stringtranslate.com

Mohamed Reza Pahlavi

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi [a] (26 de octubre de 1919 - 27 de julio de 1980), comúnmente conocido en el mundo occidental como Mohammad Reza Shah , [b] o simplemente el Sha , fue el último monarca de Irán . Comenzó a gobernar el Estado Imperial de Irán después de suceder a su padre, Reza Shah , en 1941 y permaneció en el poder hasta que fue derrocado por la Revolución iraní de 1979 , que abolió la monarquía del país y estableció la República Islámica de Irán . En 1967, asumió el título de Shahanshah ( lit. ' Rey de reyes ' ) [1] y ocupó varios otros, incluidos Aryamehr ( lit. ' Luz de los arios ' ) y Bozorg Arteshtaran ( lit. ' Gran comandante del ejército ' ).

Fue el segundo y último monarca gobernante de la dinastía Pahlavi en gobernar Irán . Su sueño de lo que él llamaba una " Gran Civilización " ( تمدن بزرگ ) en Irán lo llevó a liderar una rápida modernización industrial y militar, así como reformas económicas y sociales. [2] [3]

Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial , la invasión anglosoviética de Irán obligó a la abdicación del padre de Pahlavi, Reza Shah, a quien sucedió. Durante el reinado de Pahlavi, la industria petrolera de propiedad británica fue nacionalizada por el primer ministro Mohammad Mosaddegh , quien contó con el apoyo del parlamento nacional de Irán para hacerlo. Sin embargo, Mosaddegh fue derrocado en el golpe de Estado iraní de 1953 , que fue llevado a cabo por el ejército iraní bajo la égida del Reino Unido y los Estados Unidos. Posteriormente, el gobierno iraní centralizó el poder bajo Pahlavi y trajo de vuelta a las compañías petroleras extranjeras a la industria del país a través del Acuerdo de Consorcio de 1954. [ 4]

En 1963, Mohammad Reza introdujo la Revolución Blanca , una serie de reformas económicas, sociales y políticas destinadas a transformar a Irán en una potencia mundial y modernizar la nación nacionalizando industrias clave y redistribuyendo la tierra . El régimen también implementó políticas nacionalistas iraníes que establecieron a Ciro el Grande , el Cilindro de Ciro y la Tumba de Ciro el Grande como símbolos populares de Irán . El Sha inició importantes inversiones en infraestructura, subsidios y concesiones de tierras para las poblaciones campesinas, participación en las ganancias para los trabajadores industriales, construcción de instalaciones nucleares, nacionalización de los recursos naturales de Irán y programas de alfabetización que se consideraron algunos de los más efectivos del mundo. El Sha también instituyó aranceles de política económica y préstamos preferenciales a las empresas iraníes que buscaban crear una economía independiente para la nación. La fabricación de automóviles, electrodomésticos y otros bienes en Irán aumentó sustancialmente, lo que llevó a la creación de una nueva clase industrial aislada de las amenazas de la competencia extranjera. En la década de 1970, el Sha era visto como un estadista maestro y utilizó su creciente poder para aprobar el Acuerdo de Compraventa de 1973 . Estas reformas culminaron en décadas de crecimiento económico sostenido que convertirían a Irán en una de las economías de más rápido crecimiento tanto en el mundo desarrollado como en el mundo en desarrollo . Durante sus 37 años de gobierno, Irán gastó miles de millones de dólares en industria, educación, salud y gasto militar y disfrutó de tasas de crecimiento económico superiores a las de Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido y Francia. Asimismo, el ingreso nacional iraní aumentó 423 veces y el país experimentó un aumento sin precedentes en el ingreso per cápita , que alcanzó el nivel más alto de cualquier momento en la historia de Irán, y altos niveles de urbanización . En 1977, el enfoque de Mohammad Reza en el gasto de defensa, que vio como un medio para poner fin a la intervención de las potencias extranjeras en el país, había culminado en la posición del ejército iraní como la quinta fuerza armada más fuerte del mundo. [5]

A medida que el malestar político crecía en todo Irán a fines de la década de 1970, [6] la posición de Mohammad Reza en el país se volvió insostenible por la masacre de la Plaza Jaleh , en la que el ejército iraní mató e hirió a docenas de manifestantes en Teherán , [7] y el incendio del Cinema Rex , un ataque incendiario en Abadan que se atribuyó erróneamente a la agencia de inteligencia iraní SAVAK . La Conferencia de Guadalupe de 1979 vio a los aliados occidentales de Mohammad Reza declarar que no había una manera factible de salvar a la monarquía iraní de ser derrocada. El Sha finalmente abandonó Irán para exiliarse el 17 de enero de 1979. [8] Aunque había dicho a algunos contemporáneos occidentales que preferiría abandonar el país que disparar contra su propio pueblo, [9] las estimaciones del número total de muertes durante la Revolución Islámica varían de 540 a 2000 (cifras de estudios independientes) a 60 000 (cifras del gobierno islámico ). [10] Después de abolir formalmente la monarquía iraní, el clérigo musulmán Ruhollah Khomeini asumió el liderazgo como Líder Supremo de Irán . Mohammad Reza murió en el exilio en Egipto , donde el presidente egipcio Anwar Sadat le había concedido asilo político . Tras su muerte, su hijo Reza Pahlavi se declaró a sí mismo como el nuevo Sha de Irán en el exilio.

Vida temprana, familia y educación

Mohamed Reza, c. 1926

Nacido en Teherán , en el Estado Sublime de Irán , hijo de Reza Khan (más tarde Reza Shah Pahlavi, primer Shah de la dinastía Pahlavi ) y su segunda esposa, Tadj ol-Molouk , Mohammad Reza fue el hijo mayor de su padre y el tercero de sus once hijos. Su padre era de origen mazandarani [11] [12] [13] y nació en Alasht , condado de Savadkuh , provincia de Māzandarān . Fue un general de brigada de la Brigada Cosaca Persa , comisionado en el 7º Regimiento Savadkuh , que sirvió en la Guerra Anglo-Persa en 1856. [14] La madre de Mohammad Reza era una inmigrante musulmana de Georgia (entonces parte del Imperio Ruso ), [15] cuya familia había emigrado al Irán continental después de que Irán se viera obligado a ceder todos sus territorios en el Cáucaso tras las Guerras Ruso-Persas varias décadas antes. [16] Ella era de origen azerbaiyano , habiendo nacido en Bakú , Imperio Ruso (ahora Azerbaiyán ).

El príncipe heredero Mohamed Reza en 1939

Mohammad Reza nació con su hermana gemela, Ashraf . Sin embargo, él, Ashraf, sus hermanos Shams y Ali Reza , y su media hermana mayor, Fatimeh , no eran de la realeza por nacimiento, ya que su padre no se convirtió en Sha hasta 1925. Sin embargo, Reza Khan siempre estuvo convencido de que su repentino capricho de buena suerte había comenzado en 1919 con el nacimiento de su hijo, que fue apodado khoshghadam ("pájaro de buen augurio"). [17] Como la mayoría de los iraníes en ese momento, Reza Khan no tenía apellido. Después del golpe de estado persa de 1921 que vio el derrocamiento de Ahmad Shah Qajar , Reza Khan fue informado de que necesitaría un apellido para su casa. Esto lo llevó a aprobar una ley que ordenaba a todos los iraníes tomar un apellido; eligió para sí mismo el apellido Pahlavi, que es el nombre de la lengua persa media , derivada del persa antiguo . [18] En la coronación de su padre el 24 de abril de 1926, Mohammad Reza fue proclamado Príncipe Heredero . [18] [19]

Bandera de Irán en Pahlavi

Familia

Mohammad Reza describió a su padre en su libro Misión por mi país como "uno de los hombres más aterradores" que había conocido, retratando a Reza Khan como un hombre dominante con un temperamento violento. [20] Un soldado duro, feroz y muy ambicioso que se convirtió en el primer persa en comandar la brigada cosaca de élite entrenada por los rusos, a Reza Khan le gustaba patear en la ingle a los subordinados que no seguían sus órdenes. Al crecer bajo su sombra, Mohammad Reza era un niño profundamente asustado e inseguro que carecía de confianza en sí mismo, según el historiador iraní-estadounidense Abbas Milani . [21]

Un joven Shah con su hermana gemela, Ashraf , en la década de 1940.

Reza Khan creía que si los padres mostraban amor por sus hijos, esto causaba homosexualidad más adelante en la vida, por lo que para asegurarse de que su hijo favorito fuera heterosexual, le negó amor y afecto cuando era joven, aunque luego se volvió más afectuoso con el Príncipe Heredero cuando era un adolescente. [22] Reza Khan siempre se dirigía a su hijo como shoma ("señor") y se negaba a utilizar el más informal tow ("usted"), y a su vez su hijo se dirigía a él utilizando la misma formalidad. [23] El periodista polaco Ryszard Kapuściński observó en su libro Shah of Shahs que al mirar fotografías antiguas de Reza Khan y su hijo, le sorprendió lo seguro y confiado que parecía Reza Khan con su uniforme, mientras que Mohammad Reza parecía nervioso y nervioso con su uniforme de pie junto a su padre. [24]

En la década de 1930, Reza Khan fue un admirador declarado de Adolf Hitler , menos por el racismo y el antisemitismo de Hitler y más porque había surgido de un entorno mediocre, al igual que Reza Khan, para convertirse en un líder notable del siglo XX . [25] Reza Khan a menudo inculcó en su hijo su creencia de que la historia la hicieron grandes hombres como él, y que un verdadero líder es un autócrata . [25] Reza Khan era un hombre grande y musculoso que medía más de 6 pies 4 pulgadas (1,93 m), lo que llevó a su hijo a compararlo con una montaña. A lo largo de su vida, Mohammad Reza estuvo obsesionado con la altura y la estatura, usaba zapatos con alzas para parecer más alto de lo que realmente era, a menudo se jactaba de que la montaña más alta de Irán, el monte Damavand, era más alta que cualquier pico de Europa o Japón, y proclamaba que siempre se sentía más atraído por las mujeres altas. [26] En su calidad de shah, Mohammad Reza menospreció constantemente a su padre en privado, llamándolo cosaco matón que no había logrado nada como shah. De hecho, casi borró a su padre de la historia durante su reinado, hasta el punto de insinuar que la Casa de Pahlavi comenzó su gobierno en 1941 en lugar de 1925. [27]

Las familias imperiales iraní y egipcia después de una boda en el Palacio de Saadabad , Teherán, el 25 de abril de 1939

La madre de Mohammad Reza, Tadj ol-Molouk, era una mujer asertiva que también era muy supersticiosa. Creía que los sueños eran mensajes de otro mundo, sacrificaba corderos para atraer la buena suerte y ahuyentar a los malos espíritus, y cubría a sus hijos con amuletos protectores para alejar el poder del mal de ojo . [28] Tadj ol-Molouk era el principal apoyo emocional de su hijo, y cultivó en él la creencia de que el destino lo había elegido para grandes cosas, algo que los adivinos a los que consultaba habían interpretado como una prueba de sus sueños. [29] Mohammad Reza creció rodeado de mujeres, ya que las principales influencias sobre él fueron su madre, su hermana mayor Shams y su hermana gemela Ashraf, lo que llevó al psicoanalista y economista político estadounidense Marvin Zonis a concluir que fue "de las mujeres, y aparentemente solo de las mujeres" de donde el futuro Sha "recibió todo el alimento psicológico que pudo obtener cuando era niño". [30] Tradicionalmente, se consideraba que los niños varones eran preferibles a las niñas, y cuando era niño, Mohammad Reza fue a menudo malcriado por su madre y sus hermanas. [30] Mohammad Reza era muy cercano a su hermana gemela Ashraf, quien comentó: "Fue esta relación de hermanamiento y de hermano lo que me nutrió y me sostuvo durante toda mi infancia... No importaba cuánto intentara en los años venideros -a veces incluso desesperadamente- encontrar una identidad y un propósito propio, seguiría estando inextricablemente ligado a mi hermano... siempre, el centro de mi existencia fue, y es, Mohammad Reza". [31]

Tras convertirse en príncipe heredero, Mohamed Reza fue separado de su madre y sus hermanas para que recibiera una "educación varonil" por parte de oficiales seleccionados por su padre, quien también ordenó que todos, incluida su madre y sus hermanos, debían dirigirse al príncipe heredero como "Su Alteza". [23] Según Zonis, el resultado de su educación contradictoria por parte de una madre amorosa, aunque posesiva y supersticiosa, y un padre autoritario y autoritario hizo de Mohamed Reza "un joven de baja autoestima que enmascaraba su falta de confianza en sí mismo, su indecisión, su pasividad, su dependencia y su timidez con bravuconería masculina, impulsividad y arrogancia". Esto lo convirtió en una persona de marcadas contradicciones, afirma Zonis, ya que el príncipe heredero era "a la vez gentil y cruel, retraído y activo, dependiente y asertivo, débil y poderoso". [32]

Educación

Mohammad Reza entrando en la Madrasa Nezam , una escuela militar en Teherán , 1938

Cuando Mohammad Reza cumplió 11 años, su padre aceptó la recomendación de Abdolhossein Teymourtash , el Ministro de la Corte, de enviar a su hijo al Institut Le Rosey , un internado suizo, para que continuara sus estudios. Mohammad Reza abandonó Irán rumbo a Suiza el 7 de septiembre de 1931. [33] En su primer día como estudiante en Le Rosey, el Príncipe Heredero se enfrentó a un grupo de sus compañeros de estudios al exigirles que se pusieran de pie cuando pasara, tal como lo hacía todo el mundo en Irán. En respuesta, uno de los estudiantes estadounidenses lo golpeó, y rápidamente aprendió a aceptar que la gente no lo respetaría en Suiza de la forma en que estaba acostumbrado en casa. [34] Como estudiante, Mohammad Reza jugó al fútbol de competición , pero los registros escolares indican que su principal problema como jugador era su "timidez", ya que el Príncipe Heredero tenía miedo de correr riesgos. [35] Estudió francés en Le Rosey, y su estancia allí le dejó a Mohammad Reza un amor permanente por todo lo francés. [36] En artículos que escribió en francés para el periódico estudiantil en 1935 y 1936, Mohammad Reza elogió a Le Rosey por ampliar su mente y presentarle la civilización europea . [35]

Mohammad Reza fue el primer príncipe iraní en la sucesión al trono que fue enviado al extranjero para recibir una educación en el extranjero y permaneció allí durante los siguientes cuatro años antes de regresar para obtener su diploma de secundaria en Irán en 1936. Después de regresar al país, el Príncipe Heredero se registró en la academia militar local en Teherán , donde permaneció inscrito hasta 1938, graduándose como segundo teniente. Al graduarse, Mohammad Reza fue rápidamente ascendido al rango de capitán, un rango que mantuvo hasta que se convirtió en Sha. Durante la universidad, el joven príncipe fue nombrado Inspector del Ejército y pasó tres años viajando por todo el país, examinando instalaciones civiles y militares. [19] [37]

Mohammad Reza hablaba inglés, francés y alemán con fluidez, además de su lengua materna, el persa . [38]

El joven Mohammad Reza con Abdolhossein Teymourtash en el Instituto Le Rosey en Lausana , Suiza, 1932

Durante su estancia en Suiza, Mohammad Reza se hizo amigo de su maestro Ernest Perron , quien le presentó la poesía francesa , y bajo su influencia, Chateaubriand y Rabelais se convirtieron en sus "autores franceses favoritos". [39] Al príncipe heredero le gustaba tanto Perron que cuando regresó a Irán en 1936, se lo llevó consigo, instalando a su mejor amigo en el Palacio de Mármol . [40] Perron vivió en Irán hasta su muerte en 1961, y como mejor amigo de Mohammad Reza, era un hombre de considerable poder tras bambalinas. [41] Después de la Revolución Islámica iraní de 1979, el nuevo régimen publicó un libro superventas, Ernest Perron, el marido del Sha de Irán, de Mohammad Pourkian, en el que se alegaba una relación homosexual entre el Sha y Perron. Incluso hoy en día, esta sigue siendo la interpretación oficial de su relación por parte de la República Islámica de Irán . [42] Marvin Zonis describió el libro como extenso en afirmaciones y escaso en evidencia de una relación homosexual entre los dos, señalando que todos los cortesanos del Sha rechazaron la afirmación de que Perron era el amante del Sha. Argumentó que el tenaz Reza Khan, que era muy homofóbico , no habría permitido que Perron se mudara al Palacio de Mármol en 1936 si hubiera creído que Perron era el amante de su hijo. [43]

Ascenso al poder

Primer matrimonio

Fotografía de la ceremonia nupcial del príncipe heredero Mohammad Reza (derecha) y la princesa Fawzia de Egipto en el Palacio Abdeen de El Cairo , 1939

Una de las principales iniciativas de la política exterior iraní y turca había sido el Pacto de Saadabad de 1937, una alianza que reunía a Turquía , Irán, Irak y Afganistán , con la intención de crear un bloque musulmán que, se esperaba, disuadiría a cualquier agresor. El presidente Mustafa Kemal Atatürk de Turquía sugirió a su amigo Reza Khan durante la visita de este último que un matrimonio entre las cortes iraní y egipcia sería beneficioso para los dos países y sus dinastías, ya que podría llevar a que Egipto se uniera al pacto de Saadabad. [44] La princesa Fawzia de Dilawar de Egipto (5 de noviembre de 1921 - 2 de julio de 2013) era hija del rey Fuad I de Egipto y Nazli Sabri y hermana del rey Faruk I de Egipto . De acuerdo con la sugerencia de Atatürk, Mohammad Reza y la princesa egipcia Fawzia se casaron el 15 de marzo de 1939 en el Palacio Abdeen de El Cairo . [44] Reza Shah no participó en la ceremonia. [44] Durante su visita a Egipto, Mohammad Reza quedó muy impresionado con la grandeza de la corte egipcia cuando visitó los diversos palacios construidos por Isma'il Pasha , también conocido como "Isma'il el Magnífico", el Jedive de Egipto famoso por su derroche de dinero , y decidió que Irán necesitaba palacios igualmente grandiosos para igualarlos. [45]

El matrimonio de Mohammad Reza con Fawzia produjo una hija, la princesa Shahnaz Pahlavi (nacida el 27 de octubre de 1940). Su matrimonio no fue feliz, ya que el príncipe heredero era abiertamente infiel y a menudo se lo veía conduciendo por Teherán en uno de sus costosos autos con una de sus novias. [46] Además, la madre dominante y posesiva de Mohammad Reza veía a su nuera como una rival del amor de su hijo y se dedicó a humillar a la princesa Fawzia, cuyo esposo se puso del lado de su madre. [46] Fawzia, una mujer tranquila y tímida, describió su matrimonio como miserable, sintiéndose muy indeseada y no querida por la familia Pahlavi y anhelando regresar a Egipto. [46] En su libro de 1961 Misión por mi país , Mohammad Reza escribió que el "único momento feliz y luminoso" de todo su matrimonio con Fawzia fue el nacimiento de su hija. [47]

Invasión anglosoviética y destitución de su padre Reza Shah

Reunión de Pahlavi con el presidente estadounidense Franklin D. Roosevelt durante la Conferencia de Teherán (1943), dos años después de la abdicación forzada de su padre durante la invasión anglosoviética de Irán

Mientras tanto, en medio de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en 1941, la Alemania nazi comenzó la Operación Barbarroja e invadió la Unión Soviética , rompiendo el Pacto Molotov-Ribbentrop . Esto tuvo un gran impacto en Irán, que había declarado neutralidad en el conflicto. [48] En el verano de 1941, los diplomáticos soviéticos y británicos transmitieron numerosos mensajes advirtiendo que consideraban la presencia de alemanes administrando los ferrocarriles estatales iraníes como una amenaza, lo que implicaba una guerra si no se despedía a los alemanes. [49] Gran Bretaña deseaba enviar armas a la Unión Soviética a través de los ferrocarriles iraníes, y las declaraciones de los gerentes alemanes de los ferrocarriles iraníes de que no cooperarían hicieron que tanto los soviéticos como los británicos insistieran en que los alemanes que Reza Khan había contratado tenían que ser despedidos de inmediato. [49] Como asesor más cercano de su padre, el príncipe heredero Mohammad Reza no consideró adecuado plantear la cuestión de una posible invasión anglosoviética de Irán, asegurándole alegremente a su padre que no sucedería nada. [49] El historiador iraní-estadounidense Abbas Milani escribió sobre la relación entre Reza Khan y el príncipe heredero en ese momento, señalando: "Como ahora compañero constante de su padre, los dos hombres consultaban sobre prácticamente todas las decisiones". [50]

El joven Mohammad Reza Shah (centro), fotografiado entre el líder soviético Joseph Stalin y el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de la Unión Soviética, Vyacheslav Molotov, en la Conferencia de Teherán .

Más tarde ese año, las fuerzas británicas y soviéticas ocuparon Irán en una invasión militar , obligando a Reza Shah a abdicar. [51] El 25 de agosto de 1941, las fuerzas navales británicas y australianas atacaron el Golfo Pérsico mientras la Unión Soviética realizaba una invasión terrestre desde el norte. En el segundo día de la invasión, con la fuerza aérea soviética bombardeando Teherán, Mohammad Reza se sorprendió al ver que el ejército iraní simplemente colapsaba, con miles de oficiales y hombres aterrorizados por todo Teherán quitándose los uniformes para desertar y huir, a pesar de no haber visto aún el combate. [52] Como reflejo del pánico, un grupo de generales iraníes de alto rango llamó al Príncipe Heredero para recibir su bendición para celebrar una reunión para discutir la mejor manera de rendirse. [50] Cuando Reza Khan se enteró de la reunión, montó en cólera y atacó a uno de sus generales, Ahmad Nakhjavan , golpeándolo con su fusta, arrancándole sus medallas y casi ejecutándolo personalmente antes de que su hijo lo persuadiera de que hiciera que el general fuera sometido a un consejo de guerra. [50] El colapso del ejército iraní que su padre había trabajado tan duro para construir humilló a su hijo, quien juró que nunca volvería a ver a Irán derrotado de esa manera, presagiando la posterior obsesión del futuro Sha con el gasto militar. [52]

Ascenso al trono

La toma de posesión de Mohammad Reza como Sha de Irán en la Asamblea Nacional, el 17 de septiembre de 1941

El 16 de septiembre de 1941, el primer ministro Mohammad Ali Foroughi y el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Ali Soheili asistieron a una sesión especial del parlamento para anunciar la dimisión de Reza Shah y que Mohammad Reza iba a sustituirle. Al día siguiente, a las 16.30  horas, Mohammad Reza prestó juramento al cargo y fue recibido calurosamente por los parlamentarios. De camino de vuelta al palacio, las calles se llenaron de gente que daba la bienvenida jubilosa al nuevo Shah, aparentemente con más entusiasmo del que les hubiera gustado a los aliados. [53] A los británicos les hubiera gustado volver a poner a un Qajar en el trono, pero el principal pretendiente Qajar al trono era el príncipe Hamid Mirza , un oficial de la Marina Real que no hablaba persa, por lo que los británicos se vieron obligados a aceptar a Mohammad Reza como Shah. [54] El principal interés soviético en 1941 era asegurar la estabilidad política para asegurar los suministros aliados, lo que significaba aceptar la ascensión de Mohammad Reza al trono. Tras su sucesión como rey, Irán se convirtió en una importante vía de acceso para la ayuda británica y, más tarde, estadounidense a la URSS durante la guerra. Esta enorme ruta de suministro pasó a conocerse como el Corredor Persa . [55]

Gran parte del mérito de orquestar una transición fluida del poder del Rey al Príncipe Heredero se debió a los esfuerzos de Mohammad Ali Foroughi. [56] Foroughi, que sufría de angina de pecho, fue convocado al Palacio y nombrado primer ministro cuando Reza Shah temió el fin de la dinastía Pahlavi una vez que los Aliados invadieran Irán en 1941. [57] Cuando Reza Shah buscó su ayuda para asegurarse de que los Aliados no pusieran fin a la dinastía Pahlavi, Foroughi dejó de lado sus sentimientos personales adversos por haber sido marginado políticamente desde 1935. El Príncipe Heredero le confió con asombro al ministro británico que Foroughi "difícilmente esperaba que cualquier hijo de Reza Shah fuera un ser humano civilizado", [57] pero Foroughi descarriló con éxito los pensamientos de los Aliados de emprender un cambio más drástico en la infraestructura política de Irán. [58]

El primer ministro Mohammad Ali Foroughi (izquierda) con Mohammad Reza Shah

Dos días después de la ascensión al trono de Mohamed Reza, el 19 de septiembre de 1941, se promulgó una amnistía general. Todas las personalidades políticas que habían caído en desgracia durante el reinado de su padre fueron rehabilitadas y se revocó la política de velo obligatorio inaugurada por su padre en 1935. A pesar de las decisiones ilustradas del joven rey, el ministro británico en Teherán informó a Londres de que "el joven sah recibió una bienvenida bastante espontánea en su primera experiencia pública, posiblemente más [debido] al alivio por la desaparición de su padre que al afecto público por sí mismo". Durante sus primeros días como sah, Mohamed Reza carecía de confianza en sí mismo y pasó la mayor parte de su tiempo con Perron escribiendo poesía en francés. [59]

En 1942, Mohammad Reza conoció a Wendell Willkie , el candidato republicano a la presidencia de Estados Unidos en las elecciones de 1940, que ahora estaba en una gira mundial para promover su política de "un mundo". Willkie llevó al Sha a volar por primera vez. [60] El primer ministro, Ahmad Qavam , había aconsejado al Sha que no volara con Willkie, diciendo que nunca había conocido a un hombre con un problema de flatulencia peor, pero el Sha se arriesgó. [60] Mohammad Reza le dijo a Willkie que cuando estaba volando "quería permanecer en el aire indefinidamente". [60] Disfrutando del vuelo, Mohammad Reza contrató al piloto estadounidense Dick Collbarn para que le enseñara a volar. Al llegar al Marble Palace, Collbarn señaló que "el Sha debe tener veinticinco autos hechos a medida... Buicks , Cadillacs , seis Rolls-Royce , un Mercedes ". [60] Durante la conferencia de Teherán con las fuerzas aliadas en 1943, el Sha fue humillado cuando conoció a Joseph Stalin , quien lo visitó en el Palacio de Mármol y no permitió que los guardaespaldas del Sha estuvieran presentes, siendo solo el Ejército Rojo el que los custodiaba. [61]

Opinión sobre el gobierno de su padre

A pesar de sus manifestaciones públicas de admiración en años posteriores, Mohammad Reza tenía serias dudas no sólo sobre los medios políticos groseros y descuidados adoptados por su padre, sino también sobre su enfoque poco sofisticado de los asuntos de Estado. El joven Sha poseía un temperamento decididamente más refinado, y entre los acontecimientos desagradables que "lo perseguirían cuando fuera rey" estaban la desgracia política que trajo su padre en Teymourtash , la destitución de Foroughi a mediados de la década de 1930 y el suicidio de Ali Akbar Davar en 1937. [62] Una decisión aún más significativa que dejó una larga sombra fue el acuerdo desastroso y unilateral que su padre había negociado con la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) en 1933, que comprometía la capacidad del país para recibir retornos más favorables del petróleo extraído del país.

Relación con su padre exiliado

Mohammad Reza expresó su preocupación por su padre exiliado, que anteriormente se había quejado al gobernador británico de Mauricio de que vivir en la isla era una prisión climática y social. Mohammad Reza siguió atentamente su vida en el exilio y se oponía a la menor oportunidad al trato que recibía su padre por parte de los británicos. Ambos se enviaban cartas, aunque la entrega se demoraba a menudo, y Mohammad Reza encargó a su amigo, Ernest Perron, que le entregara personalmente un mensaje grabado de amor y respeto a su padre, y trajo consigo una grabación de su voz: [63]

El príncipe heredero Mohammad Reza con su padre, Reza Shah, septiembre de 1941

Querido hijo, desde que dimití en tu favor y dejé mi país, mi único placer ha sido ser testigo de tu sincero servicio a tu país. Siempre he sabido que tu juventud y tu amor por la patria son vastas reservas de fuerza de las que te servirás para mantenerte firme frente a las dificultades que se te presenten y que, a pesar de todos los problemas, saldrás de esta prueba con honor. No pasa un momento sin que piense en ti y, sin embargo, lo único que me mantiene feliz y satisfecho es el pensamiento de que estás dedicando tu tiempo al servicio de Irán. Debes estar siempre al tanto de lo que sucede en el país. No debes sucumbir a consejos interesados ​​y falsos. Debes permanecer firme y constante. Nunca debes tener miedo de los acontecimientos que se te presenten. Ahora que has asumido esta pesada carga sobre tus hombros en días tan oscuros, debes saber que el precio a pagar por el más mínimo error de tu parte puede ser nuestros veinte años de servicio y el nombre de nuestra familia. Nunca debes ceder a la ansiedad o la desesperación; Más bien, debes permanecer tranquilo y tan firmemente arraigado en tu lugar que ningún poder pueda esperar mover la constancia de tu voluntad. [64]

Inicio de la Guerra Fría

Mohammad Reza en un hospital tras un intento fallido de asesinato, 1949

En 1945-46, el principal problema en la política iraní fue el gobierno separatista patrocinado por los soviéticos en Azerbaiyán y Kurdistán iraní , lo que alarmó mucho al Sha. Chocó repetidamente con su primer ministro Ahmad Qavam , a quien consideraba demasiado prosoviético. [65] Al mismo tiempo, la creciente popularidad del Partido Comunista Tudeh preocupó a Mohammad Reza, quien sintió que había una seria posibilidad de que lideraran un golpe de Estado. [66] En junio de 1946, Mohammad Reza se sintió aliviado cuando el Ejército Rojo se retiró de Irán. [67] En una carta al líder comunista azerbaiyano Ja'far Pishevari , Stalin escribió que tenía que retirarse de Irán, ya que de lo contrario los estadounidenses no se retirarían de China , y quería ayudar a los comunistas chinos en su guerra civil contra el Kuomintang . [68] Sin embargo, el régimen de Pishevari permaneció en el poder en Tabriz , Azerbaiyán, y Mohammad Reza trató de socavar los intentos de Qavam de llegar a un acuerdo con Pishevari como una forma de deshacerse de ambos. [69] El 11 de diciembre de 1946, el ejército iraní , dirigido por el Sha en persona, entró en Azerbaiyán iraní y el régimen de Pishevari se derrumbó con poca resistencia, y la mayoría de los combates se produjeron entre gente corriente que atacaba a los funcionarios de Pishevari que les habían tratado brutalmente. [69] En sus declaraciones de entonces y posteriores, Mohammad Reza atribuyó su fácil éxito en Azerbaiyán a su "poder místico". [70] Conociendo la inclinación de Qavam por la corrupción, el Sha utilizó esa cuestión como motivo para despedirlo. [71] Para ese momento, la esposa del Sha, Fawzia, había regresado a Egipto y, a pesar de los esfuerzos del rey Farouk para convencerla de regresar a Irán, ella se negó a ir, lo que llevó a Mohammad Reza a divorciarse de ella el 17 de noviembre de 1948. [72]

Para entonces, Mohammad Reza, ya piloto cualificado, estaba fascinado con el vuelo y los detalles técnicos de los aeroplanos, y cualquier insulto hacia él era siempre un intento de "cortarle las alas". Mohammad Reza destinó más dinero a la Fuerza Aérea Imperial Iraní que a cualquier otra rama de las fuerzas armadas, y su uniforme favorito era el de Mariscal de la Fuerza Aérea Imperial Iraní. [73] Marvin Zonis escribió que la obsesión de Mohammad Reza por volar reflejaba un complejo de Ícaro , también conocido como "ascensionismo", una forma de narcisismo basada en "un anhelo de atención y admiración no solicitadas" y el "deseo de superar la gravedad, de mantenerse erguido, de crecer alto... de saltar o balancearse en el aire, de trepar, de elevarse, de volar". [74]

Mohammad Reza a menudo hablaba de las mujeres como objetos sexuales que existían solo para gratificarlo, y durante una entrevista de 1973 con la periodista italiana Oriana Fallaci , ella se opuso vehementemente a sus actitudes hacia las mujeres. [75] Como visitante habitual de los clubes nocturnos de Italia, Francia y el Reino Unido, Mohammad Reza estuvo vinculado románticamente con varias actrices, entre ellas Gene Tierney , Yvonne De Carlo y Silvana Mangano . [76]

Al menos dos intentos de asesinato fallidos se produjeron contra el joven Sha. El 4 de febrero de 1949, asistió a una ceremonia anual para conmemorar la fundación de la Universidad de Teherán . [77] En la ceremonia, el pistolero Fakhr-Arai disparó cinco tiros contra él a una distancia de unos tres metros. Sólo uno de los disparos alcanzó al rey, rozando su mejilla. El pistolero fue inmediatamente abatido por oficiales cercanos. Después de una investigación, Fakhr-Arai fue declarado miembro del Partido Comunista Tudeh , [78] que posteriormente fue prohibido. [79] Sin embargo, hay pruebas de que el presunto asesino no era un miembro del Tudeh sino un miembro fundamentalista religioso de Fada'iyan-e Islam . [76] [80] No obstante, el Tudeh fue culpado y perseguido. [81]

La segunda esposa del Sha fue Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiary , una mujer mitad alemana, mitad iraní y la única hija de Khalil Esfandiary-Bakhtiary , embajador iraní en Alemania Occidental, y su esposa Eva Karl. Fue presentada al Sha por Forough Zafar Bakhtiary, un pariente cercano de Soraya, a través de una fotografía tomada por Goodarz Bakhtiary, en Londres, a petición de Forough Zafar. Se casaron el 12 de febrero de 1951, [44] cuando Soraya tenía 18 años, según el anuncio oficial. Sin embargo, se rumoreaba que en realidad tenía 16 años, mientras que el Sha tenía 32. [82] Cuando era niña, fue instruida y criada por Frau Mantel, y por lo tanto carecía de un conocimiento adecuado de Irán, como ella misma admitió en sus memorias personales, afirmando: "Yo era una tonta: no sabía casi nada de la geografía, las leyendas de mi país, nada de su historia, nada de la religión musulmana". [65]

Nacionalización del petróleo y golpe de Estado en Irán en 1953

Pahlavi con el presidente estadounidense Harry S. Truman en Washington, DC , noviembre de 1949

A principios de la década de 1950, la crisis política que se estaba gestando en Irán atrajo la atención de los líderes políticos británicos y estadounidenses. Tras las elecciones legislativas iraníes de 1950 , Mohammad Mosaddegh fue elegido primer ministro en 1951. Se comprometió a nacionalizar la industria petrolera iraní controlada por la Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (anteriormente Anglo-Persian Oil Company o APOC). [83] Bajo el liderazgo de Mosaddegh y su movimiento nacionalista, el parlamento iraní votó por unanimidad nacionalizar la industria petrolera, dejando fuera así a la inmensamente rentable AIOC, que era un pilar de la economía británica y le proporcionaba influencia política en la región. [84]

Al comienzo de la confrontación, la simpatía política estadounidense hacia Irán se manifestó en la administración Truman . [85] En particular, Mosaddegh se sintió alentado por el asesoramiento y el consejo que estaba recibiendo del embajador estadounidense en Teherán, Henry F. Grady . Sin embargo, con el tiempo los responsables de la toma de decisiones estadounidenses perdieron la paciencia y, cuando la administración republicana del presidente Dwight D. Eisenhower asumió el cargo, los temores de que los comunistas estuvieran dispuestos a derrocar al gobierno se convirtieron en una preocupación omnipresente. Estas preocupaciones fueron posteriormente descartadas como "paranoicas" en los comentarios retrospectivos sobre el golpe de Estado de los funcionarios del gobierno estadounidense. Poco antes de las elecciones presidenciales de 1952 en los Estados Unidos, el gobierno británico invitó al oficial de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) Kermit Roosevelt Jr. a Londres para proponer una colaboración en un plan secreto para obligar a Mosaddegh a dejar el cargo. [86] Esta sería la primera de tres operaciones de "cambio de régimen" lideradas por el director de la CIA, Allen Dulles (las otras dos fueron el exitoso golpe de Estado de Guatemala de 1954 instigado por la CIA y la fallida invasión de Bahía de Cochinos en Cuba ).

Bajo la dirección de Roosevelt, la CIA estadounidense y el Servicio Secreto de Inteligencia británico (SIS) financiaron y dirigieron una operación encubierta para derrocar a Mosaddegh con la ayuda de fuerzas militares desleales al gobierno. Conocida como Operación Ajax , [87] la trama dependía de las órdenes firmadas por Mohammad Reza para destituir a Mosaddegh como primer ministro y reemplazarlo por el general Fazlollah Zahedi , una elección acordada por los británicos y los estadounidenses. [88] [89] [90]

Antes del intento de golpe, la embajada estadounidense en Teherán informó que el apoyo popular a Mosaddegh seguía siendo sólido. El primer ministro solicitó al Majlis el control directo del ejército . Dada la situación, junto con el fuerte apoyo personal del primer ministro conservador Winston Churchill y el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Anthony Eden para la acción encubierta, el gobierno estadounidense dio el visto bueno a un comité, al que asistieron el secretario de Estado John Foster Dulles , el director de la CIA Allen Dulles , Kermit Roosevelt Jr., Henderson, [¿ quién? ] y el secretario de Defensa Charles Erwin Wilson . Kermit Roosevelt Jr. regresó a Irán el 13 de julio de 1953, y nuevamente el 1 de agosto de 1953, en su primera reunión con el rey. Un automóvil lo recogió a medianoche y lo llevó al palacio. Se tumbó en el asiento y se cubrió con una manta mientras los guardias le hacían señas a su chófer para que atravesara las puertas. El Sha subió al automóvil y Roosevelt le explicó la misión. La CIA lo sobornó con un millón de dólares en moneda iraní, que Roosevelt había guardado en una gran caja fuerte, un escondite voluminoso, dado el tipo de cambio de entonces de 1.000  riales por 15  dólares estadounidenses . [91]

Mientras tanto, los comunistas organizaron manifestaciones masivas para secuestrar las iniciativas de Mosaddegh, y Estados Unidos conspiró activamente contra él. El 16 de agosto de 1953, el ala derecha del ejército atacó. Armada con una orden del Sha, nombró al general Fazlollah Zahedi como primer ministro. Una coalición de turbas y oficiales retirados cercanos al palacio ejecutaron este golpe de estado. Fracasaron estrepitosamente y el Sha huyó del país a Bagdad y luego a Roma . Ettelaat , el diario más importante del país, y su editor pro-Sha, Abbas Masudi, lo criticaron, calificando la derrota de "humillante". [92]

Durante la estancia del Sha en Roma, un diplomático británico informó de que el monarca pasaba la mayor parte del tiempo en clubes nocturnos con la reina Soraya o su última amante, y escribió: "Odia tomar decisiones y no se puede confiar en que las cumpla cuando las toma. No tiene valor moral y sucumbe fácilmente al miedo". [93] Para conseguir que apoyara el golpe, su hermana gemela, la princesa Ashraf —que era mucho más dura que él y cuestionó públicamente su hombría varias veces— lo visitó el 29 de julio de 1953 para reprenderlo y obligarlo a firmar un decreto que destituía al Mossaddegh. [94]

En los días previos al segundo intento de golpe, los comunistas se volvieron contra Mosaddegh. La oposición contra él creció enormemente. Vagaron por Teherán, izando banderas rojas y derribando estatuas de Reza Shah. Esto fue rechazado por clérigos conservadores como Kashani y líderes del Frente Nacional como Hossein Makki , que se alinearon con el rey. El 18 de agosto de 1953, Mosaddegh defendió al gobierno contra este nuevo ataque. Los partisanos Tudeh fueron apaleados y dispersados. [95] El partido Tudeh no tuvo más opción que aceptar la derrota.

Firman del Sha nombrando al general Fazlollah Zahedi como nuevo primer ministro . Los golpistas hicieron copias del documento y lo hicieron circular por Teherán para ayudar a recuperar el impulso tras el fracaso del plan original.

Mientras tanto, según el complot de la CIA, Zahedi apeló a los militares, afirmó ser el primer ministro legítimo y acusó a Mosaddegh de organizar un golpe de Estado al ignorar el decreto del Sha. El hijo de Zahedi, Ardashir, actuó como contacto entre la CIA y su padre. El 19 de agosto de 1953, los partidarios del Sha, sobornados con 100.000 dólares de fondos de la CIA, finalmente aparecieron y marcharon desde el sur de Teherán hacia el centro de la ciudad, donde otros se unieron a ellos. Bandas con palos, cuchillos y piedras controlaron las calles, volcaron camiones del Tudeh y golpearon a activistas anti-Sha. Mientras Roosevelt felicitaba a Zahedi en el sótano de su escondite, las turbas del nuevo primer ministro irrumpieron y lo llevaron arriba en hombros. Esa noche, Henderson sugirió a Ardashir que no se hiciera daño a Mosaddegh. Roosevelt le dio a Zahedi los 900.000 dólares que quedaban de los fondos de la Operación Ajax. [96]

Tras su breve exilio en Italia, el Sha regresó a Irán, esta vez a través de un segundo intento de golpe de Estado que tuvo éxito. El depuesto Mosaddegh fue arrestado y juzgado, y el rey intervino para conmutar su sentencia a tres años de prisión, [97] a los que seguiría una cadena perpetua en el exilio interno. Zahedi fue nombrado sucesor de Mosaddegh. [98] Aunque Mohammad Reza regresó al poder, nunca extendió el estatus de élite de la corte a los tecnócratas e intelectuales que surgieron de las universidades iraníes y occidentales. De hecho, su sistema irritó a las nuevas clases, a las que se les prohibió participar en el poder real. [99]

Autoafirmación: de monarca figura decorativa a autoritario eficaz

Mohammad Reza con su amigo y asesor, Ernest Perron (izquierda), década de 1950

Tras el golpe de Estado de 1953, Mohamed Reza era considerado ampliamente como un monarca figura decorativa, y el general Fazlollah Zahedi , el primer ministro, se veía a sí mismo y era visto por otros como el "hombre fuerte" de Irán. [100] Mohamed Reza temía que la historia se repitiera, recordando cómo su padre era un general que había tomado el poder en un golpe de Estado en 1921 y depuesto al último shah Qajar en 1925, y su principal preocupación en los años 1953-55 era neutralizar a Zahedi. [101] Los diplomáticos estadounidenses y británicos en sus informes a Washington y Londres en la década de 1950 despreciaban abiertamente la capacidad de Mohamed Reza para liderar, llamando al Sha un hombre de voluntad débil y cobarde que era incapaz de tomar una decisión. [101] El desprecio que las élites iraníes tenían por el Sha condujo a un período a mediados de la década de 1950 en el que la élite mostró tendencias fisíparas, peleándose entre sí ahora que Mossadegh había sido derrocado, lo que finalmente permitió a Mohammad Reza enfrentarse a varias facciones de la élite para afirmarse como el líder de la nación. [101]

El hecho de que Mohammad Reza fuera considerado un cobarde e insustancial resultó ser una ventaja, ya que el Sha demostró ser un político hábil, enfrentando a las facciones de la élite y a los estadounidenses contra los británicos con el objetivo de ser un autócrata en la práctica y en la teoría. [101] Los partidarios del prohibido Frente Nacional fueron perseguidos, pero en su primera decisión importante como líder, Mohammad Reza intervino para asegurar que la mayoría de los miembros del Frente Nacional llevados a juicio, como el propio Mosaddegh, no fueran ejecutados como muchos esperaban. [102] Muchos en la élite iraní estaban abiertamente decepcionados de que Mohammad Reza no llevara a cabo la esperada purga sangrienta y ahorcara a Mosaddegh y sus seguidores como habían querido y esperado. [102] En 1954, cuando doce profesores universitarios emitieron una declaración pública criticando el golpe de 1953, todos fueron despedidos de sus puestos, pero en el primero de sus muchos actos de "magnanimidad" hacia el Frente Nacional, Mohammad Reza intervino para que fueran reinstalados. [103] Mohammad Reza se esforzó mucho por cooptar a los partidarios del Frente Nacional adoptando parte de su retórica y abordando sus preocupaciones, por ejemplo, declarando en varios discursos sus preocupaciones sobre las condiciones económicas del Tercer Mundo y la pobreza que prevalecía en Irán, un asunto que no le había interesado mucho antes. [104]

Retrato formal del joven Sha con traje militar, c.  1949

Mohammad Reza estaba decidido a copiar a Mosaddegh, que había ganado popularidad prometiendo amplias reformas socioeconómicas, y quería crear una base de poder de masas, ya que no quería depender de las élites tradicionales, que sólo lo querían como figura legitimadora. [102] En 1955, Mohammad Reza destituyó al general Zahedi de su puesto de primer ministro y nombró a su archienemigo, el tecnócrata Hossein Ala' como primer ministro, a quien a su vez destituyó en 1957. [105] A partir de 1955, Mohammad Reza comenzó a cultivar silenciosamente a intelectuales de izquierda, muchos de los cuales habían apoyado al Frente Nacional y algunos de los cuales estaban asociados con el prohibido partido Tudeh, pidiéndoles consejo sobre la mejor manera de reformar Irán. [106] Fue durante este período que Mohammad Reza comenzó a adoptar la imagen de un Sha "progresista", un reformador que modernizaría Irán, que atacaría en sus discursos el sistema social "reaccionario" y "feudal" que estaba retardando el progreso, que llevaría a cabo una reforma agraria y que daría a las mujeres derechos iguales. [106]

Manifestación a favor del Sha, 1954

Decidido a gobernar y reinar, fue a mediados de la década de 1950 que Mohammad Reza comenzó a promover un culto estatal en torno a Ciro el Grande, retratado como un gran Sha que había reformado el país y construido un imperio con obvios paralelos a él mismo. [106] Junto a este cambio de imagen, Mohammad Reza comenzó a hablar de su deseo de "salvar" a Irán, un deber que, según él, le había dado Dios, y prometió que bajo su liderazgo Irán alcanzaría un nivel de vida occidental en un futuro cercano. [107] Durante este período, Mohammad Reza buscó el apoyo de los ulemas y reanudó la política tradicional de perseguir a los iraníes que pertenecían a la Fe Baháʼí , permitiendo que el principal templo baháʼí en Teherán fuera demolido en 1955 y promulgando una ley que prohibía a los baháʼís reunirse en grupos. [107] Un diplomático británico informó en 1954 que Reza Khan "debía estar revolviéndose en su tumba en Rey . ¡Al ver la arrogancia y el descaro de los mulás una vez más desenfrenados en la ciudad santa! ¡Cómo debe despreciar el viejo tirano la debilidad de su hijo, que permitió que estos sacerdotes turbulentos recuperaran gran parte de su influencia reaccionaria!" [107] En ese momento, el matrimonio del Sha estaba bajo tensión ya que la Reina Soraya se quejaba del poder del mejor amigo de Mohammad Reza, Ernest Perron, a quien llamaba un " shetun " y un "demonio cojo". [108] Perron era un hombre muy resentido por su influencia sobre Mohammad Reza y a menudo era descrito por los enemigos como un personaje "diabólico" y "misterioso", cuyo puesto era el de secretario privado, pero que era uno de los asesores más cercanos del Sha, con mucho más poder del que su título de trabajo sugería. [109]

En un estudio de 1957 compilado por el Departamento de Estado de los EE. UU ., Mohammad Reza fue elogiado por su "creciente madurez" y por no necesitar "buscar consejo a cada paso", como había concluido el estudio anterior de 1951. [110] El 27 de febrero de 1958, se frustró un golpe militar para deponer al Sha dirigido por el general Valiollah Gharani, lo que llevó a una crisis importante en las relaciones iraní-estadounidenses cuando surgió evidencia de que los asociados de Gharani se habían reunido con diplomáticos estadounidenses en Atenas, lo que el Sha utilizó para exigir que de ahí en adelante ningún funcionario estadounidense pudiera reunirse con sus oponentes. [111] Otro problema en las relaciones iraní-estadounidenses fue la sospecha de Mohammad Reza de que Estados Unidos no estaba suficientemente comprometido con la defensa de Irán, observando que los estadounidenses se negaron a unirse al Pacto de Bagdad , y los estudios militares habían indicado que Irán solo podría resistir unos pocos días en caso de una invasión soviética. [112]

Noticiero Universal sobre el 40 cumpleaños del Sha, 1959
El Sha encendiendo un cigarrillo para su esposa Soraya, década de 1950

En enero de 1959, el Sha inició negociaciones sobre un pacto de no agresión con la Unión Soviética, a las que, según él, se vio obligado por la falta de apoyo estadounidense. [113] Después de recibir una carta ligeramente amenazante del presidente Eisenhower advirtiéndole de no firmar el tratado, Mohammad Reza decidió no firmar, lo que condujo a un importante esfuerzo de propaganda soviética que pedía su derrocamiento. [114] El líder soviético Nikita Khrushchev ordenó el asesinato de Mohammad Reza. [115] Una señal del poder de Mohammad Reza llegó en 1959 cuando una empresa británica ganó un contrato con el gobierno iraní que fue cancelado repentinamente y entregado a Siemens en su lugar. [116] Una investigación de la embajada británica pronto descubrió la razón: Mohammad Reza quería acostarse con la esposa del agente de ventas de Siemens para Irán, y el agente de Siemens había consentido en permitir que su esposa se acostara con el Sha a cambio de recuperar el contrato que acababa de perder. [116] El 24 de julio de 1959, Mohammad Reza reconoció de facto a Israel al permitir que se abriera una oficina comercial israelí en Teherán que funcionaba como embajada de facto , una medida que ofendió a muchos en el mundo islámico. [117] Cuando Eisenhower visitó Irán el 14 de diciembre de 1959, Mohammad Reza le dijo que Irán se enfrentaba a dos amenazas externas principales: la Unión Soviética al norte y el nuevo gobierno revolucionario prosoviético en Irak al oeste. Esto lo llevó a solicitar un aumento considerable de la ayuda militar estadounidense, diciendo que su país era un estado de primera línea en la Guerra Fría que necesitaba tanto poder militar como fuera posible. [117]

El matrimonio del Sha y Soraya terminó en 1958 cuando se hizo evidente que, incluso con la ayuda de los médicos, ella no podía tener hijos. Soraya le dijo más tarde al New York Times que el Sha no tuvo más remedio que divorciarse de ella, y que estaba apesadumbrado por la decisión. [118] Sin embargo, incluso después del matrimonio, se informa que el Sha todavía sentía un gran amor por Soraya, y se informa que se vieron varias veces después de su divorcio y que ella vivió su vida post-divorcio cómodamente como una dama rica, a pesar de que nunca se volvió a casar; [119] recibiendo un salario mensual de aproximadamente $ 7,000 de Irán. [120] Después de su muerte en 2001 a la edad de 69 años en París, una subasta de las posesiones incluía una propiedad parisina de tres millones de dólares, un anillo de diamantes de 22,37 quilates y un Rolls-Royce de 1958. [121]

Pahlavi manifestó posteriormente su interés en casarse con la princesa María Gabriela de Saboya , hija del depuesto rey italiano, Humberto II . El papa Juan XXIII supuestamente vetó la sugerencia. En un editorial sobre los rumores que rodeaban el matrimonio entre un "soberano musulmán y una princesa católica", el periódico del Vaticano, L'Osservatore Romano , consideró el matrimonio "un grave peligro", [122] especialmente considerando que bajo el Código de Derecho Canónico de 1917 un católico romano que se casara con una persona divorciada sería automáticamente, y podría ser formalmente, excomulgado .


En las elecciones presidenciales estadounidenses de 1960 , el Sha había favorecido al candidato republicano, el vicepresidente en ejercicio Richard Nixon , a quien había conocido por primera vez en 1953 y le agradaba bastante, y según el diario de su mejor amigo Asadollah Alam , Mohammad Reza contribuyó con dinero a la campaña de Nixon de 1960. [123] Las relaciones con el vencedor de las elecciones de 1960, el demócrata John F. Kennedy , no fueron amistosas. [123] En un intento de reparar las relaciones después de la derrota de Nixon, Mohammad Reza envió al general Teymur Bakhtiar de SAVAK para reunirse con Kennedy en Washington el 1 de marzo de 1961. [124] De Kermit Roosevelt , Mohammad Reza se enteró de que Bakhtiar, durante su viaje a Washington, había pedido a los estadounidenses que apoyaran un golpe de Estado que estaba planeando, lo que aumentó enormemente los temores del Sha sobre Kennedy. [124] El 2 de mayo de 1961, comenzó en Irán una huelga de profesores en la que participaron 50.000 personas, que Mohammad Reza creía que era obra de la CIA. [125] Mohammad Reza tuvo que despedir a su primer ministro Jafar Sharif-Emami y ceder ante los profesores tras saber que el ejército probablemente no dispararía contra los manifestantes. [126] En 1961, Bakhtiar fue destituido como jefe de SAVAK y expulsado de Irán en 1962 tras un enfrentamiento entre estudiantes universitarios que se manifestaban y el ejército el 21 de enero de 1962 que dejó tres muertos. [127] En abril de 1962, cuando Mohammad Reza visitó Washington, se encontró con manifestaciones de estudiantes iraníes en universidades estadounidenses, que creía que estaban organizadas por el fiscal general de Estados Unidos Robert F. Kennedy , hermano del presidente y la principal voz anti-Pahlavi en la administración Kennedy. [128] Posteriormente, Mohammad Reza visitó Londres. En una señal de la dinámica cambiada en las relaciones anglo-iraníes, el Sha se ofendió cuando le informaron que podía unirse a la Reina Isabel II para una cena en el Palacio de Buckingham que se ofrecía en honor de otra persona, insistiendo con éxito en que cenaría con la Reina solo cuando fuera en su propio honor. [128]

El primer enfrentamiento importante de Mohammad Reza con el Ayatolá Jomeini ocurrió en 1962, cuando el Sha cambió las leyes locales para permitir que los judíos, cristianos, zoroastrianos y bahaíes iraníes tomaran juramento para los consejos municipales usando sus libros sagrados en lugar del Corán. [129] Jomeini escribió al Sha para decirle que esto era inaceptable y que solo el Corán podía usarse para jurar a los miembros de los consejos municipales independientemente de cuál fuera su religión, escribiendo que escuchó que "el Islam no está indicado como una condición previa para presentarse a un cargo y a las mujeres se les está otorgando el derecho a votar... Por favor, ordene que todas las leyes contrarias a la fe sagrada y oficial del país sean eliminadas de las políticas gubernamentales". [129] El Sha respondió, dirigiéndose a Jomeini como Hojat-al Islam en lugar de como Ayatolá, declinando su solicitud. [129] Sintiéndose presionado por las manifestaciones organizadas por el clero, el Sha retiró la ley ofensiva, pero fue reinstaurada con la Revolución Blanca de 1963. [130]

Años intermedios

La revolución blanca

El Sha habla sobre los principios de su Revolución Blanca , 1963

Conflicto con los islamistas

En 1963, Mohammad Reza lanzó la Revolución Blanca , una serie de reformas de gran alcance, que provocaron mucha oposición por parte de los eruditos religiosos. Estaban furiosos porque el referéndum que aprobaba la Revolución Blanca en 1963 permitía a las mujeres votar, y el Ayatolá Jomeini dijo en sus sermones que el destino de Irán nunca debería ser decidido por las mujeres. [131] En 1963 y 1964, se produjeron manifestaciones a nivel nacional contra el gobierno de Mohammad Reza en todo Irán, siendo el centro de los disturbios la ciudad santa de Qom . [132] Los estudiantes que estudiaban para ser imanes en Qom fueron los más activos en las protestas, y el Ayatolá Jomeini surgió como uno de los líderes, dando sermones pidiendo el derrocamiento del Sha. [132] Al menos 200 personas murieron, y la policía arrojó a algunos estudiantes desde edificios altos, y Jomeini fue exiliado a Irak en agosto de 1964. [133]

El segundo intento de asesinato contra el Sha ocurrió el 10 de abril de 1965. [134] Un soldado se abrió paso a tiros por el Palacio de Mármol . El asesino fue asesinado antes de llegar a los aposentos reales, pero dos guardias civiles murieron mientras protegían al Sha. [135]

Conflicto con los comunistas

Según Vladimir Kuzichkin , un ex oficial de la KGB que desertó al MI-6 , la Unión Soviética también tenía al Sha en la mira. Los soviéticos intentaron usar un control remoto de televisión para detonar un Volkswagen Beetle cargado de bombas ; el control remoto de la televisión no funcionó. [136] Un desertor rumano de alto rango, Ion Mihai Pacepa , también apoyó esta afirmación, afirmando que había sido el objetivo de varios intentos de asesinato por parte de agentes soviéticos durante muchos años. [137]

La corte de Pahlavi

Boda del Sha con Farah Diba el 20 de diciembre de 1959
El Sha y su esposa, Farah, después del nacimiento de su hijo, Reza , en un hospital público de Teherán , 1960

La tercera y última esposa de Mohammad Reza fue Farah Diba (nacida el 14 de octubre de 1938), hija única de Sohrab Diba, un capitán del Ejército Imperial iraní (hijo de un embajador iraní en la Corte Romanov en San Petersburgo, Rusia), y su esposa, la ex Farideh Ghotbi . Se casaron en 1959, y la reina Farah fue coronada Shahbanu , o Emperatriz, un título creado especialmente para ella en 1967. Las consortes reales anteriores habían sido conocidas como "Malakeh" (árabe: Malika ), o Reina. La pareja permaneció junta durante 21 años, hasta la muerte del Sha. Tuvieron cuatro hijos juntos:

Una de las actividades favoritas de Mohammad Reza era ver películas, y sus favoritas eran las comedias francesas ligeras y las películas de acción de Hollywood, para gran decepción de Farah, que se esforzó por interesarlo en películas más serias. [138] Mohammad Reza le era infiel con frecuencia a Farah, y su mano derecha, Asadollah Alam, importaba regularmente mujeres europeas altas para "salidas" con el Sha, aunque el diario de Alam también menciona que si no había mujeres del "mundo de ojos azules", le traía al Sha "producto local". [139] Mohammad Reza tenía un apetito insaciable por el sexo, y el diario de Alam cuenta que el Sha le decía constantemente que necesitaba tener sexo varias veces al día, todos los días, o de lo contrario caería en una depresión. [139] Cuando Farah se enteró de sus aventuras en 1973, Alam culpó al primer ministro Amir Abbas Hoveyda, mientras que el Sha pensó que era la KGB. Milani señaló que ninguno de los dos admitió que las "crasas infidelidades" del Sha fueron las que causaron este problema. [139] Milani escribió además que "Alam, en sus momentos más destructivos de adulación, le aseguró al Sha -o a su "amo", como él lo llama- que el país era próspero y que nadie le escatimaba al Rey un poco de diversión". También tenía pasión por los automóviles y los aviones, y a mediados de los años 1970, el Sha había acumulado una de las mayores colecciones de coches y aviones de lujo del mundo. [140] Sus visitas a Occidente eran invariablemente la ocasión de importantes protestas de la Confederación de Estudiantes Iraníes, un grupo paraguas de estudiantes universitarios iraníes de extrema izquierda que estudiaban en el extranjero, y Mohammad Reza tenía uno de los mayores equipos de seguridad del mundo, ya que vivía con el miedo constante de ser asesinado. [127]

Manifestación contra el Sha en Berlín Occidental, 1968

Milani describió la corte de Mohammad Reza como abierta y tolerante, y señaló que sus dos diseñadores de interiores favoritos y los de Farah, Keyvan Khosrovani y Bijan Saffari, eran abiertamente homosexuales y no eran penalizados por su orientación sexual, y que Khosrovani a menudo daba consejos al Sha sobre cómo vestirse. [141] Milani señaló la estrecha conexión entre la arquitectura y el poder en Irán, ya que la arquitectura es la "poesía del poder" en Irán. [141] En este sentido, el Palacio Niavaran, con su mezcla de estilo modernista, fuertemente influenciado por los estilos franceses actuales y el estilo tradicional persa, reflejaba la personalidad de Mohammad Reza. [142] Mohammad Reza era un francófilo cuya corte tenía un ambiente decididamente francés. [143]

Mohammad Reza encargó un documental al cineasta francés Albert Lamorisse para glorificar el Irán bajo su gobierno. Pero le molestó que la película se centrara únicamente en el pasado de Irán, y le escribió a Lamorisse que no había edificios modernos en su película, lo que según él hacía que Irán pareciera "atrasado". [138] La oficina de Mohammad Reza era funcional, cuyos techos y paredes estaban decorados con arte Qajar. [144] Farah comenzó a coleccionar arte moderno y, a principios de la década de 1970, poseía obras de Picasso , Gauguin , Chagall y Braque , que se sumaban al estilo modernista del Palacio Niavaran. [143]

Coronación imperial

El 26 de octubre de 1967, veintiséis años después de su reinado como Sha ("Rey"), adoptó el antiguo título de Shāhanshāh ("Emperador" o "Rey de Reyes") en una suntuosa ceremonia de coronación celebrada en Teherán. Dijo que había elegido esperar hasta ese momento para asumir el título porque, en su opinión, hasta entonces "no lo merecía"; también se dice que dijo que no había "ningún honor en ser emperador de un país pobre" (como consideraba que era Irán hasta ese momento). [145]

Celebración de los 2.500 años del Imperio Persa

La llegada del Shah Mohammad Reza, Shahbanu Farah y el príncipe heredero Reza a Pasargadae , frente a la tumba de Ciro, el 12 de octubre de 1971

Como parte de sus esfuerzos por modernizar Irán y dar al pueblo iraní una identidad no islámica, Mohammad Reza comenzó conscientemente a celebrar la historia iraní antes de la conquista árabe con un enfoque especial en el período aqueménida . [146] En octubre de 1971, marcó el aniversario de los 2.500 años de monarquía persa continua desde la fundación del Imperio aqueménida por Ciro el Grande . Simultáneamente con esta celebración, Mohammad Reza cambió el punto de referencia del calendario iraní de la Hégira al comienzo del Primer Imperio Persa , medido a partir de la coronación de Ciro el Grande. [147]

En la celebración en Persépolis en 1971, el Sha tuvo un elaborado espectáculo de fuegos artificiales destinado a enviar un doble mensaje: que Irán todavía era fiel a sus antiguas tradiciones y que Irán había trascendido su pasado para convertirse en una nación moderna, que Irán no estaba "estancado en el pasado", sino que como nación que abrazó la modernidad había elegido ser fiel a su pasado. [148] El mensaje se reforzó aún más al día siguiente cuando se realizó el "Desfile de la Historia Persa" en Persépolis, cuando 6.000 soldados vestidos con los uniformes de cada dinastía, desde los aqueménidas hasta los pahlavis, marcharon junto a Mohammad Reza en un gran desfile que muchos contemporáneos comentaron que "superó en puro espectáculo las imaginaciones de celuloide más floridas de las epopeyas de Hollywood". [148] Para completar el mensaje, Mohammad Reza remató las celebraciones inaugurando un nuevo museo en Teherán, el Shahyad Aryamehr, que estaba ubicado en un edificio muy modernista, y asistió a otro desfile en el recién inaugurado Estadio Aryamehr, con la intención de dar un mensaje de "tiempo comprimido" entre la antigüedad y la modernidad. [148] Un folleto publicado por el Comité de Celebraciones afirmaba explícitamente el mensaje: "Sólo cuando el cambio es extremadamente rápido, y los últimos diez años han demostrado serlo, el pasado alcanza valores nuevos e insospechados que vale la pena cultivar", y continuaba diciendo que las celebraciones se llevaron a cabo porque "Irán ha comenzado a sentirse seguro de su modernización". [148] Milani señaló que era una señal de la liberalización de los años intermedios del reinado de Mohammad Reza que Hussein Amanat, el arquitecto que diseñó el Shahyad, fuera un joven bahá'í de una familia de clase media que no pertenecía a las "mil familias" que tradicionalmente dominaban Irán, escribiendo que sólo en este momento de la historia iraní algo así era posible. [149]

El papel en la OPEP

Guerra árabe-israelí de 1973

Antes del embargo petrolero de 1973, Irán encabezó el objetivo de la OPEP de lograr precios más altos del petróleo. Cuando aumentaba los precios del petróleo, Irán señalaba la creciente inflación como un medio para justificar los aumentos de precios. [150] Después de la Guerra de Yom Kippur , los estados árabes emplearon un embargo petrolero en 1973 contra las naciones occidentales. Aunque el Sha declaró neutralidad, trató de explotar la falta de suministro de petróleo crudo en beneficio de Irán. El Sha celebró una reunión de productores de petróleo del Golfo Pérsico declarando que debían duplicar el precio del petróleo por segunda vez en un año. El aumento de precios resultó en un "shock petrolero" que paralizó las economías occidentales mientras que Irán vio un rápido crecimiento de los ingresos petroleros. Los ingresos petroleros iraníes se duplicaron a $ 4.6 mil millones en 1973-1974 y aumentaron a $ 17.8 mil millones en el año siguiente. Como resultado, el Sha se había establecido como la figura dominante de la OPEP, teniendo control sobre los precios y la producción de petróleo. Irán experimentó una tasa de crecimiento económico del 33% en 1973 y del 40% el año siguiente, y el PNB se expandió un 50% el año siguiente. [151]

El Sha destinó el crecimiento de los ingresos petroleros a la economía nacional. La educación primaria se hizo gratuita y obligatoria, se hicieron grandes inversiones en el ejército y en 1974 se gastaron 16 mil millones de dólares en construir nuevas escuelas y hospitales. El golpe petrolero del Sha señaló que Estados Unidos había perdido la capacidad de influir en la política exterior y económica iraní. [151] Bajo el Sha, Irán dominaba las exportaciones de petróleo de la OPEP y Oriente Medio. [152]

Irán nacionalista

En el siglo XIX, muchos intelectuales iraníes empezaron a utilizar la palabra persa Vatan para referirse a una patria nacional. El sistema educativo estaba controlado en gran medida por el clero chiita, que utilizaba un sistema Maktab en el que se impedía el debate político abierto sobre la modernización. Sin embargo, varios intelectuales académicos, entre ellos Mirzā FathʿAli Ākhundzādeh , Mirzā Āqā Khān Kermāni y Mirzā Malkam Khān, empezaron a criticar el papel del Islam en la vida pública al tiempo que promovían una identidad secular para Irán. Con el tiempo, los estudios de la gloriosa historia de Irán y la realidad actual de un periodo Qajar en decadencia llevaron a muchos a preguntarse qué condujo a la decadencia de Irán. [153] En última instancia, la historia iraní se clasificó en dos periodos: preislámico e islámico. El período preislámico de Irán fue visto como próspero, mientras que las invasiones árabes fueron vistas como "una catástrofe política que golpeó a la civilización iraní superior bajo su pezuña". [154] Por lo tanto, como resultado del creciente número de intelectuales iraníes en el siglo XIX, el antiguo Imperio Persa simbolizó la modernidad y la originalidad, mientras que el período islámico traído por las invasiones árabes llevó a Irán a un período de atraso. [153]

En última instancia, estas revelaciones en Irán conducirían al surgimiento del nacionalismo ario en Irán y a la percepción de un "despertar intelectual", como lo describe Homa Katouzian. En Europa, muchos conceptos del nacionalismo ario estaban dirigidos al sentimiento antijudío. En contraste, el nacionalismo ario de Irán estaba profundamente arraigado en la historia persa y se convirtió en sinónimo de un sentimiento antiárabe. Además, los períodos aqueménida y sasánida se percibían como la verdadera Persia, una Persia que se ganaba el respeto del mundo y que estaba desprovista de cultura extranjera antes de las invasiones árabes. [153]

Así, bajo el Estado de Pahlavi, estas ideas del nacionalismo iraní ario y preislámico continuaron con el ascenso de Reza Shah. Bajo el último Shah, la tumba de Ciro el Grande se estableció como un lugar significativo para todos los iraníes. La Misión por mi país, escrita por el Shah, describió a Ciro como "uno de los hombres más dinámicos de la historia" y que "dondequiera que Ciro conquistara, perdonaría a las mismas personas que lo habían combatido, las trataría bien y las mantendría en sus antiguos puestos ... Si bien Irán en ese momento no sabía nada de instituciones políticas democráticas, Ciro demostró, sin embargo, algunas de las cualidades que brindan la fuerza de las grandes democracias modernas". El Cilindro de Ciro también se convirtió en un símbolo cultural importante y Pahlavi popularizó con éxito el decreto como una antigua declaración de derechos humanos. [153] El Shah empleó títulos como Āryāmehr y Shāhanshāh para enfatizar la supremacía iraní y los reyes de Irán. [155]

El Sha continuó con las ideas de su padre sobre el nacionalismo iraní y concluyó que los árabes eran el otro extremo . Narrativas nacionalistas que fueron ampliamente aceptadas por la mayoría de los iraníes y que retrataban a los árabes como hostiles al renacimiento de Pahlavi del Irán "moderno" y "auténtico". [156]

Crecimiento económico

El Sha visitando el complejo petroquímico de Kharg , 1970

En la década de 1970, Irán tenía una tasa de crecimiento económico igual a la de Corea del Sur, Turquía y Taiwán, y los periodistas occidentales predijeron regularmente que Irán se convertiría en una nación del Primer Mundo en la próxima generación. [157] Significativamente, había comenzado una "fuga de cerebros inversa" con iraníes que habían sido educados en Occidente regresando a casa para ocupar puestos en el gobierno y los negocios. [158] La empresa Iran National dirigida por los hermanos Khayami se había convertido en 1978 en el mayor fabricante de automóviles en Medio Oriente produciendo 136.000 automóviles cada año mientras empleaba a 12.000 personas en Mashhad . [158] Mohammad Reza tenía fuertes tendencias estatistas y estaba profundamente involucrado en la economía, con sus políticas económicas que guardaban un fuerte parecido con las mismas políticas estatistas que estaba llevando a cabo simultáneamente el general Park Chung-hee en Corea del Sur. Mohammad Reza se consideraba socialista y decía que era "más socialista y revolucionario que nadie". [158] Reflejando sus tendencias autoproclamadas socialistas, aunque los sindicatos eran ilegales, el Sha introdujo leyes laborales que eran "sorprendentemente justas para los trabajadores". [159] Irán en los años 1960 y 1970 era un lugar tolerante para la minoría judía , y un judío iraní, David Menasheri , recordaba que el reinado de Mohammad Reza fue la "edad de oro" para los judíos iraníes, cuando eran iguales y cuando la comunidad judía iraní era una de las comunidades judías más ricas del mundo. La minoría bahá'í también prosperó después de que terminara el episodio de persecución a mediados de los años 1950, con varias familias bahá'ís que ascendieron a la prominencia en el mundo de los negocios iraníes. [160]

Bajo su reinado, Irán experimentó más de una década de crecimiento del PIB de dos dígitos, acompañado de importantes inversiones en el ejército y la infraestructura. [161]

El primer plan económico del Sha estaba orientado a grandes proyectos de infraestructura y a mejorar el sector agrícola, lo que llevó al desarrollo de muchas represas importantes, particularmente en Karaj , Safīdrūd y Dez. El siguiente plan económico estuvo dirigido y caracterizado por una expansión de la política crediticia y monetaria de una nación que resultó en una rápida expansión del sector privado de Irán, particularmente la construcción. Desde el período 1955-1959, la formación bruta real de capital fijo en el sector privado vio un aumento anual promedio del 39,3%. [162] El crédito al sector privado aumentó un 46 por ciento en 1957, un 61 por ciento en 1958 y un 32 por ciento en 1959 (Banco Central de Irán, Informe Anual, 1960 y 1961). En 1963, el Sha había comenzado una redistribución de la tierra ofreciendo compensación a los terratenientes valorados en evaluaciones fiscales anteriores, y la tierra obtenida por el gobierno se vendió luego en términos favorables a los campesinos iraníes. [163] El Sha también inició la nacionalización de los bosques y los pastos, el sufragio femenino, la participación en las ganancias de los trabajadores industriales, la privatización de las industrias estatales y la formación de cuerpos de alfabetización. Estos avances marcaron un punto de inflexión en la historia iraní, ya que la nación se preparaba para embarcarse en un proceso de industrialización rápido y agresivo. [162]

El período 1963-1978 representó el período más largo de crecimiento sostenido en el ingreso real per cápita que la economía iraní haya experimentado jamás. Durante el período 1963-1977, el Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) creció a una tasa anual promedio del 10,5%, con una tasa anual de crecimiento demográfico de alrededor del 2,7%, lo que colocó a Irán como una de las economías de más rápido crecimiento del mundo. El PIB per cápita de Irán era de 170 dólares en 1963 y aumentó a 2.060 dólares en 1977. El crecimiento no fue solo resultado del aumento de los ingresos petroleros. De hecho, los PIB no petroleros crecieron a una tasa anual promedio del 11,5 por ciento, que fue superior a la tasa anual promedio de crecimiento experimentada por los ingresos petroleros. En la quinta planificación económica, el PIB petrolero aumentó al 15,3%, superando ampliamente las tasas de crecimiento de los ingresos petroleros, que solo crecieron un 0,5%. Entre 1963 y 1977, los sectores industrial y de servicios experimentaron tasas de crecimiento anual del 15,0 y el 14,3 por ciento, respectivamente. La fabricación de automóviles, televisores, refrigeradores y otros artículos para el hogar aumentó sustancialmente en Irán. Por ejemplo, durante el breve período de 1969 a 1977, el número de automóviles particulares producidos en Irán aumentó de manera constante de 29.000 a 132.000 y el número de televisores producidos aumentó de 73.000 en 1969 a 352.000 en 1975. [162]

El crecimiento de los sectores industriales en Irán condujo a una importante urbanización del país, que pasó del 31 por ciento en 1956 al 49 por ciento en 1978. A mediados de los años setenta, la deuda nacional de Irán estaba saldada, lo que hizo que la nación pasara de ser deudora a ser acreedora. Los saldos de la cuenta corriente de la nación durante el período 1959-78 dieron como resultado un superávit de fondos de aproximadamente 15.170 millones de dólares. El quinto plan económico quinquenal del Sha pretendía lograr una reducción de las importaciones extranjeras mediante el uso de aranceles más altos para los bienes de consumo, préstamos bancarios preferenciales a los industriales, el mantenimiento de un rial sobrevaluado y subsidios a los alimentos en las zonas urbanas. Estos avances llevaron al desarrollo de una nueva y gran clase industrial en Irán y la estructura industrial del país quedó extremadamente aislada de las amenazas de la competencia extranjera. [162]

En 1976, Irán experimentó el mayor aumento de su PIB en su historia, gracias en gran parte a las políticas económicas del Sha. Según el Banco Mundial, si se lo valora en dólares de 2010, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi elevó el PIB per cápita del país a 10.261 dólares, el más alto en cualquier momento de la historia de Irán. [164]

Según el economista Fereydoun Khavand, “Durante estos 15 años, la tasa media de crecimiento anual del país fluctuó por encima del 10%. El volumen total de la economía de Irán aumentó casi cinco veces durante este período. En contraste, durante los últimos 40 años, la tasa media de crecimiento económico anual de Irán ha sido de sólo un 2%. Considerando la tasa de crecimiento de la población de Irán en el período posterior a la revolución, la tasa media de crecimiento per cápita de Irán en los últimos 40 años se estima entre cero y medio por ciento. Entre los principales factores que obstaculizan la tasa de crecimiento en Irán se encuentran la falta de un entorno empresarial favorable, una grave debilidad de la inversión, niveles muy bajos de productividad y una tensión constante en las relaciones regionales y globales del país”. [165]

Muchas empresas de inversión europeas, estadounidenses y japonesas buscaron oportunidades comerciales y establecer sedes en Irán. Según un banquero de inversiones estadounidense:

“Ahora dependen de la tecnología occidental, pero ¿qué sucederá cuando produzcan y exporten acero y cobre, cuando reduzcan sus problemas agrícolas? Se comerán vivos a todos los demás en Oriente Medio”. [166]

Relación con el mundo occidental

By the 1960s and 1970s, Iranian oil revenues experienced rapid growth. By the mid-1960s Iran saw "weakened U.S. influence in Iranian politics" and a strengthening in the power of the Iranian state. According to Homa Katouzian, the perception that the US was the instructor of the Shah's regime due to their support for the 1953 coup contradicted the reality that "its real influence" in domestic Iranian politics and policy "declined considerably".[167] In 1973 the Shah initiated an oil price hike with his control of OPEC further demonstrating the US no longer had influence over Iranian foreign and economic policies.[151] In response to American media outlets critical of him, the Shah claimed that Iran's oil price hikes did little to contribute to the rising inflation in the United States. Pahlavi also implied criticism of the US for not taking the lead on anti-communist efforts.[168]

In 1974 during the oil crisis, the Shah began an atomic nuclear energy policy prompting US Trade Administrator William E. Simon to denounce the Shah as a "nut." In response, US President Nixon publicly apologized to the Shah and through a letter in order to disassociate the president and the United States from the statement. Simon's statement illustrated the growing American tensions with Iran over the Shah's raising of oil prices. Nixon's apology covered up the reality that the Shah's ambitions to become the leader in the Persian Gulf Area and the Indian Ocean basin was placing a serious strain on his relationship with the United States, particularly as India had tested its first atomic bomb in May 1974.[169]

Many critics labeled the Shah as a Western and American "puppet", an accusation that has been disproven as unfounded by contemporary scholars due to the Shah's strong regional and nationalist ambitions which often led Tehran to disputes with its Western allies.[170] In particular, the Carter administration which took control of the White House in 1977 saw the Shah as a troublesome ally and sought change in Iran's political system.[171]

By the 1970s, the Shah had become a strongman. His power had dramatically increased both in Iran and internationally, and on the tenth anniversary of the White Revolution, he challenged The Consortium Agreement of 1954 and terminated the agreement after negotiations with the oil consortium resulting in the establishment of 1973 Sale and Purchase Agreement.[172][173]

Khomeini accused the Shah of false rumors and employed Soviet methods of deception. The accusations were amplified by international media outlets which widely propagated the information and protests were widely shown on Iranian televisions.[174]

Many Iranian students studied across Western Europe and the United States where ideas of liberalism, democracy, and counterculture flourished. Among left-leaning Westerners, the Shah's reign was seen as equivalent to that of right-wing hate figures. Western anti-Shah fervor broadcast by European and American media outlets was ultimately adopted by Iranian students and intellectuals studying the West who accused the shah of Westoxification when it was the students themselves who were adopting Western liberalism they experienced during their studies. These Western ideas of liberalism resulted in utopian visions for revolution and social change. In turn, the Shah criticized Western democracies and equated them to chaos. Furthermore, the Shah chastised Americans and Europeans as being "lazy," and "lacking discipline," and criticized their student radicalism as being caused by Western decline. President Nixon expressed his concern to the Shah that Iranian students in the United States would similarly become radicalized, asking the Shah:[175]

“Are your students infected?” and “Can you do anything?”

[175]

Foreign relations and policies

France

Mohammad Reza, U.S. President John F. Kennedy, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the White House Cabinet Room, 1962

In 1961, the Francophile Mohammad Reza visited Paris to meet his favourite leader, General Charles de Gaulle of France.[176] Mohammad Reza saw height as the measure of a man and a woman (the Shah had a marked preference for tall women) and the 6 feet 5 inches (1.96 m) de Gaulle was his most admired leader. Mohammad Reza loved to be compared to his "ego ideal" of General de Gaulle, and his courtiers constantly flattered him by calling him Iran's de Gaulle.[176] During the French trip, Queen Farah, who shared her husband's love of French culture and language, befriended the culture minister André Malraux, who arranged for the exchange of cultural artifacts between French and Iranian museums and art galleries, a policy that remained a key component of Iran's cultural diplomacy until 1979.[177] Many of the legitimising devices of the regime such as the constant use of referendums were modelled after de Gaulle's regime.[177] Intense Francophiles, Mohammad Reza and Farah preferred to speak French rather than Persian to their children.[178] Mohammad Reza built the Niavaran Palace which took up 840 square metres (9,000 sq ft) and whose style was a blend of Persian and French architecture.[179]

United States

The Shah's diplomatic foundation was the United States' guarantee that it would protect his regime, enabling him to stand up to larger enemies. While the arrangement did not preclude other partnerships and treaties, it helped to provide a somewhat stable environment in which Mohammad Reza could implement his reforms. Another factor guiding Mohammad Reza in his foreign policy was his wish for financial stability, which required strong diplomatic ties. A third factor was his wish to present Iran as a prosperous and powerful nation; this fuelled his domestic policy of Westernisation and reform. A final component was his promise that communism could be halted at Iran's border if his monarchy was preserved. By 1977, the country's treasury, the Shah's autocracy, and his strategic alliances seemed to form a protective layer around Iran.[180]

Mohammad Reza Shah and Farah Pahlavi meeting with general secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, 1970
The Shah and his wife visited Espoo, Finland in June 1970. President Urho Kekkonen next to the Shah.

Although the U.S. was responsible for putting the Shah in power, he did not always act as a close American ally. In the early 1960s, when the State Department's Policy Planning Staff that included William R. Polk encouraged the Shah to distribute Iran's growing revenues more equitably, slow the rush toward militarisation, and open the government to political processes, he became furious and identified Polk as "the principal enemy of his regime." In July 1964, the Shah, Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, and Pakistani President Ayub Khan announced in Istanbul the establishment of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) organisation to promote joint transportation and economic projects. It also envisioned Afghanistan's joining at some time in the future. The Shah was the first regional leader to grant de facto recognition to Israel.[181] When interviewed on 60 Minutes by reporter Mike Wallace, he criticised American Jews for their presumed control over U.S. media and finance, saying that The New York Times and The Washington Post were so pro-Israel in their coverage that it was a disservice to Israel's own interests. He also said that the Palestinians were "bully[ing] the world" through "terrorism and blackmail".[182] The Shah's remarks on the alleged Jewish lobby are widely believed to have been intended to pacify the Shah's Arab critics, and in any case, bilateral relations between Iran and Israel were not adversely affected.[181] In a 1967 memo to President Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara wrote that "our sales [to Iran] have created about 1.4 million man-years of employment in the U.S. and over $1 billion in profits to American industry over the last five years," leading him to conclude that Iran was an arms market the United States could not do without.[183] In June 1965, after the Americans proved reluctant to sell Mohammad Reza some of the weapons he asked for, the Shah visited Moscow, where the Soviets agreed to sell some $110 million worth of weaponry; the threat of Iran pursuing the "Soviet option" caused the Americans to resume selling Iran weapons.[183] Additionally, British, French, and Italian arms firms were willing to sell Iran weapons, thus giving Mohammad Reza considerable leverage in his talks with the Americans, who sometimes worried that the Shah was buying more weapons than Iran needed or could handle.[183]

Arab countries

The Shah with his wife Farah meets Indira Gandhi in India, 1970

Concerning the fate of Bahrain (which Britain had controlled since the 19th century, but which Iran claimed as its own territory) and three small Persian Gulf islands, the Shah negotiated an agreement with the British, which, by means of a public consensus, ultimately led to the independence of Bahrain (against the wishes of Iranian nationalists). In return, Iran took full control of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Strait of Hormuz, three strategically sensitive islands which were claimed by the United Arab Emirates. During this period, the Shah sent one of his most trusted tribal men Sheikh Abdulkarim Al-Faisali and maintained cordial relations with the Persian Gulf states and established close diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. Mohammad Reza saw Iran as the natural dominant power in the Persian Gulf region, and tolerated no challenges to Iranian hegemony, a claim that was supported by a gargantuan arms-buying spree that started in the early 1960s.[184] Mohammad Reza supported the Yemeni royalists against republican forces in the Yemen Civil War (1962–70) and assisted the sultan of Oman in putting down a rebellion in Dhofar (1971). In 1971, Mohammad Reza told a journalist: "World events were such that we were compelled to accept the fact that sea adjoining the Oman Sea—I mean the Indian Ocean—does not recognise borders. As for Iran's security limits—I will not state how many kilometers we have in mind, but anyone who is acquainted with geography and the strategic situation, and especially with the potential air and sea forces, know what distances from Chah Bahar this limit can reach".[185]

From 1968 to 1975 the Iraq deported over 60,000 Iraqis of Iranian descent into Iran causing a rise in tensions.[186] Iran's relations with Iraq, however, were often difficult due to political instability in the latter country. Mohammad Reza was distrustful of both the socialist government of Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Arab nationalist Ba'ath Party. He resented the internationally recognised Iran-Iraq border on the Shatt al-Arab River, which a 1937 treaty fixed on the low watermark on the Iranian side, giving Iraq control of most of the Shatt al-Arab.[187] On 19 April 1969, the Shah abrogated the treaty, and as a result Iran ceased paying tolls to Iraq when its ships used the Shatt al-Arab, ending Iraq's lucrative source of income.[188] He justified his move by arguing that almost all river borders all over the world ran along the thalweg (deep channel mark), and by claiming that because most of the ships that used the Shatt al-Arab were Iranian, the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran.[189] Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but when on 24 April 1969 an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships sailed down the Shatt al-Arab without paying tolls, Iraq, being the militarily weaker state, did nothing.[190] The Iranian abrogation of the 1937 treaty marked the beginning of a period of acute Iraqi-Iranian tension that was to last until the Algiers Accords of 1975.[190] The fact that Iraq had welcomed the former SAVAK chief General Teymur Bakhtiar to Baghdad, where he regularly met with representatives of the Tudeh Party and the Confederation of Iranian Students, added to the difficult relations between Iran and Iraq.[191] On 7 August 1970, Bakhtiar was badly wounded by a SAVAK assassin who shot him five times, and he died five days later; Alam wrote in his diary that Mohammad Reza rejoiced at the news.[192]

Soviet Union

Mohammad Reza speaks with Richard Nixon in the Oval Office, 1973

On 7 May 1972, Mohammad Reza told a visiting President Richard Nixon that the Soviet Union was attempting to dominate the Middle East via its close ally Iraq, and that to check Iraqi ambitions would also be to check Soviet ambitions.[193] Nixon agreed to support Iranian claims to have the thalweg in the Shatt al-Arab recognised as the border and to generally back Iran in its confrontation with Iraq.[193] Mohammad Reza financed Kurdish separatist rebels in Iraq, and to cover his tracks, armed them with Soviet weapons which Israel had seized from Soviet-backed Arab regimes, then handed over to Iran at the Shah's behest. The initial operation was a disaster, but the Shah continued attempts to support the rebels and weaken Iraq. Then, in 1975, the countries signed the Algiers Accord, which granted Iran equal navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab as the thalweg was now the new border, while Mohammad Reza agreed to end his support for Iraqi Kurdish rebels.[194] The Shah also maintained close relations with King Hussein of Jordan, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and King Hassan II of Morocco.[195] Beginning in 1970, Mohammad Reza formed an unlikely alliance with the militantly left-wing regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, as both leaders wanted higher oil prices for their nations, leading Iran and Libya joining forces to press for the "leapfrogging" of oil prices.[196]

Reina Farah de Persia Presidente de Egipto Anwar Sadat Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi de Persia 1975
The Shah meeting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, with his wife Farah in Tehran, 1975
The Shah meeting Algerian President Houari Boumediène and Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein in Algiers in order to sign the 1975 Algiers Agreement

The U.S.-Iran relationship grew more contentious as the U.S. became more dependent on Mohammad Reza to be a stabilising force in the Middle East, under the Nixon Doctrine. In a July 1969 visit to Guam, President Nixon had announced the Nixon Doctrine, which declared that the United States would honour its treaty commitments in Asia, but "as far as the problems of international security are concerned ... the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will increasingly be handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves."[183] The particular Asian nation the Nixon Doctrine was aimed at was South Vietnam, but the Shah seized upon the doctrine, with its message that Asian nations should be responsible for their own defense, to argue that the Americans should sell him arms without limitation, a suggestion that Nixon embraced.[183] A particular dynamic was established in American-Iranian relations from 1969 onward, in which the Americans gave in to whatever Mohammad Reza demanded, as they felt they needed a strong Iran as a pro-American force in the Middle East and could not afford to lose Iran as an ally.[197] Further adding to the Shah's confidence was the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969, which forced the Red Army to make a major redeployment to the Chinese border.[198] Mohammad Reza, who always feared the prospect of a Soviet invasion, welcomed the Sino-Soviet war and the resulting reduction of Red Army divisions along the Soviet-Iranian border as giving him more room internationally.[198]

Mohammad Reza and Gerald Ford on the South Lawn, 1975

Under Nixon, the United States finally agreed to sever all contact with any Iranians opposed to the Shah's regime, a concession that Mohammad Reza had been seeking since 1958.[192] The often very anti-American tone of the Iranian press was ignored because Mohammad Reza supported the U.S. in the Vietnam War and likewise the Americans ignored the Shah's efforts to raise oil prices, despite the fact it cost many American consumers more.[197] After 1969, a process of "reverse leverage" set in, when Mohammad Reza began to dictate to the United States as the Americans needed him more than he needed the Americans.[199] The American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger wrote in 1982 that because of the Vietnam War, it was not politically possible in the 1970s for the United States to fight a major war: "There was no possibility of assigning any American forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam War and its attendant trauma. Congress would have tolerated no such commitment; the public would not have supported it. Fortunately, Iran was willing to play this role."[199] Consequently, the Americans badly needed Iran as an ally, which allowed Mohammad Reza to dictate to them. This experience greatly boosted the Shah's ego, as he felt he was able to impose his will on the world's most powerful nation.[199]

Iran and Israel vs. Iraq

The Americans initially rejected Mohammad Reza's suggestion that they join him in supporting the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighting for independence on the grounds that an independent Kurdistan would inspire the Turkish Kurds to rebel, and they had no interest in antagonising the NATO member Turkey.[193] Some of the Shah's advisers also felt it was unwise to support the peshmerga, saying that if the Iraqi Kurds won independence, then the Iranian Kurds would want to join them. When Nixon and Kissinger visited Tehran in May 1972, the Shah convinced them to take a larger role in what had, up to then, been a mainly Israeli-Iranian operation to aid Iraqi Kurds in their struggles against Iraq, against the warnings of the CIA and State Department that the Shah would ultimately betray the Kurds. He did this in March 1975 with the signing of the Algiers Accord that settled Iraqi-Iranian border disputes, an action taken without prior consultation with the U.S., after which he cut off all aid to the Kurds and prevented the U.S. and Israel from using Iranian territory to provide them assistance.[200]

As a way of increasing pressure on Baghdad, the peshmerga had been encouraged by Iran and the U.S. to abandon guerrilla war for conventional war in April 1974, so the years 1974–75 saw the heaviest fighting between the Iraqi Army and the peshmerga. The sudden cut-off of Iranian support in March 1975 left the Kurds very exposed, causing them to be crushed by Iraq.[201] The British journalist Patrick Brogan wrote that "...the Iraqis celebrated their victory in the usual manner, by executing as many of the rebels as they could lay their hands on."[201] Kissinger later wrote in his memoirs that it was never the intention of the U.S. or Iran to see the peshmerga actually win, as an independent Kurdistan would have created too many problems for both Turkey and Iran; rather, the intention was to "irritate" Iraq enough to force the Iraqis to change their foreign policy.[193]

Middle East oil industry

Mohammad Reza Shah shakes hands with members of OPEC in a landmark session in Tehran, 1970

The Shah also used America's dependence on Middle Eastern oil as leverage; although Iran did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo, he purposely increased production in its aftermath to capitalise on the higher prices. In December 1973, only two months after oil prices were raised by 70 per cent, he urged OPEC nations to push prices even higher, which they agreed to do, more than doubling the price. Oil prices increased 470 per cent over a 12-month period, which also increased Iran's GDP by 50 per cent. Despite personal pleas from President Nixon, the Shah ignored any complaints, claimed the U.S. was importing more oil than any time in the past, and proclaimed that "the industrial world will have to realise that the era of their terrific progress and even more terrific income and wealth based on cheap oil is finished."[200]

Modernization and style of governance

After opening the Micro-wave station, the Shah visits its different departments, 1970

With Iran's great oil wealth, the Shah became the preeminent leader of the Middle East, and self-styled "Guardian" of the Persian Gulf. In 1961 he defended his style of rule, saying "When Iranians learn to behave like Swedes, I will behave like the King of Sweden."[202]

During the last years of his regime, the Shah's government became more autocratic. In the words of a U.S. Embassy dispatch: "The Shah's picture is everywhere. The beginning of all film showings in public theaters presents the Shah in various regal poses accompanied by the strains of the National Anthem ... The monarch also actively extends his influence to all phases of social affairs ... there is hardly any activity or vocation in which the Shah or members of his family or his closest friends do not have a direct or at least a symbolic involvement. In the past, he had claimed to take a two-party system seriously and declared, 'If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organised'."[203]

However, by 1975, Mohammad Reza had abolished the two-party system of government in favour of a one-party state under the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party. This was the merger of the New Iran Party,[204] a centre-right party, and the People's Party,[205] a liberal party. The Shah justified his actions by declaring: "We must straighten out Iranians' ranks. To do so, we divide them into two categories: those who believe in Monarchy, the constitution and the Six Bahman Revolution and those who don't ... A person who does not enter the new political party and does not believe in the three cardinal principles will have only two choices. He is either an individual who belongs to an illegal organisation, or is related to the outlawed Tudeh Party, or in other words a traitor. Such an individual belongs to an Iranian prison, or if he desires he can leave the country tomorrow, without even paying exit fees; he can go anywhere he likes, because he is not Iranian, he has no nation, and his activities are illegal and punishable according to the law."[206] In addition, the Shah had decreed that all Iranian citizens and the few remaining political parties become part of Rastakhiz.[207]

Image and self-image in the 1970s

The Shah greeting the people – advertising his White Revolution as a step towards modernisation, photograph from 1963

From 1973 onward, Mohammad Reza had proclaimed his aim as that of the tamaddon-e-bozorg, the "Great Civilisation," a turning point not only in Iran's history, but also the history of the entire world, a claim that was taken seriously for a time in the West.[208] On 2 December 1974, The New Yorker published an article by Paul Erdman that was a conjectural future history entitled "The Oil War of 1976: How The Shah Won the World: The World as We Knew It Came to an End When the Shah Of Iran Decided to Restore The Glory of Ancient Persia with Western Arms".[209] In 1975, U.S. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller declared in a speech: "We must take His Imperial Majesty to the United States for a couple of years so that he can teach us how to run a country."[210] In 1976, a pulp novel by Alan Williams was published in the United States under the title A Bullet for the Shah: All They Had To Do Was Kill the World's Most Powerful Man, whose sub-title reveals much about how the American people viewed the Shah at the time (the original British title was the more prosaic Shah-Mak).[209]

The great wealth generated by Iran's oil encouraged a sense of nationalism at the Imperial Court. The Empress Farah recalled of her days as a university student in 1950s France about being asked where she was from:

When I told them Iran ... the Europeans would recoil in horror as if Iranians were barbarians and loathsome. But after Iran became wealthy under the Shah in the 1970s, Iranians were courted everywhere. Yes, Your Majesty. Of course, Your Majesty. If you please, Your Majesty. Fawning all over us. Greedy sycophants. Then they loved Iranians.[211]

Mohammad Reza shared the Empress's sentiments as Westerners came begging to his court looking for his largesse, leading him to remark in 1976:

Now we are the masters and our former masters are our slaves. Everyday they beat a track to our door begging for favors. How can they be of assistance? Do we want arms? Do we want nuclear power stations? We have only to answer, and they will fulfill our wishes.[211]

Because the House of Pahlavi were a parvenu house as Reza Khan had begun his career as a private in the Persian Army, rising up to the rank of general, taking power in a coup d'état in 1921, and making himself Shah in 1925, Mohammad Reza was keen to gain the approval of the older royal families of the world, and was prepared to spend large sums of money to gain that social acceptance.[212]

Amongst the royalty that came to Tehran looking for the Shah's generosity were King Hussein of Jordan, the former King Constantine II of Greece, King Hassan II of Morocco, the princes and princesses of the Dutch House of Orange, and the Italian Princess Maria Gabriella of Savoy, whom the Shah had once courted in the 1950s.[212] He coveted the British Order of the Garter, and had, prior to courting Maria Gabriella, inquired about marrying Princess Alexandra of Kent, granddaughter of King George V, but in both cases he was rebuffed in no uncertain terms.[213] As an Iranian, Mohammad Reza greatly enjoyed supporting the Greek branch of the House of Glücksburg, knowing the Greeks still celebrated their victories over the Persians in the 5th and 4th centuries BC.[212] He enjoyed close relations with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, as demonstrated by the fact that he was the guest of honour at the Persepolis celebrations in 1971. Ethiopia and Iran, along with Turkey and Israel, were envisioned as an "alliance of the periphery" that would constrain Arab power in the greater Middle East.[214]

In an era of high oil prices, Iran's economy boomed while the economies of the Western nations were trapped in stagflation (economic stagnation and inflation) after the 1973–74 oil shocks, which seemed to prove the greatness of Mohammad Reza both to himself and to the rest of the world.[215] In 1975, both the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing made pleading phone calls to Mohammad Reza asking him for loans, which ultimately led the Shah to give a US$1 billion loan to the United Kingdom and another US$1 billion to France.[215] In a televised speech in January 1975 explaining why he was lending Britain a sum equal to US$1 billion, Mohammad Reza declared in his usual grandiose style: "I have known the most dark hours when our country was obliged to pass under the tutelage of foreign powers, amongst them England. Now I find that England has not only become our friend, our equal, but also the nation to which, should we be able, we will render assistance with pleasure," going on to say that since he "belonged to this [European] world," he did not want Europe to collapse economically.[215] As Britain had often dominated Iran in the past, the change in roles was greatly gratifying to Mohammad Reza.[215]

Courtiers at the Imperial court were devoted to stroking the Shah's ego, competing to be the most sycophantic, with Mohammad Reza being regularly assured he was a greater leader than his much admired General de Gaulle, that democracy was doomed, and that based on Rockefeller's speech, that the American people wanted Mohammad Reza to be their leader, as well as doing such a great job as Shah of Iran.[210] According to historian Abbas Milani, all of this praise boosted Mohammad Reza's ego, and he went from being a merely narcissistic man to a megalomaniac, believing himself a man chosen by Allah Himself to transform Iran and create the "Great Civilisation."[209][210] When one of the Shah's courtiers suggested launching a campaign to award him the Nobel Peace Prize, he wrote on the margin: "If they beg us, we might accept. They give the Nobel to kaka siah ["any black face"] these days. Why should we belittle ourselves with this?"[216] Befitting all this attention and praise, Mohammad Reza started to make increasingly outlandish claims for the "Great Civilisation", telling the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in a 1973 interview with L'Europeo:

Halfway measures, compromises, are unfeasible. In other words, either one is a revolutionary or one demands law and order. One can't be a revolutionary with law and order. And even less with tolerance ... when Castro came to power, he killed at least 10,000 people ... in a sense, he was really capable, because he's still in power. So am I, however! And I intend to stay there, and to demonstrate that one can achieve a great many things by the use of force, show even that your old socialism is finished. Old, obsolete, finished ... I achieve more than the Swedes ... Huh! Swedish socialism! It didn't even nationalize forests and water. But I have ... my White Revolution ... is a new original kind of socialism and ... believe me, in Iran we're far more advanced than you and we really have nothing to learn from you.[217]

In an interview with Der Spiegel published on 3 February 1974, Mohammad Reza declared: "I would like you to know that in our case, our actions are not just to take vengeance on the West. As I said, we are going to be a member of your club".[218] In a press conference on 31 March 1974, Mohammad Reza predicted what Iran would be like in 1984, saying:

In the cities, electric cars would replace the gas engines and mass transportation systems would be switched to electricity, monorail over the ground or electric buses. And, furthermore, in the great era of civilization that lies ahead of our people, there will be least two or three holidays a week.[219]

In 1976, Mohammad Reza told the Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in an interview: "I want the standard of living in Iran in ten years' time to be exactly on a level with that in Europe today. In twenty years' time we shall be ahead of the United States".[219]

Lunar astronaut Neil Armstrong meeting the Shah of Iran during visit of Apollo 11 astronauts to Tehran on 28–31 October 1969[220]

Reflecting his need to have Iran seen as "part of the world" (by which Mohammad Reza meant the western world), all through the 1970s he sponsored conferences in Iran at his expense, with for example in one week in September 1975 the International Literacy Symposium meeting in Persepolis, the International Congress of Philosophy meeting in Mashhad and the International Congress of Mithraic Studies meeting in Tehran.[221] He also sought to hold the 1984 Summer Olympics in Tehran. For most ordinary Iranians, struggling with inflation, poverty, air pollution, having to pay extortion payments to the police who demanded money from even those performing legal jobs such as selling fruits on the street, and daily traffic jams, the Shah's sponsorship of international conferences were just a waste of money and time.[222] Furthermore, conferences on pre-Islamic practices such as the cult of Mithra fuelled religious anxieties.[223] Though Mohammad Reza envisioned the "Great Civilisation" of a modernised Iran whose standard of living would be higher than those of the United States and at the forefront of modern technology, he did not envision any political change, making it clear that Iran would remain an autocracy.[219]

Achievements

Mohammad Reza at a press conference in Niavaran Palace, 24 January 1971

Women, children, and peasant class

In his "White Revolution" starting in the 1960s, Mohammad Reza made major changes to modernise Iran. He curbed the power of certain ancient elite factions by expropriating large and medium-sized estates for the benefit of more than four million small farmers. He took a number of other major measures, including extending suffrage to women and the participation of workers in factories through shares and other measures. In the 1970s, the governmental programme of free-of-charge nourishment for children at school known as "Taghziye Rāyegan" (Persian: تغذیه رایگان lit. free nourishment) was implemented. Under the Shah's reign, the national Iranian income showed an unprecedented rise for an extended period.

Education and military

Iranian newspaper clip from 1968, reading: "A quarter of Iran's nuclear energy scientists are women", a marked change in women's rights

Improvement of the educational system was made through the creation of new elementary schools. In addition, literacy courses were set up in remote villages by the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, this initiative being called "Sepāh-e Dānesh" (Persian: سپاه دانش) meaning "Army of Knowledge". The Armed Forces were also engaged in infrastructural and other educational projects throughout the country "Sepāh-e Tarvij va Ābādāni" (Persian: سپاه ترویج و آبادانی lit. army for promotion and development) as well as in health education and promotion "Sepāh-e Behdāsht" (Persian: سپاه بهداشت lit. "army for hygiene"). The Shah instituted exams for Islamic theologians to become established clerics. Many Iranian university students were sent to and supported in foreign, especially Western, countries and the Indian subcontinent.

Between 1967 and 1977, the number of universities increased in number from 7 to 22, the number of institutions of advanced learning rose from 47 to 200, and the number of students in higher education soared from 36,742 to 100,000. Iran's literacy programs were among the most innovative and effective anywhere in the world, so that by 1977 the number of Iranians able to read and write had climbed from just 27 percent to more than 80 percent.[224]

In the field of diplomacy, Iran realised and maintained friendly relations with Western and East European countries as well as Israel and China and became, especially through its close friendship with the United States, more and more a hegemonial power in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East.

As to infrastructural and technological progress, the Shah continued and developed further the policies introduced by his father. His programmes included projects in technologies such as steel, telecommunications, petrochemical facilities, power plants, dams and the automobile industry. The Aryamehr University of Technology was established as a major new academic institution.[225][226][227]

International cultural cooperation was encouraged and organised, such as the 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire and Shiraz Arts Festival. As part of his various financial support programmes in the fields of culture and arts, the Shah, along with King Hussein of Jordan made a donation to the Chinese Muslim Association for the construction of the Taipei Grand Mosque.[228]

Nuclear facilities

The Shah also led a massive military build-up and began the construction of many nuclear facilities.[166] By 1977, Iran was considered the fifth strongest nation in the world according to a report by Georgetown University.[229] The Shah announced the days of foreign exploitation in Iran were over and exclaimed statements such as:

“Nobody can dictate to us,” and “Nobody can wave a finger at us because we will wave back."[166]

The Shah sought to protect Iran's interests through various means such as funding foreign rebellions in Iraq, military support in Oman, financial/military action, and diplomacy, promoting the CIA to conclude that:

“In summary, thanks to the Shah himself and oil resources, Iran is well on its way to playing a leading role in the Mid East with a modernized elite, large economic resources and strong forces. Succession is always a question in an authoritarian regime, even a benevolent one, but each year reinforces the social and political momentum in the direction the Shah has set. I believe the U.S. can keep close to and benefit from this process and even influence Iran toward a positive regional and world role rather than a bid for area hegemony or other adventurism.”[230]

Despite criticism from Western critics, the Shah was seen as a master statesman through his domestic reforms, popular base in Iran, successful opposition to radical Arab neighbors, and ambitions for regional stability and prosperity, particularly in the two superpowers and other European powers. The fall of the Pahlavi order in 1979 removed the Shah's stabilizing efforts, leading to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the destabilization of Pakistani politics, the emergence of Saudi Arabia as a major oil power, the rise of Saddam Hussein and Ba'athists in regional conflicts, and the subsequent Wahhabi-Salafi militancy.[231]

Economic reforms

Under the Shah's leadership, Iran experienced an impressive transformation of the economy. From 1925 to 1976 Iran's economy had grown 700 times, per capita 200 times, and domestic capital formation 3,400 times most of which occurred during the reign of the second Pahlavi Monarch, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Iran enjoyed an average annual industrial growth rate of over 20% from 1963 to 1976. From 1965 to 1976 Iranian per capita income rose 8 times from $195 to $1,600. By 1978 per capita income surpassed $2,400. Much of the growth was not due to oil income. Among the OPEC oil-producing nations experts agreed only Iran's growth was due to an intelligent development plan while the growth seen in nations such as Saudi Arabia and Libya was solely based upon oil revenues. Iran's growth was expected to continue, with half of the Iranian families expected to own cars by 1985, per capita income reaching $4,500 ($12,748 adjusted for inflation), Iran would produce twenty million tons of steel annually, one million tons of aluminum, one million cars, three million television sets, one million tons of paper, and a large number of engineers.[232]

During the Shah's rule, Iran's average income level was nearing that of Western European nations, and Iranians experienced an unprecedented amount of prosperity and opportunity with an emerging middle class. Iran's growing prosperity coupled with goals of independence allowed for increasing autonomy from Western nations like the US. From 1963 to 1977 Iran experienced an average annual growth rate of 10.5% making it one of the world's fastest-growing economies and Iran experienced its largest GDP growth ever. The economic growth was not simply based on oil, in fact, non-oil revenues grew at a faster rate of 11.5% annually.[233]

During the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's society and the economy experienced a great transformation as a result of rapid industrialization. The state invested in infrastructure to develop industry and provided financial capital resulting in profitable conditions for private Iranian companies. As a result, Iran's development across the industrialization scale, technological advancement, economic growth, urbanization, and per capita income increase was extraordinary compared to other developing nations. World Bank data during this period reveals Iran had an annual real growth rate of 9.6% for middle-income categories which was the highest of any other country in the developing world. Investment, savings, consumption, employment, and per capita income also demonstrated exceptional growth. Gross domestic investment grew at an average yearly rate of 16% and reached 33% of the GDP by 1977-1978. Iranian consumption grew on average by 18% a year. Iran's middle class was far larger than any other developing country. Iran's economic growth was compared to that of rapidly industrializing Asian countries such as South Korea. Since the revolution, Iran's economic growth and rapid industrialization have plummeted.[152]

During the early 1970s, with the success of the Shah's White Revolution, Iran had become a country of economic opportunity, and its international status was rising. From 1959 and 1970 the Gross national product (GNP) approximately tripled rising from $3.8 to $10.6 billion and by the late 1960s Iran become one of the middle east's most flourishing spots for investment among foreign investors due to financial stability and rise in purchasing power. Many foreign powers struggled to compete for relations with Iran due to the rising potential of its growing marketplace. Iran Air also became one of the fastest growing airlines in the world and many Iranian construction companies some funded by the state had been involved in many construction projects such as Pre-Fab Inc. which created the precast concrete benches for the Āryāmehr Stadium.[234]

Islamic Revolution

Background

The overthrow of the Shah came as a surprise to almost all observers.[235][236] The first militant anti-Shah demonstrations of a few hundred started in October 1977, after the death of Khomeini's son Mostafa.[237] On 7 January 1978, an article Iran and Red and Black Colonization was published in the newspaper Ettela'at attacking Ruhollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Iraq at the time; it referred to him as a homosexual, a drug addict, a British spy and claimed he was an Indian, not an Iranian.[238] Khomeini's supporters had brought in audio tapes of his sermons, and Mohammad Reza was angry with one sermon, alleging corruption on his part, and decided to hit back with the article, despite the feeling at the court, SAVAK and Ettela'at editors that the article was an unnecessary provocation that was going to cause trouble.[238] The next day, protests against the article began in the holy city of Qom, a traditional centre of opposition to the House of Pahlavi.[239]

Pahlavi's cancer diagnosis

Tehran on 31 December 1977: Mohammad Reza and Farah with New Year's guests King Hussein and President Carter

Mohammad Reza was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia in 1974.[240] As it worsened, from the spring of 1978, he stopped appearing in public, with the official explanation being that he was suffering from a "persistent cold."[241] In May 1978, the Shah suddenly cancelled a long-planned trip to Hungary and Bulgaria.[241] He spent the entire summer of 1978 in Ramsar Palace in the Caspian Sea resort, where two of France's most prominent doctors, Jean Bernard and Georges Flandrin, treated his cancer.[241] To try to stop his cancer, Bernard and Flandrin had Mohammad Reza take prednisone, a drug with numerous potential side effects including depression and impaired thinking.[241][242]

As nationwide protests and strikes swept Iran, the court found it impossible to get decisions from Mohammad Reza, as he became utterly passive and indecisive, content to spend hours listlessly staring into space as he rested by the Caspian Sea while the revolution raged.[241] The seclusion of the Shah, who normally loved the limelight, sparked all sorts of rumors about the state of his health and damaged the imperial mystique, as the man who had been presented as a god-like ruler was revealed to be fallible.[243] A July 1978 attempt to deny the rumors of Mohammad Reza's declining health (by publishing a crudely doctored photograph in the newspapers of the Emperor and Empress walking on the beach) instead further damaged the imperial mystique, as most people realised that what appeared to be two beach clogs on either side of the Shah were merely substitutes inserted for his airbrushed aides, who were holding him up as he now had difficulty walking by himself.[244]

In June 1978, Mohammad Reza's French doctors first revealed to the French government how serious his cancer was, and in September the French government informed the American government that the Shah was dying of cancer; until then, U.S. officials had no idea that Mohammad Reza had even been diagnosed with cancer four years earlier.[240] The Shah had created a very centralised system in which he was the key decision-maker on all issues, and as historian Abbas Milani noted, he was mentally crippled in the summer of 1978 owing to his tendency to be indecisive when faced with a crisis which, combined with his cancer and the effects of the anti-cancer drugs, made his mood "increasingly volatile and unpredictable. One day, he was full of verve and optimism and the next day or hour he fell into a catatonic stupor," bringing the entire government to a halt.[245] Milani wrote that the Shah was in 1978 "beset with depression, indecision and paralysis, and his indecision led to the immobilisation of the entire system."[246] Empress Farah grew so frustrated with her husband that she suggested numerous times that he leave Iran for medical treatment and appoint her regent, saying she would handle the crisis and save the House of Pahlavi. Mohammad Reza vetoed this idea, saying he did not want Farah to be "Joan of Arc," and it would be too humiliating for him as a man to flee Iran and leave a woman in charge.[246]

Black Friday massacre

The Shah-centred command structure of the Iranian military, and the lack of training to confront civil unrest, was marked by disaster and bloodshed. There were several instances where army units had opened fire, the most significant being the events on 8 September 1978.[247][248][249][250][251][252][253]

Collapse of the regime

Supporters of the revolution remove a statue of the Shah in Tehran University, 1978

Hoping to calm the situation, on 2 October 1978, the Shah granted a general amnesty to dissidents living abroad, including Ayatollah Khomeini.[254] But by then it was too late. October 1978 was characterized by extreme unrest and open opposition to the monarchy; strikes paralyzed the country, and in early December a "total of 6 to 9 million"—more than 10% of the country—marched against the Shah throughout Iran.[255] In October 1978, after flying over a huge demonstration in Tehran in his helicopter, Mohammad Reza accused the British ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons and the American ambassador William H. Sullivan of organising the demonstrations, screaming that he was being "betrayed" by the United Kingdom and the United States.[256] The fact that the BBC's journalists tended to be very sympathetic towards the revolution was viewed by most Iranians, including Mohammad Reza, as a sign that Britain was supporting the revolution. This impression turned out to be crucial, as the Iranian people had a very exaggerated idea about Britain's capacity to "direct events" in Iran.[257] In a subsequent internal inquiry, the BBC found many of its more left-wing journalists disliked Mohammad Reza as a "reactionary" force and sympathised with a revolution seen as "progressive".[258] Mohammad Reza spent much of his time working out various conspiracy theories about who was behind the revolution, with his favourite candidates being some combination of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.[259] Milani wrote that Mohammad Reza's view of the revolution as a gigantic conspiracy organised by foreign powers suggested that there was nothing wrong with Iran, and the millions of people demonstrating against him were just dupes being used by foreigners, a viewpoint that did not encourage concessions and reforms until it was too late.[260] For much of 1978, Mohammad Reza saw his enemies as "Marxist" revolutionaries rather than Islamists.[256] The Shah had exaggerated ideas about the power of the KGB, which he thought of as omnipotent, and often expressed the view that all of the demonstrations against him had been organised in Moscow, saying only the KGB had the power to bring out thousands of ordinary people to demonstrate.[261] In October 1978, the oil workers went on strike, shutting down the oil industry and with it, Mohammad Reza's principal source of revenue.[262] The Iranian military had no plans in place to deal with such an event, and the strike pushed the regime to the economic brink.[262]

The revolution had attracted support from a broad coalition ranging from secular, far-left nationalists to Islamists on the right, and Khomeini, who was temporarily based in Paris after being expelled from Iraq, chose to present himself as a moderate able to bring together all the different factions leading the revolution.[263] On 3 November, a SAVAK plan to arrest about 1,500 people considered to be leaders of the revolution was submitted to Mohammad Reza, who at first tentatively agreed, but then changed his mind, disregarding not only the plan, but also dismissing its author, Parviz Sabeti.[264] On 5 November 1978, Mohammad Reza went on Iranian television to say, "I have heard the voice of your revolution" and promise major reforms.[265] In a major concession to the opposition, on 7 November 1978, Mohammad Reza freed all political prisoners while ordering the arrest of the former prime minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda and several senior officials of his regime, a move that both emboldened his opponents and demoralised his supporters.[266] On 21 November 1978, the Treasury Secretary of the United States Michael Blumenthal visited Tehran to meet Mohammad Reza and reported back to President Jimmy Carter, "This man is a ghost", as by now the ravages of his cancer could no longer be concealed.[267] In late December 1978, the Shah learned that many of his generals were making overtures to the revolutionary leaders and the loyalty of the military could no longer be assured.[268] In a sign of desperation, the following month Mohammad Reza reached out to the National Front, asking if one of their leaders would be willing to become prime minister.[269]

The Shah was especially interested in having the National Front's Gholam Hossein Sadighi as prime minister.[269] Sadighi had served as interior minister under Mosaddegh, had been imprisoned after the 1953 coup, and pardoned by Mohammad Reza on the grounds that he was a "patriot".[270] Sadighi remained active in the National Front and had often been harassed by SAVAK but was willing to serve as prime minister under Mohammad Reza in order to "save" Iran, saying he feared what might come after if the Shah was overthrown.[270] Despite the opposition of the other National Front leaders, Sadighi visited the Niavaran palace several times in December 1978 to discuss the terms under which he might become prime minister, with the main sticking point being that he wanted the Shah not to leave Iran, saying he needed to remain in order to ensure the loyalty of the military.[269] On 7 December 1978, it was announced that President Carter of the U.S., President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany and Prime Minister James Callaghan of the United Kingdom would meet in Guadeloupe on 5 January 1979 to discuss the crisis in Iran.[271] For Mohammad Reza this announcement was the final blow, and he was convinced that the Western leaders were holding the meeting to discuss how best to abandon him.[272]

Islamic Republic

Shah Mohammad Reza and Shahbanun Farah shortly before leaving Iran in 1979 during the Iranian revolution
Shah Mohammad Reza and Shahbanu Farah shortly before leaving Iran in Mehrabad Airport, 1979
Ettela'at newspaper in the hand of a revolutionary when Mohammad Reza and his family left Iran on 16 January 1979: "The Shah is Gone".

On 16 January 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah made a contract with Farboud and left Iran at the behest of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar (a longtime opposition leader himself), who sought to calm the situation.[273] As Mohammad Reza boarded the plane to take him out of Iran, many of the Imperial Guardsmen wept while Bakhtiar did little to hide his disdain and dislike for the Shah.[274] Spontaneous attacks by members of the public on statues of the Pahlavis followed, and "within hours, almost every sign of the Pahlavi dynasty" was destroyed.[275] Bakhtiar dissolved SAVAK, freed all political prisoners, and allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to return to Iran after years in exile. He asked Khomeini to create a Vatican-like state in Qom, promised free elections, and called upon the opposition to help preserve the constitution, proposing a "national unity" government including Khomeini's followers. Khomeini rejected Bakhtiar's demands and appointed his own interim government, with Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister, stating that "I will appoint a state. I will act against this government. With the nation's support, I will appoint a state."[276] In February, pro-Khomeini revolutionary guerrilla and rebel soldiers gained the upper hand in street fighting, and the military announced its neutrality. On the evening of 11 February, the dissolution of the monarchy was complete.[277]

Criticism of reign and causes of his overthrow

The Shah of Iran meets the clergy in the 1970s.

American inaction

The U.S. State Department drew criticism for doing little to communicate with Tehran or discourage protest and opposition to the Shah. The intelligence community within the US has also been subject to criticism particularly for reporting to President Jimmy Carter, "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'pre-revolutionary' situation." President Jimmy Carter was also blamed for his lack of support for the Shah while failing to deter opposition. Within Iran, the revolution is widely believed to have been a British plot to overthrow the Shah. This theory would come to be known as the 1979 Iranian Revolution Conspiracy Theory. The theory was supported by the Shah of Iran who believed his increasing control over oil markets and his 1973 nationalization of Iranian oil prompted international oil companies to unseat him.[278]

An Amnesty International assessment on Iran for 1974–1975 stated:

“The total number of political prisoners has been reported at times throughout the year [1975] to be anything from 25,000 to 100,000".[279][280]

At the Federation of American Scientists, John Pike wrote:

In 1978 the deepening opposition to the Shah erupted in widespread demonstrations and rioting. Recognising that even this level of violence had failed to crush the rebellion, the Shah abdicated the Peacock Throne and fled Iran on 16 January 1979. Despite decades of pervasive surveillance by SAVAK, working closely with CIA, the extent of public opposition to the Shah, and his sudden departure, came as a considerable surprise to the US intelligence community and national leadership. As late as 28 September 1978 the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the Shah "is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years."[281]

Explanations for the overthrow of Mohammad Reza include his status as a dictator put in place by a non-Muslim Western power, the United States,[282][283] whose foreign culture was seen as influencing that of Iran. Additional contributing factors included reports of oppression, brutality,[284][285] corruption, and extravagance.[284][286] Basic functional failures of the regime have also been blamed—economic bottlenecks, shortages and inflation; the regime's over-ambitious economic programme;[287] the failure of its security forces to deal with protests and demonstrations;[288] and the overly centralised royal power structure.[289]International policies pursued by the Shah in order to increase national income by remarkable increases in the price of oil through his leading role in the Organization of the Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) have been stressed as a major cause for a shift of Western interests and priorities, and for a reduction of their support for him reflected in a critical position of Western politicians and media, especially of the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter regarding the question of human rights in Iran, and in strengthened economic ties between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s.[290]

The Shah addressing the Iranian Senate, 1975

Sidelining Islam

In October 1971, Mohammad Reza celebrated the twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of the Iranian monarchy; The New York Times reported that $100 million was spent on the celebration.[291] Next to the ancient ruins of Persepolis, the Shah gave orders to build a tent city covering 160 acres (0.65 km2), studded with three huge royal tents and fifty-nine lesser ones arranged in a star-shaped design. French chefs from Maxim's of Paris prepared breast of peacock for royalty and dignitaries from around the world, the buildings were decorated by Maison Jansen (the same firm that helped Jacqueline Kennedy redecorate the White House), the guests ate off Limoges porcelain and drank from Baccarat crystal glasses. This became a major scandal, as the contrast between the dazzling elegance of the celebration and the misery of the nearby villages was so dramatic that no one could ignore it. Months before the festivities, university students went on strike in protest. Indeed, the cost was so sufficiently impressive that the Shah forbade his associates to discuss the actual figures. However, he and his supporters argued that the celebrations opened new investments in Iran, improved relationships with the other leaders and nations of the world and provided greater recognition of Iran.[292][293]

The Shah and the cabinet of Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansur, Niavaran Palace, 1964

Other actions thought to have contributed to his downfall include antagonising formerly apolitical Iranians—especially merchants of the bazaars—with the creation in 1975 of a single-party political monopoly (the Rastakhiz Party), with compulsory membership and dues, and general aggressive interference in the political, economic, and religious concerns of people's lives;[294] and the 1976 change from an Islamic calendar to an Imperial calendar, marking the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus as the first day, instead of the migration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina. This supposed date was designed so that the year 2500 would fall on 1941, the year when his own reign started. Overnight, the year changed from 1355 to 2535.[295] During the extravagant festivities to celebrate the 2500th anniversary, the Shah was quoted as saying at Cyrus's tomb: "Rest in peace, Cyrus, for we are awake".[296]

It has been argued that the White Revolution was "shoddily planned and haphazardly carried out", upsetting the wealthy while not going far enough to provide for the poor or offer greater political freedom.[297] In 1974, Mohammad Reza learned from his French doctors that he was suffering from the cancer that was to kill him six years later.[298] Though this was such a carefully guarded secret that not even the Americans were aware of it (as late as 1977 the CIA submitted a report to President Carter describing the Shah as being in "robust health"), the knowledge of his impending death left Mohammad Reza depressed and passive in his last years, a man no longer capable of acting.[298]

Unemployment

Some achievements of the Shah—such as broadened education—had unintended consequences. While school attendance rose (by 1966 the school attendance of urban seven- to fourteen-year-olds was estimated at 75.8%), Iran's labour market was slow to absorb the high number of educated youth. In 1966, high school graduates had "a higher rate of unemployment than did the illiterate", and the educated unemployed often supported the revolution.[299]

Exile

The Shah and Henry Boniet in Cuernavaca, Mexico, in 1979

During his second exile, Mohammad Reza traveled from country to country seeking what he hoped would be temporary residence. First, he flew to Aswan, Egypt, where he received a warm and gracious welcome from President Anwar El-Sadat. He later lived in Marrakesh, Morocco, as a guest of King Hassan II. Mohammad Reza loved to support royalty during his time as Shah and one of those who benefitted had been Hassan, who received an interest-free loan of US$110 million from his friend.[300] Mohammad Reza expected Hassan to return the favour, but he soon learned Hassan had other motives. Richard Parker, the U.S. ambassador to Morocco, reported, "The Moroccans believed the Shah was worth about $2 billion, and they wanted to take their share of the loot".[301] After leaving Morocco, Mohammad Reza lived in Paradise Island, in the Bahamas, and in Cuernavaca, Mexico, near Mexico City, as a guest of José López Portillo. Richard Nixon, the former president, visited the Shah in summer 1979 in Mexico.[302] A U.S. doctor, Benjamin Kean, who examined Mohammad Reza in Cuernavaca later wrote:

There was no longer any doubt. The atmosphere had changed completely. The Shah's appearance was stunningly worse ... Clearly he had obstructive jaundice. The odds favored gallstones, since his fever, chills and abdominal distress suggested an infection of the biliary tract. Also he had a history of indigestion. Besides the probable obstruction – he now had been deeply jaundiced for six to eight weeks – he was emaciated and suffering from hard tumor nodes in the neck and a swollen spleen, signs that his cancer was worsening, and he had severe anemia and very low white blood counts.[303]

Decline of health

The Shah suffered from gallstones that required prompt surgery. He was offered treatment in Switzerland but insisted on treatment in the United States. President Carter did not wish to admit Mohammad Reza to the U.S. but came under pressure from Henry Kissinger, who phoned Carter to say he would not endorse the SALT II treaty that Carter had just signed with the Soviet Union unless the former Shah was allowed into the United States, reportedly prompting Carter more than once to hang up his phone in rage in the Oval Office and shout "Fuck the Shah!".[304] Because many Republicans were attacking the SALT II treaty as a U.S. give-away to the Soviet Union, Carter desired the endorsement of a Republican elder statesman like Kissinger to fend off this criticism. Mohammad Reza had decided not to tell his Mexican doctors he had cancer, and the Mexican doctors had misdiagnosed his illness as malaria, giving him a regime of anti-malarial drugs that did nothing to treat his cancer, which caused his health to go into rapid decline as he lost 30 pounds (14 kg).[304] In September 1979, a doctor sent by David Rockefeller reported to the State Department that Mohammad Reza needed to come to the United States for medical treatment, an assessment not shared by Kean, who stated that the proper medical equipment for treating Mohammad Reza's cancer could be found in Mexico and the only problem was the former Shah's unwillingness to tell the Mexicans he had cancer.[305] The State Department warned Carter not to admit the former Shah into the U.S., saying it was likely that the Iranian regime would seize the U.S. embassy in Tehran if that occurred.[306] Milani suggested there was a possible conflict of interest on the part of Rockefeller, noting that his Chase Manhattan Bank had given Iran a $500 million loan under questionable conditions in 1978 (several lawyers had refused to endorse the loan) which placed the money in an account with Chase Manhattan, that the new Islamic Republic had been making "substantial withdrawals" from its account with Chase Manhattan, and that Rockefeller wanted Mohammad Reza in the US, knowing full well it was likely to cause the Iranians to storm the U.S. embassy, which in turn would cause the U.S. government to freeze Iranian financial assets in America—such as the Iranian account at Chase Manhattan.[306]

Treatment in the United States

On 22 October 1979, President Jimmy Carter reluctantly allowed the Shah into the United States to undergo surgical treatment at the Weill Cornell Medical Center. While there, Mohammad Reza used the name of "David D. Newsom", Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at that time, as his temporary code name, without Newsom's knowledge. The Shah was taken later by U.S. Air Force jet to Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and from there to Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland Air Force Base.[307] It was anticipated that his stay in the United States would be short; however, surgical complications ensued, which required six weeks of confinement in the hospital before he recovered. His prolonged stay in the United States was extremely unpopular with the revolutionary movement in Iran, which still resented the United States' overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh and the years of support for the Shah's rule. The Iranian government demanded his return to Iran, but he stayed in the hospital.[308] Mohammad Reza's time in New York was highly uncomfortable; he was under a heavy security detail as every day, Iranian students studying in the United States gathered outside his hospital to shout "Death to the Shah!", a chorus that Mohammad Reza heard.[309] The former Shah was obsessed with watching news from Iran, and was greatly upset at the new order being imposed by the Islamic Republic.[309] Mohammad Reza could no longer walk by this time, and for security reasons had to be moved in his wheelchair under the cover of darkness when he went to the hospital while covered in a blanket, as the chances of his assassination were too great.[309]

There are claims that Reza's admission to the United States resulted in the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the kidnapping of U.S. diplomats, military personnel, and intelligence officers, which soon became known as the Iran hostage crisis.[310] In the Shah's memoir, Answer to History, he claimed that the United States never provided him any kind of health care and asked him to leave the country.[311] From the time of the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the taking of the embassy staff as hostages, Mohammad Reza's presence in the United States was viewed by the Carter administration as a stumbling block to the release of the hostages, and as Zonis noted "... he was, in effect, expelled from the country".[312] Mohammad Reza wanted to go back to Mexico, saying he had pleasant memories of Cuernavaca, but was refused.[313] Mexico was a candidate to be a rotating member of the UN Security Council, but needed the vote of Cuba to be admitted, and the Cuban leader Fidel Castro told President José López Portillo that Cuba's vote was conditional on Mexico not accepting the Shah again.[313]

He left the United States on 15 December 1979 and lived for a short time in the Isla Contadora in Panama. This caused riots by Panamanians who objected to the Shah being in their country. General Omar Torrijos, the dictator of Panama, kept Mohammad Reza Shah as a virtual prisoner at the Paitilla Medical Center, a hospital condemned by the former Shah's U.S. doctors as "an inadequate and poorly staffed hospital", and in order to hasten his death allowed only Panamanian doctors to treat his cancer.[314] General Torrijos, a populist left-winger, had only taken in Mohammad Reza under heavy U.S. pressure, and he made no secret of his dislike of Mohammad Reza, whom he called after meeting him "the saddest man he had ever met".[315] When he first met Mohammad Reza, Torrijos taunted him by telling him "it must be hard to fall off the Peacock Throne into Contadora" and called him a "chupon", a Spanish term meaning an sucker or pacifier that has all the juice squeezed out of it, which is slang for someone who is finished.[315]

Torrijos added to Mohammad Reza's misery by making his chief bodyguard a militantly Marxist sociology professor who spent much time lecturing Mohammad Reza on how he deserved his fate because he had been a tool of the "American imperialism" that was ostensibly oppressing the Third World, and charged Mohammad Reza a monthly rent of US$21,000, making him pay for all his food and the wages of the 200 National Guardsmen assigned as his bodyguards.[315] The interim government in Iran still demanded his and his wife's immediate extradition to Tehran. A short time after Mohammad Reza's arrival in Panama, an Iranian ambassador was dispatched to the Central American nation carrying a 450-page long extradition request. That official appeal alarmed both the Shah and his advisors. Whether the Panamanian government would have complied is a matter of speculation amongst historians.[316]

In January 1980, the Shah gave his last television interview to British journalist David Frost on Contadora Island,[317] re-broadcast by ABC in the U.S. on 17 January.[318] The Shah talks about his wealth, his illness, the SAVAK, the torture during his reign, own political mistakes, Khomeini and his threat of extradition to Iran.[319]

The only consolation for Mohammad Reza during his time in Panama were letters from Princess Soraya saying that she still loved him and wanted to see him one last time before he died.[320] Mohammad Reza, in the letters he sent to Paris, declared he wanted to see Soraya one last time as well but said that the Empress Farah could not be present, which presented some complications as Farah was continually by his deathbed.[321]

Asylum in Egypt

After that event, the Shah again sought the support of Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat, who renewed his offer of permanent asylum in Egypt to the ailing monarch. He returned to Egypt in March 1980, where he received urgent medical treatment, including a splenectomy performed by Michael DeBakey.[322] On 28 March 1980, Mohammad Reza's French and U.S. doctors finally performed an operation meant to have been performed in the fall of 1979.[323] Kean recalled:

The operation went beautifully. That night, however, was terrible. The medical team-U.S., Egyptian, French-was in the pathology lab. The focus was on the Shah's cancerous spleen, grotesquely swollen to 20 times normal. It was one-foot long, literally the size of a football. But I was drawn to the liver tissues that had also been removed. The liver was speckled with white. Malignancy. The cancer had hit the liver. The Shah would soon die ... The tragedy is that a man who should have had the best and easiest medical care had, in many respects, the worst.[324]

By that point, it was arranged by President Sadat that Soraya would quietly visit Mohammad Reza on his deathbed in Egypt without Farah present, but Milani noted the two were "star-crossed lovers" and Mohammad Reza died before Soraya could come to Egypt from her home in Paris.[321]

Illness and death

In 1974 the Shah's doctor, Abdol Karim Ayadi, diagnosed the Shah with splenomegaly after he complained of a swollen abdomen. On 1 May 1974, French Professor Georges Flandrin flew to Tehran to treat the Shah. On the first visit, Flandrin was able to diagnose the Shah with chronic lymphocytic leukemia. The Shah's diagnosis of cancer would not be revealed to him until 1978. Medical reports given to the Shah were falsified and altered in order to state that the Shah was in good health to conceal his cancer from him. In 1976, the Shah met with French physicians in Zurich who were disturbed by his abnormal blood count. They discovered he was being treated with a wrong medication, worsening his condition.[325]

CIA assassination conspiracy

In 1979, the Shah left Iran. First, the Shah found refuge in the Bahamas but was later forced to leave. He then sought treatment in Mexico. Multiple recommendations urged the Shah to seek treatment in the United States. In response, the Shah stated:

"How could I go to a place [the US] that had undone me?"

After some initial denials, the Shah agreed to travel to the U.S. for treatment. He later left the U.S. for Panama. While the Shah was in Panama, one of Ruhollah Khomeini's close advisors, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh had a meeting with Hamilton Jordan, Jimmy Carter's Chief of Staff. Ghotbzadeh requested that the CIA kill the Shah while he was in Panama. Fearing for his life, the Shah left Panama delaying further surgery. He fled to Rabat, Morocco, where he stayed with King Hassan II and then to Cairo, Egypt, with his condition worsening.[326][327]

Failed operation and death

Michael DeBakey, an American heart surgeon, was called to perform a splenectomy. Although DeBakey was world-renowned in his field, his experience performing this surgery was limited. When the splenectomy was being performed, the tail of the pancreas was injured. This led to infection and the subsequent death of the Shah in the following days.[328][329]

In his hospital bed, the Shah was asked to describe his feelings for Iran and its people and to define the country. The Shah, a fervent nationalist, responded "Iran is Iran." After pausing for minutes, he said "Its land, people, and history," and "Every Iranian has to love it." He continued on to repeat "Iran is Iran" over and over.[330] Shortly after, the Shah slipped into a coma and died at 09:15 AM on 27 July 1980 at age 60. He kept a bag of Iranian soil under his death bed.[327]

Egyptian state funeral

Egyptian President Sadat gave the Shah a state funeral.[331] In addition to members of the Pahlavi family, Anwar Sadat, Richard Nixon and Constantine II of Greece attended the funeral ceremony in Cairo.[332]

Mohammad Reza Shah is buried in the Al Rifa'i Mosque in Cairo, a mosque of great symbolic importance. Also buried there is Farouk of Egypt, Mohammad Reza Shah's former brother-in-law. The tombs lie to the left of the entrance. Years earlier, his father and predecessor, Reza Shah, had also initially been buried at the Al Rifa'i Mosque.

Legacy

The interior of Mohammad Reza's tomb in Cairo's Al Rifa'i Mosque

In 1969, Mohammad Reza sent one of 73 Apollo 11 Goodwill Messages to NASA for the historic first lunar landing.[333] The message still rests on the lunar surface today. He stated in part, "we pray the Almighty God to guide mankind towards ever increasing success in the establishment of culture, knowledge and human civilisation". The Apollo 11 crew visited Mohammad Reza during a world tour.[333]

Shortly after his overthrow, Mohammad Reza wrote an autobiographical memoir Réponse à l'histoire (Answer to History). It was translated from the original French into English, Persian (Pasokh be Tarikh), and other languages. However, by the time of its publication, the Shah had already died. The book is his personal account of his reign and accomplishments, as well as his perspective on issues related to the Iranian Revolution and Western foreign policy toward Iran. He places some of the blame for the wrongdoings of SAVAK, and the failures of various democratic and social reforms (particularly through the White Revolution), upon Amir Abbas Hoveyda and his administration.[334][335]

Recently, the Shah's reputation has experienced something of a revival in Iran, with some people looking back on his era as a time when Iran was more prosperous[336][334] and the government less oppressive.[337] Journalist Afshin Molavi reported that some members of the uneducated poor—traditionally core supporters of the revolution that overthrew the Shah—were making remarks such as, "God bless the Shah's soul, the economy was better then", and found that "books about the former Shah (even censored ones) sell briskly", while "books of the Rightly Guided Path sit idle".[338] On 28 October 2016, thousands of people in Iran celebrating Cyrus Day at the Tomb of Cyrus, chanted slogans in support of him, and against the current Islamic regime of Iran and Arabs, and many were subsequently arrested.[335]

Religious beliefs

Mohammad Reza during his Hajj pilgrimage in the 1970s

From his mother, Mohammad Reza inherited an almost messianic belief in his own greatness and that God was working in his favour, which explained the often passive and fatalistic attitudes that he displayed as an adult.[339] In 1973, Mohammad Reza told the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci:

A king who does not need to account to anyone for what he says and does is unavoidably doomed to loneliness. However, I am not entirely alone, because a force others can't perceive accompanies me. My mystical force. Moreover, I receive messages. I have lived with God besides me since I was 5 years old. Since, that is, God sent me those visions.[340]

Mohammad Reza often spoke in public and in private from childhood onward of his belief that God had chosen him for a "divine mission" to transform Iran, as he believed that dreams he had as a child of the Twelve Imams of Shia Islam were all messages from God.[341] In his 1961 book Mission for My Country, Mohammad Reza wrote:

From the time I was six or seven, I have felt that perhaps there is a supreme being, who is guiding me. I don't know. Sometimes the thought disturbs me because then, I ask myself, what is my own personality, and am I possessed of free will? Still, I often reflect, if I am driven-or perhaps I should say supported-by another force, there must be a reason.[342]

In his biography of the Shah, Marvin Zonis has argued that Mohammad Reza really believed in these claims of divine support. Shia Islam has no tradition of describing Shahs being favoured with messages from all, very few Shahs had ever claimed that their dreams were divine messages, and most people in the West laughed at Mohammad Reza's claim that his dreams were messages from God.[343] Reza Shah, Mohammad Reza's father, who was less religious, dismissed these visions as nonsense, and told his son to have more common sense.[344]

Fereydoon Hoveyda, a veteran diplomat who served as the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations (1971–1979), and the brother of Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, the Prime Minister under the Shah (1965–1977) executed after the Islamic revolution, and himself a critic of the régime who died in exile, says that "when it comes to religion and spirituality, many passages of the monarch's and Khomeini's publications are interchangeable", which he perceives as the continuity of the Iranian civilization, where the religion changes but the spirit remains.[345]

Wealth

The newly crowned Shah with his Pahlavi Crown

Mohammad Reza inherited the wealth built by his father Reza Shah who preceded him as king of Iran and became known as the richest person in Iran during his reign, with his wealth estimated to be higher than 600 million rials[346] and including vast amounts of land and numerous large estates especially in the province of Mazandaran[347] obtained usually at a fraction of their real price.[348] Reza Shah, facing criticism for his wealth, decided to pass on all of his land and wealth to his eldest son Mohammad Reza in exchange for a sugar cube, known in Iran as habbe kardan.[347] However, shortly after obtaining the wealth Mohammad Reza was ordered by his father and then king to transfer a million toman ($500,000) to each of his siblings.[349] By 1958, it was estimated that the companies possessed by Mohammad Reza had a value of $157 million (in 1958 USD) with an estimated additional $100 million saved outside Iran.[350] Rumours of his and his family's corruption began to surface which greatly damaged his reputation. This formed one of the reasons for the creation of the Pahlavi Foundation and the distribution of additional land to the people of some 2,000 villages inherited by his father, often at very low and discounted prices.[351] In 1958, using funds from inherited crown estates, Mohammad Reza established the Pahlavi Foundation which functioned as a tax-exempt charity and held all his assets, including 830 villages spanning a total area of 2.5 million hectares.[352] According to Business Insider, Mohammad Reza had set up the organisation "to pursue Iran's charitable interests in the U.S."[353] At its height, the organisation was estimated to be worth $3 billion; however, on numerous occasions, the Pahlavi Foundation was accused of corruption.[354][355] Despite these charges, in his book Answer to History, Pahlavi affirms that he "never made the slightest profit" out of the Foundation.[356]

In a 1974 interview which was shown in a documentary titled Crisis in Iran, Mohammad Reza told Mike Wallace that the rumours of corruption were "the most unjust thing that I have heard," calling them a "cheap accusation" whilst arguing the allegations were not as serious as those regarding other governments, including that of the United States.[357] In November 1978, after Pahlavi dismissed Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and appointed a military government, he pledged in a televised address "not to repeat the past mistakes and illegalities, the cruelty and corruption."[358] Despite this, the royal family's wealth can be seen as one of the factors behind the Iranian revolution. This was due to the oil crises of the 1970s which increased inflation resulting in economic austerity measures which made lower class workers more inclined to protest.[359]

Mohammad Reza's wealth remained considerable during his time in exile. While staying in the Bahamas he offered to purchase the island that he was staying on for $425 million (in 1979 USD); however, his offer was rejected by the Bahamas which claimed that the island was worth far more. On 17 October 1979, again in exile and perhaps knowing the gravity of his illness, he split up his wealth amongst his family members, giving 20% to Farah, 20% to his eldest son Reza, 15% to Farahnaz, 15% to Leila, 20% to his younger son, in addition to giving 8% to Shahnaz and 2% to his granddaughter Mahnaz Zahedi.[360]

The Shah of Persia, body by Carrozzeria Touring
Touring Superleggera Sciàdipersia

On 14 January 1979, an article titled "Little pain expected in exile for Shah" by The Spokesman Review newspaper found that the Pahlavi dynasty had amassed one of the largest private fortunes in the world; estimated then at well over $1 billion. It also stated that a document submitted to the ministry of justice, in protest of the royal family's activity in many sectors of the nation's economy, detailed the Pahlavis dominating role in the economy of Iran. The list showed that the Pahlavi dynasty had interests in, amongst other things, 17 banks and insurance companies, including a 90 per cent ownership in the nation's third-largest insurance company, 25 metal enterprises, 8 mining companies, 10 building materials companies, including 25 per cent of the largest cement company, 45 construction companies, 43 food companies, and 26 enterprises in trade or commerce, including a share of ownership in almost every major hotel in Iran; the Pahlavis also had major interests in real estate.[361] Mohammad Reza was also known for his interest in cars and had a personal collection of 140 classic and sports cars including a Mercedes-Benz 500K Autobahn cruiser, one of only six ever made.[362] The first Maserati 5000 GT was named the Shah of Persia, it was built for Mohammad Reza, who had been impressed by the Maserati 3500 and requested Giulio Alfieri, Maserati's chief engineer, to use a modified 5-litre engine from the Maserati 450S on the 3500GT's chassis.[363] There was also a 2019 car named in his honour.

Titles, styles, honours, and emblems

The Imperial family at the Niavaran Palace yard, 1970s

Titles, styles, and honours

Mohammad Reza was Sovereign of many orders in Iran and received honours and decorations from around the world. Mohammad Reza used the style His Majesty until his imperial coronation in 1967, ascending to the title of Shahanshah, when he adopted the style His Imperial Majesty. Mohammad Reza also held many supplementary titles such as Bozorg Artestaran, a military rank superseding his prior position as captain. On 15 September 1965, Mohammad Reza was granted the title of Aryamehr ('The Sun of the Aryans') by an extraordinary session of the joint Houses of Parliament.[364]

Coats of arms

From 24 April 1926, until his accession, Mohammad Reza's arms notably consisted of two Shahbaz birds in the centre, a common symbol during the Achaemenid period, with the Pahlavi Crown placed above them. Upon his accession, he adopted his father's coat of arms which included a shield composed of the Lion and the Sun symbol in first quarter, the Faravahar in the second quarter, the two-pointed sword of Ali (Zulfiqar) in third quarter and the Simurgh in the fourth quarter. Overall, in the centre is a circle depicting Mount Damavand with a rising sun, the symbol of the Pahlavi dynasty. The shield is crowned by the Pahlavi crown and surrounded by the chain of the Order of Pahlavi. Two lions rampant regardant, holding scimitars supports the coat of arms on either side. Under the whole device is the motto: "Mara dad farmud va Khod Davar Ast" ("Justice He bids me do, as He will judge me" or, alternatively, "He gave me power to command, and He is the judge").

Imperial standards

The Pahlavi imperial family employed rich heraldry to symbolise their reign and ancient Persian heritage. An image of the imperial crown was included in every official state document and symbol, from the badges of the armed forces to paper money and coinage. The image of the crown was the centerpiece of the imperial standard of the Shah.

The personal standards consisted of a field of pale blue, the traditional colour of the Iranian imperial family, at the centre of which was placed the heraldic motif of the individual. The Imperial Iranian national flag was placed in the top left quadrant of each standard. The appropriate imperial standard was flown beside the national flag when the individual was present. In 1971, new designs were adopted.[365]

Notes

  1. ^ Persian: محمدرضا پهلوی [mohæmˈmæd reˈzɒː pæhlæˈviː]
  2. ^ Persian: محمدرضا شاه

Bibliography

Mohammad Reza published several books in the course of his kingship and two later works after his downfall. Amongst others, these include:

See also

References

  1. ^ D. N. MacKenzie. A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary. Routledge Curzon, 2005.
  2. ^ Gholami 2016, p. 80.
  3. ^ Alikarami, Leila (2018). Women and Equality in Iran: Law, Society and Activism. Bloomsbury. p. 54. ISBN 978-1-78831-887-7.
  4. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. New York: John Wiley & Sons. p. 195 f. ISBN 0-471-26517-9.
  5. ^ Cooper 2016, p. 21, 22.
  6. ^ Razipour, Suzanne Maloney and Keian (24 January 2019). "The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events". Brookings. Archived from the original on 25 January 2019. Retrieved 10 February 2021.
  7. ^ Staff, IFP Editorial (7 September 2016). "Iran's Black Friday: Massacre of Thousands in 1978". Iran Front Page. Archived from the original on 4 February 2021. Retrieved 10 February 2021.
  8. ^ Kabalan 2020, p. 113.
  9. ^ Cooper 2016, p. 10, 36.
  10. ^ "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 December 2019.
  11. ^ Amanat 2017, p. 473.
  12. ^ Aghaie 2011, p. 49.
  13. ^  • "سندی نویافته از نیای رضاشاه" (PDF). پرتال جامع علوم انسانی. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 February 2021. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
     • معتضد, خسرو (1387). تاج های زنانه (چاپ اول ed.). تهران: نشر البرز. pp. 46–51 جلد اول. ISBN 9789644425974.
     • نیازمند, رضا (1387). رضاشاه از تولد تا سلطنت (چاپ ششم ed.). تهران: حکایت قلم نوین. pp. 15–16, 21–33, 39–40, 43–45. ISBN 9645925460.
     • زیباکلام, صادق (1398). رضاشاه (اول ed.). تهران: روزنه،لندن:اچ انداس. pp. 61, 62. ISBN 978-1-78083-762-8.
  14. ^ Nahai 2000, p. 180–181.
  15. ^ Afkhami 2009, p. 4.
  16. ^ Katouzian 2006, p. 269.
  17. ^ Fereydoun Hoveyda. The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution (Westport: Praeger, 2003) p. 5; and Ali Dashti, Panjah va Panj ("Fifty Five") (Los Angeles: Dehkhoda, 1381) p. 13.
  18. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 25.
  19. ^ a b Inlow, E. Burke (1979). Shahanshah: The Study Of Monarchy Of Iran. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 90. ISBN 9788120822924.
  20. ^ Milani 2011, p. 14.
  21. ^ Milani 2011, p. 14–19.
  22. ^ Milani 2011, p. 22–23, 36–38.
  23. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 36.
  24. ^ Kapuściński, Ryszard. Shah of Shahs, New York: Vintage, 1992, p. 27.
  25. ^ a b Brogan, Patrick. The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide To World Conflicts Since 1945, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p. 246.
  26. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 13 f.
  27. ^ Milani 2011, p. 15.
  28. ^ Milani 2011, p. 13, 23.
  29. ^ Milani 2011, p. 23.
  30. ^ a b Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 33.
  31. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 121.
  32. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 54.
  33. ^ Afkhami 2009, p. 29–31.
  34. ^ Milani 2011, p. 46.
  35. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 47.
  36. ^ Milani 2011, p. 48.
  37. ^ Fardust, Hossein; Dareini, Ali (April 1999). The rise and fall of the Pahlavi dynasty : memoirs of former General Hussein Fardust. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publ. pp. 15–16. ISBN 978-8120816428.
  38. ^ Curtis, Charlotte (13 October 1971). "First Party of Iran's 2,500-Year Celebration". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 19 February 2018. Retrieved 17 September 2015.
  39. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 50.
  40. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 116 f.
  41. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 117.
  42. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 118.
  43. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 117 f.
  44. ^ a b c d Gholam Reza Afkhami (27 October 2008). The Life and Times of the Shah. University of California Press. p. 35. ISBN 978-0-520-25328-5. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 4 November 2012.
  45. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 63.
  46. ^ a b c Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan 2011, p. 78.
  47. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 139.
  48. ^ Glenn E. Curtis, Eric Hooglund (2008). Iran: A Country Study. Government Printing Office. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-8444-1187-3. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  49. ^ a b c Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan 2011, p. 77.
  50. ^ a b c Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan 2011, p. 79.
  51. ^ David S. Sorenson (2013). An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics. Avalon Publishing. p. 206. ISBN 978-0-8133-4922-0. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  52. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan 2011, p. 78 f.
  53. ^ Afkhami 2009, p. 79.
  54. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 85.
  55. ^ T.H. Vail Motter (1952). United States Army in World War II the Middle East Theater the Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia. United States Army Center of Military History. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 27 February 2015.
  56. ^ Ali Akbar Dareini, Hossein Fardoust (1998). Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty. Motilal Banarsidass Publ. pp. 35, 36, 126. ISBN 978-81-208-1642-8. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  57. ^ a b Abbas Milani (2008). Eminent Persians. Syracuse University Press. pp. 156, 157. ISBN 978-0-8156-0907-0. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  58. ^ Ghosh, Palash (20 March 2012). Iran: The Long Lasting Legacy of the 1953 US/CIA Coup. Archived from the original on 10 June 2023. Retrieved 27 February 2015. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
  59. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan 2011, p. 91.
  60. ^ a b c d Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 135.
  61. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan 2011, p. 112.
  62. ^ Gholam Reza Afghami. The Life and Times of the Shah (2009), p. 34 f.
  63. ^ Afkhami 2009, p. 82–83.
  64. ^ Afkhami 2009, p. 84.
  65. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 115.
  66. ^ Milani 2011, p. 122–123.
  67. ^ Milani 2011, p. 124.
  68. ^ Milani 2011, p. 125.
  69. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 126.
  70. ^ Milani 2011, p. 127.
  71. ^ Milani 2011, p. 128–129.
  72. ^ Milani 2011, p. 138.
  73. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 8–13.
  74. ^ Zonis, Marvin (1991). Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 15.
  75. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, pp. 34–35.
  76. ^ a b Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. New York: John Wiley & Sons. p. 62. ISBN 0-471-26517-9.
  77. ^ "Ali Vazir Safavi". Web Archive. 27 October 2009. Archived from the original on 27 October 2009. Retrieved 18 June 2011.
  78. ^ "The Shah". Persepolis. Archived from the original on 7 April 2023. Retrieved 18 June 2011.
  79. ^ "Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi". Iran Chamber. Archived from the original on 6 February 2017. Retrieved 18 June 2011.
  80. ^ Dreyfuss, Robert (2006). Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. Owl Books. ISBN 0-8050-8137-2.
  81. ^ Behrooz writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark j. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p. 121.
  82. ^ Milani 2011, p. 156.
  83. ^ Shiva Balaghi; New York University. "A Brief History of 20th-Century Iran". nyu.edu. Archived from the original on 9 January 2016. Retrieved 27 February 2015.
  84. ^ Michael Clark (28 April 1951). "Premier Quits as Iran Speeds Nationalization of Oil Fields". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 14 May 2017. Retrieved 27 February 2015.
  85. ^ Gerhard Peters, John T. Woolley; University of California, Santa Barbara The American Presidency Project (9 July 1951). "Message to the Prime Minister of Iran Following the Breakdown of Oil Discussions With Great Britain". ucsb.edu. Archived from the original on 26 December 2015. Retrieved 27 February 2015.
  86. ^ Kermit Roosevelt. Counter Coup, New York, 1979.
  87. ^ Risen, James (2000). "Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 25 January 2013. Retrieved 30 March 2007.
  88. ^ "CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup". nsarchive2.gwu.edu. The National Security Archive. 19 August 2013. Archived from the original on 20 March 2020. Retrieved 21 August 2018.
  89. ^ Saeed Kamali Dehghan; Richard Norton-Taylor (19 August 2013). "CIA admits role in 1953 Iranian coup". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 12 November 2019. Retrieved 20 August 2013.
  90. ^ "In declassified document, CIA acknowledges role in '53 Iran coup". Cnn.com. Archived from the original on 14 June 2017. Retrieved 22 August 2013.
  91. ^ Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, p. 66.
  92. ^ The New York Times, 23 July 1953, 1:5.
  93. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. New York: John Wiley & Sons. p. 6. ISBN 0-471-26517-9.
  94. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. New York: John Wiley & Sons. p. 7 f. ISBN 0-471-26517-9.
  95. ^ The New York Times, 19 August 1953, 1:4, p. 5.
  96. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men. New York: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 188–91.
  97. ^ "Mossadegh Gets 3-Year Jail Term". Archive.nytimes.com. Archived from the original on 25 July 2021. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
  98. ^ Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (2005), p. 72 f.
  99. ^ R. W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran.
  100. ^ Ansari 2003, p. 128.
  101. ^ a b c d Ansari 2003, p. 129.
  102. ^ a b c Ansari 2003, p. 130.
  103. ^ Ansari 2003, p. 132.
  104. ^ Ansari 2003, p. 131.
  105. ^ Ansari 2003, p. 133.
  106. ^ a b c Ansari 2003, p. 140.
  107. ^ a b c Milani 2011, p. 144.
  108. ^ Milani 2011, p. 159.
  109. ^ Milani 2011, p. 50.
  110. ^ Milani 2011, p. 223.
  111. ^ Milani 2011, p. 210.
  112. ^ Milani 2011, p. 225.
  113. ^ Milani 2011, p. 226.
  114. ^ Milani 2011, p. 228.
  115. ^ Milani 2011, p. 229.
  116. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 244.
  117. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 230.
  118. ^ "Soraya Arrives for US Holiday" (PDF). The New York Times. 23 April 1958. p. 35. Archived from the original on 2 February 2017. Retrieved 23 March 2007.
  119. ^ "Princess Soraya, 69, Shah's Wife Whom He Shed for Lack of Heir". The New York Times. 26 October 2001. Archived from the original on 9 January 2013. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
  120. ^ Milani 2011, p. 215.
  121. ^ Milani 2011, p. 214.
  122. ^ Paul Hofmann, "Pope Bans Marriage of Princess to Shah", The New York Times, 24 February 1959, p. 1.
  123. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 248.
  124. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 250.
  125. ^ Milani 2011, p. 251.
  126. ^ Milani 2011, p. 253.
  127. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 270.
  128. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 287.
  129. ^ a b c Milani 2011, p. 291.
  130. ^ Milani 2011, p. 292.
  131. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 294, 408.
  132. ^ a b Brogan, Patrick. The Fighting Never Stopped: a comprehensive guide to world conflicts since 1945, New York: Vintage Book, 1989, p. 246 f.
  133. ^ Brogan, Patrick. The Fighting Never Stopped: a comprehensive guide to world conflicts since 1945, New York: Vintage Book, 1989, p. 247.
  134. ^ Bill, James A. (1970). "The Journal of Politics: Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1970)". The Journal of Politics. 32 (1): 19–40. doi:10.2307/2128863. hdl:2152/24201. JSTOR 2128863. S2CID 155052262.
  135. ^ Musel, Robert (16 July 1975). "The rise of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi". Ludington Daily News. London. United Press International. Archived from the original on 29 October 2020. Retrieved 23 July 2013.
  136. ^ Kuzichkin, Vladimir (1990). Inside the KGB: My Life in Soviet Espionage. Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-8041-0989-3.
  137. ^ Pacepa, Ion Mihai (8 August 2007). "The Kremlin's Killing Ways: A long tradition continues". National Review. Archived from the original on 8 August 2007. Retrieved 2 June 2022.
  138. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 348.
  139. ^ a b c Milani 2011, p. 314.
  140. ^ Milani 2011, p. 351.
  141. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 339.
  142. ^ Milani 2011, p. 344.
  143. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 346.
  144. ^ Milani 2011, p. 350.
  145. ^ National Geographic magazine, Vol. 133, No. 3 (March 1968), p. 299.
  146. ^ Grigor, Tallinn. "Preserving the Antique Modern: Persepolis '71", pp. 21–29, in: Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 2005), p. 24.
  147. ^ "March, 15, 1976 A.D.: Iran Switches To Imperial Calendar". The Iranian History Chronicle. Archived from the original on 22 December 2016. Retrieved 16 July 2015.
  148. ^ a b c d Grigor, Tallinn "Preserving the Antique Modern: Persepolis '71", pp. 21–29, in: Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 2005), p. 26.
  149. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 351 ff.
  150. ^ Amanat, Abbas. Iran: A Modern History. p. 1004.
  151. ^ a b c Cooper, Andrew Scott. The Fall of Heaven. pp. 198–199.
  152. ^ a b Amineh, Mehdi Parvizi (2022). "Why Did China's Rise Succeed and Iran's Fail? the Political Economy of Development in China and Iran". Asian Affairs. 53: 28–50. doi:10.1080/03068374.2022.2029038. S2CID 246888363.
  153. ^ a b c d Steele, Robert (2020). The Shah's Imperial Celebrations of 1971_ Nationalism, Culture and Politics in Late Pahlavi Iran. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 16–28.
  154. ^ Amanat 2017, p. 322–323.
  155. ^ Steele, Robert (2020). The Shah's Imperial Celebrations of 1971_ Nationalism, Culture and Politics in Late Pahlavi Iran. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 31.
  156. ^ Amanat, Abbas. Modern History of Iran. p. 1024.
  157. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 393.
  158. ^ a b c Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 313.
  159. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 314.
  160. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 335 f.
  161. ^ ALVANDI, ROHAM (2012). "Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf". Diplomatic History. 36 (2): 337–372. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01025.x. JSTOR 44376155. Archived from the original on 30 October 2021. Retrieved 14 October 2021.
  162. ^ a b c d ECONOMY ix. IN THE PAHLAVI PERIOD. Encyclopedia Iranica. Archived from the original on 20 October 2021. Retrieved 28 October 2021.
  163. ^ Lambton, K .S. (1969). The Persian Land Reform. Oxford.
  164. ^ "Khomeini Factcheck: Did the Shah Hinder Iran's Development?". Iranwire.com. Archived from the original on 27 January 2022. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
  165. ^ خاوند, فریدون (13 February 2019). "اقتصاد سیاسی جمهوری اسلامی؛ یک نظام ۴۰ ساله در دام ۱۰ بختک". رادیو فردا. Archived from the original on 12 July 2019. Retrieved 19 October 2021.
  166. ^ a b c Cooper, Andrew Scott. Fall of Heaven. The Pahlavis and the Final Days (2016, Henry Holt & Co.).
  167. ^ Katouzian, Homa (2004). Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. p. 23.
  168. ^ Amanat, Abbas. Iran: A Modern History. p. 1022.
  169. ^ Afkhami, Reza. The Life and Times of the Shah.
  170. ^ Atabai, Kambiz (31 December 2012). "What 'Argo' Gets Wrong About Iran". The Daily Beast. Archived from the original on 27 December 2021. Retrieved 27 December 2021.
  171. ^ Hoveyda, Fereydoun. THE SHAH AND THE AYATOLLAH: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution. PRAEGER.
  172. ^ Afkhami, Gholam Reza. The Life and Times of the Shah. pp. 523–527.
  173. ^ "The Day Iranian Oil Really Became National". Iran Petroleum Museum and Documents. 31 August 2020. Archived from the original on 25 March 2022. Retrieved 19 March 2022.
  174. ^ Hoveyda, Freyedoun. The Shah and Ayatollah. p. 27.
  175. ^ a b Alvandi, Roham. The Age of Aryamer. pp. 21–33.
  176. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 278.
  177. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 279.
  178. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 347.
  179. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 344–347.
  180. ^ Precht, Henry. "Ayatollah Realpolitik." Archived 18 January 2017 at the Wayback Machine Foreign Policy 70 (1988): 109–28.
  181. ^ a b Abadi, Joseph (2004). Israel's Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia. Frank Cass Publishers / Routledge. p. 84. ISBN 978-1-135-76868-3. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 24 March 2020.
  182. ^ "Shah of Iran Says U.S. Jews Control Banks, Media, Finances". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. 20 March 2015 [26 October 1976]. Archived from the original on 1 April 2024. Retrieved 1 April 2024.
  183. ^ a b c d e Karsh, Effraim. Islamic Imperialism: A History, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 199.
  184. ^ Karsh, Effraim. Islamic Imperialism: A History Archived 7 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, pp. 198–199.
  185. ^ Karsh, Effraim Islamic Imperialism: A History, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 198.
  186. ^ Amanat, Abbas. Modern History of Iran. p. 1035.
  187. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 142.
  188. ^ Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988, London: Osprey, 2002 p. 7 f.
  189. ^ Bulloch, John and Morris, Harvey. The Gulf War, London: Methuen, 1989, p. 37.
  190. ^ a b Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988, London: Osprey, 2002, p. 8.
  191. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 317.
  192. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 318.
  193. ^ a b c d Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 360.
  194. ^ "Iran – State and Society, 1964–74". Country-data.com. 21 January 1965. Archived from the original on 7 April 2023. Retrieved 18 June 2011.
  195. ^ Interview with Farah Pahlavi Archived 31 July 2012 at archive.today Mary Bitterman, 15 March 2004.
  196. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 199.
  197. ^ a b Karsh, Effraim Islamic Imperialism A History, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 200.
  198. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 321.
  199. ^ a b c Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 201.
  200. ^ a b Keck, Zachary (21 January 2015). "The 5 Most Precarious US Allies of All Time". National Interest.org. Archived from the original on 9 August 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2015.
  201. ^ a b Brogan, Patrick The fighting never stopped, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p. 298.
  202. ^ America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Tony Smith. Princeton Princeton University Press: p. 255
  203. ^ Mohammad Reza, Mission for my Country, London, 1961, p. 173
  204. ^ Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz & Christof Hartmann (2001) Elections in Asia: A data handbook, Volume I, p. 59, ISBN 0-19-924958-X
  205. ^ Cottam, Richard W. (1979). Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978. University of Pittsburgh Pre. p. 297. ISBN 0-8229-7420-7.
  206. ^ Fred Halliday, Iran; Dictatorship and Development, Penguin, ISBN 0-14-022010-0
  207. ^ "Opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah's Regime". Archived from the original on 21 April 2005. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
  208. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 62.
  209. ^ a b c Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 61.
  210. ^ a b c Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 3.
  211. ^ a b Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 221.
  212. ^ a b c Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 6.
  213. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 204.
  214. ^ "Ben Gurion's Alliance of the Periphery within the Context of US-Israel relations". Ankara Papers. 12 (1). Taylor & Francis: 35–37. 2004 – via EBSCO.
  215. ^ a b c d Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 66.
  216. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 310.
  217. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 64.
  218. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 222.
  219. ^ a b c Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 65.
  220. ^ "Round the World Flights". Wingnet.org. Archived from the original on 26 May 2022. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
  221. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 80–81.
  222. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 80 & 221.
  223. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 81.
  224. ^ Amir Taheri, "New Frame for a New Picture," Kayhan International, 10 June 1978.
  225. ^ Robert Graham, Iran, St. Martins, January 1979
  226. ^ Gholam Reza Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, University of California Press, January 2009, ISBN 0-520-25328-0, ISBN 978-0-520-25328-5
  227. ^ Abbas Milani, The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution, Mage Publishers, 1 October 2003; ISBN 0-934211-88-4, ISBN 978-0-934211-88-8
  228. ^ Peter G. Gowing (July–August 1970). "Islam in Taiwan". Saudi Aramco World. Archived from the original on 11 September 2014. Retrieved 1 March 2011.
  229. ^ Cooper 2016, p. 32.
  230. ^ Amanat, Abbas. Iran: A Modern History. pp. 1022–1023.
  231. ^ Amanat, Abbas. Iran: A Modern History. p. 1041.
  232. ^ Afhkami, Reza. The Life and Times of The Shah. p. 328.
  233. ^ Afkhami, Reza. The Age of Aryamehr. pp. 18–20.
  234. ^ Alvandi., Roham. The Age of Aryamer.
  235. ^ Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution (1991), pp. 4, 9–12
  236. ^ Narrative of Awakening : A Look at Imam Khomeini's Ideal, Scientific and Political Biography from Birth to Ascension by Hamid Ansari, Institute for Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini, International Affairs Division, [no date], p. 163
  237. ^ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, HUP, 2004, p. 164
  238. ^ a b Milani, Abbas The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 389.
  239. ^ Milani, Abbas The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 390.
  240. ^ a b Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 160
  241. ^ a b c d e Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 159
  242. ^ "Prednisone Monograph for Professionals". Drugs.com. AHFS. Archived from the original on 22 October 2019. Retrieved 24 December 2018.
  243. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 159–160
  244. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 160.
  245. ^ Milani, Abbas The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 408–409.
  246. ^ a b Milani, Abbas The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 409.
  247. ^ The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution, Abbas Milani, pp. 292–293
  248. ^ Seven Events That Made America America, By Larry Schweikart, p. Archived 22 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine
  249. ^ The Iranian Revolution of 1978/1979 and How Western Newspapers Reported It by Edgar Klüsener, p. 12
  250. ^ Cultural History After Foucault by John Neubauer, p. 64
  251. ^ Islam in the World Today: A Handbook of Politics, Religion, Culture, and Society by Werner Ende, Udo Steinbach, p. 264
  252. ^ The A to Z of Iran, by John H. Lorentz, p. 63
  253. ^ Islam and Politics, John L. Esposito, p. 212
  254. ^ Nikazmerad, Nicholas M. (1980). "A Chronological Survey of the Iranian Revolution". Iranian Studies. 13 (1/4): 327–368. doi:10.1080/00210868008701575. JSTOR 4310346.
  255. ^ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (2004), p. 122
  256. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 391.
  257. ^ Milani, Abbas The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 391–392.
  258. ^ Milani 2011, p. 392.
  259. ^ Milani 2011, p. 385 & 409.
  260. ^ Milani 2011, p. 409.
  261. ^ Milani 2011, p. 368.
  262. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 395.
  263. ^ Milani 2011, p. 407.
  264. ^ Milani 2011, p. 396–397.
  265. ^ Milani 2011, p. 397.
  266. ^ Milani 2011, p. 389.
  267. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 161
  268. ^ Milani 2011, p. 413.
  269. ^ a b c Milani 2011, p. 399–400.
  270. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 398.
  271. ^ Milani 2011, p. 401.
  272. ^ Milani 2011, p. 401–402.
  273. ^ "1979: Shah of Iran flees into exile". BBC. 16 January 1979. Archived from the original on 29 October 2009. Retrieved 5 January 2007.
  274. ^ Brogan, Patrick The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide To World Conflicts Since 1945, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p. 248.
  275. ^ Taheri, Spirit (1985), p. 240.
  276. ^ "Imam Khomeini – Return to Tehran". Imam Khomeini. 16 August 2011. Archived from the original on 7 April 2023. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
  277. ^ Afary, Janet. "Iranian Revolution". Encyclopedia Britannica. Archived from the original on 24 November 2019. Retrieved 2 June 2022.
  278. ^ Maloney, Suzanne (24 January 2019). "1979: Iran and America". Archived from the original on 28 September 2021. Retrieved 28 September 2021.
  279. ^ "Amnesty International Annual Report 1974–1975". Amnesty International. Archived from the original on 22 November 2018. Retrieved 19 December 2018.
  280. ^ Baraheni, Reza (28 October 1976). "Terror in Iran". The New York Review of Books. 23 (17). Archived from the original on 16 May 2022. Retrieved 21 January 2019.
  281. ^ "Federation of American Scientists -". Archived from the original on 4 October 2012.
  282. ^ Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001).
  283. ^ Shirley, Know Thine Enemy (1997), p. 207.
  284. ^ a b Harney, The Priest (1998), pp. 37, 47, 67, 128, 155, 167.
  285. ^ Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, p.437
  286. ^ Mackay, Iranians (1998), pp. 236, 260.
  287. ^ Graham, Iran (1980), pp. 19, 96.
  288. ^ Graham, Iran (1980) p. 228.
  289. ^ Arjomand, Turban (1998), pp. 189–90.
  290. ^ Andrew Scott Cooper. The Oil Kings: How the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. Simon & Schuster, 2011. ISBN 1-4391-5517-8.
  291. ^ The New York Times, 12 October 1971, 39:2
  292. ^ (R.W Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 329)
  293. ^ Michael Ledeen & William Lewis, Debacle: The American Failure in Iran, Knopf, p. 22
  294. ^ Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (1982) pp. 442–6.
  295. ^ Books.Google.com Archived 7 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine, Persian pilgrimages, Afshin Molavi
  296. ^ "Waiting for God". The Economist. 2 March 2013. Archived from the original on 1 July 2017. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
  297. ^ Farmanfarmaian, Mannucher and Roxane. Blood & Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince. Random House, New York, 1997, ISBN 0-679-44055-0, p. 366
  298. ^ a b Karsh, Effraim Islamic Imperialism A History New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 200
  299. ^ Fischer, Michael M.J., Iran, From Religious Dispute to Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 59
  300. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 4–5
  301. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 5.
  302. ^ "40 Years Ago Richard Nixon Strengthens Persian Ally". Archived from the original on 21 February 2014. Retrieved 11 February 2014.
  303. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 162
  304. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 420
  305. ^ Milani, Abbas The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 420–421.
  306. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 421.
  307. ^ "Iran protests Shah's Move to Texas". 3 December 1979. Archived from the original on 1 November 2020. Retrieved 18 June 2011.
  308. ^ Darling, Dallas. Ten Things the US needs to learn from Iran's Islamic Revolution[dead link]. AlJazeera Magazine. 14 February 2009
  309. ^ a b c Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 424.
  310. ^ Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, ISBN 978-0-307-38900-8, p. 274.
  311. ^ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Answer to History. Stein & Day Pub, 1980. ISBN 978-0-7720-1296-8
  312. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 164.
  313. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 425.
  314. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 164
  315. ^ a b c Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 427.
  316. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 428–429.
  317. ^ "On Iran" Archived 14 February 2022 at the Wayback Machine, (Breakfast with Frost) BBC News, 12 December 2004
  318. ^ Gholam Reza Afkham The Life and Times of the Shah Archived 3 September 2024 at the Wayback Machine, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, p. 655 n.17:7
  319. ^ "20/20 {DAVID FROST INTERVIEWS THE SHAH OF IRAN} (TV)". Paleycenter.org. 17 January 1980. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
  320. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 430–431.
  321. ^ a b Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 431.
  322. ^ Demaret, Kent (21 April 1980). "Dr. Michael Debakey Describes the Shah's Surgery and Predicts a Long Life for Him". People. Archived from the original on 17 February 2013. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
  323. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 165
  324. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 165.
  325. ^ Khooshnood, Arvin (2016). "The death of an emperor – Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and his political cancer". Alexandria Journal of Medicine. 52 (3): 201–208. doi:10.1016/j.ajme.2015.11.002.
  326. ^ "Jimmy Carter and the 1979 Decision to Admit the Shah into the United States | American Diplomacy Est 1996". Archived from the original on 18 March 2023. Retrieved 8 November 2022.
  327. ^ a b Khooshnood, Arvin (2016). "The death of an emperor – Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and his political cancer" (PDF). Alexandria Journal of Medicine. 52 (3): 201–208. doi:10.1016/j.ajme.2015.11.002. S2CID 74450395. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 September 2019. Retrieved 6 September 2019.
  328. ^ Khoshnood, Ardavan; Khoshnood, Arvin (1 September 2016). "The death of an emperor – Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and his political cancer". Alexandria Journal of Medicine. 52 (3): 201–208. doi:10.1016/j.ajme.2015.11.002. ISSN 2090-5068.
  329. ^ "Documentary examines medical mistakes that killed Iran's Shah". gulfnews.com. 17 November 2017. Archived from the original on 18 September 2021. Retrieved 13 March 2021.
  330. ^ Cooper, Andrew. The Fall of Heaven. p. 499.
  331. ^ Shah's Flight. Time. 31 March 1980
  332. ^ "SOMEONE ELSE'S PROBLEM". The New York Times. 6 November 1988. Archived from the original on 1 July 2017. Retrieved 11 February 2017.
  333. ^ a b Rahman, Tahir (2007). We Came in Peace for all Mankind- the Untold Story of the Apollo 11 Silicon Disc. Leathers Publishing. ISBN 978-1-58597-441-2
  334. ^ a b Ganji, Akbar (20 December 2016). "A Criminal As The Successor To Khamenei?". HuffPost. Archived from the original on 22 December 2016. Retrieved 22 December 2016.
  335. ^ a b "Iranians arrested after celebrating ancient Persian king Cyrus the Great". Reuters. 31 October 2016. Archived from the original on 7 November 2017. Retrieved 2 July 2017.
  336. ^ Molavi, Afshin, The Soul of Iran, Norton (2005), p. 74
  337. ^ Sciolino, Elaine, Persian Mirrors, Touchstone (2000), p.239, 244
  338. ^ Molavi, Afshin, The Soul of Iran, Norton (2005), pp. 74, 10
  339. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan, 2011, pp. 23–24.
  340. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 150.
  341. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 21 & 150–151.
  342. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 152.
  343. ^ Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 151.
  344. ^ Milani, Abbas. The Shah, London: Macmillan 2011, pp. 22–23.
  345. ^ Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution, ABC-CLIO (2003), p. 31
  346. ^ Milani 2011, p. 97.
  347. ^ a b Milani 2011, p. 96.
  348. ^ Milani 2011, p. 95.
  349. ^ Fardust, Memoirs Vol 1, p. 109
  350. ^ Milani 2011, p. 440.
  351. ^ Milani 2011, p. 441.
  352. ^ Naraghi, Ehsan (1994). From Palace to Prison: Inside the Iranian Revolution. I. B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-86064-494-8. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 19 February 2017.
  353. ^ Gayathri, Amrutha. "US Government Set To Seize New York City Building Linked To Iran In 'Largest Ever Terrorism-Related Forfeiture'". Business Insider. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
  354. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008
  355. ^ Kaplan, Robert D. (March 1996). "A Bazaari's World". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 12 May 2008. Retrieved 10 March 2017.
  356. ^ "Never made the slightest profit out of Pahlavi Foundation: Shah of Iran". India Today. 23 December 2014. Archived from the original on 20 February 2017. Retrieved 19 February 2017.
  357. ^ Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza (1974). "Crisis in Iran" (Interview). Interviewed by Mike Wallace.
  358. ^ Randal, Jonathan (19 November 1978). "Corruption in Iran". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 12 March 2017. Retrieved 19 February 2017.
  359. ^ Graham, Robert (1980). Iran : the illusion of power (Rev. ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press. p. 226. ISBN 0-312-43588-6.
  360. ^ Milani 2011, p. 428.
  361. ^ Crittenden, Ann (14 January 1979). "Little pain in exile expected for Shah". The Spokesman-Review. Archived from the original on 3 September 2024. Retrieved 3 May 2013.
  362. ^ Farsian, Behzad (7 October 2004). "Shah's car collection is still waiting for the green light". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 11 January 2022. Retrieved 31 October 2012.
  363. ^ Nebiolo, Gino (1 November 1959). "Colori e linee gentili delle auto richiamano signore e profani". La Stampa (in Italian). p. 5. Archived from the original on 30 June 2016. Retrieved 10 February 2015.
  364. ^ Ansari, Ali M. (2012). The politics of nationalism in modern Iran. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 103. ISBN 978-0-521-68717-1.
  365. ^ "Farah Pahlavi Official Site – Imperial Standards of Iran". www.farahpahlavi.org. Archived from the original on 26 December 2017. Retrieved 11 June 2017.

Sources

Primary sources

Historiography

External links