21 a Siria en junio de 1982 reveló que la Fuerza Aérea iraquí sólo tenía tres escuadrones de cazabombarderos capaces de montar operaciones en Irán. El Cuerpo Aéreo del Ejército iraquí estaba en algo mejor forma y todavía podía operar más de 70 helicópteros. [120] A pesar de esto, los iraquíes todavía tenían 3.000 tanques, mientras que Irán tenía 1.000. [59]

En ese momento, Saddam creyó que su ejército estaba demasiado desmoralizado y dañado para mantener el control de Khuzestan y grandes franjas del territorio iraní, y retiró sus fuerzas restantes, redesplegándolas en defensa a lo largo de la frontera. [62] Sin embargo, sus tropas continuaron ocupando algunas áreas fronterizas iraníes clave de Irán, incluidos los territorios en disputa que motivaron su invasión, en particular la vía fluvial Shatt al-Arab. [59] [121] En respuesta a sus fracasos contra los iraníes en Khorramshahr, Saddam ordenó la ejecución de los generales Juwad Shitnah y Salah al-Qadhi y los coroneles Masa y al-Jalil. [114] Al menos una docena de otros oficiales de alto rango también fueron ejecutados durante este tiempo. [110] Esto se convirtió en un castigo cada vez más común para aquellos que le fallaron en la batalla. [114]

Respuesta internacional temprana

En abril de 1982, el régimen rival baasista de Siria , una de las pocas naciones que apoyaban a Irán, cerró el oleoducto Kirkuk-Baniyas que había permitido que el petróleo iraquí llegara a los petroleros en el Mediterráneo, reduciendo el presupuesto iraquí en 5 mil millones de dólares por mes. [62] El periodista Patrick Brogan escribió: "Parecía por un tiempo que Irak sería estrangulado económicamente antes de ser derrotado militarmente". [90] : 260  El cierre del oleoducto Kirkuk-Baniyas por parte de Siria dejó a Irak con el oleoducto a Turquía como el único medio de exportación de petróleo, junto con el transporte de petróleo en camiones cisterna al puerto de Aqaba en Jordania. [122]

El oleoducto turco tenía una capacidad de sólo 500.000 barriles por día (79.000 m 3 /d), lo cual era insuficiente para pagar la guerra. [123] : 160  Arabia Saudita, Kuwait y los otros estados del Golfo salvaron a Irak de la bancarrota [62] al proporcionarle entre 37 y 60 mil millones de dólares en préstamos. [90] [124] [125] [126] : 263  [ aclaración necesaria ] Aunque Irak había sido previamente hostil hacia otros estados del Golfo, "la amenaza del fundamentalismo persa era mucho más temida". [123] : 162–163  [90] : 263  Estaban especialmente inclinados a temer la victoria iraní después de que el Ayatolá Jomeini declarara que las monarquías eran ilegítimas y una forma de gobierno no islámica. [62] La declaración de Jomeini fue ampliamente recibida como un llamado a derrocar a las monarquías del Golfo. [62] Los periodistas John Bulloch y Harvey Morris escribieron:

La virulenta campaña iraní, que en su apogeo parecía tener como objetivo de guerra el derrocamiento del régimen saudí, al mismo nivel que la derrota de Irak, tuvo un efecto en el Reino [de Arabia Saudita], pero no el que los iraníes querían: en lugar de volverse más conciliadores, los saudíes se volvieron más duros, más seguros de sí mismos y menos propensos a buscar compromisos. [123] : 163 

Se decía que Arabia Saudita proporcionaba a Irak 1.000 millones de dólares al mes a partir de mediados de 1982. [123] : 160 

Irak empezó a recibir apoyo de Estados Unidos y de los países de Europa occidental. Saddam recibió apoyo diplomático, monetario y militar de Estados Unidos, incluidos préstamos masivos, influencia política e información sobre los despliegues iraníes recopilada por satélites espías estadounidenses. [127] Los iraquíes dependían en gran medida de las imágenes de satélite y los aviones de radar estadounidenses para detectar los movimientos de tropas iraníes, y permitieron a Irak trasladar tropas al lugar antes de la batalla. [128]

Con el éxito iraní en el campo de batalla, Estados Unidos aumentó su apoyo al gobierno iraquí, proporcionándole inteligencia, ayuda económica y equipos y vehículos de doble uso , además de normalizar sus relaciones intergubernamentales (que se habían roto durante la Guerra de los Seis Días de 1967 ). [127] En marzo de 1982, el presidente Ronald Reagan firmó el Memorando de Estudio de Seguridad Nacional (NSSM) 4-82, que buscaba "una revisión de la política estadounidense hacia Oriente Medio", y en junio Reagan firmó una Directiva de Decisión de Seguridad Nacional (NSDD) coescrita por el funcionario del NSC Howard Teicher , que determinaba: "Estados Unidos no podía permitirse el lujo de permitir que Irak perdiera la guerra contra Irán", [129] [130] y que Estados Unidos "haría lo que fuera necesario para evitar que Irak perdiera". [131]

En 1982, Reagan eliminó a Irak de la lista de países que "apoyan el terrorismo" y vendió armas como obuses a Irak a través de Jordania. [127] Francia vendió a Irak millones de dólares en armas, incluidos helicópteros Gazelle , cazas Mirage F-1 y misiles Exocet . Tanto Estados Unidos como Alemania Occidental vendieron a Irak pesticidas y venenos de doble uso que se utilizarían para crear armas químicas . [127]

Irán no tenía dinero para comprar armas en la misma medida que Irak. Contaba con China, Corea del Norte , Libia , Siria y Japón para que le suministraran todo tipo de cosas, desde armas y municiones hasta equipos logísticos y de ingeniería. [132]

Propuesta de alto el fuego

El 20 de junio de 1982, Saddam anunció que quería pedir la paz y propuso un alto el fuego inmediato y la retirada del territorio iraní en dos semanas. [133] Jomeini respondió diciendo que la guerra no terminaría hasta que se instalara un nuevo gobierno en Irak y se pagaran las reparaciones. [134] Proclamó que Irán invadiría Irak y no se detendría hasta que el régimen Baaz fuera reemplazado por una república islámica . [62] [121] Irán apoyó un gobierno en el exilio para Irak, el Consejo Supremo de la Revolución Islámica en Irak , dirigido por el clérigo iraquí exiliado Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim , que se dedicó a derrocar al partido Baaz. Reclutaron prisioneros de guerra, disidentes, exiliados y chiítas para unirse a la Brigada Badr , el ala militar de la organización. [59]

La decisión de invadir Irak se tomó después de mucho debate dentro del gobierno iraní. [62] Una facción, compuesta por el primer ministro Mir-Hossein Mousavi , el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Ali Akbar Velayati , el presidente Ali Khamenei , [135] el jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército, el general Ali Sayad Shirazi, así como el general de división Qasem-Ali Zahirnejad, quería aceptar el alto el fuego, ya que la mayor parte del suelo iraní había sido recapturado. [62] En particular, el general Shirazi y Zahirnejad se oponían a la invasión de Irak por razones logísticas, y declararon que considerarían dimitir si "gente no cualificada seguía entrometiéndose en la conducción de la guerra". [62] : 38  De la opinión opuesta estaba una facción de línea dura liderada por los clérigos del Consejo Supremo de Defensa , cuyo líder era el políticamente poderoso portavoz del Majlis , Akbar Rafsanjani . [62]

Irán también esperaba que sus ataques provocaran una revuelta contra el régimen de Saddam por parte de la población chií y kurda de Irak, lo que posiblemente resultaría en su caída. Tuvo éxito en ello con la población kurda, pero no con la chiíta. [59] Irán había capturado grandes cantidades de equipo iraquí, suficiente para crear varios batallones de tanques, Irán volvió a tener 1.000 tanques, y también logró adquirir clandestinamente repuestos, incluidos los correspondientes al F-14 Tomcat. [82] [136]

En una reunión de gabinete en Bagdad, el Ministro de Salud Riyadh Ibrahim Hussein sugirió que Saddam podría dimitir temporalmente como una forma de facilitar a Irán el cese del fuego, y luego volver al poder. [123] : 147  Saddam, molesto, preguntó si alguien más en el Gabinete estaba de acuerdo con la idea del Ministro de Salud. Cuando nadie levantó la mano en apoyo, escoltó a Riyadh Hussein a la habitación de al lado, cerró la puerta y le disparó con su pistola. [123] : 147 

Irán invade Irak y las tácticas iraquíes en respuesta

Declaración de advertencia emitida por el gobierno iraquí para advertir a las tropas iraníes en la guerra entre Irán e Irak. La declaración dice: "¡Eh, iraníes! Nadie ha sido oprimido en el país donde están enterrados Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib, Husayn ibn Ali y Abbas ibn Ali . Irak ha sido, sin duda, un país honorable. Todos los refugiados son valiosos. Cualquiera que quiera vivir en el exilio puede elegir Irak libremente. Nosotros, los Hijos de Irak, hemos estado tendiendo emboscadas a los agresores extranjeros. Los enemigos que planean asaltar Irak serán desfavorecidos por Dios en este mundo y en el más allá. ¡Tengan cuidado de atacar Irak y a Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib! Si se rinden, pueden estar en paz".

En su mayor parte, Irak permaneció a la defensiva durante los siguientes cinco años, incapaz y poco dispuesto a lanzar ninguna ofensiva importante, mientras que Irán lanzó más de 70 ofensivas. La estrategia de Irak cambió de mantener territorio en Irán a negar a Irán cualquier ganancia importante en Irak, así como a mantener territorios en disputa a lo largo de la frontera. [60] Saddam comenzó una política de guerra total , orientando la mayor parte de su país hacia la defensa contra Irán. Para 1988, Irak gastaba entre el 40 y el 75% de su PIB en equipo militar. [137] Saddam también había más que duplicado el tamaño del ejército iraquí, de 200.000 soldados (12 divisiones y tres brigadas independientes) a 500.000 (23 divisiones y nueve brigadas). [62] Irak también comenzó a lanzar ataques aéreos contra ciudades fronterizas iraníes, aumentando enormemente la práctica en 1984. [60] : 2 

A finales de 1982, Irak había sido reabastecido con nuevo material soviético y chino , y la guerra terrestre entró en una nueva fase. Irak utilizó los tanques T-55, T-62 y T-72 recién adquiridos, así como copias chinas, lanzacohetes montados en camiones BM-21 y helicópteros artillados Mi-24 para preparar una defensa de tres líneas de tipo soviético, repleta de obstáculos como alambre de púas, campos de minas, posiciones fortificadas y búnkeres. El Cuerpo de Ingenieros de Combate construyó puentes sobre obstáculos de agua, colocó campos de minas, erigió revestimientos de tierra, cavó trincheras, construyó nidos de ametralladoras y preparó nuevas líneas de defensa y fortificaciones. [60] : 2 

Irak comenzó a centrarse en el uso de la defensa en profundidad para derrotar a los iraníes. [82] Irak creó múltiples líneas de defensa estáticas para desangrar a los iraníes mediante su gran tamaño. [82] Cuando se enfrentaban a un gran ataque iraní, donde oleadas humanas invadían las defensas de infantería atrincheradas de Irak, los iraquíes a menudo se retiraban, pero sus defensas estáticas desangraban a los iraníes y los canalizaban en ciertas direcciones, atrayéndolos hacia trampas o bolsas. Los ataques aéreos y de artillería iraquíes entonces inmovilizaban a los iraníes, mientras que los tanques y los ataques de infantería mecanizada utilizando la guerra móvil los hacían retroceder. [128]

En ocasiones, los iraquíes lanzaban "ataques de sondeo" contra las líneas iraníes para provocarlas y que lanzaran sus ataques antes. Si bien los ataques iraníes en oleadas humanas tuvieron éxito contra las fuerzas iraquíes atrincheradas en Khuzestan, tuvieron problemas para atravesar las líneas de defensa en profundidad de Irak. [59] Irak tenía una ventaja logística en su defensa: el frente estaba ubicado cerca de las principales bases y depósitos de armas iraquíes, lo que permitía que su ejército fuera abastecido de manera eficiente. [90] : 260, 265  En cambio, el frente en Irán estaba a una distancia considerable de las principales bases y depósitos de armas iraníes y, como tal, las tropas y los suministros iraníes tenían que atravesar cadenas montañosas antes de llegar al frente. [90] : 260 

El poder militar de Irán se vio debilitado una vez más por las grandes purgas de 1982, que resultaron de otro supuesto intento de golpe de Estado. [138]

Operación Ramadán (Primera Batalla de Basora)

Los generales iraníes querían lanzar un ataque total contra Bagdad y apoderarse de ella mientras los suministros del ejército iraní lo permitieran. Esto fue rechazado por ser impracticable [121] y se tomó la decisión de capturar una zona de Irak tras otra, con la esperanza de que esto obligara a Irak a retirarse de los territorios fronterizos en disputa y comenzar las negociaciones para poner fin a la guerra. [121]

El 13 de julio de 1982, Irán comenzó su ataque en el sur de Irak, cerca de Basora. [62] Llamada Operación Ramadán , involucró a más de 180.000 tropas de ambos lados, y fue una de las batallas terrestres más grandes desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial . [60] : 3  La estrategia iraní dictaba que lanzaran su ataque principal en el punto más débil de las líneas iraquíes. Sin embargo, los iraquíes fueron informados de los planes de batalla de Irán y trasladaron todas sus fuerzas al área que los iraníes planeaban atacar. [120] Los iraquíes estaban equipados con gas lacrimógeno para usar contra el enemigo, que fue el primer uso importante de la guerra química durante el conflicto, arrojando a una división atacante entera al caos. [138]

95.000 niños soldados iraníes fueron víctimas durante la guerra entre Irán e Irak, la mayoría de ellos de entre 16 y 17 años, y unos pocos más jóvenes. [139] [140]

Más de 100.000 soldados de la Guardia Revolucionaria y de las fuerzas voluntarias Basij cargaron contra las líneas iraquíes. [62] Las tropas iraquíes se habían atrincherado en formidables defensas y habían establecido una red de búnkeres y posiciones de artillería. [62] Los Basij utilizaron oleadas humanas e incluso fueron utilizados para limpiar físicamente los campos minados iraquíes y permitir el avance de la Guardia Revolucionaria. [62] Los combatientes se acercaron tanto entre sí que los iraníes pudieron abordar los tanques iraquíes y lanzar granadas dentro de los cascos. Al octavo día, los iraníes habían ganado 16 km (9,9 mi) dentro de Irak y habían tomado varias calzadas. La Guardia Revolucionaria de Irán también utilizó los tanques T-55 que habían capturado en batallas anteriores. [82]

Los ataques se detuvieron y los iraníes recurrieron a medidas defensivas. Ante esto, Irak utilizó sus helicópteros Mi-25 , junto con helicópteros Gazelle armados con Euromissile HOT , contra columnas de infantería mecanizada y tanques iraníes. Estos equipos de helicópteros "cazadores-asesinos", que se habían formado con la ayuda de asesores de Alemania del Este , resultaron muy costosos para los iraníes. Se produjeron combates aéreos entre los MiG iraquíes y los F-4 Phantom iraníes. [138]

El 16 de julio, Irán volvió a intentarlo más al norte y logró hacer retroceder a los iraquíes. A sólo 13 km de Basora, las fuerzas iraníes, mal equipadas, fueron rodeadas por tres lados por iraquíes con armamento pesado. Algunos fueron capturados, mientras que muchos murieron. Sólo un ataque de último momento de los helicópteros iraníes AH-1 Cobra impidió que los iraquíes derrotaran a los iraníes. [120] Tres ataques más similares ocurrieron alrededor de la zona de la carretera Khorramshahr-Bagdad hacia finales de mes, pero ninguno tuvo un éxito significativo. [82]

Irak había concentrado tres divisiones blindadas, la 3.ª, la 9.ª y la 10.ª, como fuerza de contraataque para atacar cualquier penetración. Tuvieron éxito en derrotar los avances iraníes, pero sufrieron grandes pérdidas. La 9.ª División Blindada en particular tuvo que ser disuelta y nunca fue reformada. El número total de bajas había aumentado hasta incluir 80.000 soldados y civiles. 400 tanques y vehículos blindados iraníes fueron destruidos o abandonados, mientras que Irak perdió al menos 370 tanques. [141] [142]

Operaciones finales de 1982

Tras el fracaso de Irán en la Operación Ramadán, sólo llevó a cabo unos pocos ataques menores. Irán lanzó dos ofensivas limitadas destinadas a recuperar las colinas de Sumar y aislar el enclave iraquí de Naft shahr en la frontera internacional, ambos parte de los territorios en disputa que aún se encuentran bajo ocupación iraquí. Luego, se propuso capturar la ciudad fronteriza iraquí de Mandali . [120] Planearon tomar a los iraquíes por sorpresa utilizando milicianos Basij, helicópteros del ejército y algunas fuerzas blindadas, para luego extender sus defensas y posiblemente atravesarlas para abrir un camino hacia Bagdad para su futura explotación. [120]

Durante la Operación Muslim ibn Aqil (1–7 de octubre), [nota 7] Irán recuperó 150 km2 ( 58 millas cuadradas) de territorio en disputa a lo largo de la frontera internacional y llegó a las afueras de Mandali antes de ser detenido por ataques de helicópteros y blindados iraquíes. [99] [120] Durante la Operación Muharram (1–21 de noviembre), [nota 8] los iraníes capturaron parte del yacimiento petrolífero de Bayat con la ayuda de sus aviones de combate y helicópteros, destruyendo 105 tanques iraquíes, 70 APC y 7 aviones con pocas pérdidas. Casi rompieron las líneas iraquíes pero no lograron capturar Mandali después de que los iraquíes enviaran refuerzos, incluidos tanques T-72 nuevos , que poseían un blindaje que no podía ser perforado desde el frente por los misiles TOW iraníes . [120] El avance iraní también se vio impedido por fuertes lluvias. Murieron 3.500 iraquíes y un número desconocido de iraníes, y el resultado para Irán fue menor. [120]

1983-84: Estancamiento y guerra de desgaste

Los mayores avances de terreno logrados por ambos bandos durante la guerra

Tras el fracaso de las ofensivas de verano de 1982, Irán creyó que un gran esfuerzo a lo largo de todo el frente daría la victoria. En 1983, los iraníes lanzaron cinco grandes ataques a lo largo del frente. Ninguno logró un éxito sustancial, ya que los iraníes organizaron más ataques masivos de "olas humanas". [62] En ese momento, se estimaba que no más de 70 aviones de combate iraníes seguían operativos en un momento dado. Irán tenía sus propias instalaciones de reparación de helicópteros, que quedaron de antes de la revolución, y a menudo utilizaba helicópteros para apoyo aéreo cercano. [120] [144]

Los pilotos de combate iraníes tenían un entrenamiento superior en comparación con sus homólogos iraquíes, ya que la mayoría había recibido entrenamiento de oficiales estadounidenses antes de la revolución de 1979 , [145] y continuaron dominando en combate. [146] Sin embargo, la escasez de aeronaves, el tamaño del territorio/espacio aéreo defendido y la inteligencia estadounidense suministrada a Irak permitieron a los iraquíes explotar las brechas en el espacio aéreo iraní. Las campañas aéreas iraquíes encontraron poca oposición y atacaron a más de la mitad de Irán, ya que los iraquíes pudieron ganar superioridad aérea hacia el final de la guerra. [147]

Operación antes del amanecer

En la Operación Antes del Amanecer , lanzada el 6 de febrero de 1983, los iraníes cambiaron su foco de atención del sur a los sectores central y norte. Empleando 200.000 tropas de la Guardia Revolucionaria de "última reserva", Irán atacó a lo largo de un tramo de 40 km (25 mi) cerca de al-Amarah, Irak , a unos 200 km (120 mi) al sureste de Bagdad, en un intento de alcanzar las carreteras que conectan el norte y el sur de Irak. El ataque fue detenido por 60 km (37 mi) de escarpaduras montañosas, bosques y torrentes fluviales que cubrían el camino a al-Amarah, pero los iraquíes no pudieron obligar a los iraníes a retroceder. Irán dirigió la artillería hacia Basora, Al-Amara y Mandali . [144]

Los iraníes sufrieron un gran número de bajas al limpiar campos minados y abrir brechas en las minas antitanque iraquíes , que los ingenieros iraquíes no pudieron reemplazar. Después de esta batalla, Irán redujo el uso de ataques con oleadas humanas, aunque siguieron siendo una táctica clave a medida que avanzaba la guerra. [144]

En abril de 1983, Irán realizó nuevos ataques en el sector norte-central de Mandali-Bagdad, pero fueron repelidos por las divisiones mecanizadas y de infantería iraquíes. Las bajas fueron numerosas y, a fines de 1983, se estima que habían muerto 120.000 iraníes y 60.000 iraquíes. Irán tenía la ventaja en la guerra de desgaste . En 1983, Irán tenía una población estimada de 43,6 millones frente a los 14,8 millones de Irak, y la discrepancia continuó creciendo durante toda la guerra. [60] [148] [149] : 2 

Operaciones Dawn

Desde principios de 1983 hasta 1984, Irán lanzó una serie de cuatro Operaciones Valfajr (Amanecer), que finalmente sumaron 10. Durante la Operación Amanecer-1 , a principios de febrero de 1983, 50.000 fuerzas iraníes atacaron hacia el oeste desde Dezful y se enfrentaron a 55.000 fuerzas iraquíes. El objetivo iraní era cortar la carretera de Basora a Bagdad en el sector central. Los iraquíes llevaron a cabo 150 incursiones aéreas contra los iraníes, e incluso bombardearon Dezful, Ahvaz y Khorramshahr en represalia. El contraataque iraquí fue disuelto por la 92.ª División Blindada de Irán. [144]

Prisioneros de guerra iraníes en 1983 cerca de Tikrit , Irak

Durante la Operación Dawn-2 , los iraníes dirigieron operaciones de insurgencia por delegación en abril de 1983 apoyando a los kurdos en el norte. Con el apoyo kurdo, los iraníes atacaron el 23 de julio de 1983, capturando la ciudad iraquí de Haj Omran y manteniéndola contra una contraofensiva iraquí con gas venenoso. [ cita requerida ] Esta operación incitó a Irak a realizar posteriormente ataques químicos indiscriminados contra los kurdos. [144] Los iraníes intentaron explotar aún más las actividades en el norte el 30 de julio de 1983, durante la Operación Dawn-3 . Irán vio una oportunidad de barrer a las fuerzas iraquíes que controlaban las carreteras entre las ciudades fronterizas montañosas iraníes de Mehran, Dehloran y Elam . Irak lanzó ataques aéreos y equipó helicópteros de ataque con ojivas químicas . Aunque ineficaces, demostraron el creciente interés tanto del estado mayor iraquí como de Saddam en el uso de armas químicas. Al final, 17.000 personas murieron en ambos bandos [ aclaración necesaria ], sin que ninguno de los dos países obtuviera ganancias. [144]

El foco de la Operación Dawn-4 en septiembre de 1983 fue el sector norte del Kurdistán iraní. Tres divisiones regulares iraníes, la Guardia Revolucionaria y elementos del Partido Democrático del Kurdistán (PDK) se concentraron en Marivan y Sardasht en un movimiento para amenazar la importante ciudad iraquí de Suleimaniyah . La estrategia de Irán era presionar a las tribus kurdas para que ocuparan el valle de Banjuin, que estaba a 45 km (28 mi) de Suleimaniyah y a 140 km (87 mi) de los yacimientos petrolíferos de Kirkuk . Para detener la marea, Irak desplegó helicópteros de ataque Mi-8 equipados con armas químicas y ejecutó 120 incursiones contra la fuerza iraní, que los detuvo a 15 km (9,3 mi) en territorio iraquí. [144]

5.000 iraníes y 2.500 iraquíes murieron. [144] Irán recuperó 110 km2 de su territorio en el norte, ganó 15 km2 de tierra iraquí y capturó a 1.800 prisioneros iraquíes mientras Irak abandonaba grandes cantidades de armas valiosas y material de guerra en el campo. Irak respondió a estas pérdidas disparando una serie de misiles SCUD-B contra las ciudades de Dezful, Masjid Soleiman y Behbehan . El uso de artillería por parte de Irán contra Basora mientras las batallas en el norte se desarrollaban creó múltiples frentes, que efectivamente confundieron y desgastaron a Irak. [144]

El cambio de táctica de Irán

Anteriormente, los iraníes habían superado en número a los iraquíes en el campo de batalla, pero Irak amplió su reclutamiento militar , siguiendo una política de guerra total, y en 1984, los ejércitos eran iguales en tamaño. En 1986, Irak tenía el doble de soldados que Irán. En 1988, Irak tenía un millón de soldados, lo que lo convertía en el cuarto ejército más grande del mundo. Algunos de sus equipos, como los tanques, superaban en número al de Irán por al menos cinco a uno. Los comandantes iraníes, sin embargo, seguían siendo más hábiles tácticamente. [82]

Después de las Operaciones Dawn, Irán intentó cambiar de táctica. Ante la creciente profundidad de la defensa iraquí, así como el aumento de armamentos y personal, Irán ya no podía depender de simples ataques en oleadas humanas. [98] Las ofensivas iraníes se volvieron más complejas e implicaron una extensa guerra de maniobras utilizando principalmente infantería ligera. Irán lanzó ofensivas frecuentes, y a veces más pequeñas, para ganar terreno lentamente y agotar a los iraquíes mediante el desgaste. [96] Querían llevar a Irak al fracaso económico desperdiciando dinero en armas y movilización de guerra, y agotar a su población más pequeña desangrándola, además de crear una insurgencia antigubernamental . Tuvieron éxito en Kurdistán, pero no en el sur de Irak. [59] [96] [138]

Irán apoyó sus ataques con armamento pesado cuando fue posible y con una mejor planificación, aunque la peor parte de las batallas todavía recaía sobre la infantería. El Ejército y la Guardia Revolucionaria trabajaron mejor juntos a medida que sus tácticas mejoraron. [59] Los ataques en oleadas humanas se volvieron menos frecuentes, aunque todavía se utilizaban. [114] Para negar la ventaja iraquí de defensa en profundidad, posiciones estáticas y gran potencia de fuego, Irán comenzó a centrarse en combatir en áreas donde los iraquíes no podían utilizar su armamento pesado, como pantanos, valles y montañas, y con frecuencia utilizó tácticas de infiltración. [114]

Irán comenzó a entrenar tropas en infiltración, patrullaje, combate nocturno, guerra en pantanos y guerra en las montañas. [98] Comenzaron a entrenar a miles de comandos de la Guardia Revolucionaria en guerra anfibia , [150] ya que el sur de Irak es pantanoso y está lleno de humedales. Irán utilizó lanchas rápidas para cruzar los pantanos y ríos en el sur de Irak y desembarcó tropas en las orillas opuestas, donde cavaban y colocaban puentes de pontones a través de los ríos y humedales para permitir que cruzaran tropas pesadas y suministros. Irán también aprendió a integrar unidades guerrilleras extranjeras como parte de sus operaciones militares. [98] En el frente norte, Irán comenzó a trabajar intensamente con los Peshmerga, guerrillas kurdas. [98] Los asesores militares iraníes organizaron a los kurdos en grupos de asalto de 12 guerrilleros, que atacarían puestos de mando iraquíes, formaciones de tropas, infraestructura, incluidas carreteras y líneas de suministro, y edificios gubernamentales. [98] Las refinerías de petróleo de Kirkuk se convirtieron en un objetivo favorito y a menudo eran alcanzadas por cohetes Peshmerga caseros. [98]

Batalla de los Pantanos

Un prisionero de guerra iraquí que fue baleado por tropas iraníes después de que conquistaron el campo petrolífero iraquí de Majnoon en octubre de 1984.

En 1984, las fuerzas terrestres iraníes se reorganizaron lo suficientemente bien como para que la Guardia Revolucionaria iniciara la Operación Kheibar , [144] [151] que duró del 24 de febrero al 19 de marzo. [123] : 171  El 15 de febrero de 1984, los iraníes comenzaron a lanzar ataques contra la sección central del frente, donde estaba desplegado el Segundo Cuerpo del Ejército iraquí: 250.000 iraquíes se enfrentaron a 250.000 iraníes. [62] El objetivo de esta nueva gran ofensiva era la captura de la autopista Basora-Bagdad, cortando Basora de Bagdad y preparando el escenario para un eventual ataque a la ciudad. [59] El alto mando iraquí había asumido que las marismas sobre Basora eran barreras naturales para los ataques, y no las había reforzado. Las marismas anulaban la ventaja iraquí en blindados y absorbían rondas de artillería y bombas. [59] Antes del ataque, comandos iraníes a bordo de helicópteros habían aterrizado detrás de las líneas iraquíes y destruido la artillería iraquí. Irán lanzó dos ataques preliminares antes de la ofensiva principal, la Operación Dawn 5 y la Operación Dawn 6. [ 144]

La Operación Kheibar comenzó el 24 de febrero con soldados de infantería iraníes cruzando los pantanos de Hawizeh utilizando lanchas motoras y helicópteros de transporte en un asalto anfibio . [59] Los iraníes atacaron la vital isla productora de petróleo Majnoon desembarcando tropas a través de helicópteros en las islas y cortando las líneas de comunicación entre Amareh y Basora. [151] Luego continuaron el ataque hacia Qurna . [59] Para el 27 de febrero, habían capturado la isla, pero sufrieron catastróficas pérdidas de helicópteros a manos de la IrAF . Ese día, una gran cantidad de helicópteros iraníes que transportaban tropas pasdaran fueron interceptados por aviones de combate iraquíes ( MiG , Mirage y Sukhoi). En lo que fue esencialmente una masacre aérea, los aviones iraquíes derribaron 49 de los 50 helicópteros iraníes. [59] A veces, los combates tuvieron lugar en aguas de más de 2 m (6,6 pies) de profundidad. Irak colocó cables eléctricos activos a través del agua, electrocutando a numerosas tropas iraníes y luego exhibiendo sus cadáveres en la televisión estatal. [144]

El 29 de febrero, los iraníes habían llegado a las afueras de Qurna y se acercaban a la carretera de Bagdad a Basora . [59] Habían salido de los pantanos y habían regresado a terreno abierto, donde se enfrentaron a la artillería iraquí, tanques, poder aéreo y gas mostaza . 1.200 soldados iraníes murieron en el contraataque. Los iraníes se retiraron a los pantanos, aunque todavía los conservaban junto con la isla Majnoon. [59] [62] : 44 

Tropas iraníes disparando un obús D-20 de 152 mm

La batalla de los pantanos puso de relieve una defensa iraquí que había estado bajo tensión continua desde el 15 de febrero. Se sintieron aliviados por el uso de armas químicas y la defensa en profundidad , donde superpusieron líneas defensivas: incluso si los iraníes atravesaban la primera línea, generalmente no podían atravesar la segunda debido al agotamiento y las grandes pérdidas. [123] : 171  En gran medida, dependieron del Mi-24 Hind para "cazar" a las tropas iraníes en los pantanos. [59] Al menos 20.000 iraníes murieron en las batallas de los pantanos. [144] Irán utilizó los pantanos como trampolín para futuros ataques/infiltraciones. [59]

Cuatro años después del inicio de la guerra, el costo humano para Irán había sido de 170.000 muertos en combate y 340.000 heridos. Se estima que el número de muertos en combate iraquíes fue de 80.000 y el de heridos de 150.000. [59]

Guerra de petrolerosy elGuerra de las ciudades

Unable to launch successful ground attacks against Iran, Iraq used their now expanded air force to carry out strategic bombing against Iranian shipping, economic targets, and cities in order to damage Iran's economy and morale.[59][152] Iraq also wanted to provoke Iran into doing something that would cause the superpowers to be directly involved in the conflict on the Iraqi side.[60]

Attacks on shipping

Operation Earnest Will: Tanker convoy No. 12 under US Navy escort (21 October 1987)

The so-called tanker war started when Iraq attacked the oil terminal and oil tankers at Kharg Island in early 1984.[62] Iraq's aim in attacking Iranian shipping was to provoke the Iranians to retaliate with extreme measures, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz to all maritime traffic, thereby bringing American intervention; the United States had threatened several times to intervene if the Strait of Hormuz were closed.[62] As a result, the Iranians limited their retaliatory attacks to Iraqi shipping, leaving the strait open to general passage.[62]

Iraq declared that all ships going to or from Iranian ports in the northern zone of the Persian Gulf were subject to attack.[62] They used F-1 Mirage, Super Etendard, Mig-23, Su-20/22, and Super Frelon helicopters armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles as well as Soviet-made air-to-surface missiles to enforce their threats. Iraq repeatedly bombed Iran's main oil export facility on Kharg Island, causing increasingly heavy damage. As a first response to these attacks, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti tanker carrying Iraqi oil near Bahrain on 13 May 1984, as well as a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters on 16 May.[62]

Because Iraq had become landlocked during the course of the war, they had to rely on their Arab allies, primarily Kuwait, to transport their oil. Iran attacked tankers carrying Iraqi oil from Kuwait, later attacking tankers from any Persian Gulf state supporting Iraq. Attacks on ships of noncombatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter, with both nations attacking oil tankers and merchant ships of neutral nations in an effort to deprive their opponent of trade.[62] The Iranian attacks against Saudi shipping led to Saudi F-15s shooting down a pair of F-4 Phantom II fighters on 5 June 1984.[62]

The air and small-boat attacks did little damage to Persian Gulf state economies, and Iran moved its shipping port to Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz.[153]

The Iranian Navy imposed a naval blockade of Iraq, using its British-built frigates to stop and inspect any ships thought to be trading with Iraq. They operated with virtual impunity, as Iraqi pilots had little training in hitting naval targets. Some Iranian warships attacked tankers with ship-to-ship missiles, while others used their radars to guide land-based anti-ship missiles to their targets.[154] Iran began to rely on its new Revolutionary Guard's navy, which used Boghammar speedboats fitted with rocket launchers and heavy machine guns. These speedboats would launch surprise attacks against tankers and cause substantial damage. Iran also used F-4 Phantom II fighters and helicopters to launch Maverick missiles and unguided rockets at tankers.[59]

A U.S. Navy ship, Stark, was struck on 17 May 1987 by two Exocet anti-ship missiles fired from an Iraqi F-1 Mirage plane.[155][156] The missiles had been fired at about the time the plane was given a routine radio warning by Stark.[157] The frigate did not detect the missiles with radar, and warning was given by the lookout only moments before they struck.[158] Both missiles hit the ship, and one exploded in crew quarters, killing 37 sailors and wounding 21.[158]

Lloyd's of London, a British insurance market, estimated that the tanker war damaged 546 commercial vessels and killed about 430 civilian sailors. The largest portion of the attacks was directed by Iraq against vessels in Iranian waters, with the Iraqis launching three times as many attacks as the Iranians.[60]: 3  But Iranian speedboat attacks on Kuwaiti shipping led Kuwait to formally petition foreign powers on 1 November 1986 to protect its shipping. The Soviet Union agreed to charter tankers starting in 1987, and the United States Navy offered to provide protection for foreign tankers reflagged and flying the U.S. flag starting 7 March 1987 in Operation Earnest Will.[62][157] Neutral tankers shipping to Iran were not protected by Earnest Will, resulting in reduced foreign tanker traffic to Iran, since they risked Iraqi air attack. Iran accused the United States of helping Iraq.[59][127][60]

During the course of the war, Iran attacked two Soviet merchant ships.[159]

Seawise Giant, the largest ship ever built, was struck by Iraqi Exocet missiles as it was carrying Iranian crude oil out of the Persian Gulf.[160]

Attacks on cities

Meanwhile, Iraq's air force also began carrying out strategic bombing raids against Iranian cities. While Iraq had launched numerous attacks with aircraft and missiles against border cities from the beginning of the war and sporadic raids on Iran's main cities, this was the first systematic strategic bombing that Iraq carried out during the war. This would become known as the war of the cities. With the help of the USSR and the west, Iraq's air force had been rebuilt and expanded.[111] Meanwhile, Iran, due to sanctions and lack of spare parts, had heavily curtailed its air force operations. Iraq used Tu-22 Blinder and Tu-16 Badger strategic bombers to carry out long-range high-speed raids on Iranian cities, including Tehran. Fighter-bombers such as the MiG-25 Foxbat and Su-22 Fitter were used against smaller or shorter range targets, as well as escorting the strategic bombers.[111] Civilian and industrial targets were hit by the raids,[161] and each successful raid inflicted economic damage from regular strategic bombing.[111]

In response, the Iranians deployed their F-4 Phantoms to combat the Iraqis, and eventually they deployed F-14s as well. By 1986, Iran also expanded their air defense network heavily to relieve the pressure on the air force. By later in the war, Iraqi air attacks were used only on fewer, more important targets.[162] Starting in 1987, Saddam also ordered several chemical attacks on civilian targets in Iran, such as the town of Sardasht.[163]

A map indicating the attacks on civilian areas of Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait that were targeted during the war of the cities

Iran also launched several retaliatory air raids on Iraq, while primarily shelling border cities such as Basra. Iran also bought some Scud missiles from Libya, and launched them against Baghdad. These too inflicted damage upon Iraq.[59]

On 7 February 1984, during the first war of the cities, Saddam ordered his air force to attack eleven Iranian cities;[62] bombardments ceased on 22 February 1984. It was estimated that 1,200 Iranian civilians were killed during the raids in February alone.[59]

Strategic situation in 1984

By 1984, Iran's losses were estimated to be 300,000 soldiers, while Iraq's losses were estimated to be 150,000.[60]: 2  Foreign analysts agreed that both Iran and Iraq failed to use their modern equipment properly, and both sides failed to carry out modern military assaults that could win the war. Both sides also abandoned equipment in the battlefield because their technicians were unable to carry out repairs. Iran and Iraq showed little internal coordination on the battlefield, and in many cases units were left to fight on their own. As a result, by the end of 1984, the war was a stalemate.[60]: 2 [164] One limited offensive Iran launched (Dawn 7) took place from 18 to 25 October 1984, when they recaptured the Iranian city of Mehran, which had been occupied by the Iraqis from the beginning of the war.[62][138]

1985–86 Iraqi offensives

By 1985, Iraqi armed forces were receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Persian Gulf states, and were making substantial arms purchases from the Soviet Union, China, and France. For the first time since early 1980, Saddam launched new offensives.

On 6 January 1986, the Iraqis launched an offensive attempting to retake Majnoon Island. They were quickly bogged down into a stalemate against 200,000 Iranian infantrymen, reinforced by amphibious divisions.[144] However, they managed to gain a foothold in the southern part of the island.[89]

Iraq also carried out another war of the cities between 12 and 14 March, hitting up to 158 targets in over 30 towns and cities, including Tehran. Iran responded by launching 14 Scud missiles for the first time, purchased from Libya. More Iraqi air attacks were carried out in August, resulting in hundreds of additional civilian casualties. Iraqi attacks against both Iranian and neutral oil tankers in Iranian waters continued, with Iraq carrying out 150 airstrikes using French bought Super Etendard and Mirage F-1 jets as well as Super Frelon helicopters, armed with Exocet missiles.[152]

Operation Badr

Iraqi commanders discussing strategies on the battlefront, 1986

The Iraqis attacked again on 28 January 1985; they were defeated, and the Iranians retaliated on 11 March 1985 with a major offensive directed against the Baghdad-Basra highway (one of the few major offensives conducted in 1985), codenamed Operation Badr (after the Battle of Badr, Muhammad's first military victory in Mecca).[62][165] Ayatollah Khomeini urged Iranians on, declaring:

It is our belief that Saddam wishes to return Islam to blasphemy and polytheism...if America becomes victorious...and grants victory to Saddam, Islam will receive such a blow that it will not be able to raise its head for a long time...The issue is one of Islam versus blasphemy, and not of Iran versus Iraq.[166]

This operation was similar to Operation Kheibar, though it invoked more planning. Iran used 100,000 troops, with 60,000 more in reserve. They assessed the marshy terrain, plotted points where they could land tanks, and constructed pontoon bridges across the marshes. The Basij forces were also equipped with anti-tank weapons.[144]

The ferocity of the Iranian offensive broke through the Iraqi lines. The Revolutionary Guard, with the support of tanks and artillery, broke through north of Qurna on 14 March. That same night 3,000 Iranian troops reached and crossed the Tigris River using pontoon bridges and captured part of the Baghdad–Basra Highway 6, which they had failed to achieve in Operations Dawn 5 and 6.[59]

Saddam responded by launching chemical attacks against the Iranian positions along the highway and by initiating the aforementioned second war of the cities, with an air and missile campaign against twenty to thirty Iranian population centres, including Tehran.[62] Under General Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Tai and General Jamal Zanoun (both considered to be among Iraq's most skilled commanders), the Iraqis launched air attacks against the Iranian positions and pinned them down. They then launched a pincer attack using mechanized infantry and heavy artillery.[59] Chemical weapons were used, and the Iraqis also flooded Iranian trenches with specially constructed pipes delivering water from the Tigris River.

The Iranians retreated back to the Hoveyzeh marshes while being attacked by helicopters,[59] and the highway was recaptured by the Iraqis. Operation Badr resulted in 10,000–12,000 Iraqi casualties and 15,000 Iranian ones.[62]

Iranian counteroffensives

Iranian President Ali Khamenei on the battlefront during the war

The failure of the human wave attacks in earlier years had prompted Iran to develop a better working relationship between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard[62] and to mould the Revolutionary Guard units into a more conventional fighting force. To combat Iraq's use of chemical weapons, Iran began producing an antidote.[144] They also created and fielded their own homemade drones, the Mohajer 1's, fitted with six RPG-7's to launch attacks. They were primarily used in observation, being used for up to 700 sorties.[167]

For the rest of 1986, and until the spring of 1988, the Iranian Air Force's efficiency in air defence increased, with weapons being repaired or replaced and new tactical methods being used. For example, the Iranians would loosely integrate their SAM Sites and interceptors to create "killing fields" in which dozens of Iraqi planes were lost, which was reported in the West as the Iranian Air Force using F-14s as "mini-AWACs". The Iraqi Air Force reacted by increasing the sophistication of its equipment, incorporating modern electronic countermeasure pods, decoys such as chaff and flare, and anti-radiation missiles.[151]

Due to the heavy losses in the last war of the cities, Iraq reduced their use of aerial attacks on Iranian cities. Instead, they launched Scud missiles, which the Iranians could not stop. Since the range of the Scud missile was too short to reach Tehran, they converted them to al-Husayn missiles with the help of East German engineers, cutting up their Scuds into three chunks and attaching them together. Iran responded to these attacks by using their own Scud missiles.[167]

Compounding the extensive foreign help to Iraq, Iranian attacks were severely hampered by their shortages of weaponry, particularly heavy weapons as large amounts had been lost during the war. Iran still managed to maintain 1,000 tanks, often by capturing Iraqi ones and additional artillery, but many needed repairs to be operational. By this time Iran managed to procure spare parts from various sources, helping them to restore some weapons. They secretly imported some weapons, such as RBS-70 anti-aircraft MANPADS.[59] In an exception to the United States' support for Iraq, in exchange for Iran using its influence to help free western hostages in Lebanon, the United States secretly sold Iran some limited supplies. In Akbar Rafsanjani's postwar interview, he stated that during the period when Iran was succeeding, for a short time the United States supported Iran, then shortly after began helping Iraq again.[121] Iran managed to get some advanced weapons, such as anti-tank TOW missiles, which worked better than rocket-propelled grenades. Iran later reverse-engineered and produced those weapons themselves.[59][152] All of these almost certainly helped increase the effectiveness of Iran, although it did not reduce the human cost of their attacks.[59][152]

First Battle of al-Faw

Operation Dawn 8 during which Iran captured the Faw Peninsula

On the night of 10–11 February 1986, the Iranians launched Operation Dawn 8,[168] in which 30,000 troops in five Army divisions and men from the Revolutionary Guard and Basij advanced in a two-pronged offensive to capture the al-Faw peninsula in southern Iraq, the only area touching the Persian Gulf.[62] The capture of Al Faw and Umm Qasr was a major goal for Iran.[121] Iran began with a feint attack against Basra, which was stopped by the Iraqis.[62][150]

Meanwhile, an amphibious strike force landed at the foot of the peninsula. The resistance, consisting of several thousand poorly trained soldiers of the Iraqi Popular Army, fled or were defeated, and the Iranian forces set up pontoon bridges crossing the Shatt al-Arab[note 5], allowing 30,000 soldiers to cross in a short period of time.[150] They drove north along the peninsula almost unopposed, capturing it after only 24 hours of fighting.[62][123]: 240 [82] Afterwards they dug in and set up defenses.[82]

The sudden capture of al-Faw shocked the Iraqis, since they had thought it impossible for the Iranians to cross the Shatt al-Arab. On 12 February 1986, the Iraqis began a counter-offensive to retake al-Faw, which failed after a week of heavy fighting.[62][82] On 24 February 1986, Saddam sent one of his best commanders, General Maher Abd al-Rashid, and the Republican Guard to begin a new offensive to recapture al-Faw.[62] A new round of heavy fighting took place. Their attempts again ended in failure, costing them many tanks and aircraft.[62] Their 15th mechanised division was almost completely wiped out.[59] The capture of al-Faw and the failure of the Iraqi counter-offensives were blows to the Ba'ath regime's prestige, and led the Gulf countries to fear that Iran might win the war.[62] Kuwait in particular felt menaced with Iranian troops only 16 km (9.9 mi) away, and increased its support of Iraq accordingly.[123]: 241 

In March 1986, the Iranians tried to follow up their success by attempting to take Umm Qasr, which would have completely severed Iraq from the Gulf and placed Iranian troops on the border with Kuwait.[62][121] The offensive failed due to Iranian shortages of armor.[62] By this time, 17,000 Iraqis and 30,000 Iranians were casualties.[62] The First Battle of al-Faw ended in March, but heavy combat operations lasted on the peninsula into 1988, with neither side being able to displace the other. The battle bogged down into a World War I-style stalemate in the marshes of the peninsula.[114]

Battle of Mehran

Immediately after the Iranian capture of al-Faw, Saddam declared a new offensive against Iran, designed to drive deep into the state.[59][page needed] The Iranian border city of Mehran, on the foot of the Zagros Mountains, was selected as the first target. On 15–19 May, Iraqi Army's Second Corps, supported by helicopter gunships, attacked and captured the city. Saddam then offered to exchange Mehran for al-Faw.[59][page needed] The Iranians rejected the offer. Iraq then continued the attack, attempting to push deeper into Iran. Iraq's attack was quickly warded off by Iranian AH-1 Cobra helicopters with TOW missiles, which destroyed numerous Iraqi tanks and vehicles.[59][page needed]

The Iranians built up their forces on the heights surrounding Mehran. On 30 June, using mountain warfare tactics, they launched their attack, recapturing the city by 3 July.[59][page needed] Saddam ordered the Republican Guard to retake the city on 4 July, but their attack was ineffective. Iraqi losses were heavy enough to allow the Iranians to also capture territory inside Iraq,[59][page needed] and depleted the Iraqi military enough to prevent them from launching a major offensive for the next two years.[59][page needed] Iraq's defeats at al-Faw and at Mehran were severe blows to the prestige of the Iraqi regime. Western powers, including the US, became more determined to prevent an Iraqi loss.[59][page needed]

Situation at the end of 1986

Through the eyes of international observers, Iran was prevailing in the war by the end of 1986.[150] In the northern front, the Iranians began launching attacks toward the city of Suleimaniya with the help of Kurdish fighters, taking the Iraqis by surprise. They came within 16 km (9.9 mi) of the city before being stopped by chemical and army attacks. Iran's army had also reached the Meimak Hills, only 113 km (70 mi) from Baghdad.[150] Iraq managed to contain Iran's offensives in the south, but was under serious pressure, as the Iranians were slowly overwhelming them.

Iraq retaliated by initiating another war of the cities. In one attack, Tehran's main oil refinery was hit, and in another instance, Iraq damaged Iran's Assadabad satellite dish, disrupting Iranian overseas telephone and telex service for almost two weeks.[150] Civilian areas were also hit, resulting in many casualties. Iraq continued to attack oil tankers via air.[59] Iran responded by launching Scud missiles and air attacks at Iraqi targets.

Iraq continued to attack Kharg Island and the oil tankers and facilities as well. Iran created a tanker shuttle service of 20 tankers to move oil from Kharg to Larak Island, escorted by Iranian fighter jets. Once moved to Larak, the oil would be moved to oceangoing tankers, usually neutral.[169] They also rebuilt the oil terminals damaged by Iraqi air raids and moved shipping to Larak Island, while attacking foreign tankers that carried Iraqi oil, as Iran had blocked Iraq's access to the open sea with the capture of al-Faw. By now, they almost always used the armed speedboats of the IRGC navy, and attacked many tankers.[59]

The tanker war escalated drastically, with attacks nearly doubling in 1986, the majority carried out by Iraq. Iraq got permission from the Saudi government to use its airspace to attack Larak Island, although due to the distance attacks were less frequent there. The escalating tanker war in the Gulf became an ever-increasing concern to foreign powers, especially the United States.[169]

In April 1986, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa declaring that the war must be won by March 1987. The Iranians increased recruitment efforts, obtaining 650,000 volunteers.[144] The animosity between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard arose again, with the Army wanting to use more refined, limited military attacks, while the Revolutionary Guard wanted to carry out major offensives.[144] Iran, confident in its successes, began planning their largest offensives of the war, which they called their "final offensives".[144]

Iraq's dynamic defense strategy

Faced with their recent defeats in al-Faw and Mehran, Iraq appeared to be losing the war. Iraq's generals, angered by Saddam's interference, threatened a full-scale mutiny against the Ba'ath Party unless they were allowed to conduct operations freely. In one of the few times during his career, Saddam gave in to the demands of his generals.[82][page needed] Up to this point, Iraqi strategy was to ride out Iranian attacks. However, the defeat at al-Faw led Saddam to declare the war to be Al-Defa al-Mutaharakha (The Dynamic Defense),[59][page needed] and announcing that all civilians had to take part in the war effort.

The government tried to integrate the Shias into the war effort by recruiting many as part of the Ba'ath Party.[82][page needed] In an attempt to counterbalance the religious fervor of the Iranians and gain support from the devout masses, the regime also began to promote religion and, on the surface, Islamization, despite the fact that Iraq was run by a secular regime. Scenes of Saddam praying and making pilgrimages to shrines became common on state-run television. While Iraqi morale had been low throughout the war, the attack on al-Faw raised patriotic fervor, as the Iraqis feared invasion.[82][page needed]

Saddam also recruited volunteers from other Arab countries into the Republican Guard, and received much technical support from foreign nations as well.[59][page needed] While Iraqi military power had been depleted in recent battles, through heavy foreign purchases and support, they were able to expand their military to much larger proportions by 1988.[59][page needed]

At the same time, Saddam ordered the al-Anfal campaign in an attempt to crush the Kurdish resistance, who were now allied with Iran. The result was the deaths of several hundred thousand Iraqi Kurds, and the destruction of villages, towns, and cities.[170]

Iraq began to try to perfect its maneuver tactics.[82][page needed] The Iraqis began to prioritize the professionalization of their military. Prior to 1986, the conscription-based Iraqi regular army and the volunteer-based Iraqi Popular Army conducted the bulk of the operations in the war, to little effect. The Republican Guard, formerly an elite praetorian guard, was expanded as a volunteer army and filled with Iraq's best generals.[82] Loyalty to the state was no longer a primary requisite for joining. After the war, due to Saddam's paranoia, the former duties of the Republican Guard were transferred to a new unit, the Special Republican Guard.[82][page needed] Full-scale war games against hypothetical Iranian positions were carried out in the western Iraqi desert against mock targets. They were repeated over the course of a full year until the forces involved fully memorized their attacks.[82] Iraq built its military massively, eventually possessing the 4th largest in the world, in order to overwhelm the Iranians through sheer size.[82][page needed]

1987–88: Renewed Iranian Offensives

Burned-out vehicles shown in the aftermath of Operation Mersad[citation needed]

Meanwhile, Iran continued to attack as the Iraqis were planning their strike. In 1987 the Iranians renewed a series of major human wave offensives in both northern and southern Iraq. The Iraqis had elaborately fortified Basra with 5 defensive rings, exploiting natural waterways such as the Shatt-al-Arab and artificial ones, such as Fish Lake and the Jasim River, along with earth barriers. Fish Lake was a massive lake filled with mines, underwater barbed wire, electrodes and sensors. Behind each waterway and defensive line was radar-guided artillery, ground attack aircraft and helicopters, all capable of firing poison gas or conventional munitions.[59]

The Iranian strategy was to penetrate the Iraqi defences and encircle Basra, cutting off the city as well as the Al-Faw peninsula from the rest of Iraq.[150] Iran's plan was for three assaults: a diversionary attack near Basra, the main offensive and another diversionary attack using Iranian tanks in the north to divert Iraqi heavy armor from Basra.[59] For these battles, Iran had re-expanded their military by recruiting many new Basij and Pasdaran volunteers.[150] Iran brought 150,000–200,000 total troops into the battles.[82]

Operation Karbala-4

On 25 December 1986, Iran launched Operation Karbala-4 (Karbala referring to Husayn ibn Ali's Battle of Karbala).[171] According to Iraqi General Ra'ad al-Hamdani, this was a diversionary attack.[114] The Iranians launched an amphibious assault against the Iraqi island of Umm al-Rassas in the Shatt-Al-Arab river, parallel to Khoramshahr. They then set up a pontoon bridge and continued the attack, eventually capturing the island in a costly success but failing to advance further. The Iranians had 60,000 casualties, while the Iraqis 9,500.[144] The Iraqi commanders exaggerated Iranian losses to Saddam, and it was assumed that the main Iranian attack on Basra had been fully defeated and that it would take the Iranians six months to recover. When the main Iranian attack, Operation Karbala 5, began, many Iraqi troops were on leave.[114]

Karbala-5 (Sixth Battle of Basra)

The Siege of Basra, code-named Operation Karbala-5 (Persian: عملیات کربلای ۵), was an offensive operation carried out by Iran in an effort to capture the Iraqi port city of Basra in early 1987. This battle, known for its extensive casualties and ferocious conditions, was the biggest battle of the war and proved to be the beginning of the end of the Iran–Iraq War.[172][173] While Iranian forces crossed the border and captured the eastern section of Basra Governorate, the operation ended in a stalemate.

Karbala-6

At the same time as Operation Karbala 5, Iran launched Operation Karbala-6 against the Iraqis in Qasr-e Shirin in central Iran to prevent the Iraqis from rapidly transferring units down to defend against the Karbala-5 attack. The attack was carried out by Basij infantry and the Revolutionary Guard's 31st Ashura and the Army's 77th Khorasan armored divisions. The Basij attacked the Iraqi lines, forcing the Iraqi infantry to retreat. An Iraqi armored counter-attack surrounded the Basij in a pincer movement. The Iranian tank divisions attacked, breaking the encirclement. The Iranian attack was stopped by mass Iraqi chemical weapons attacks.[174]

Iranian war-weariness

Operation Karbala-5 was a severe blow to Iran's military and morale.[138] To foreign observers, it appeared that Iran was continuing to strengthen. By 1988, Iran had become self-sufficient in many areas, such as anti-tank TOW missiles, Scud ballistic missiles (Shahab-1), Silkworm anti-ship missiles, Oghab tactical rockets, and producing spare parts for their weaponry. Iran had improved its air defenses with smuggled surface to air missiles.[59] Iran was even producing UAV's and the Pilatus PC-7 propeller aircraft for observation.[59] Iran doubled their stocks of artillery, and was self-sufficient in the manufacture of ammunition and small arms.[175]

While it was not obvious to foreign observers, the Iranian public had become increasingly war-weary and disillusioned with the fighting, and relatively few volunteers joined the fight in 1987–88. Because the Iranian war effort relied on popular mobilization, their military strength actually declined, and Iran was unable to launch any major offensives after Karbala-5. As a result, for the first time since 1982, the momentum of the fighting shifted towards the regular army. Since the regular army was conscription based, it made the war even less popular. Many Iranians began to try to escape the conflict. As early as May 1985, anti-war demonstrations took place in 74 cities throughout Iran, which were crushed by the regime, resulting in some protesters being shot and killed.[176]

The leadership acknowledged that the war was a stalemate, and began to plan accordingly.[82] No more "final offensives" were planned.[59] The head of the Supreme Defense Council Akbar Rafsanjani announced during a news conference the end of human wave attacks.[177] Mohsen Rezaee, head of the IRGC, announced that Iran would focus exclusively on limited attacks and infiltrations, while arming and supporting opposition groups inside of Iraq.[150]

On the Iranian home front, sanctions, declining oil prices, and Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil facilities and shipping took a heavy toll on the economy. While the attacks themselves were not as destructive as some analysts believed, the U.S.-led Operation Earnest Will, which protected Iraqi and allied oil tankers, but not Iranian ones, led many neutral countries to stop trading with Iran because of rising insurance and fear of air attack.[59][127][60] Iranian oil and non-oil exports fell by 55%, inflation reached 50% by 1987, and unemployment skyrocketed.[59] At the same time, Iraq was experiencing crushing debt and shortages of workers, encouraging its leadership to try to end the war quickly.[138]

Strategic situation in late 1987

Adnan Khairallah, Iraqi Defense Minister, meeting with Iraqi soldiers during the war

By the end of 1987, Iraq possessed 5,550 tanks, outnumbering the Iranians six to one, and 900 fighter aircraft, outnumbering the Iranians ten to one.[59] After Operation Karbala-5, Iraq only had 100 qualified fighter pilots remaining. Therefore, Iraq began to invest in recruiting foreign pilots from countries such as Belgium, South Africa, Pakistan, East Germany and the Soviet Union.[178] They replenished their manpower by integrating volunteers from other Arab countries into their army. Iraq also became self-sufficient in chemical weapons and some conventional ones and received much equipment from abroad.[59] Foreign support helped Iraq bypass its economic troubles and massive debt to continue the war and increase the size of its military.[59]

While the southern and central fronts were at a stalemate, Iran began to focus on carrying out offensives in northern Iraq with the help of the Peshmerga (Kurdish insurgents). The Iranians used a combination of semi-guerrilla and infiltration tactics in the Kurdish mountains with the Peshmerga. During Operation Karbala-9 in early April, Iran captured territory near Suleimaniya, provoking a severe poison gas counter-attack. During Operation Karbala-10, Iran attacked near the same area, capturing more territory. During Operation Nasr-4, the Iranians surrounded the city of Suleimaniya and, with the help of the Peshmerga, infiltrated over 140 km into Iraq and raided and threatened to capture the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and other northern oilfields.[138]

Air and tanker war

With the stalemate on land, the air/tanker war began to play an increasingly major role in the conflict.[169] The Iranian air force had become very small, with only 20 F-4 Phantoms, 20 F-5 Tigers, and 15 F-14 Tomcats in operation, although Iran managed to restore some damaged planes to service. The Iranian Air Force, despite its once sophisticated equipment, lacked enough equipment and personnel to sustain the war of attrition that had developed, and was unable to lead an outright onslaught against Iraq.[151]

The Iraqi Air Force, had originally lacked modern equipment and experienced pilots, but after pleas from Iraqi military leaders, Saddam decreased political influence on everyday operations and left the fighting to his combatants. The Soviets began delivering more advanced aircraft and weapons to Iraq, while the French improved training for flight crews and technical personnel and continually introduced new methods for countering Iranian weapons and tactics.[151] Iranian ground air defense still shot down many Iraqi aircraft.[59][151]

The main Iraqi air effort had shifted to the destruction of Iranian war-fighting capability, primarily Persian Gulf oil fields, tankers, and Kharg Island, and starting in late 1986, the Iraqi Air Force began a comprehensive campaign against Iranian economic infrastructure.[151] By late 1987, the Iraqi Air Force could count on direct American support for conducting long-range operations against Iranian infrastructural targets and oil installations deep in the Persian Gulf. U.S. Navy ships tracked and reported movements of Iranian shipping and defences. In the massive Iraqi air strike against Kharg Island, flown on 18 March 1988, the Iraqis destroyed two supertankers but lost five aircraft to Iranian F-14 Tomcats, including two Tupolev Tu-22Bs and one Mikoyan MiG-25RB.[151]

IRGC navy speedboats using swarm tactics

The attacks on oil tankers continued. Both Iran and Iraq carried out frequent attacks during the first four months of the year. Iran was effectively waging a naval guerilla war with its IRGC navy speedboats, while Iraq attacked with its aircraft. In 1987, Kuwait asked to reflag its tankers to the U.S. flag. They did so in March, and the U.S. Navy began Operation Earnest Will to escort the tankers.[169] The result of Earnest Will would be that, while oil tankers shipping Iraqi/Kuwaiti oil were protected, Iranian tankers and neutral tankers shipping to Iran would be unprotected, resulting in both losses for Iran and the undermining of its trade with foreign countries, damaging Iran's economy further.[169]

Iran deployed Silkworm missiles to attack ships, but only a few were actually fired. Both the United States and Iran jockeyed for influence in the Gulf. To discourage the United States from escorting tankers, Iran secretly mined some areas. The United States began to escort the reflagged tankers, but one was damaged by a mine while under escort. While being a public-relations victory for Iran, the United States increased its reflagging efforts. While Iran mined the Persian Gulf, their speedboat attacks were reduced, primarily attacking unflagged tankers shipping in the area.[169]

On 24 September, US Navy SEALS captured the Iranian mine-laying ship Iran Ajr, a diplomatic disaster for the already isolated Iranians. Iran had previously sought to maintain at least a pretense of plausible deniability regarding its use of mines, but the Navy SEALS captured and photographed extensive evidence of Iran Ajr's mine-laying activities.[179] On 8 October, the U.S. Navy destroyed four Iranian speedboats, and in response to Iranian Silkworm missile attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers, launched Operation Nimble Archer, destroying two Iranian oil rigs in the Persian Gulf.[59] During November and December, the Iraqi air force launched a bid to destroy all Iranian airbases in Khuzestan and the remaining Iranian air force. Iran managed to shoot down 30 Iraqi fighters with fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns, and missiles, allowing the Iranian air force to survive to the end of the war.[59]

On 28 June, Iraqi fighter bombers attacked the Iranian town of Sardasht near the border, using chemical mustard gas bombs. While many towns and cities had been bombed before, and troops attacked with gas, this was the first time that the Iraqis had attacked a civilian area with poison gas.[180] One quarter of the town's then population of 20,000 was burned and stricken, and 113 were killed immediately, with many more dying and suffering health effects over following decades.[163]

1988: Final Iraqi offensives

By 1988, with massive equipment imports and reduced Iranian volunteers, Iraq was ready to launch major offensives against Iran.[82] In February 1988, Saddam began the fifth and most deadly war of the cities.[62] Over the next two months, Iraq launched over 200 al-Husayn missiles at 37 Iranian cities.[62][175] Saddam also threatened to use chemical weapons in his missiles, which caused 30% of Tehran's population to leave the city.[62] Iran retaliated, launching at least 104 missiles against Iraq in 1988 and shelling Basra.[144][175] This event was nicknamed the "Scud Duel" in the foreign media.[59] In all, Iraq launched 520 Scuds and al-Husseins against Iran and Iran fired 177 in return.[67] The Iranian attacks were too few in number to deter Iraq from launching their attacks.[175] Iraq also increased their airstrikes against Kharg Island and Iranian oil tankers. With their tankers protected by U.S. warships, they could operate with virtual impunity.[59][169] In addition, the West supplied Iraq's air force with laser-guided smart bombs, allowing them to attack economic targets while evading anti-aircraft defenses. These attacks began to have a major toll on the Iranian economy and morale and caused many casualties.[59][121][169]

Iran's Kurdistan Operations

An Iranian soldier wearing a gas mask during the war

In March 1988, the Iranians carried out Operation Dawn 10, Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas 2, and Operation Zafar 7 in Iraqi Kurdistan with the aim of capturing the Darbandikhan Dam and the power plant at Lake Dukan, which supplied Iraq with much of its electricity and water, as well as the city of Suleimaniya.[90]: 264  Iran hoped that the capture of these areas would bring more favourable terms to the ceasefire agreement.[121] This infiltration offensive was carried out in conjunction with the Peshmerga. Iranian airborne commandos landed behind the Iraqi lines and Iranian helicopters hit Iraqi tanks with TOW missiles. The Iraqis were taken by surprise, and Iranian F-5E Tiger fighter jets even damaged the Kirkuk oil refinery.[59] Iraq carried out executions of multiple officers for these failures in March–April 1988, including Colonel Jafar Sadeq.[114] The Iranians used infiltration tactics in the Kurdish mountains, captured the town of Halabja and began to fan out across the province.[114]

Though the Iranians advanced to within sight of Dukan and captured around 1,040 km2 (400 sq mi) and 4,000 Iraqi troops, the offensive failed due to the Iraqi use of chemical warfare.[90]: 264  The Iraqis launched the deadliest chemical weapons attacks of the war. The Republican Guard launched 700 chemical shells, while the other artillery divisions launched 200–300 chemical shells each, unleashing a chemical cloud over the Iranians, killing or wounding 60% of them, the blow was felt particularly by the Iranian 84th infantry division and 55th paratrooper division.[114] The Iraqi special forces then stopped the remains of the Iranian force.[114] In retaliation for Kurdish collaboration with the Iranians, Iraq launched a massive poison gas attack against Kurdish civilians in Halabja, recently taken by the Iranians, killing thousands of civilians.[181] Iran airlifted foreign journalists to the ruined city, and the images of the dead were shown throughout the world, but Western mistrust of Iran and collaboration with Iraq led them to also blame Iran for the attack.[181]

Second Battle of al-Faw

On 17 April 1988, Iraq launched Operation Ramadan Mubarak (Blessed Ramadan), a surprise attack against the 15,000 Basij troops on the al-Faw peninsula.[82] The attack was preceded by Iraqi diversionary attacks in northern Iraq, with a massive artillery and air barrage of Iranian front lines. Key areas, such as supply lines, command posts, and ammunition depots, were hit by a storm of mustard gas and nerve gas, as well as by conventional explosives. Helicopters landed Iraqi commandos behind Iranian lines on al-Faw while the main Iraqi force made a frontal assault. Within 48 hours, all of the Iranian forces had been killed or cleared from the al-Faw Peninsula.[82] The day was celebrated in Iraq as Faw Liberation Day throughout Saddam's rule. The Iraqis had planned the offensive well. Prior to the attack, the Iraqi soldiers gave themselves poison gas antidotes to shield themselves from the effect of the saturation of gas. The heavy and well executed use of chemical weapons was the decisive factor in the victory.[182] Iraqi losses were relatively light, especially compared to Iran's casualties.[114] Ra'ad al-Hamdani later recounted that the recapture of al-Faw marked "the highest point of experience and expertise that the Iraqi Army reached."[183] The Iranians eventually managed to halt the Iraqi drive as they pushed towards Khuzestan.[59]

To the shock of the Iranians, rather than breaking off the offensive, the Iraqis kept up their drive, and a new force attacked the Iranian positions around Basra.[62] Following this, the Iraqis launched a sustained drive to clear the Iranians out of all of southern Iraq.[90]: 264  One of the most successful Iraqi tactics was the "one-two punch" attack using chemical weapons. Using artillery, they would saturate the Iranian front line with rapidly dispersing cyanide and nerve gas, while longer-lasting mustard gas was launched via fighter-bombers and rockets against the Iranian rear, creating a "chemical wall" that blocked reinforcement.[59]

Operation Praying Mantis

The Iranian frigate IS Sahand burns after being hit by 20 U.S. air launched missiles and bombs, killing a third of the crew, April 1988[184]

The same day as Iraq's attack on al-Faw peninsula, the United States Navy launched Operation Praying Mantis in retaliation against Iran for damaging a warship with a mine. Iran lost oil platforms, destroyers, and frigates in this battle, which ended only when President Reagan decided that the Iranian navy had been damaged enough. In spite of this, the Revolutionary Guard Navy continued their speedboat attacks against oil tankers.[82] The defeats at al-Faw and in the Persian Gulf nudged Iranian leadership towards quitting the war, especially when facing the prospect of fighting the Americans.[82]

Iranian counteroffensive

Faced with such losses, Khomeini appointed Rafsanjani as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, though he had in actuality occupied that position for months.[175] Rafsanjani ordered a last desperate counter-attack into Iraq, which was launched 13 June 1988. The Iranians infiltrated through the Iraqi trenches and moved 10 km (6.2 mi) into Iraq and managed to strike Saddam's presidential palace in Baghdad using fighter aircraft.[59] After three days of fighting, the decimated Iranians were driven back to their original positions again as the Iraqis launched 650 helicopter and 300 aircraft sorties.[175]

Operation Forty Stars

On 18 June 1988, the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) conducted a military operation known as Operation Forty Stars (Persian: عملیات چلچراغ).[185] In four days, the People's Mujahedin of Iran wiped out a Pasdaran division, seizing Mehran and building a bridgehead twelve miles into Iran.[186][175] According to the MEK, Iraqi soldiers did not participate in the operation. Baghdad also said it was not involved in the battle.[185]

Tawakalna ala Allah operations

On 25 May 1988, Iraq launched the first of five Tawakalna ala Allah Operations,[114] consisting of one of the largest artillery barrages in history, coupled with chemical weapons. The marshes had been dried by drought, allowing the Iraqis to use tanks to bypass Iranian field fortifications, expelling the Iranians from the border town of Shalamcheh after less than 10 hours of combat.[62]: 11 [90]: 265 [175]

Iranian soldiers captured during Iraq's 1988 offensives

On 25 June, Iraq launched the second Tawakal ala Allah operation against the Iranians on Majnoon Island. Iraqi commandos used amphibious craft to block the Iranian rear,[59] then used hundreds of tanks with massed conventional and chemical artillery barrages to recapture the island after 8 hours of combat.[114][175] Saddam appeared live on Iraqi television to "lead" the charge against the Iranians.[175] The majority of the Iranian defenders were killed during the quick assault.[114] The final two Tawakal ala Allah operations took place near al-Amarah and Khaneqan.[114] By 12 July, the Iraqis had captured the city of Dehloran, 30 km (19 mi) inside Iran, along with 2,500 troops and much armour and material, which took four days to transport to Iraq. These losses included more than 570 of the 1,000 remaining Iranian tanks, over 430 armored vehicles, 45 self-propelled artillery, 300 towed artillery pieces, and 320 antiaircraft guns. These figures only included what Iraq could actually put to use; total amount of captured materiel was higher. Since March, the Iraqis claimed to have captured 1,298 tanks, 155 infantry fighting vehicles, 512 heavy artillery pieces, 6,196 mortars, 5,550 recoilless rifles and light guns, 8,050-man-portable rocket launchers, 60,694 rifles, 322 pistols, 454 trucks, and 1,600 light vehicles.[175] The Iraqis withdrew from Dehloran soon after, claiming that they had "no desire to conquer Iranian territory".[59] History professor Kaveh Farrokh considered this to be Iran's greatest military disaster during the war. Stephen Pelletier, a Journalist, Middle East expert, and author, noted that "Tawakal ala Allah ... resulted in the absolute destruction of Iran's military machine."[59]

During the 1988 battles, the Iranians put up little resistance, having been worn out by nearly eight years of war.[90]: 253  They lost large amounts of equipment.[59] On 2 July, Iran belatedly set up a joint central command which unified the Revolutionary Guard, Army, and Kurdish rebels, and dispelled the rivalry between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard. However, this came too late and, following the capture of 570 of their operable tanks and the destruction of hundreds more, Iran was believed to have fewer than 200 remaining operable tanks on the southern front, against thousands of Iraqi ones.[175] The only area where the Iranians were not suffering major defeats was in Kurdistan.[138]

Iran accepts the ceasefire

Saddam sent a warning to Khomeini in mid-1988, threatening to launch a new and powerful full-scale invasion and attack Iranian cities with weapons of mass destruction. Shortly afterwards, Iraqi aircraft bombed the Iranian town of Oshnavieh with poison gas, immediately killing and wounding over 2,000 civilians. The fear of an all out chemical attack against Iran's largely unprotected civilian population weighed heavily on the Iranian leadership, and they realized that the international community had no intention of restraining Iraq.[187] The lives of the civilian population of Iran were becoming very disrupted, with a third of the urban population evacuating major cities in fear of the seemingly imminent chemical war. Meanwhile, Iraqi conventional bombs and missiles continuously hit towns and cities, destroying vital civilian and military infrastructure, and increasing the death toll. Iran replied with missile and air attacks, but not sufficiently to deter the Iraqis.[175]

USS Vincennes in 1987 a year before it shot down Iran Air Flight 655

With the threat of a new and even more powerful invasion, Commander-in-Chief Rafsanjani ordered the Iranians to retreat from Haj Omran, Kurdistan on 14 July.[175][188] The Iranians did not publicly describe this as a retreat, instead calling it a "temporary withdrawal".[188] By July, Iran's army inside Iraq had largely disintegrated.[59] Iraq put up a massive display of captured Iranian weapons in Baghdad, claiming they captured 1,298 tanks, 5,550 recoilless rifles, and thousands of other weapons.[175] However, Iraq had taken heavy losses as well, and the battles were very costly.[114]

In July 1988, Iraqi aircraft dropped bombs on the Iranian Kurdish village of Zardan. Dozens of villages, such as Sardasht, and some larger towns, such as Marivan, Baneh and Saqqez,[189] were once again attacked with poison gas, resulting in even heavier civilian casualties.[190] On 3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 passengers and crew. The lack of international sympathy disturbed the Iranian leadership, and they came to the conclusion that the United States was on the verge of waging a full-scale war against them, and that Iraq was on the verge of unleashing its entire chemical arsenal upon their cities.[187]

At this point, elements of the Iranian leadership, led by Rafsanjani (who had initially pushed for the extension of the war), persuaded Khomeini to accept a ceasefire.[62] They stated that in order to win the war, Iran's military budget would have to be increased eightfold and the war would last until 1993.[175] On 20 July 1988, Iran accepted Resolution 598, showing its willingness to accept a ceasefire.[62]: 11  A statement from Khomeini was read out in a radio address, and he expressed deep displeasure and reluctance about accepting the ceasefire,

Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Happy are those who have lost their lives in this convoy of light. Unhappy am I that I still survive and have drunk the poisoned chalice...[62][123]: 1 

The news of the end of the war was greeted with celebration in Baghdad, with people dancing in the streets; in Tehran, however, the end of the war was greeted with a somber mood.[123]: 1 

Operation Mersad and end of the war

Operation Mersad (مرصاد "ambush") was the last big military operation of the war. Both Iran and Iraq had accepted Resolution 598, but despite the ceasefire, after seeing Iraqi victories in the previous months, Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) decided to launch an attack of its own and wished to advance all the way to Tehran. Saddam and the Iraqi high command decided on a two-pronged offensive across the border into central Iran and Iranian Kurdistan.[59] Shortly after Iran accepted the ceasefire, the MEK army began its offensive, attacking into Ilam province under cover of Iraqi air power. In the north, Iraq also launched an attack into Iraqi Kurdistan, which was blunted by the Iranians.[59]

On 26 July 1988, the MEK started their campaign in central Iran, Operation Forough Javidan (Eternal Light), with the support of the Iraqi army. The Iranians had withdrawn their remaining soldiers to Khuzestan in fear of a new Iraqi invasion attempt, allowing the Mujahedeen to advance rapidly towards Kermanshah, seizing Qasr-e Shirin, Sarpol-e Zahab, Kerend-e Gharb, and Islamabad-e-Gharb. The MEK expected the Iranian population to rise up and support their advance; the uprising never materialised but they reached 145 km (90 mi) deep into Iran. In response, the Iranian military launched its counter-attack, Operation Mersad, under Lieutenant General Ali Sayyad Shirazi. Iranian paratroopers landed behind the MEK lines while the Iranian Air Force and helicopters launched an air attack, destroying much of the enemy columns.[59] The Iranians defeated the MEK in the city of Kerend-e Gharb on 29 July 1988.[175] On 31 July, Iran drove the MEK out of Qasr-e-Shirin and Sarpol Zahab, though MEK claimed to have "voluntarily withdrawn" from the towns.[59][175] Iran estimated that 4,500 MEK were killed, while 400 Iranian soldiers died.[191]

MEK soldiers killed in Operation Mersad, 1988

The last notable combat actions of the war took place on 3 August 1988, in the Persian Gulf when the Iranian navy fired on a freighter and Iraq launched chemical attacks on Iranian civilians, killing an unknown number of them and wounding 2,300.[175] Iraq came under international pressure to curtail further offensives. Resolution 598 became effective on 8 August 1988, ending all combat operations between the two countries.[188] By 20 August 1988, peace with Iran was restored.[188] UN peacekeepers belonging to the UNIIMOG mission took the field, remaining on the Iran–Iraq border until 1991. The majority of Western analysts believe that the war had no winners while some believed that Iraq emerged as the victor of the war, based on Iraq's overwhelming successes between April and July 1988.[59] While the war was now over, Iraq spent the rest of August and early September clearing the Kurdish resistance. Using 60,000 troops along with helicopter gunships, chemical weapons (poison gas), and mass executions, Iraq hit 15 villages, killing rebels and civilians, and forced tens of thousands of Kurds to relocate to settlements.[175] Many Kurdish civilians fled to Iran. By 3 September 1988, the anti-Kurd campaign ended, and all resistance had been crushed.[175] 400 Iraqi soldiers and 50,000–100,000 Kurdish civilians and soldiers had been killed.[175][192]

At the war's conclusion, it took several weeks for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran to evacuate Iraqi territory to honor pre-war international borders set by the 1975 Algiers Agreement.[59] The last prisoners of war were exchanged in 2003.[193][194]

The Security Council did not identify Iraq as the aggressor of the war until 11 December 1991, some 11 years after Iraq invaded Iran and 16 months following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.[195][196]

Aftermath

Casualties

The Al-Shaheed Monument in Baghdad was erected to commemorate the fallen Iraqi soldiers during the war.

The Iran–Iraq War was the deadliest conventional war ever fought between regular armies of developing countries.[72] Encyclopædia Britannica states: "Estimates of total casualties range from 1,000,000 to twice that number. The number killed on both sides was perhaps 500,000, with Iran suffering the greatest losses."[23] Iraqi casualties are estimated at 105,000–200,000 killed,[34][44][48][49] while about 400,000 had been wounded and some 70,000 taken prisoner.[36][48] Thousands of civilians on both sides died in air raids and ballistic missile attacks.[67] Prisoners taken by both countries began to be released in 1990, though some were not released until more than 10 years after the end of the conflict.[193] Cities on both sides had also been considerably damaged. While revolutionary Iran had been bloodied, Iraq was left with a large military and was a regional power, albeit with severe debt, financial problems, and labour shortages.[138]

According to Iranian government sources, the war cost Iran an estimated 200,000–220,000 killed,[34][43][36][44] or up to 262,000 according to the conservative Western estimates.[34][35] This includes 123,220 combatants,[34][43] 60,711 MIA[34] and 11,000–16,000 civilians.[34][43] Combatants include 79,664 members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and additional 35,170 soldiers from regular military.[43] In addition, prisoners of war accounted for 42,875 Iranian casualties, captured and kept in Iraqi detention centres from 2.5 to more than 15 years after the war was over.[45]

According to the Janbazan Affairs Organization, 398,587 Iranians sustained injuries that required prolonged medical and health care following primary treatment, including 52,195 (13%) injured due to the exposure to chemical warfare agents.[45] From 1980 to 2012, 218,867 Iranians died due to war injuries and the mean age of combatants was 23 years old.[45] This includes 33,430 civilians, mostly women and children.[45] More than 144,000 Iranian children were orphaned as a consequence of these deaths.[45] Other estimates put Iranian casualties up to 600,000.[38][39][40][41][197][198][199]

Both Iraq and Iran manipulated loss figures to suit their purposes. At the same time, Western analysts accepted improbable estimates.[200] By April 1988, such casualties were estimated at between 150,000 and 340,000 Iraqis dead, and 450,000 to 730,000 Iranians.[200] Shortly after the end of the war, it was thought that Iran suffered even more than a million dead.[43] Considering the style of fighting on the ground and the fact that neither side penetrated deeply into the other's territory, USMC analysts believe events do not substantiate the high casualties claimed.[200] The Iraqi government has claimed 800,000 Iranians were killed in action, four times more than Iranian official figures,[34] whereas Iraqi intelligence privately put the number at 228,000–258,000 as of August 1986.[201] Iraqi losses were also revised downwards over time.[49]

Peace talks and postwar situation

Iranian Martyr Cemetery in Isfahan

With the ceasefire in place, and UN peacekeepers monitoring the border, Iran and Iraq sent their representatives to Geneva, Switzerland, to negotiate a peace agreement on the terms of the ceasefire. However, peace talks stalled. Iraq, in violation of the UN ceasefire, refused to withdraw its troops from 7,800 square kilometres (3,000 sq mi) of disputed territory at the border area unless the Iranians accepted Iraq's full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Foreign powers continued to support Iraq, which wanted to gain at the negotiating table what they failed to achieve on the battlefield, and Iran was portrayed as the one not wanting peace.[202]

In response, Iran refused to release 70,000 Iraqi prisoners of war, compared to 40,000 Iranian prisoners of war held by Iraq. They continued to carry out a naval blockade of Iraq, although its effects were mitigated by Iraqi use of ports in friendly neighbouring Arab countries. Iran began to improve relations with many of the states that opposed it during the war. Because of Iranian actions, by 1990, Saddam had become more conciliatory, and in a letter to the future fourth President of Iran Rafsanjani, he became more open to the idea of a peace agreement, although he still insisted on full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.[202]

By 1990, Iran was undergoing military rearmament and reorganization, and purchased $10 billion worth of heavy weaponry from the USSR and China, including aircraft, tanks, and missiles. Rafsanjani reversed Iran's self-imposed ban on chemical weapons, and ordered the manufacture and stockpile of them (Iran destroyed them in 1993 after ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention).[citation needed] As war with the western powers loomed, Iraq became concerned about the possibility of Iran mending its relations with the west in order to attack Iraq. Iraq had lost its support from the West, and its position in Iran was increasingly untenable.[202] Saddam realized that if Iran attempted to expel the Iraqis from the disputed territories in the border area, it was likely they would succeed.[59]

Shortly after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam wrote a letter to Rafsanjani stating that Iraq recognised Iranian rights over the eastern half of the Shatt al-Arab, a reversion to status quo ante bellum that he had repudiated a decade earlier,[203] and that he would accept Iran's demands and withdraw Iraq's military from the disputed territories. A peace agreement was signed finalizing the terms of the UN resolution, diplomatic relations were restored, and by late 1990-early 1991, the Iraqi military withdrew. The UN peacekeepers withdrew from the border shortly afterward. Most of the prisoners of war were released in 1990, although some remained as late as 2003.[202] Iranian politicians declared it to be the "greatest victory in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran".[202]

Most historians and analysts consider the war to be a stalemate.[48][204][193] Certain analysts believe that Iraq won, on the basis of the successes of their 1988 offensives which thwarted Iran's major territorial ambitions in Iraq and persuaded Iran to accept the ceasefire.[59] Iranian analysts believe that they won the war because although they did not succeed in overthrowing the Iraqi government, they thwarted Iraq's major territorial ambitions in Iran, and that, two years after the war had ended, Iraq permanently gave up its claim of ownership over the entire Shatt al-Arab as well.[59]

On 9 December 1991, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, UN Secretary General at the time, reported that Iraq's initiation of the war was unjustified, as was its occupation of Iranian territory and use of chemical weapons against civilians:

That [Iraq's] explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact...[the attack] cannot be justified under the charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law, or any principles of international morality, and entails the responsibility for conflict. Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran—which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict—in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens...On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons ha[d] been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center lacking any protection against that kind of attack."[205]

He also stated that had the UN accepted this fact earlier, the war would have almost certainly not lasted as long as it did. Iran, encouraged by the announcement, sought reparations from Iraq, but never received any.[202]

The Iranian Martyrs Museum in Tehran

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Iran and Iraq relations remained balanced between a cold war and a cold peace. Despite renewed and somewhat thawed relations, both sides continued to have low level conflicts. Iraq continued to host and support the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, which carried out multiple attacks throughout Iran up until the 2003 invasion of Iraq, including the assassination of Iranian general Ali Sayyad Shirazi in 1998, cross border raids, and mortar attacks. Iran carried out several airstrikes and missile attacks against Mujahedeen targets inside of Iraq, the largest taking place in 2001, when Iran fired 56 Scud missiles at Mujahedeen targets.[206]

According to General Hamdani, Iran continued to carry out low-level infiltrations of Iraqi territory, using Iraqi dissidents and anti-government activists rather than Iranian troops, in order to incite revolts. After the fall of Saddam in 2003, Hamdani claimed that Iranian agents infiltrated and created numerous militias in Iraq and built an intelligence system operating within the country.[114]

In 2005, the new government of Iraq apologised to Iran for starting the war.[207] The Iraqi government also commemorated the war with various monuments, including the Hands of Victory and the al-Shaheed Monument, both in Baghdad. The war also helped to create a forerunner for the Coalition of the Gulf War, when the Gulf Arab states banded together early in the war to form the Gulf Cooperation Council to help Iraq fight Iran.[138]

Economic situation

The economic loss at the time was believed to exceed $500 billion for each country ($1.2 trillion total).[54][208] In addition, economic development stalled and oil exports were disrupted. Iraq had accrued more than $130 billion of international debt, excluding interest, and was also weighed down by a slowed GDP growth. Iraq's debt to the Paris Club amounted to $21 billion, 85% of which had originated from the combined inputs of Japan, the USSR, France, Germany, the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom. The largest portion of Iraq's debt, amounting to $130 billion, was to its former Arab backers, with $67 billion loaned by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and Jordan.[citation needed]

After the war, Iraq accused Kuwait of slant drilling and stealing oil, inciting its invasion of Kuwait, which in turn worsened Iraq's financial situation: the United Nations Compensation Commission mandated Iraq to pay reparations of more than $200 billion to victims of the invasion, including Kuwait and the United States. To enforce payment, Iraq was put under a comprehensive international embargo, which further strained the Iraqi economy and pushed its external debt to private and public sectors to more than $500 billion by the end of Saddam's rule. Combined with Iraq's negative economic growth after prolonged international sanctions, this produced a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 1,000%, making Iraq the most indebted developing country in the world. The unsustainable economic situation compelled the new Iraqi government to request that a considerable portion of debt incurred during the Iran–Iraq war be written off.[209][210][211][212]

Science and technology

The war had its impact on medical science: a surgical intervention for comatose patients with penetrating brain injuries was created by Iranian physicians treating wounded soldiers, later establishing neurosurgery guidelines to treat civilians who had suffered blunt or penetrating skull injuries.[213] Iranian physicians' experience in the war informed the medical care of U.S. congresswoman Gabby Giffords after the 2011 Tucson shooting.[213][214]

In addition to helping trigger the Persian Gulf War, the Iran–Iraq War also contributed to Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War. Iraq's military was accustomed to fighting the slow moving Iranian infantry formations with artillery and static defenses, while using mostly unsophisticated tanks to gun down and shell the infantry and overwhelm the smaller Iranian tank force; in addition to being dependent on weapons of mass destruction to help secure victories. Therefore, they were rapidly overwhelmed by the high-tech, quick-maneuvering Coalition forces using modern doctrines such as AirLand Battle.[138]

Domestic situation

Iraq

At first, Saddam attempted to ensure that the Iraqi population suffered from the war as little as possible. There was rationing, but civilian projects begun before the war continued.[62] At the same time, the already extensive personality cult around Saddam reached new heights while the regime tightened its control over the military.[62]

After the Iranian victories of the spring of 1982 and the Syrian closure of Iraq's main pipeline, Saddam did a volte-face on his policy towards the home front: a policy of austerity and total war was introduced, with the entire population being mobilised for the war effort.[62] All Iraqis were ordered to donate blood and around 100,000 Iraqi civilians were ordered to clear the reeds in the southern marshes. Mass demonstrations of loyalty towards Saddam became more common.[62] Saddam also began implementing a policy of discrimination against Iraqis of Iranian origin.[59]

In the summer of 1982, Saddam began a campaign of terror. More than 300 Iraqi Army officers were executed for their failures on the battlefield.[62] In 1983, a major crackdown was launched on the leadership of the Shia community. Ninety members of the al-Hakim family, an influential family of Shia clerics whose leading members were the émigrés Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, were arrested, and 6 were hanged.[62]

The crackdown on Kurds saw 8,000 members of the Barzani clan, whose leader (Massoud Barzani) also led the Kurdistan Democratic Party, similarly executed.[62] From 1983 onwards, a campaign of increasingly brutal repression was started against the Iraqi Kurds, characterised by Israeli historian Efraim Karsh as having "assumed genocidal proportions" by 1988.[62] The al-Anfal Campaign was intended to "pacify" Iraqi Kurdistan permanently.[62] By 1983, the Barzanis entered an alliance with Iran in defense against Saddam Hussein.[215]

Gaining civilian support

To secure the loyalty of the Shia population, Saddam allowed more Shias into the Ba'ath Party and the government, and improved Shia living standards, which had been lower than those of the Iraqi Sunnis.[62] Saddam had the state pay for restoring Imam Ali's tomb with white marble imported from Italy.[62] The Baathists also increased their policies of repression against the Shia. The most infamous event was the massacre of 148 civilians of the Shia town of Dujail.[216]

Despite the costs of the war, the Iraqi regime made generous contributions to Shia waqf (religious endowments) as part of the price of buying Iraqi Shia support.[123]: 75–76  The importance of winning Shia support was such that welfare services in Shia areas were expanded during a time in which the Iraqi regime was pursuing austerity in all other non-military fields.[123]: 76  During the first years of the war in the early 1980s, the Iraqi government tried to accommodate the Kurds in order to focus on the war against Iran. In 1983, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan agreed to cooperate with Baghdad, but the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) remained opposed.[217] In 1983, Saddam signed an autonomy agreement with Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), though Saddam later reneged on the agreement.[62] By 1985, the PUK and KDP had joined forces, and Iraqi Kurdistan saw widespread guerrilla warfare up to the end of the war.[62]

Iran

An Iranian soldier's funeral in Mashhad, 2013

Israeli-British historian Ephraim Karsh argued that the Iranian government saw the outbreak of war as chance to strengthen its position and consolidate the Islamic revolution, noting that government propaganda presented it domestically as a glorious jihad and a test of Iranian national character.[62] The Iranian regime followed a policy of total war from the beginning, and attempted to mobilise the nation as a whole.[62] They established a group known as the Reconstruction Campaign, whose members were exempted from conscription and were instead sent into the countryside to work on farms to replace the men serving at the front.[62]

Iranian workers had a day's pay deducted from their pay cheques every month to help finance the war, and mass campaigns were launched to encourage the public to donate food, money, and blood.[62] To further help finance the war, the Iranian government banned the import of all non-essential items, and launched a major effort to rebuild the damaged oil plants.[62]

According to former Iraqi general Ra'ad al-Hamdani, the Iraqis believed that in addition to the Arab revolts, the Revolutionary Guards would be drawn out of Tehran, leading to a counter-revolution in Iran that would cause Khomeini's government to collapse and thus ensure Iraqi victory.[114][218] However, rather than turning against the revolutionary government as experts had predicted, Iran's people (including Iranian Arabs) rallied in support of the country and put up a stiff resistance.[59][60]

The IRGC grew as an organization to encompass not just military concerns but also matters of economic, religious, and educational importance.[219] The organization's growth during the war is vital to understanding the organization's role in Iranian society and how it has evolved since its initial formation in 1979. Domestically, the IRGC dealt with suppressing uprisings by Kurds, Baluchs, Turkmen, and the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) which broke with Khomeini in June 1981. While initially dealing with internal threats to the revolution in its first few years, the IRGC focused its attention on external threats at the outbreak of the war in 1980. In January of 1981, the IRGC would take control of the Basij to aid in the fight against Iraqi forces.[219] The Basij helped bolster the prominence and legitimacy of the IRGC during the war as a vehicle for indoctrination and through its contributions to the defense of Iran. The transformation of the IRGC organized its command structure which allowed for the organization to match the force of Iran's regular military and its first abroad deployment during the war began the sponsoring of other armed groups in the region through its command of the Quds force.[220]

Civil unrest

In June 1981, street battles broke out between the Revolutionary Guard and the left-wing Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK), continuing for several days and killing hundreds on both sides.[123]: 250  In September, more unrest broke out on the streets of Iran as the MEK attempted to seize power.[62] Thousands of left-wing Iranians (many of whom were not associated with the MEK) were shot and hanged by the government.[90]: 251  The MEK began an assassination campaign that killed hundreds of regime officials by the fall of 1981.[123]: 251  On 28 June 1981, they assassinated the secretary-general of the Islamic Republican Party, Mohammad Beheshti and on 30 August, killed Iran's president, Mohammad-Ali Rajai.[123]: 251  The government responded with mass executions of suspected MEK members, a practice that lasted until 1985.[62]

In addition to the open civil conflict with the MEK, the Iranian government was faced with Iraqi-supported rebellions in Iranian Kurdistan, which were gradually put down through a campaign of systematic repression.[62] 1985 also saw student anti-war demonstrations, which were crushed by government forces.[62]

Economy

In September 2020, Ali Fadavi announced that Iran spent $19.6 billion in the war.[221] The war furthered the decline of the Iranian economy that had begun with the revolution in 1978–79.[62] Between 1979 and 1981, foreign exchange reserves fell from $14.6 billion to $1 billion.[62] As a result of the war, living standards dropped dramatically,[62][90]: 252  and Iran was described by British journalists John Bulloch and Harvey Morris as "a dour and joyless place" ruled by a harsh regime that "seemed to have nothing to offer but endless war".[123]: 239 

Though Iran was becoming bankrupt, Khomeini interpreted Islam's prohibition of usury to mean they could not borrow against future oil revenues to meet war expenses. As a result, Iran funded the war by the income from oil exports after cash had run out. The revenue from oil dropped from $20 billion in 1982 to $5 billion in 1988.[90]: 252  French historian Pierre Razoux argued that this sudden drop in economic industrial potential, in conjunction with the increasing aggression of Iraq, placed Iran in a challenging position that had little leeway other than accepting Iraq's conditions of peace.

In January 1985, former prime minister and anti-war Islamic Liberation Movement co-founder Mehdi Bazargan criticised the war in a telegram to the United Nations, calling it un-Islamic and illegitimate and arguing that Khomeini should have accepted Saddam's truce offer in 1982 instead of attempting to overthrow the Ba'ath.[62] In a public letter to Khomeini sent in May 1988, he added "Since 1986, you have not stopped proclaiming victory, and now you are calling upon population to resist until victory. Is that not an admission of failure on your part?"[90]: 252  Khomeini was annoyed by Bazargan's telegram, and issued a lengthy public rebuttal in which he defended the war as both Islamic and just.[62]

By 1987, Iranian morale had begun to crumble, reflected in the failure of government campaigns to recruit "martyrs" for the front.[62] Israeli historian Efraim Karsh points to the decline in morale in 1987–88 as being a major factor in Iran's decision to accept the ceasefire of 1988.[62]

Not all saw the war in negative terms. The Islamic Revolution of Iran was strengthened and radicalised.[222] The Iranian government-owned Etelaat newspaper wrote, "There is not a single school or town that is excluded from the happiness of 'holy defence' of the nation, from drinking the exquisite elixir of martyrdom, or from the sweet death of the martyr, who dies in order to live forever in paradise."[223]

Comparison of Iraqi and Iranian military strength

Iran's regular Army had been purged after the 1979 Revolution, with most high-ranking officers either having fled the country or been executed.[224]

At the beginning of the war, Iraq held a clear advantage in armour, while both nations were roughly equal in terms of artillery. The gap only widened as the war went on. Iran started with a stronger air force, but over time, the balance of power reversed in Iraq's favour (as Iraq was constantly expanding its military, while Iran was under arms sanctions). Estimates for 1980 and 1987 were:[225]

The conflict has been compared to World War I[226]: 171  in terms of the tactics used, including large-scale trench warfare with barbed wire stretched across trenches, manned machine gun posts, bayonet charges, human wave attacks across a no man's land, and extensive use of chemical weapons such as sulfur mustard by the Iraqi government against Iranian troops, civilians, and Kurds. The world powers United States and the Soviet Union, together with many Western and Arab countries, provided military, intelligence, economic, and political support for Iraq. On average, Iraq imported about $7 billion in weapons during every year of the war, accounting for fully 12% of global arms sales in the period.[227]

The value of Iraqi arms imports increased to between $12 billion and $14 billion during 1984–1987, whereas the value of Iranian arms imports fell from $14 billion in 1985 to $5.89 billion in 1986 and an estimated $6 billion to $8 billion in 1987. Iran was constrained by the price of oil during the 1980s oil glut as foreign countries were largely unwilling to extend credit to Iran, but Iraq financed its continued massive military expansion by taking on vast quantities of debt that allowed it to win a number of victories against Iran near the end of the war but that left the country bankrupt.[228]

Despite its larger population, by 1988 Iran's ground forces numbered only 600,000 whereas the Iraqi army had grown to include 1 million soldiers.[229]

Foreign support to Iraq and Iran

Donald Rumsfeld as the American special envoy to the Middle East meets Saddam Hussein in December 1983. Rumsfeld was later US Defense Secretary during the 2003 Iraq War, which saw Saddam ousted from power and ultimately executed.

During the war, Iraq was regarded by the West and the Soviet Union as a counterbalance to post-revolutionary Iran.[123]: 119  The Soviet Union, Iraq's main arms supplier during the war, did not wish for the end of its alliance with Iraq, and was alarmed by Saddam's threats to find new arms suppliers in the West and China if the Kremlin did not provide him with the weapons he wanted.[123]: 119, 198–199  The Soviet Union hoped to use the threat of reducing arms supplies to Iraq as leverage for forming a Soviet–Iranian alliance.[123]: 197 

During the early years of the war, the United States lacked meaningful relations with either Iran or Iraq, the former due to the Iranian Revolution and the Iran hostage crisis and the latter because of Iraq's alliance with the Soviet Union and hostility towards Israel. Following Iran's success in repelling the Iraqi invasion and Khomeini's refusal to end the war in 1982, the United States made an outreach to Iraq, beginning with the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1984. The United States wished to both keep Iran away from Soviet influence and protect other Gulf states from any threat of Iranian expansion. As a result, the U.S. began to provide limited support to Iraq.[123]: 142–143  In 1982, Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, outlined U.S. policy towards Iran:

The focus of Iranian pressure at this moment is Iraq. There are few governments in the world less deserving of our support and less capable of using it. Had Iraq won the war, the fear in the Gulf and the threat to our interest would be scarcely less than it is today. Still, given the importance of the balance of power in the area, it is in our interests to promote a ceasefire in that conflict; though not a cost that will preclude an eventual rapprochement with Iran either if a more moderate regime replaces Khomeini's or if the present rulers wake up to geopolitical reality that the historic threat to Iran's independence has always come from the country with which it shares a border of 1,500 miles [2,400 km]: the Soviet Union. A rapprochement with Iran, of course, must await at a minimum Iran's abandonment of hegemonic aspirations in the Gulf.[123]: 142–143 

Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State during the war, testified to Congress in 1984 that the Reagan administration believed a victory for either Iran or Iraq was "neither militarily feasible nor strategically desirable".[123]: 178 

Support to Iraq was given via technological aid, intelligence, the sale of dual-use chemical and biological warfare related technology and military equipment, and satellite intelligence. While there was direct combat between Iran and the United States, it is not universally agreed that the fighting between the United States and Iran was specifically to benefit Iraq, or for separate issues between the U.S. and Iran. American official ambiguity towards which side to support was summed up by Henry Kissinger when he remarked, "It's a pity they can't both lose."[230]

More than 30 countries provided support to Iraq, Iran, or both; most of the aid went to Iraq. Iran had a complex clandestine procurement network to obtain munitions and critical materials. Iraq had an even larger clandestine purchasing network, involving 10–12 allied countries, to maintain ambiguity over their arms purchases and to circumvent "official restrictions". Arab mercenaries and volunteers from Egypt[231] and Jordan formed the Yarmouk Brigade[232] and participated in the war alongside Iraqis.

Iraq

An Iraqi Mil Mi-24 on display at the military museum of Sa'dabad Palace in Iran

According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, the Soviet Union, France, and China together accounted for over 90% of the value of Iraq's arms imports between 1980 and 1988.[233]

The United States pursued policies in favour of Iraq by reopening diplomatic channels, lifting restrictions on the export of dual-use technology, overseeing the transfer of third-party military hardware, and providing operational intelligence on the battlefield[citation needed]. France, which from the 1970s had been one of Iraq's closest allies, was a major supplier of military hardware.[123]: 184–185  The French sold weapons equal to $5 billion, which made up well over a quarter of Iraq's total arms stockpile.[123]: 184–185  Citing French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur as the primary source, but also quoting French officials, the New York Times reported France had been sending chemical precursors of chemical weapons to Iraq, since 1986.[234] China, which had no direct stake in the victory of either side and whose interests in the war were entirely commercial, freely sold arms to both sides.[123]: 185, 187–188, 192–193 

Iraq also made extensive use of front companies, middlemen, secret ownership of all or part of companies all over the world, forged end-user certificates, and other methods to hide what it was acquiring. Some transactions may have involved people, shipping, and manufacturing in as many as 10 countries.[235] Support from Great Britain exemplified the methods by which Iraq would circumvent export controls. Iraq bought at least one British company with operations in the United Kingdom and the United States, and had a complex relationship with France and the Soviet Union, its major suppliers of actual weapons.

Turkey took action against the Kurds in 1986, alleging they were attacking the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which prompted a harsh diplomatic intervention by Iran, which planned a new offensive against Iraq at the time and were counting on the support of Kurdish factions.[236]

Sudan supported Iraq directly during the war, sending a contingent to fight at the frontlines. The Sudanese unit consisted to a large degree of Ugandan refugees from the West Nile Region, recruited by Juma Oris.[237]

The United Nations Security Council initially called for a cease-fire after a week of fighting while Iraq was occupying Iranian territory, and renewed the call on later occasions. However, the UN did not come to Iran's aid to repel the Iraqi invasion, and the Iranians thus interpreted the UN as subtly biased in favour of Iraq.[208]

Financial support

Iraq's main financial backers were the oil-rich Persian Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia ($30.9 billion), Kuwait ($8.2 billion), and the United Arab Emirates ($8 billion).[citation needed] In all, Iraq received $35 billion in loans from the West and between $30 and $40 billion from the Persian Gulf states during the 1980s.[124]

The Iraqgate scandal revealed that a branch of Italy's largest bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), in Atlanta, Georgia, relied partially on U.S. taxpayer-guaranteed loans to funnel $5 billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989. In August 1989, when FBI agents raided the Atlanta branch of BNL, branch manager Christopher Drogoul was charged with making unauthorised, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq—some of which, according to his indictment, were used to purchase arms and weapons technology.[238] According to the Financial Times, Hewlett-Packard, Tektronix, and Matrix Churchill's branch in Ohio were among the companies shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq under the eye of the U.S. government.

Iran

While the United States directly fought Iran, citing freedom of navigation as a major casus belli, it also indirectly supplied some weapons to Iran as part of a complex and illegal programme that became known as the Iran–Contra affair. These secret sales were partly to help secure the release of hostages held in Lebanon, and partly to make money to help the Contras rebel group in Nicaragua. This arms-for-hostages agreement turned into a major scandal.

Israel supported Iran in its war against Iraq through the supply of military equipment including spare parts for fighter jets, missile systems, ammunition and tank engines.[239] Israel's motivations for supporting Iran stemmed from a fear of what would have become if Iraq came out victorious and as an opportunity to create business for the Israeli arms industry.[240]

North Korea was a major arms supplier to Iran, often acting as a third party in arms deals between Iran and the Communist bloc. Support included domestically manufactured arms and Eastern-Bloc weapons, for which the major powers wanted deniability. Among the other arms suppliers and supporters of Iran's Islamic Revolution, the major ones were Libya, Syria, and China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, China was the largest foreign arms supplier to Iran between 1980 and 1988.[241]

Syria and Libya, breaking Arab solidarity, supported Iran with arms, rhetoric and diplomacy.[242] However, Libya then distanced itself from Iran from 1987, criticizing Tehran's attitude and restoring diplomatic relations with Iraq.[243][244]

Aid to both countries

Besides the United States and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia also sold weapons to both countries for the entire duration of the conflict. Likewise, Portugal helped both countries;[175]: 8  it was not unusual to see Iranian and Iraqi flagged ships anchored at Setúbal, waiting their turn to dock.

From 1980 to 1987, Spain sold €458 million in weapons to Iran and €172 million[clarification needed] to Iraq. Weapons sold to Iraq included 4x4 vehicles, BO-105 helicopters, explosives, and ammunition. A research party later discovered that an unexploded chemical Iraqi warhead in Iran was manufactured in Spain.[175]: 8 [245]

Although neither side acquired any weapons from Turkey, both sides enjoyed Turkish civilian trade during the conflict, although the Turkish government remained neutral and refused to support the U.S.-imposed trade embargo on Iran. Turkey's export market jumped from $220 million in 1981 to $2 billion in 1985, making up 25% of Turkey's overall exports. Turkish construction projects in Iraq totaled $2.5 billion between 1974 and 1990. Trading with both countries helped Turkey to offset its ongoing economic crisis, though the benefits decreased as the war neared its end and accordingly disappeared entirely with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Iraq sanctions Turkey imposed in response.[246]

U.S. involvement

American support for Ba'athist Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, in which it fought against post-revolutionary Iran, included several billion dollars' worth of economic aid, the sale of dual-use technology, non-U.S. origin weaponry, military intelligence, and special operations training.[247][248] The U.S. refused to sell arms to Iraq directly due to Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, but several sales of "dual-use" technology have been documented; notably, Iraq purchased 45 Bell helicopters for $200 million in 1985. Total sales of U.S. dual-use technology to Iraq are estimated at $500 million.[249][250]

U.S. government support for Iraq was not a secret and was frequently discussed in open sessions of the Senate and House of Representatives.[251] American views toward Iraq were not enthusiastically supportive in its conflict with Iran, and activity in assistance was largely to prevent an Iranian victory. This was encapsulated by Henry Kissinger when he remarked, "It's a pity they both can't lose."[230]

U.S. embargo

President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George H. W. Bush in the Oval Office of the White House, 20 July 1984

A key element of U.S. political–military and energy–economic planning occurred in early 1983. The Iran–Iraq war had been going on for three years and there were significant casualties on both sides, reaching hundreds of thousands. Within the Reagan National Security Council concern was growing that the war could spread beyond the boundaries of the two belligerents. A National Security Planning Group meeting was called chaired by Vice President George Bush to review U.S. options. It was determined that there was a high likelihood that the conflict would spread into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but that the United States had little capability to defend the region.[252]

It was determined that a prolonged war in the region would induce much higher oil prices and threaten the fragile world recovery which was just beginning to gain momentum. On 22 May 1984, President Reagan was briefed on the project conclusions in the Oval Office by William Flynn Martin who had served as the head of the NSC staff that organized the study. The full declassified presentation can be seen here.[252]

The conclusions were threefold: firstly, oil stocks needed to be increased among members of the International Energy Agency and, if necessary, released early in the event of oil market disruption; second, the United States needed to reinforce the security of friendly Arab states in the region; and thirdly, an embargo should be placed on sales of military equipment to Iran and Iraq. The plan was approved by the President and later affirmed by the G-7 leaders headed by Margaret Thatcher in the London Summit of 1984.

U.S. knowledge of Iraqi chemical weapons use

According to Foreign Policy, the "Iraqis used mustard gas and sarin prior to four major offensives in early 1988 that relied on U.S. satellite imagery, maps, and other intelligence. ... According to recently declassified CIA documents and interviews with former intelligence officials like Francona, the U.S. had firm evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks beginning in 1983."[253]

Iraqi attack on U.S. warship

USS Stark listing following two hits by Exocet missiles

On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi Dassault Mirage F1 fighter jet launched two Exocet missiles at USS Stark, a Perry class frigate.[254] The first struck the port side of the ship and failed to explode, though it left burning propellant in its wake; the second struck moments later in approximately the same place and penetrated through to crew quarters, where it exploded, killing 37 crew members and leaving 21 injured. Whether or not Iraqi leadership authorised the attack is still unknown. Initial claims by the Iraqi government that Stark was inside the Iran–Iraq War zone were shown to be false, and the motives and orders of the pilot remain unanswered.[255]

Though American officials claimed that the pilot who attacked Stark had been executed, an ex-Iraqi Air Force commander since stated he had not been punished, and was still alive at the time.[255] The attack remains the only successful anti-ship missile strike on an American warship.[256][257] Due to the extensive political and military cooperation between the Iraqis and Americans by 1987, the attack had little effect on relations between the two countries.

U.S. military actions toward Iran

U.S. attention was focused on isolating Iran as well as maintaining freedom of navigation. It criticised Iran's mining of international waters, and sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 598, which passed unanimously on 20 July, under which the U.S. and Iranian forces skirmished during Operation Earnest Will. During Operation Nimble Archer in October 1987, the United States attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City.[157]

On 14 April 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts was badly damaged by an Iranian mine, and 10 sailors were wounded. U.S. forces responded with Operation Praying Mantis on 18 April, the U.S. Navy's largest engagement of surface warships since World War II. Two Iranian oil platforms were destroyed, and five Iranian warships and gunboats were sunk. An American helicopter also crashed.[157]

Iran Air Flight 655

In the course of escorts by the U.S. Navy, the cruiser USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988, killing all 290 passengers and crew on board. The American government claimed that Vincennes was in international waters at the time (which was later proven to be untrue), that the Airbus A300 had been mistaken for an Iranian F-14 Tomcat, and that Vincennes feared that she was under attack.[255]: 260–273 [256] The Iranians maintain that Vincennes was in their own waters, and that the passenger jet was turning away and increasing altitude after take-off. U.S. Admiral William J. Crowe later admitted on Nightline that Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. At the time of the attack, Admiral Crowe claimed that the Iranian plane did not identify itself and sent no response to warning signals he had sent. In 1996, the United States expressed their regret for the event and the civilian deaths it caused.[67][256]

Iraq's use of chemical weapons

In a declassified 1991 report, the CIA estimated that Iran had suffered more than 50,000 casualties from Iraq's use of several chemical weapons,[260] though current estimates are more than 100,000 as the long-term effects continue to cause casualties.[67][261] The official CIA estimate did not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans of Iran. According to a 2002 article in the Star-Ledger, 20,000 Iranian soldiers were killed on the spot by nerve gas. As of 2002, 5,000 of the 80,000 survivors continue to seek regular medical treatment, while 1,000 are hospital inpatients.[262][263]

According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France. A report stated that Dutch, Australian, Italian, French and both West and East German companies were involved in the export of raw materials to Iraqi chemical weapons factories.[264] Declassified CIA documents show that the United States was providing reconnaissance intelligence to Iraq around 1987–88 which was then used to launch chemical weapon attacks on Iranian troops and that the CIA fully knew that chemical weapons would be deployed and sarin and cyclosarin attacks followed.[265]

On 21 March 1986, the United Nations Security Council made a declaration stating that "members are profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian troops, and the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons." The United States was the only member who voted against the issuance of this statement.[266][note 9] A mission to the region in 1988 found evidence of the use of chemical weapons, and was condemned in Security Council Resolution 612.

Victims of the 1987 chemical attack on Sardasht, West Azerbaijan, Iran

According to W. Patrick Lang, senior defense intelligence officer at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, "the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose". He claimed that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival".[182] The Reagan administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports of the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.[267][268]

The United States accused Iran of using chemical weapons as well,[255]: 214  though the allegations have been disputed. Joost Hiltermann, the principal researcher for Human Rights Watch between 1992 and 1994, conducted a two-year study that included a field investigation in Iraq, and obtained Iraqi government documents in the process. According to Hiltermann, the literature on the Iran–Iraq War reflects allegations of chemical weapons used by Iran, but they are "marred by a lack of specificity as to time and place, and the failure to provide any sort of evidence".[269]: 153 

Analysts Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter have called the allegations against Iran "mere assertions" and stated, "No persuasive evidence of the claim that Iran was the primary culprit [of using chemical weapons] was ever presented."[269]: 156  Policy consultant and author Joseph Tragert stated, "Iran did not retaliate with chemical weapons, probably because it did not possess any at the time".[270] Documents uncovered after the 2003 invasion of Iraq show that Iraqi military intelligence was not aware of any large-scale chemical attacks by Iranian forces, although a March 1987 document describes five small-scale chemical attacks perpetrated by the Iranians (four involving mustard gas and one involving phosgene, with the likely source being captured Iraqi munitions), and there are also reports of Iranian use of tear gas and white phosphorus.[271]

At his trial in December 2006, Saddam said he would take responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the war, but that he took issue with the charges that he ordered attacks on Iraqis.[272] A medical analysis of the effects of Iraqi mustard gas is described in a U.S. military textbook and contrasted effects of World War I gas.[273]

At the time of the conflict, the United Nations Security Council issued statements that "chemical weapons had been used in the war". UN statements never clarified that only Iraq was using chemical weapons, and according to retrospective authors "the international community remained silent as Iraq used weapons of mass destruction against Iranian[s] as well as Iraqi Kurds."[274][275][127] A 1987 UN report conducted at the behest of both belligerents discovered weapon fragments that established Iraqi responsibility for chemical attacks on Iranian soldiers and civilians, but could not substantiate Iraq's allegations of Iranian chemical weapons use: "Iraqi forces have been affected by mustard gas and a pulmonary element, possibly phosgene. In the absence of conclusive evidence of the weapons used, it could not be determined how the injuries were caused."[276]

Evidence suggests that these Iraqi chemical casualties were likely the result of "blowback," whereas the evidence that Iraq submitted to the UN—such as two Iranian 130 mm shells that UN specialists found had "no internal chemical-resistant coating" and were "normally used for filling with high explosives"—did not withstand scrutiny; UN official Iqbal Riza later acknowledged that Iraq's evidence was "clearly fabricated." However, the report's phrasing—"chemical weapons were again used against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces ... now also Iraqi forces have sustained injuries from chemical warfare"—contributed to an erroneous perception that Iran and Iraq were equally at fault.[276]

In response to further Iraqi chemical attacks on Kurdish civilians after the August 1988 ceasefire with Iran, United States senators Claiborne Pell and Jesse Helms called for comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq, including an oil embargo and severe limitations on the export of dual-use technology. Although the ensuing legislation passed in the U.S. Senate, it faced strong opposition within the House of Representatives and did not become law. In a rare rebuke, Secretary of State George Shultz condemned Iraq's "unjustified and abhorrent" chemical attacks, which Shultz's assistant Charles E. Redman characterized as "unacceptable to the civilized world." Even after these pronouncements, however, the State Department advised against sanctions.[277]

Comparison to other conflicts

Bruce Riedel describes the Iran–Iraq War as "one of the largest and longest conventional interstate wars" of the twentieth century and "the only war in modern times in which chemical weapons were used on a massive scale."[54] Kanan Makiya writes that "there has not been anything like it in the long history of Iraqi–Iranian relations, just like there had been nothing like World War I in the history of Europe."[278]

Iran's attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in September 1980 was the first attack on a nuclear reactor and one of only a small handful of military attacks on nuclear facilities in history. It was also the first instance of a pre-emptive attack on a nuclear reactor to forestall the development of a nuclear weapon, though it did not achieve its objective, as France repaired the reactor after the attack.[279] (It took a second pre-emptive strike by the Israeli Air Force in June 1981 to disable the reactor, killing a French engineer in the process and causing France to pull out of Osirak. The decommissioning of Osirak has been cited as causing a substantial delay to Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons.[280][281][282][283][284])

The Iran–Iraq War was the first conflict in the history of warfare in which both forces used ballistic missiles against each other.[280] This war also saw the only confirmed air-to-air helicopter battles in history with the Iraqi Mi-25s flying against Iranian AH-1J SeaCobras (supplied by the United States before the Iranian Revolution) on several separate occasions. In November 1980, not long after Iraq's initial invasion of Iran, two Iranian SeaCobras engaged two Mi-25s with TOW wire-guided antitank missiles. One Mi-25 went down immediately, the other was badly damaged and crashed before reaching base.[285][286]

The Iranians repeated this accomplishment on 24 April 1981, destroying two Mi-25s without incurring losses to themselves.[285] One Mi-25 was also downed by an Iranian F-14A Tomcat.[287] The Iraqis hit back, claiming the destruction of a SeaCobra on 14 September 1983 (with YaKB machine gun), then three SeaCobras on 5 February 1984[286] and three more on 25 February 1984 (two with Falanga missiles, one with S-5 rockets).[285] After a lull in helicopter losses, each side lost a gunship on 13 February 1986.[285] Later, a Mi-25 claimed a SeaCobra shot down with YaKB gun on 16 February, and a SeaCobra claimed a Mi-25 shot down with rockets on 18 February.[285]

The last engagement between the two types was on 22 May 1986, when Mi-25s shot down a SeaCobra. The final claim tally was 10 SeaCobras and 6 Mi-25s destroyed. The relatively small numbers and the inevitable disputes over actual kill numbers makes it unclear if one gunship had a real technical superiority over the other. Iraqi Mi-25s also claimed 43 kills against other Iranian helicopters, such as Agusta-Bell UH-1 Hueys.[286] Both sides, especially Iraq, also carried out air and missile attacks against population centres.

In October 1986, Iraqi aircraft began to attack civilian passenger trains and aircraft on Iranian soil, including an Iran Air Boeing 737 unloading passengers at Shiraz International Airport.[263] In retaliation for the Iranian Operation Karbala 5, Iraq attacked 65 cities in 226 sorties over 42 days, bombing civilian neighbourhoods. Eight Iranian cities came under attack from Iraqi missiles. The bombings killed 65 children in an elementary school in Borujerd. The Iranians responded with Scud missile attacks on Baghdad and struck a primary school there. These events became known as the war of the cities.[67]

The war of the cities resumed and peaked in 1988, when Iraq dropped 40 tons of high explosives on Tehran using modified Scud missiles (dubbed "al-Husayn" missiles) over seven weeks, causing panic among civilians and prompting almost 1 million residents of Tehran to temporarily flee their homes. Nevertheless, scholars have noted that this still "ranks as one of the smallest strategic bombing campaigns in history," paling in comparison to strategic bombing during World War II, which saw 1.2 million tons of bombs dropped on German cities in 1944 alone, or more recent events such as the so-called "Christmas bombings" of North Vietnam, which saw 20,000 tons of bombs dropped on Hanoi and Haiphong in a mere eleven days. In total, 10,000–11,000 civilians died as a result of the aerial bombardment of Iranian cities with the majority of those deaths occurring in the final year of the war.[288]

Despite the war, Iran and Iraq maintained diplomatic relations and embassies in each other's countries until mid-1987.[111]

Iran's government used human waves to attack enemy troops and even in some cases to clear minefields. Children volunteered as well. Some reports mistakenly have the Basijis marching into battle while marking their expected entry to heaven by wearing "Plastic Keys to Paradise" around their necks, although other analysts regard this story as a hoax involving a misinterpretation of the carrying of a prayer book called "The Keys to Paradise"(Mafatih al-Janan) by Sheikh Abbas Qumi given to all volunteers.[112]

According to journalist Robin Wright:

During the Fateh offensive in February 1987, I toured the southwest front on the Iranian side and saw scores of boys, aged anywhere from nine to sixteen, who said with staggering and seemingly genuine enthusiasm that they had volunteered to become martyrs. Regular army troops, the paramilitary Revolutionary Guards and mullahs all lauded these youths, known as baseeji [Basij], for having played the most dangerous role in breaking through Iraqi lines. They had led the way, running over fields of mines to clear the ground for the Iranian ground assault. Wearing white headbands to signify the embracing of death, and shouting "Shaheed, shaheed" (Martyr, martyr) they literally blew their way into heaven. Their numbers were never disclosed. But a walk through the residential suburbs of Iranian cities provided a clue. Window after window, block after block, displayed black-bordered photographs of teenage or preteen youths.[289]

Iran and Iraq's modern relationship

The relationship between Iraq and Iran has warmed immensely since the downfall of Saddam Hussein, out of mostly pragmatic interests, as they share a common enemy in the Islamic State. Significant military assistance has been provided by Iran to Iraq, resulting in Iran holding a large amount of political influence in Iraq's newly elected Shia government. Iraq is also heavily dependent on the more stable and developed Iran for its energy needs, so a stable Iraq is an interest for Iran, foreign policy wise.[290]

Damage to a mosque in Khoramshahr, Iran, the city that was invaded by Iraq in September 1980

The Iran–Iraq War is regarded as being a major trigger for rising sectarianism in the region, as it was viewed by many as a clash between Sunni Muslims[291][292][293] (Ba'athist Iraq and other Arab States) and the Shia revolutionaries that had recently taken power in Iran.[294] There remains lingering animosity however despite the pragmatic alliance that has been formed as multiple government declarations from Iran have stated that the war will "affect every issue of internal and foreign policy" for decades to come.[295]

The sustained importance of this conflict is attributed mostly to the massive human and economic cost resulting from it, along with its ties to the Iranian Revolution.[295] Another significant effect that the war has on Iran's policy is the issue of remaining war reparations. The UN estimates that Iraq owes about $149 billion, while Iran contends that, with both the direct and indirect effects taken into account, the cost of the war reaches a trillion.[296]

Iran has not vocalized the desire for these reparations in recent years, and has even suggested forms of financial aid.[296] This is due most likely to Iran's interest in keeping Iraq politically stable, and imposing these reparation costs would further burden the already impoverished nation. The most important factor that governs Iraq's current foreign policy is the national government's consistent fragility following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Iraq's need for any and all allies that can help bring stability and bring development has allowed Iran to exert significant influence over the new Iraqi state despite lingering memories of the war.[297]

Currently, Iraq is between two opposing interests, one with Iran, who can provide a reliable source of power as well as military support to the influential Shia militias and political factions, and the other with the United States, who can offer Iraq significant economic aid packages, along with military support in the form of air and artillery strikes. If Iraq is seen to be pulled too far into one side's orbit, then the benefits offered to them by the other side will likely be gradually reduced or cut off completely. Another significant factor influencing relations is the shared cultural interests of Iraq and Iran's citizens to freely visit the multitude of holy sites located in each country.[298]

Legacy and memory

An Iranian mother mourning her son in a military cemetery. Isfahan, 2011.

The war is known in Iran as the Defā-e Moqaddas ("Sacred Defence") and the Jang-e Tahmili ("the Imposed War").[299][54] The war is known in the Arab world and a few other regions as the First Gulf War (Arabic: حرب الخليج الأولى). That name, or simply the 'Gulf War', was used by Western sources also, until it was used to refer to the conflict between the American-led coalition and Iraq in 1991. The Iran–Iraq War was rarely referred to as the Persian Gulf War until the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, after which the previous war was dubbed the First Persian Gulf War.[300]

Besides the Iran–Iraq war, the 1990 Iraq–Kuwait conflict, as well as The Iraq War from 2003 to 2011 have all been called the Second Persian Gulf War.[300] State media in Iraq dubbed the war Saddam's Qadisiyyah (قادسية صدام, Qādisiyyat Ṣaddām), in reference to the seventh-century Battle of al-Qādisiyyah, in which Arab warriors overcame the Sasanian Empire during the Muslim conquest of Iran.[301]

"We are armed with Allahu Akbar", the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolutionary military march song performed by IRGC troops in front of Ayatollah Khomeini in Jamaran Husinie, made a cultural impact during the war.[302]

See also

Notable Iranian veterans

Notable Iranian casualties


Notable Iraqi veterans

Notable Iraqi casualties

Persons

Memoirs

Stories

Relevant conflicts

Notes

  1. ^ Pollack gives the figure as 1,000 for fully operational tanks in April of 1988. Cordesman gives the figure as 1,500+ operational tanks in March 1988 (1,298 were captured by the Iraqis by July 1988, 200 were still in the hands of the Iranians, and an unknown number were destroyed), with an unknown number in workshops.
  2. ^ Estimates of Iranian casualties during the Iran–Iraq War vary.[34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42]
  3. ^ Estimates of Iraqi casualties during the Iran–Iraq War vary.[44][46][47][48][49][50]
  4. ^ The total 100,000+ civilians killed during the war does not include 50,000–200,000 Kurdish civilians killed in the Al-Anfal genocide.[51][52]
  5. ^ a b c d Called Arvand Rood (اروندرود) in Iran and Shatt al-Arab (شط العرب) in Iraq
  6. ^ Massoud Rajavi
  7. ^ Muslim ibn Aqil referring to the Muslim figure.
  8. ^ Muharram referring to the first month of the Islamic calendar, during which the operation took place.[143]
  9. ^ This was a "decision" rather than a resolution.
  1. ^ from:
  2. ^ from:[12][13]
  3. ^ Also: 1983–1988 Kuwait terror attacks, 1981 Iraqi embassy bombing in Beirut, Lebanon hostage crisis, 1983 Beirut barracks bombings and 1985–86 Paris attacks.
  4. ^ Iraq claimed victory following a successful 1988 counter-offensive aimed at expelling Iranian forces from Iraq which compelled Iran to submit to a ceasefire the same year, and also due to the country becoming the dominant power in the Middle East as a result of the conflict, while Iran also claimed victory for expelling Iraqi forces from Iran following 1982 offensives, despite failing in its later-goal to overthrow the Iraqi government and also despite suffering higher military and economic losses than Iraq.[20][21]
  5. ^ After the war concluded, Iraq continued to maintain control over the entire Shatt al-Arab and other Iranian territories it had occupied along the border, covering an area of 3,000 km². It was not until 16 August 1990 that Iraq agreed to return these occupied territories back to Iran and to divide sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. This restored the border to the terms established by the 1975 Algiers Agreement.[22][23]
  6. ^ Arabic: حرب الخليج الأولى, romanizedḤarb al-Khalīj al-ʾAwlā; Persian: جنگ ایران و عراق, romanizedJang-e Irān va Erāq
  7. ^ Also known in Iran as the Sepah-e-Pasdaran
  8. ^ A resort that became increasingly necessary as the war continued. Though Iran could and did acquire weapons from multiple foreign manufacturers; the pre-revolution arsenal was composed overwhelmingly of US made weaponry, meaning obtaining additional spare parts was not an option.

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Sources

Further reading

External links