Los campos de internamiento de Xinjiang , [nota 1] oficialmente llamados centros de educación y formación profesional ( chino :职业技能教育培训中心; pinyin : Zhíyè jìnéng jiàoyù péixùn zhōngxīn ; Wade–Giles : Chih 2 yeh 4 chi 4 neng 2 chiao 4 yü 4 p'ei 2 hsün 4 chung 1 hsin 1 ) por el gobierno de China , [12] [13] [14] [15] son campos de internamiento operados por el gobierno de Xinjiang y el Comité Permanente Provincial del Partido Comunista Chino . Human Rights Watch afirma que se han utilizado para adoctrinar a uigures y otros musulmanes desde 2017 como parte de una " guerra popular contra el terrorismo ", una política anunciada en 2014. [1] [16] [17] Los campos han sido criticados por los gobiernos de muchos países y organizaciones de derechos humanos por presuntos abusos de los derechos humanos , incluidos malos tratos, violaciones y torturas, y algunos de ellos alegan genocidio. [18] Unos 40 países de todo el mundo han pedido a China que respete los derechos humanos de la comunidad uigur, [19] incluidos países como Canadá, Alemania, Turquía y Japón. Los gobiernos de más de 35 países han expresado su apoyo al gobierno de China. [20] [21] [22] Los campos de internamiento de Xinjiang han sido descritos como "el ejemplo más extremo de las políticas inhumanas de China contra los uigures". [11]
El internamiento de uigures y otros musulmanes turcos en los campos constituye la detención arbitraria a mayor escala de minorías étnicas y religiosas desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial . [33] [11] [34] [35] En 2020 [update], se estimó que las autoridades chinas pueden haber detenido hasta 1,8 millones de personas, en su mayoría uigures, pero también kazajos , kirguisos y otros musulmanes étnicos turcos , cristianos , así como algunos ciudadanos extranjeros, incluidos los kazajos , en estos campos de internamiento secretos ubicados en toda la región. [36] [2] Según Adrian Zenz , un importante investigador de los campos, los internamientos masivos alcanzaron su punto máximo en 2018 y disminuyeron un poco desde entonces, y los funcionarios cambiaron el enfoque hacia los programas de trabajo forzado. [37] Otros activistas de derechos humanos y funcionarios estadounidenses también han notado un cambio de individuos de los campos al sistema penal formal . [38]
En mayo de 2018, Randall Schriver , subsecretario de Defensa de Estados Unidos para Asuntos de Seguridad del Indopacífico , dijo que "al menos un millón, pero probablemente cerca de tres millones de ciudadanos" estaban encarcelados en centros de detención, que describió como "campos de concentración". [3] [4] En agosto de 2018, Gay McDougall , representante de Estados Unidos en el Comité de las Naciones Unidas para la Eliminación de la Discriminación Racial, dijo que el comité había recibido muchos informes creíbles de que 1 millón de uigures étnicos en China han sido retenidos en "campos de reeducación". [39] [40] Ha habido comparaciones entre los campos de Xinjiang y la Revolución Cultural china . [41] [42] [43] [44] [45]
En 2019, en las Naciones Unidas, 54 países, incluida la propia China, rechazaron las acusaciones y apoyaron las políticas del gobierno chino en Xinjiang. [46] En otra carta, 23 países compartieron las preocupaciones de los informes del comité y pidieron a China que defendiera los derechos humanos. [47] [48] En septiembre de 2020, el Instituto Australiano de Política Estratégica (ASPI) informó en su Proyecto de Datos de Xinjiang que la construcción de campamentos continuó a pesar de las afirmaciones del gobierno de que su función estaba terminando. [49] En octubre de 2020, se informó de que el número total de países que denunciaron a China aumentó a 39, mientras que el número total de países que defendieron a China disminuyó a 45. Dieciséis países que defendieron a China en 2019 no lo hicieron en 2020. [50]
El Grupo Xinjiang Zhongtai gestiona algunos de los campos de reeducación y utiliza trabajadores reasignados en sus instalaciones. [51]
Fondo
Conflicto en Xinjiang
Varias dinastías chinas han ejercido históricamente diversos grados de control e influencia sobre partes de lo que es la actual Xinjiang. [52] La región quedó bajo el dominio chino completo como resultado de la expansión hacia el oeste de la dinastía Qing liderada por los manchúes , que también conquistó el Tíbet y Mongolia . [53] Esta conquista, que marcó el comienzo de Xinjiang bajo el gobierno Qing , terminó alrededor de 1758. Si bien nominalmente se declaró parte del territorio central de China, la corte imperial generalmente lo veía como una tierra lejana por sí misma; en 1758, fue designada colonia penal y sitio de exilio y, como resultado, fue gobernada como un protectorado militar, no integrada como una provincia. [54]
Desde la década de 1950 hasta la de 1970, el gobierno patrocinó una migración masiva de chinos han a la región, políticas que promovían la unidad cultural china y políticas que castigaban ciertas expresiones de la identidad uigur. [60] [61] Durante este tiempo, surgieron organizaciones separatistas uigures militantes con apoyo potencial de la Unión Soviética, siendo el Partido Popular del Turkestán Oriental el más grande en 1968. [62] [63] [64] Durante la década de 1970, los soviéticos apoyaron al Frente Revolucionario Unido del Turkestán Oriental (URFET) para luchar contra los chinos. [65]
En 1997, una redada policial y la ejecución de 30 presuntos separatistas durante el Ramadán condujeron a grandes manifestaciones en febrero de 1997 que resultaron en el incidente de Ghulja , una ofensiva del Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) que llevó a al menos nueve muertes. [66] Los atentados con bombas en los autobuses de Ürümqi más tarde ese mes mataron a nueve personas e hirieron a 68 con responsabilidad reconocida por grupos de exiliados uigures. [67] [56] En marzo de 1997, una bomba en un autobús mató a dos personas con responsabilidad reivindicada por radicales uigures y la Organización para la Libertad del Turkestán Oriental con sede en Turquía . [68] [69] [56]
Después de negar inicialmente la existencia de los campos [85], el gobierno chino ha mantenido que sus acciones en Xinjiang son respuestas justificables a las amenazas del extremismo y el terrorismo . [86]
Como región de la periferia noroccidental de China habitada por minorías étnicas, lingüísticas y religiosas, se ha dicho (por Raffi Khatchadourian) que Xinjiang "nunca pareció estar completamente bajo el control del Partido Comunista". [87] Parte de Xinjiang estuvo en su día bajo el control de la Rusia zarista y también fue independiente durante un breve período de tiempo. Tradicionalmente, el gobierno de la República Popular China ha favorecido una política asimilacionista hacia las minorías y ha acelerado esta política alentando la inmigración masiva de chinos han a tierras minoritarias. Tras el colapso de su rival y vecina, la Unión Soviética —otro enorme estado comunista multinacional con una etnia dominante—, el Partido Comunista Chino estaba "convencido de que el nacionalismo étnico había ayudado a destrozar a la antigua superpotencia". Además, los uigures cometieron ataques terroristas en 2009, 2013 y 2014. [87]
Los estudiosos que han realizado investigaciones fuera de China han presentado varios motivos potenciales adicionales para el aumento de la represión en Xinjiang. En primer lugar, la represión puede ser simplemente el resultado de un aumento de la disidencia dentro de la región a partir de alrededor de 2009; en segundo lugar, puede deberse a cambios en la política de minorías que promovieron la asimilación a la cultura Han; y en tercer lugar, la represión puede estar encabezada principalmente por el propio Chen Quanguo, como resultado de su actitud personal de línea dura hacia los actos percibidos como sedición . [88]
El gobierno chino ha utilizado los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre como justificación para sus acciones contra los uigures. Afirma que sus acciones en Xinjiang son necesarias porque Xinjiang es otro frente en la " guerra global contra el terrorismo ". [89] En concreto, están tratando de librar a China de los tres males de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghai. Los tres males son "el terrorismo transnacional, el separatismo y el extremismo religioso", los cuales el PCCh cree que poseen los uigures. La verdadera razón de la represión de los uigures es bastante enrevesada, pero algunos sostienen que se basa en el deseo del PCCh de preservar la identidad y la integridad de China, en lugar de su deseo de condenar el terrorismo. [90]
Además, algunos analistas han sugerido que el PCCh considera a Xinjiang una ruta clave en la Iniciativa del Cinturón y la Ruta de China (BRI), sin embargo, considera a la población local de Xinjiang una amenaza potencial para el éxito de la iniciativa, o teme que la apertura de Xinjiang también pueda abrirla a influencias radicalizadoras de otros estados que participan en la BRI. [91] Sean Roberts, de la Universidad George Washington, dijo que el PCCh ve el apego de los uigures a sus tierras tradicionales como un riesgo para la BRI. [92] El investigador Adrian Zenz ha sugerido que la iniciativa es una razón importante para el control del gobierno chino sobre Xinjiang. [93]
En noviembre de 2020, cuando Estados Unidos eliminó al Partido Islámico de Turkestán de su lista de organizaciones terroristas porque ya no "existía", la decisión fue elogiada por algunos funcionarios de inteligencia porque eliminaba el pretexto para la decisión del gobierno chino de emprender campañas de "erradicación del terrorismo" contra los uigures . Sin embargo, Yue Gang, un comentarista militar en Pekín , afirmó que "a raíz de la decisión de Estados Unidos sobre el ETIM , China podría intentar aumentar sus actividades antiterroristas". El grupo sigue siendo designado como grupo terrorista por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas , así como por los gobiernos de otros países. [94] [95] [96]
Políticas de 2009 a 2016
Número de licitaciones de adquisiciones gubernamentales relacionadas con la reeducación en Xinjiang , 2016-2018, según la Fundación Jamestown [97]
Tanto antes como hasta poco después de los disturbios de Ürümqi de julio de 2009 , Wang Lequan fue el secretario del Partido para la región de Xinjiang, efectivamente el cargo subnacional más alto; aproximadamente equivalente a un gobernador en una provincia o estado occidental. Wang trabajó en programas de modernización en Xinjiang, incluyendo la industrialización, el desarrollo del comercio, carreteras, ferrocarriles, desarrollo de hidrocarburos y oleoductos con el vecino Kazajstán hasta el este de China. Wang también restringió la cultura y la religión locales, reemplazó el idioma uigur con el mandarín estándar como medio de educación en las escuelas primarias y penalizó o prohibió entre los trabajadores del gobierno (en una región en la que el gobierno era un empleador muy grande), el uso de barbas y pañuelos en la cabeza, el ayuno religioso y la oración mientras se estaba en el trabajo. [98] [99] [100] En la década de 1990, muchos uigures en partes de Xinjiang no podían hablar chino mandarín. [101]
En abril de 2010, después de los disturbios de Ürümqi, Zhang Chunxian reemplazó a Wang Lequan como jefe del Partido Comunista . Zhang Chunxian continuó y fortaleció las políticas represivas de Wang. En 2011, Zhang propuso "la cultura moderna lidera el desarrollo en Xinjiang" como su declaración política y comenzó a implementar su propaganda de cultura moderna . [102] En 2012, mencionó por primera vez la frase "campañas de des-extremización" (en chino:去极端化) y comenzó a educar a los "imanes salvajes" (野阿訇) y a los extremistas (极端主义者). [103] [104] [97]
En 2013, se anunció la Iniciativa del Cinturón y la Ruta, un proyecto comercial masivo en cuyo corazón se encuentra Xinjiang. [105] En 2014, las autoridades chinas anunciaron una "guerra popular contra el terrorismo" y el gobierno local introdujo nuevas restricciones, incluida la prohibición de las barbas largas y el uso del burka en público . [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] En 2014, el concepto de "transformación a través de la educación" comenzó a usarse en contextos fuera de Falun Gong a través de las campañas sistemáticas de "des-extremización". [111] Bajo Zhang, el Partido Comunista lanzó su " Campaña de mano dura contra el terrorismo violento " en Xinjiang. [112]
En agosto de 2016, Chen Quanguo , un conocido secretario del Partido Comunista de línea dura en el Tíbet , [113] se hizo cargo de la región autónoma de Xinjiang. Los críticos lo calificaron de responsable de un componente importante de la "subyugación" del Tíbet. [114]
Tras la llegada de Chen, las autoridades locales reclutaron a más de 90.000 agentes de policía en 2016 y 2017 (el doble de los que reclutaron en los últimos siete años) [115] y establecieron hasta 7.300 puestos de control fuertemente vigilados en la región [ 116] . La provincia ha llegado a ser conocida como una de las regiones más vigiladas por la policía del mundo. Los informes de noticias en idioma inglés han calificado al actual régimen en Xinjiang como el estado policial más extenso del mundo [117] [118] [119] [120] .
Alrededor de 2015, según Chinese Human Rights Defenders , un alto funcionario del PCCh sostuvo que “un tercio” de los uigures de Xinjiang estaban “contaminados por fuerzas extremistas religiosas” y necesitaban ser “educados y reformados a través de una fuerza concentrada”. [124]
Casi al mismo tiempo, el aparato de seguridad del Estado chino estaba desarrollando una " Plataforma Integrada de Operaciones Conjuntas " (IJOP, por sus siglas en inglés) para analizar la información que se recogía de sus datos de vigilancia. Según un análisis de este software realizado por Human Rights Watch , un miembro de un grupo minoritario podría ser evaluado por la IJOP como perteneciente a uno de los 36 "tipos de personas" que podrían llevar a su arresto e internamiento en un campo de reeducación. Algunos de estos tipos de personas incluían:
Personas que no utilizan un teléfono móvil
Personas que usan la puerta trasera en lugar de la delantera.
personas que consumen una cantidad "inusual" de electricidad
personas que tienen una barba "anormal"
personas que socializan muy poco
personas que mantienen relaciones "complejas"
personas que tienen un familiar que exhibe algunos de estos rasgos y por lo tanto es "insuficientemente leal" [87]
Historia
A partir de 2017, los medios de comunicación locales se refirieron a las instalaciones como "centros de entrenamiento contra el extremismo" (去极端化培训班) y "centros de entrenamiento para la educación y la transformación" (教育转化培训中心). La mayoría de esas instalaciones fueron escuelas existentes u otros edificios oficiales reconvertidos, aunque algunas de ellas fueron construidas para ese fin. [1]
La región, fuertemente vigilada por la policía y los miles de puestos de control, ayudaron y aceleraron la detención de los habitantes locales en los campos. En 2017, la región representó el 21% de todos los arrestos en China a pesar de comprender menos del 2% de la población nacional, ocho veces más que el año anterior. [117] [125] Las oficinas judiciales y otras oficinas gubernamentales de muchas ciudades y condados comenzaron a publicar una serie de ofertas de adquisición y construcción para los campos e instalaciones planificados. [97] Cada vez más, se construyeron centros de detención masivos en toda la región y se están utilizando para retener a cientos de miles de personas seleccionadas por sus prácticas religiosas y su origen étnico. [126] [16] [127] [114] [128]
Victor Shih, economista político de la Universidad de California en San Diego , dijo en julio de 2019 que los internamientos masivos eran innecesarios porque "no existían insurgencias activas", solo "incidentes terroristas aislados". Sugirió que, dado que se gastó una gran cantidad de dinero en establecer los campos, es probable que el dinero haya ido a parar a manos de los asociados de los políticos que los crearon. [129]
Según el embajador chino en Australia, Cheng Jingye, en diciembre de 2019, todos los "aprendices" de los centros se han graduado y han regresado gradualmente a sus trabajos o han encontrado nuevos empleos con la ayuda del gobierno. [130] Cheng también calificó de "noticias falsas" los informes de que un millón de uigures habían sido detenidos en Xinjiang y de que "lo que se ha hecho en Xinjiang no tiene... ninguna diferencia con lo que hacen los demás países, incluidos los occidentales, para luchar contra los terroristas". [130] [131]
Durante la pandemia de COVID-19 en China continental , no hubo informes de casos de coronavirus en las cárceles de Xinjiang ni de las condiciones en los campos de internamiento. [132] Después de las suspensiones de programas debido a la pandemia de coronavirus de 2019-20, se informó que los trabajadores uigures habían sido devueltos a otras partes de Xinjiang y el resto de China para reanudar el trabajo a partir de marzo de 2020. [132] [133] [134] En septiembre de 2020, el Instituto Australiano de Política Estratégica (ASPI) lanzó su Proyecto de Datos de Xinjiang, que informó que la construcción de campamentos continuó a pesar de las afirmaciones de que su función estaba terminando, con 380 campamentos y centros de detención identificados. [49] [135]
Los países de mayoría musulmana, como los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Arabia Saudita y Egipto, mostraron su apoyo abierto a la nación asiática, afirmando que "China tiene derecho a adoptar medidas antiterroristas y de des-extremismo". Las naciones árabes estaban descuidando los abusos de los derechos humanos para no arruinar los lazos económicos que mantenían con China, que es un socio comercial e inversor crucial para estos países. Además, los musulmanes uigures exiliados en estos países eran detenidos y deportados regularmente a China. [136] [137]
Según Associated Press , una joven china, Wu Huan, fue capturada durante ocho días en un centro de detención secreto dirigido por China en Dubai . Reveló que al menos otros dos prisioneros uigures estuvieron detenidos con ella en una villa convertida en prisión. Los críticos han criticado en gran medida a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos por su papel de apoyo en la detención y deportación de musulmanes uigures y otros disidentes políticos chinos por orden del gobierno chino. [138]
Fugas y hackeos
El New York Timesfiltración
Páginas de los cables de China
El 16 de noviembre de 2019, The New York Times publicó una extensa filtración de 400 páginas de documentos, procedentes de un miembro del gobierno chino, con la esperanza de que el secretario general del PCCh, Xi Jinping, fuera responsabilizado por sus acciones. The New York Times afirmó que la filtración sugiere un descontento dentro del Partido Comunista en relación con la represión en Xinjiang. El funcionario gubernamental anónimo que filtró los documentos lo hizo con la intención de que la divulgación "impidiera que los líderes del partido, incluido el Sr. Xi, escaparan de la culpabilidad por las detenciones masivas". [17]
Debemos ser tan duros como ellos y no mostrar piedad alguna. — Xi Jinping sobre los ataques terroristas de 2014 (traducido del chino mandarín ) [17]
Uno de los documentos era un manual destinado a comunicar mensajes a los estudiantes uigures que regresaban a sus hogares y preguntaban por sus amigos o familiares desaparecidos que habían sido internados en los campos. Decía que el personal del gobierno debía reconocer que los internados no habían cometido ningún delito y que "simplemente su pensamiento se había visto infectado por pensamientos malsanos". Se ordenó a los funcionarios que dijeran que ni siquiera los abuelos y los miembros de la familia que parecían demasiado mayores para ejercer la violencia podían ser perdonados. [17] [139]
El New York Times afirmó que los discursos obtenidos muestran cómo Xi ve los riesgos para el partido de manera similar al colapso de la Unión Soviética , que el New York Times afirmó que Xi "culpó a la laxitud ideológica y al liderazgo sin carácter". [17] Preocupado de que la violencia en la región de Xinjiang pudiera dañar la estabilidad social en el resto de China, Xi afirmó que "la estabilidad social sufrirá sacudidas, la unidad general de las personas de todas las etnias se verá dañada y las amplias perspectivas de reforma, desarrollo y estabilidad se verán afectadas". [17] Xi alentó a los funcionarios a estudiar cómo respondió Estados Unidos después de los ataques del 11 de septiembre. [17] Xi comparó el extremismo islámico alternativamente con un contagio similar a un virus y una droga peligrosamente adictiva, y declaró que abordarlo requeriría "un período de tratamiento doloroso e intervencionista". [17]
El China Daily informó en 2018 que el funcionario del PCCh Wang Yongzhi fue destituido por "graves violaciones disciplinarias". [17] [140] El New York Times obtuvo una copia de la confesión de Wang (que el informe señaló que probablemente fue firmada bajo coacción) y afirmó que el New York Times creía que fue despedido por ser demasiado indulgente con los uigures, por ejemplo, su liberación de 7.000 detenidos. Wang había dicho a sus superiores que le preocupaba que las acciones contra los uigures generaran descontento y, por lo tanto, resultaran en una mayor violencia en el futuro. Los documentos filtrados afirmaban que "ignoró la estrategia del liderazgo central del partido para Xinjiang y llegó al desafío descarado... Se negó a arrestar a todos los que debían ser arrestados". [17] El artículo se compartió discretamente en la plataforma china Sina Weibo , donde algunos internautas expresaron simpatía por él. [141] [139] En 2017, hubo más de 12.000 investigaciones a miembros del partido en Xinjiang por infracciones o resistencia en la "lucha contra el separatismo", lo que fue más de 20 veces la cifra del año anterior. [17]
Poco después de la publicación de los Cables de China, la filtradora Asiye Abdulaheb proporcionó a Adrian Zenz la "lista Karakax", supuestamente una hoja de cálculo del gobierno chino que rastrea la lógica detrás de 311 de los internamientos en un "Campo de Internamiento de Capacitación Vocacional" en la sede del condado de Karakax en Xinjiang. [144] El propósito de la lista puede haber sido coordinar juicios sobre si un individuo debería permanecer internado; en algunas entradas, la palabra "de acuerdo" estaba escrita al lado de un juicio. [145] Los registros detallan cómo se visten y rezan los sujetos, y cómo se comportan sus familiares y conocidos. Un sujeto fue internado porque llevaba un velo hace años; otro fue internado por hacer clic en un enlace a un sitio web extranjero; un tercero fue internado por solicitar un pasaporte, a pesar de que no representaba "ningún riesgo práctico" según la hoja de cálculo. En general, todos los sujetos de la lista Karakax tienen familiares que viven en el extranjero, una categoría que, según se informa, conduce a un "internamiento casi seguro". Se documenta que 149 sujetos violaron las políticas de control de natalidad. 116 de los sujetos están catalogados sin explicación como "poco fiables"; para 88 de ellos, esta etiqueta de "poco fiables" es la única razón que se menciona para el internamiento. Los hombres más jóvenes, en particular, suelen figurar como "personas poco fiables nacidas en una determinada década". 24 sujetos están acusados de delitos formales, incluidas seis acusaciones relacionadas con el terrorismo. La mayoría de los sujetos han sido liberados, o están programados para ser liberados, después de que finalice su período de internamiento de un año; sin embargo, a algunos de ellos se les recomienda que sean liberados para "emplearse en un parque industrial", lo que genera preocupaciones sobre un posible trabajo forzado. [146] [147]
Hackean archivos de la policía de Xinjiang
Los ' Archivos de la Policía de Xinjiang ', una gran cantidad de archivos policiales derivados de datos encontrados en un ataque informático a un servidor informático local, [148] fueron enviados al antropólogo alemán Adrian Zenz, que trabaja para la Fundación en Memoria de las Víctimas del Comunismo . [149] Zenz ha sido sancionado por el gobierno chino desde 2021. Ha sido fundamental en la exposición del sistema de campos en Xinjiang. Los archivos y algunas traducciones al inglés son parcialmente accesibles a través de su página de inicio especial creada por esta fundación o mediante los enlaces a un repositorio académico en el artículo de Zenz en el Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies . [150]
Los datos fueron analizados por periodistas de 14 medios de comunicación de todo el mundo, entre ellos la BBC británica, Le Monde de Francia y El País de España. En Alemania, Bayerischer Rundfunk y Der Spiegel examinaron e investigaron los datos. [151] [152] [153] [149] [154]
Según la evaluación de varios científicos forenses digitales y otros expertos, los archivos de la policía de Xinjiang proceden de los ordenadores de las autoridades chinas. Se trata de la mayor filtración de datos sobre los campos de reeducación estatales chinos que se ha hecho pública fuera de China hasta la fecha. [153]
En mayo de 2022, la BBC publicó resúmenes de los Archivos de la Policía de Xinjiang. [148] Los Archivos de la Policía de Xinjiang se publicaron durante la primera visita de un comisionado de derechos humanos de la ONU a China en 14 años. Al combinar las fotografías de unos 5.000 uigures contenidas en los datos con otros datos del hackeo, surgieron detalles de más de 2.800 detenciones. [148] Otros documentos de la filtración incluían protocolos policiales para el funcionamiento de un campo de internamiento. [155]
Instalaciones del campamento
En las zonas urbanas, la mayoría de los campos son escuelas vocacionales existentes, escuelas del PCCh, escuelas ordinarias u otros edificios oficiales reconvertidos, mientras que en las zonas suburbanas o rurales la mayoría de los campos fueron construidos especialmente con fines de reeducación. [156] Estos campos están vigilados por fuerzas armadas o policías especiales y equipados con puertas similares a prisiones, muros circundantes, vallas de seguridad, sistemas de vigilancia, torres de vigilancia , salas de guardia e instalaciones para la policía armada. [157] [158] [159] [160]
Si bien no existen datos públicos y verificables sobre el número de campamentos, ha habido varios intentos de documentar campamentos sospechosos basándose en imágenes satelitales y documentos gubernamentales. El 15 de mayo de 2017, Jamestown Foundation , un grupo de expertos con sede en Washington, DC, publicó una lista de 73 ofertas gubernamentales relacionadas con centros de reeducación. [97] El 1 de noviembre de 2018, el Instituto Australiano de Política Estratégica (ASPI) informó sobre campamentos sospechosos en 28 lugares. [161] El 29 de noviembre de 2018, Reuters y Earthrise Media informaron sobre 39 campamentos sospechosos. [162] El Movimiento del Despertar Nacional del Turkestán Oriental informó sobre un número aún mayor de campamentos. [163] [164]
En un informe de 2018 de Radio Free Asia , financiada por el gobierno de Estados Unidos , se decía que en el condado de Awat (Awati) había tres campos de reeducación. Un oyente de RFA proporcionó una copia de un "acuerdo de confidencialidad" que exigía a los detenidos de los campos de reeducación no hablar sobre el funcionamiento de los campos, y dijo que los residentes locales tenían instrucciones de decirles a los miembros de los equipos de inspección de los campos de reeducación que visitaran el Campo de Reeducación Nº 2 que solo había un campo en el condado. [165] El oyente de RFA también dijo que el Campo de Reeducación Nº 2 había trasladado a miles de detenidos y había quitado el alambre de púas del perímetro de los muros del campo. [165]
Internados para hijos de detenidos
La detención de uigures y otras minorías étnicas ha dejado supuestamente a muchos niños sin sus padres. El gobierno chino habría recluido a estos niños en diversas instituciones y escuelas conocidas coloquialmente como "internados", aunque no todas son instituciones residenciales, que sirven como orfanatos de facto . [166] [167] [168] En septiembre de 2018, Associated Press informó que se estaban construyendo miles de internados. [167] Según el Departamento de Educación chino, hay niños de hasta ocho años matriculados en estas escuelas. [169]
Según Adrian Zenz y la BBC en 2019, los hijos de padres detenidos en internados fueron penalizados por no hablar chino mandarín y se les impidió ejercer su religión. [170] [171] [172] [173] En un artículo publicado en el Journal of Political Risk , Zenz llama a la iniciativa una "campaña sistemática de reingeniería social y genocidio cultural". [174] Human Rights Watch dijo que los niños detenidos en centros de bienestar infantil e internados fueron retenidos sin el consentimiento o acceso de los padres. [175] [176] En diciembre de 2019, The New York Times informó que aproximadamente 497.000 estudiantes de primaria y secundaria estaban matriculados en estos internados. También informaron que a los estudiantes solo se les permite ver a sus familiares una vez cada dos semanas y que se les prohíbe hablar el idioma uigur. [169]
Se han identificado numerosos lugares como campos de reeducación. El Instituto Australiano de Política Estratégica, cuya financiación proviene principalmente del Gobierno australiano y de fondos extranjeros principalmente del Departamento de Estado y el Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos, ha identificado más de 380 "sospechosos de ser centros de detención". [177] [178]
Cuatro centros de detención en la ciudad de Aksu (Akesu), prefectura de Aksu [179]
Centro de servicios de formación en educación y capacitación profesional de la ciudad de Artux, en la prefectura de Kizilsu [ 180]
Escuela secundaria vocacional del condado de Jiashi (伽师县中等职业学校) en el condado de Payzawat (Jiashi), prefectura de Kashgar [181]
Tres centros de detención en el condado de Kalpin (Kelpin, Keping), prefectura de Aksu [179]
Ocho centros de formación profesional en el condado de Lop (Luopu), prefectura de Hotan [182]
Centro de formación y capacitación vocacional n.º 4 del condado de Lop
La información indica razonablemente que este campo de internamiento de "reeducación", que a menudo se denomina Centro de Educación y Capacitación Profesional, proporciona mano de obra penitenciaria a las empresas manufactureras cercanas en Xinjiang. La CBP identificó indicadores de trabajo forzoso, entre ellos, reclutamiento altamente coercitivo y sin libertad, trabajo y vida bajo coacción y restricción de movimiento. (Declaración del Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de los Estados Unidos [183] [184] )
Tres campos de reeducación en el condado de Uqturpan (Uchturpan, Wushi), prefectura de Aksu [188]
Centro de formación profesional del condado de Yutian en el condado de Yutian (Keriya), prefectura de Hotan, uno de los campamentos más grandes [189]
Detenidos en el campo
El internamiento masivo de uigures y otros musulmanes turcos en los campos se ha convertido en la detención arbitraria de minorías étnicas y religiosas en mayor escala desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial . [33] [11] [34] [35]
Muchos medios de comunicación han informado de que cientos de miles de uigures, así como kazajos, kirguisos y otras minorías étnicas, están detenidos en los campos. [190] [191] [192] Radio Free Asia , un servicio de noticias financiado por el gobierno de los EE. UU., estimó en enero de 2018 que 120.000 miembros de los uigures estaban detenidos en campos de reeducación política solo en la prefectura de Kashgar en ese momento. [193] En 2018, las autoridades del gobierno local del condado de Qira esperaban tener casi 12.000 detenidos en campos vocacionales y centros de detención y algunos proyectos relacionados con los centros superaron los límites presupuestarios. [194] Son comunes los informes de uigures que viven o estudian en el extranjero que son detenidos al regresar a Xinjiang, lo que se cree que está relacionado con los campos de reeducación. Muchas personas que viven en el extranjero llevan años sin poder contactar con sus familiares que aún se encuentran en Xinjiang y que podrían estar detenidos. [195] [196] : 1:23
Según Amnistía Internacional , la figura política uigur Rebiya Kadeer , que se encuentra en el exilio desde 2005, ha tenido hasta 30 familiares detenidos o desaparecidos, entre ellos sus hermanas, hermanos, hijos, nietos y hermanos. [197] [198] No está claro cuándo se los llevaron. [199] [200] En febrero de 2021, dos de las nietas de Kadeer aparecieron en un vídeo en Twitter negando los abusos y diciéndole que no se dejara "engañar otra vez por esos malos extranjeros". [201]
El 13 de julio de 2018, Sayragul Sauytbay , ciudadana china de etnia kazaja y ex empleada del estado chino, compareció ante un tribunal en la ciudad de Zharkent , Kazajstán, acusada de cruzar ilegalmente la frontera entre los dos países. Durante el juicio, habló sobre su trabajo forzado en un campo de reeducación para 2.500 personas de etnia kazaja. [202] [203] Su abogado argumentó que si es extraditada a China, se enfrentaría a la pena de muerte por exponer los campos de reeducación en un tribunal kazajo. [204] [203] Su testimonio sobre los campos de reeducación se ha convertido en el foco de un caso judicial en Kazajstán, [205] que también está poniendo a prueba los vínculos del país con Pekín . [206] [207] El 1 de agosto de 2018, Sauytbay fue puesta en libertad con una sentencia suspendida de seis meses y se le ordenó registrarse periódicamente con la policía. Solicitó asilo en Kazajstán para evitar ser deportada a China. [208] [209] [210] Kazajstán rechazó su solicitud. El 2 de junio de 2019 voló a Suecia, donde posteriormente se le concedió asilo político. [211] [212]
Según una entrevista de Radio Free Asia con un oficial de la comisaría de policía del condado de Onsu , en agosto de 2018, 30.000 personas, o aproximadamente uno de cada seis uigures del condado (aproximadamente el 16% de la población total del condado), estaban detenidas en campos de reeducación. [213]
El ruso-estadounidense Gene Bunin creó la Base de Datos de Víctimas de Xinjiang para recopilar testimonios públicos sobre las personas detenidas en los campos, y su contenido había sido mencionado en artículos de Al Jazeera, [214] RFA, [215] [216] Foreign Policy , [217] el Proyecto de Derechos Humanos Uigur, [218] Amnistía [219] y Human Rights Watch. [220] El 14 de enero de 2023, la base de datos incluyó fotos de los actores de Hong Kong Andy Lau y Chow Yun-fat en una lista de agentes de policía responsables de arrestar a "miles de víctimas documentadas", lo que despertó sospechas en Twitter sobre la autenticidad de la base de datos. [221] [222] [223]
En un artículo publicado en el Journal of Political Risk en julio de 2019, el investigador independiente Adrian Zenz estimó que el límite superior especulativo para el número de personas detenidas en los campos de reeducación de Xinjiang era de 1,5 millones. [224] En noviembre de 2019, Adrian Zenz estimó que el número de campos de internamiento en Xinjiang había superado los 1.000. [225] En noviembre de 2019, George Friedman estimó que 1 de cada 10 uigures se encuentran detenidos en campos de reeducación. [226]
Cuando la BBC fue invitada a los campos en junio de 2019, los funcionarios allí les dijeron que los detenidos eran "casi criminales" que podían elegir "entre una audiencia judicial o educación en las instalaciones de des-extremización". [227] El Globe and Mail informó en septiembre de 2019 que algunos chinos han y uigures cristianos en Xinjiang que tenían disputas con las autoridades locales o expresaban pensamientos políticamente no deseados también habían sido enviados a los campos. [228]
Imágenes anónimas tomadas con drones publicadas en YouTube en septiembre de 2019 mostraban a reclusos arrodillados y con los ojos vendados que, según un analista del Instituto Australiano de Política Estratégica, podrían haber sido transferidos a una estación de tren cerca de Korla y podrían haber sido de un campo de reeducación. [229] [230]
Anar Sabit, una kazaja de Kuytun que vive en Canadá y que fue encarcelada en 2017 tras regresar a su país tras la muerte de su padre, fue detenida por haber viajado al extranjero. Descubrió que otras minorías eran internadas por delitos como el uso de tecnología prohibida (WhatsApp, una VPN) o viajar al extranjero, pero que incluso un uigur que trabaja para el Partido Comunista como propagandista podía ser internado por el delito de haber sido alojado en un hotel por una aerolínea junto con otras personas que estaban bajo sospecha. [87]
Según un empleado anónimo del gobierno local uigur citado en un artículo de Radio Free Asia , patrocinada por el gobierno de EE. UU., durante el Ramadán de 2020 (del 23 de abril al 23 de mayo), a los residentes del condado de Makit (Maigaiti), prefectura de Kashgar , se les dijo que podrían enfrentar un castigo por ayuno religioso , incluido el envío a un campo de reeducación. [231]
Según un informe de Human Rights Watch publicado en enero de 2021, la cifra oficial de personas sometidas a este sistema es de 1,3 millones. [232] [233]
Oficialmente, los campos se conocen como Centros de Educación y Formación Profesional, informalmente como "escuelas", y algunos funcionarios los describen como "hospitales" donde los internos reciben tratamiento por la "enfermedad" de la "ideología extremista". Según funcionarios de internamiento citados en Xinjiang Daily (un periódico dirigido por el Partido Comunista), aunque "los requisitos para nuestros estudiantes" son "estrictos... tenemos una actitud amable y ponemos nuestro corazón en tratarlos". Estar en uno "es en realidad como quedarse en un internado". [87] El periódico citó a un ex recluso que declaró durante su internamiento que se había dado cuenta de que se había estado "alejando cada vez más de 'casa'", bajo la influencia del extremismo. "Con la ayuda y la educación del gobierno, he regresado... "nuestras vidas están mejorando cada día. No importa quién seas, ante todo eres un ciudadano chino". [87] Los testimonios en la literatura no perteneciente al Partido Comunista de los reclusos liberados han sido considerablemente diferentes.
Kayrat Samarkand, un ciudadano kazajo que emigró de Xinjiang, fue detenido en uno de los campos de internamiento de la región durante tres meses por visitar el vecino Kazajstán . El 15 de febrero de 2018, el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores kazajo, Kairat Abdrakhmanov, envió una nota diplomática al Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores chino, el mismo día en que Kayrat Samarkand fue liberado de la custodia. [235] Después de su liberación, Samarkand dijo que se enfrentó a un lavado de cerebro y una humillación sin fin, y que se vio obligado a estudiar propaganda comunista durante horas todos los días y a cantar consignas dando gracias y deseando una larga vida a Xi Jinping . [236] [ se necesita una mejor fuente ]
Mihrigul Tursun , una mujer uigur detenida en China, después de escapar de uno de estos campos, habló de palizas y torturas. Después de mudarse a Egipto , viajó a China en 2015 para pasar tiempo con su familia y fue detenida inmediatamente y separada de sus hijos pequeños. Cuando Tursun fue liberada tres meses después, uno de los trillizos había muerto y los otros dos habían desarrollado problemas de salud. Tursun dijo que los niños habían sido operados. Fue arrestada por segunda vez unos dos años después. Varios meses después, fue detenida por tercera vez y pasó tres meses en una celda de prisión abarrotada con otras 60 mujeres, teniendo que dormir por turnos, usar el baño frente a cámaras de seguridad y cantar canciones alabando al Partido Comunista Chino. [237]
Tursun dijo que a ella y a otras reclusas las obligaron a tomar medicamentos desconocidos, incluidas pastillas que las hacían desmayarse y un líquido blanco que provocaba sangrado en algunas mujeres y pérdida de la menstruación en otras. Tursun dijo que nueve mujeres de su celda murieron durante los tres meses que estuvo allí. Un día, recordó Tursun, la llevaron a una habitación y la colocaron en una silla alta, con las piernas y los brazos inmovilizados. "Las autoridades me pusieron una especie de casco en la cabeza, y cada vez que me electrocutaban, todo mi cuerpo temblaba violentamente y sentía el dolor en las venas", dijo Tursun en una declaración leída por un traductor. "No recuerdo el resto. Me salía espuma blanca de la boca y empecé a perder el conocimiento", dijo Tursun. "La última palabra que les oí decir es que ser uigur es un crimen". Finalmente fue liberada para que pudiera llevar a sus hijos a Egipto, pero le ordenaron regresar a China. Una vez en El Cairo, Tursun se puso en contacto con las autoridades estadounidenses y, en septiembre, fue a Estados Unidos y se instaló en Virginia. [238] La portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de China, Hua Chunying, ha declarado que Tursun fue detenido por la policía bajo "sospecha de incitar al odio étnico y la discriminación" durante un período de 20 días, pero niega que Tursun estuviera detenido en un campo de reeducación. [239] [240] [241]
Los ex reclusos afirman que se les exige que aprendan a cantar el himno nacional de China y canciones comunistas. Se dice que a quienes no lo hacen se les aplican castigos como esposarlos durante horas, someterlos a ahogamiento simulado o atarlos a una "silla de tigre" (un artilugio de metal) durante largos períodos de tiempo. [242] [243]
Anar Sabit, una reclusa cooperativa que había cometido un delito relativamente menor por viajar al extranjero, describió su confinamiento en la sección de mujeres como una prisión y marcada por la rigidez burocrática, pero dijo que no fue golpeada ni torturada. [87] Antes y después de su internamiento, Sabit dijo que experimentó lo que los chinos a veces llaman gui da qiang , o 'muros fantasma' "que confunden y atrapan a los viajeros". [87] Después de su liberación del internamiento, dijo que sigue siendo una "persona foco" en su ciudad natal de Kuytun, donde vive con la familia de su tío. Describió la ciudad como parecida a una "prisión al aire libre" debido a la cuidadosa vigilancia por parte de cámaras, sensores, policía y el comité residencial del vecindario, y que se siente rechazada por casi todos los amigos y familiares y le preocupa poner en peligro a cualquiera que la ayude. [87] Después de que Sabit se mudó de la casa de su tío, vivió en el dormitorio del comité residencial del vecindario, que según ella amenazó con devolverla al campo de internamiento por hablar fuera de turno. [87]
Según los detenidos, también se les obligó a beber alcohol y comer cerdo, que están prohibidos en el Islam . [244] [242] Se informa de que algunos recibieron medicamentos desconocidos, mientras que otros intentaron suicidarse. [245] También se han reportado muertes debido a causas no especificadas. [179] [246] [247] [248] [249] [ 250] [ 251] [252] Los detenidos han denunciado abusos sexuales generalizados, incluidos abortos forzados, uso forzado de dispositivos anticonceptivos y esterilización obligatoria . [253] [254] [255] Se ha informado de que se ha asignado a funcionarios han para residir en las casas de los uigures que se encuentran en los campamentos. [256] [257] Rushan Abbas, de la Campaña por los Uigures, sostiene que las acciones del gobierno chino equivalen a genocidio según las definiciones de las Naciones Unidas que se establecen en la Convención sobre el Genocidio . [258]
Según Time , Sarsenbek Akaruli, de 45 años, veterinario y comerciante de Ili , Xinjiang, fue arrestado en Xinjiang el 2 de noviembre de 2017. A noviembre de 2019, todavía se encuentra en un campo de detención. Según su esposa Gulnur Kosdaulet, Akaruli fue puesto en el campo después de que la policía encontró la aplicación de mensajería prohibida WhatsApp en su teléfono celular. Kosdaulet, ciudadana del vecino Kazajstán, ha viajado a Xinjiang en cuatro ocasiones para buscar a su esposo, pero no pudo obtener ayuda de amigos del Partido Comunista Chino. Kosdaulet dijo de sus amigos: "Nadie quería correr el riesgo de ser grabado por cámaras de seguridad hablando conmigo en caso de que terminaran en los campos ellos mismos". [259]
Entre mayo y junio de 2017, una mujer nativa del condado de Maralbexi (Bachu) llamada Mailikemu Maimati (también escrita Mamiti) fue detenida en el campo de reeducación del condado, según su esposo Mirza Imran Baig. Dijo que después de su liberación, las autoridades chinas no les entregaron sus pasaportes a ella ni a su hijo pequeño. [185] [186]
Según Time , el ex prisionero Bakitali Nur, de 47 años, nativo de Khorgos , Xinjiang en la frontera chino-kazaja, fue arrestado porque las autoridades sospechaban de sus frecuentes viajes al extranjero. Informó que pasó un año en una celda con otros siete prisioneros. Los prisioneros se sentaban en taburetes diecisiete horas al día, no se les permitía hablar ni moverse y estaban bajo vigilancia constante. El movimiento conllevaba el castigo de ser colocados en posiciones de estrés durante horas. Después de la liberación, se vio obligado a hacer autocríticas diarias, informar sobre sus planes y trabajar por un salario insignificante en fábricas gubernamentales. En mayo de 2019, escapó a Kazajstán. Nur resumió su experiencia en la cárcel y bajo vigilancia constante después de su liberación diciendo: "Todo el sistema está diseñado para reprimirnos". [259]
Según Radio Free Asia, Ghalipjan, un hombre uigur de 35 años del condado de Shanshan/Pichan que estaba casado y tenía un hijo de cinco años, murió en un campo de reeducación el 21 de agosto de 2018. Las autoridades informaron que su muerte se debió a un ataque cardíaco , pero el jefe del comité del vecindario de Ayagh dijo que un oficial de policía lo golpeó hasta la muerte. A su familia no se le permitió realizar los ritos funerarios islámicos . [260]
Según los archivos de la policía de Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo emitió una orden de fusilamiento contra los detenidos que intentaron escapar en 2018. [148] [261]
En junio de 2018, el presidente del Congreso Mundial Uigur (CMU), Dolkun Isa, fue informado de que su madre, Ayhan Memet, de 78 años, había muerto dos meses antes mientras se encontraba detenida en un "campo de reeducación política". [196] : 1:45 [179] El presidente del CMU no estaba seguro de si había sido encarcelada en uno de los numerosos "campos de reeducación política". [179]
Según un informe de 2018 publicado en The New York Times , Abdusalam Muhemet, de 41 años, que dirigía un restaurante en Hotan antes de huir de China en 2018, dijo que pasó siete meses en prisión y más de dos meses en un campo de concentración de Hotan en 2015 sin que se le acusara nunca de nada penal. Muhemet dijo que la mayoría de los días, los reclusos del campo se reunían para escuchar largas conferencias de funcionarios que les advertían de no abrazar el radicalismo islámico, apoyar la independencia uigur o desafiar al Partido Comunista. [262]
En una entrevista con Radio Free Asia , un oficial del Departamento de Policía del Condado de Kuqa (Kuchar, Kuche) informó que, entre junio y diciembre de 2018, 150 personas en el Campo de Internamiento No. 1 en el distrito de Yengisher del condado de Kuqa habían muerto, corroborando informes anteriores atribuidos a Himit Qari, exjefe de policía del área. [263] [264]
En agosto de 2020, la BBC publicó textos y un vídeo sacados de contrabando de un campo de reeducación por Merdan Ghappar , un ex modelo de origen uigur. A Mergan se le había permitido acceder a sus efectos personales y utilizó un teléfono para grabar vídeos del campo en el que se encuentra internado. [265]
En febrero de 2021, la BBC publicó más relatos de testigos presenciales de violaciones masivas y torturas en los campos. [234] Sayragul Sauytbay dijo a la BBC que, como profesora obligada a trabajar en los campos, "la violación era común" y que los guardias "escogían a las niñas y mujeres jóvenes que querían y se las llevaban". [234] También describió a una mujer que fue llevada a hacer una confesión forzada frente a otros 100 detenidos mientras la policía se turnaba para violarla mientras gritaba pidiendo ayuda. [234] En 2018, una entrevista del Globe and Mail con Sauytbay descubrió que ella no vio personalmente la violencia en el campo, pero sí fue testigo del hambre y de una completa falta de libertad. [266] Tursunay Ziawudun , una uigur que huyó a Kazajstán y luego a los EE. UU., dijo a la BBC que fue violada tres veces en los campos y pateada en el abdomen durante los interrogatorios. [234] En una entrevista de 2020 con BuzzFeed News , Ziawudun informó que "no fue golpeada ni abusada" mientras estuvo adentro, sino que fue sometida a largos interrogatorios, obligada a ver propaganda, mantenida en condiciones de frío con mala comida y le cortaron el pelo. [267]
Trabajo forzado
Adrian Zenz informó que los campos de reeducación también funcionan como campos de trabajos forzados en los que los uigures y los kazajos producen diversos productos para la exportación, especialmente los hechos con algodón cultivado en Xinjiang. [268] [269] [270] [271] El cultivo de algodón es fundamental para la industria de la región, ya que "el 43 por ciento de las exportaciones de Xinjiang son prendas de vestir, calzado o textiles". En 2018, el 84% del algodón de China se produjo en la provincia de Xinjiang. [272] Dado que el algodón se cultiva y se procesa en textiles en Xinjiang, un artículo de noviembre de 2019 de The Diplomat decía que "el riesgo de trabajo forzoso existe en múltiples etapas de la creación de un producto". [273]
Los académicos Zhun Xu y Fangfei Lin escriben que la conclusión de que en Xinjiang se trabaja de manera forzada no tiene suficiente respaldo. [274] Citan la importancia histórica de los trabajadores agrícolas uigures como fuerza laboral de larga data para la cosecha manual de algodón y el reclutamiento generalizado de trabajadores uigures por parte de las empresas de contratación de personal debido a los menores costos de viaje. [274] En su opinión, "[L]a demanda laboral de los recolectores de algodón temporeros uigures en el sur de Xinjiang está determinada en gran medida por su grado relativamente bajo de capitalización agrícola, no debido al 'trato especial' hacia los trabajadores migrantes de una determinada minoría étnica". [274]
En 2018, el Financial Times informó que el centro de formación profesional del condado de Yutian/Keriya , uno de los mayores campos de reeducación de Xinjiang, había abierto un centro de trabajo forzado que incluía ocho fábricas que abarcaban la fabricación de calzado, el ensamblaje de teléfonos móviles y el envasado de té, con un salario mensual base de 1.500 yenes chinos. Entre 2016 y 2018, el centro se expandió un 269 por ciento en su superficie total. [189]
El Instituto Australiano de Política Estratégica informó que entre 2017 y 2019 más de 80.000 uigures fueron enviados a otros lugares de China para trabajos en fábricas que "sugieren fuertemente que se trata de trabajo forzoso". [275] Las condiciones de estas fábricas eran consistentes con las estipulaciones del trabajo forzoso según la definición de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo . [181] [276]
En 2021, el ex proveedor de Nike, Esquel Group , demandó al gobierno de los Estados Unidos por incluirlo en una lista de sanciones por acusaciones de trabajo forzoso en Xinjiang. Posteriormente fue eliminado de la lista de sanciones debido a la falta de pruebas proporcionadas por el Departamento de Comercio de los Estados Unidos. [277]
En octubre de 2021, la CBC, en colaboración con el Investigative Reporting Project Italy y The Guardian, informó sobre la exportación de productos de tomate de Xinjiang y su vinculación con el trabajo forzoso de los uigures. El informe identificó productos de tomate que se exportaban a otros países, como Italia, para ser reenvasados para su venta en otros mercados, como Canadá . [278] [279]
En junio de 2021, los informes de derechos humanos indicaron que los costos de los módulos solares se habían deprimido en los últimos años debido a las prácticas de trabajo forzoso de China en la industria de exportación de módulos solares y turbinas eólicas. [280] [281] [282] [283] [284] A nivel mundial, China dominó la fabricación, instalación y exportación en el campo. [285] [286] La práctica del trabajo forzoso fue culpada de la quiebra de empresas en las industrias solares de EE. UU. y Alemania, varias veces, durante la década de 2010-2020. [287] [288] En un informe, al declararse en quiebra, se sugirió que el costo de las materias primas para la fabricación de paneles era el 30% de los costos totales de fabricación. Se argumentó que China no paga los costos laborales. [289]
El 8 de julio de 2019, 22 países emitieron una declaración en la que pedían el fin de las detenciones masivas en China y expresaban su preocupación por la vigilancia y la represión generalizadas. [20] [293] 50 países emitieron una contradeclaración, supuestamente coordinada por Argelia, criticando la práctica de "politizar las cuestiones de derechos humanos", afirmando que "China ha invitado a varios diplomáticos, funcionarios de organizaciones internacionales y periodistas a Xinjiang" y que "lo que vieron y oyeron en Xinjiang contradecía completamente lo que se informó en los medios de comunicación". La contradeclaración también elogió los "notables logros de China en el campo de los derechos humanos", afirmando que "la seguridad ha regresado a Xinjiang y los derechos humanos fundamentales de las personas de todos los grupos étnicos allí están salvaguardados". [20] [294] [295] Qatar retiró formalmente su nombre de la contradeclaración el 18 de julio, seis días después de su publicación, expresando el deseo de "mantener una postura neutral y ofrecemos nuestros servicios de mediación y facilitación". [295]
En octubre de 2019, 23 países emitieron una declaración conjunta instando a China a "cumplir sus leyes nacionales y sus obligaciones y compromisos internacionales de respetar los derechos humanos, incluida la libertad de religión o creencias", instando a China a abstenerse de "detener arbitrariamente a uigures y miembros de otras comunidades musulmanas". [47] [296]
En respuesta, el mismo día, 54 países (incluida la propia China) emitieron una declaración conjunta en la que reiteraban que la labor de derechos humanos en las Naciones Unidas debía realizarse de una "manera no politizada" y apoyaban las políticas de China en Xinjiang. La declaración hablaba positivamente de los resultados de las medidas de lucha contra el terrorismo y de desradicalización en Xinjiang y sostenía que esas medidas habían salvaguardado eficazmente los derechos humanos básicos de las personas de todos los grupos étnicos". [46] [296] [297] Se ha observado que los grupos de la sociedad civil de los países de mayoría musulmana con gobiernos que han apoyado las políticas de China en Xinjiang se sienten incómodos con la postura de sus gobiernos y han organizado boicots, protestas y campañas mediáticas en relación con los uigures. [298]
En octubre de 2020, Axios informó que más países en la ONU se sumaron a la condena de China por los abusos en Xinjiang. El número total de países que denunciaron a China aumentó a 39, mientras que el número total de países que defendieron a China disminuyó a 45. Cabe destacar que 16 países que defendieron a China en 2019 no lo hicieron en 2020. [50]
En el 46º período de sesiones del Consejo de Derechos Humanos, Cuba presentó una declaración conjunta de apoyo a China, firmada por 64 países. [299] [300] [301]
El 21 de mayo de 2018, durante la reanudación de la sesión del Comité de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de las Naciones Unidas, Kelley Currie , representante de los Estados Unidos ante las Naciones Unidas para asuntos económicos y sociales, planteó la cuestión de la detención masiva de uigures en campos de reeducación, y dijo que "los informes de encarcelamientos masivos en Xinjiang se documentaron al examinar las solicitudes de adquisiciones chinas en sitios web chinos que solicitaban a empresas chinas que presentaran ofertas para construir campos de reeducación política". [305] [306]
El 10 de agosto de 2018, los expertos en derechos humanos de las Naciones Unidas expresaron su alarma por los numerosos informes creíbles que indicaban que China había detenido a un millón o más de uigures étnicos en Xinjiang. [307] [308] Gay McDougall , miembro del Comité de las Naciones Unidas para la Eliminación de la Discriminación Racial , dijo que "en nombre de la lucha contra el extremismo religioso, China había convertido a Xinjiang en algo parecido a un campo de internamiento masivo, envuelto en secreto, una especie de zona sin derechos". [309] [310]
El 10 de septiembre de 2018, la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, Michelle Bachelet, pidió a China que aliviara las restricciones impuestas a ella y al equipo de su oficina, instó a China a permitir la entrada de observadores en Xinjiang y expresó su preocupación por la situación allí. Dijo: "El grupo de derechos humanos de la ONU ha demostrado que los uigures y otros musulmanes están detenidos en campos en toda Xinjiang y espero que las conversaciones con los funcionarios chinos comiencen pronto". [311]
En junio de 2019, el jefe antiterrorista de la ONU, Vladimir Voronkov, visitó Xinjiang y no encontró nada incriminatorio en los campamentos. [312] [313] [314]
The De-Extremism Regulations have been criticised by UN Special Procedures mandates for their lack of compliance with international human rights standards. Following the introduction of those laws, an estimated million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims have reportedly been sent to internment facilities under the guise of "counterterrorism and de-extremism" policies since 2016. (p.4) ...... In this context, previous communications by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention have voiced their concern that the "re-education facilities", sometimes termed "vocational training centres", due to their coercive character, amount to detention centres. It is alleged that between 1 million to 1.5 million ethnic Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang may have been arbitrary forced into these facilities, where there have been allegations of deaths in custody, physical and psychological abuse and torture, as well as lack of access to medical care. It is also reported that in several cases they have been denied free contact with their families and friends or been unable to inform them of their location and denied their basic freedom of movement.(p.8)
In June 2020, nearly 50 UN independent experts had repeatedly communicated with the Government of the People's Republic of China their alarm regarding the repression of fundamental freedoms in China. They had also raised their concerns regarding a range of issues of grave concern, including the collective repression of the population, especially religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet.[316][317]
In March 2021, sixteen UN human right experts raised grave concerns about the "alleged detention and forced labour of Muslim Uyghurs in China". The experts were appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, and several of them said they had "received information that connected over 150 domestic Chinese and foreign domiciled companies to serious allegations of human rights abuses against Uyghur workers". The experts also called for unrestricted access to China in order to conduct "fact-finding missions", meanwhile urging "global and domestic companies to closely scrutinize their supply chains".[318][319]
The most outstanding disagreement we have with China concerns the human rights situation in China, as underlined in your Report. We also focused on the situation in Xinjiang, especially the expansion of political re-education camps. And we discussed the detention of human rights defenders, including particular cases.[320]
On 19 December 2019, the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution condemning the mass incarceration of Uyghurs and calling on EU companies with supply chains in the region to ensure that they are not complicit with crimes against humanity.[321][322]
On 17 December 2020, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that strongly condemns China over allegations of forced labor by ethnic and religious minorities. In the statement, the EU body said Parliament "strongly condemns the government-led system of forced labor, in particular the exploitation of Uyghur, ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minority groups, in factories both within and outside of internment camps in Xinjiang, as well as the transfer of forced laborers to other Chinese administrative divisions, and the fact that well-known European brands and companies have been benefiting from the use of forced labor."[323]
On 22 March 2021, the European Union, joined by the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, imposed sanctions on four senior Chinese officials and the Public Security Bureau of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps over the human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[324][325] This was the first sanction by the EU against China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.[325]
On 11 November 2019, the World Bank issued a statement:[326]
In line with standard practice, immediately after receiving a series of serious allegations in August 2019 in connection with the Xinjiang Technical and Vocational Education and Training Project, the Bank launched a fact-finding review, and World Bank senior managers traveled to Xinjiang to gather information directly. After receiving the allegations, no disbursements were made on the project. The team conducted a thorough review of project documents... The review did not substantiate the allegations. In light of the risks associated with the partner schools, which are widely dispersed and difficult to monitor, the scope and footprint of the project is being reduced. Specifically, the project component that involves the partner schools in Xinjiang is being closed.
On 1 March 2019, the OIC produced a document which "commends the efforts of the People's Republic of China in providing care to its Muslim citizens."[327][328][329]
A coalition of American Muslim groups criticized the OIC's decision and accused member states of being influenced by Chinese power. The groups included the Council on American-Islamic Relations.[330]
Human rights organisations
On 10 September 2017, Human Rights Watch released a report that said "The Chinese government should immediately free people held in unlawful 'political education' centers in Xinjiang and shut them down."[1]
On 9 September 2018, Human Rights Watch released a 117-page report, "'Eradicating Ideological Viruses': China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims",[331] which accused China of the systematic mass detention of tens of thousands of ethnic Uyghurs and other Muslims in political re-education camps without being charged or tried and presented new evidence of the Chinese government's mass arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment, and the increasingly pervasive controls on daily life.[332][333] The report also urged foreign governments to pursue a range of multilateral and unilateral actions against China for its actions, including "targeted sanctions" against those responsible.[334]
On 7 January 2020, CAIR National Executive Director Nihad Awad condemned a tweet by the US Chinese embassy, saying that China was openly admitting to and celebrating forced sterilizations and abortions of Muslim Uyghur women by saying it had "emancipated" them from being "baby-making machines".[335]
Amnesty International published a dedicated website and an extensive report in 2021. Amnesty estimates up to 1 million prisoners and concludes "The evidence Amnesty International has gathered provides a factual basis for the conclusion that the Chinese government has committed at least the following crimes against humanity: imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; and persecution."[336] Their full report includes recommendations to the Chinese government, the UN and the international community in general.[337]
In September 2019, Australian Foreign MinisterMarise Payne stated, "I have previously raised Australia's concerns about reports of mass detentions of Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples in Xinjiang. We have consistently called for China to cease the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and other Muslim groups. We have raised these concerns—and we will continue to raise them—both bilaterally and in relevant international meetings."[338]
In January 2020, the Bahrain Council of Representatives called on the international community to protect Uyghur Muslims in China and "expressed deep concern over the inhumane and painful conditions to which Uyghur Muslims in China are subjected, including the detention of more than one million Muslims in mass detention camps, denial of their most basic rights, the removal of their children, wives and families, their prevention of prayer, worship and religious practices, confronting murder, ill-treatment and torture."[339]
On 5 March 2021, a group of 65 member states—led by Belarus—expressed their support of China's Xinjiang policy and opposed the "unfounded allegations against China based on disinformation" at the 44th session of Human Rights Council.[340][341]
On 15 March 2021, the Walloon Parliament voted to approve a motion condemning the "unacceptable" practices introduced by the Chinese government, including the exploitation of Uyghurs and all other ethnic minorities, in Xinjiang. All parties voted in favor, with the exception of the Workers' Party, which abstained.[342]
On 22 February 2021, the Canadian House of Commons voted 266–0 to approve a motion that formally recognizes China is committing genocide against its Muslim minorities. Prime MinisterJustin Trudeau and his cabinet did not vote.[343]
Cuba
On 6 October 2020, Cuba delivered a joint statement with 45 other countries voicing their support of China's measures in Xinjiang.[344][345]
Egypt signed both statements at the UN (in July and October 2019) that supported China's Xinjiang policies.[20][345] Egypt has been accused of deporting Uyghurs to China.[346][347]
The French authorities are examining very carefully all of the testimonies and documents disseminated by the press over the past several days, indicating the existence of a system of internment camps in Xinjiang and a widespread policy of repression in this region. As we have publicly indicated on several occasions, as have our European partners, notably at the UN, within the framework of the most recent UN Human Rights Council sessions, we call on the Chinese authorities to put an end to mass arbitrary detentions in camps and to invite the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit Xinjiang as soon possible to assess the situation in this region.[349]
In December 2018, leaders of the Muslim organization Muhammadiyah issued an open letter citing reports of violence against the "weak and innocent" community of Uyghurs and asking Beijing to explain. Soon after, Beijing responded by inviting more than a dozen top Indonesian religious leaders to the Xinjiang province and camps, and criticism greatly diminished.[351] Since then, Indonesia's largest Muslim organizations have purportedly treated reports of widespread human rights violations in Xinjiang with skepticism, dismissing them as U.S. propaganda.[352]
In October 2022, the Indonesian delegation for the UNHCR voted against debate in the chamber on the topic of the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang as it "will not yield meaningful progress", but Ambassador Febrian Ruddyard also stated, "As the world's largest Muslim country and a vibrant democracy, we cannot close our eyes to the plight of our Muslim brothers and sisters."[353]
Iran
In a December 2016 report, the research unit of the Iranian state-owned television's external services said that China is not opposed to Muslims, but instead to pro-Saudi radical ideology. In August 2020, Ali Motahari, a former member of the Iranian Parliament, tweeted that the Iranian government has kept silent about the situation of Muslims in China because the government of Iran needs China's economic support. He said that this silence has been humiliating for the Islamic Republic. Critics of Motahari responded that China was opposed to Wahabism, and had no problem with Islam or Chinese Muslims.[354][355]
Iran signed an October 2019 letter that publicly expressed support for China's treatment of Uyghurs.[345]
On 26 November 2019, Japanese Foreign MinisterToshimitsu Motegi said Japan was "monitoring the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region with concern" and that he brought up Japan's position with State CouncilorWang Yi in their meeting on 25 November.[356][357]
NPR reported that "Kazakhstan and its neighbors in the mostly Muslim region of Central Asia that have benefited from Chinese investment aren't speaking up for the Muslims inside internment camps in China".[358]
In November 2017, Kazakhstan's Ambassador to China Shahrat Nuryshev met with Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Huilai regarding Kazakh diaspora issues.[359]
On 15 February 2018, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kairat Abdrakhmanov sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the same day Samarkand, a Kazakhstan citizen, was released from re-education camp. From 17 to 19 April, Kazakh First Deputy Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi visited Xinjiang to meet with local officials.[235]
In September 2020, the Muhyiddin government confirmed that it would not extradite ethnic Uyghurs to China if Beijing requests it, continuing the policy set by the Mahathir administration. Although it is the government of Malaysia's stance not to get involved in Chinese internal affairs, it stated that the oppression of Uyghurs in the country could not be denied. Mohd Redzuan Md Yusof, minister in the Prime Minister's Department also stated that his government would grant free passage to those refugees who wished to settle in a third country.[361]
On 25 February, the States General of the Netherlands declared China's treatment of the Uyghur ethnic minority a genocide, the third country to do so.[362]
On 6 May 2021, the New Zealand Parliament passed a motion condemning China's treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, but fell short of calling it genocide, due to opposition from the governing Labour Party, who would not pass the motion unless the term 'genocide' was removed.[363]
New Zealand Prime MinisterJacinda Ardern has raised the issue of the Uyghurs on numerous occasions,[364] including in her 2019 meeting with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. She did not detail exactly what was said. In July 2019, New Zealand Foreign MinisterWinston Peters, asked why New Zealand had signed the letter to the president of the United Nations Human Rights Council criticizing Beijing for its treatment of ethnic Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region stated, "Because we believe in human rights, we believe in freedom and we believe in the liberty of personal beliefs and the right to hold them."[365]
Pakistan signed both statements at the UN (in July and October 2019) that supported China's Xinjiang policies.[20][345]
On 19 January 2020, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan was asked why he was not more outspoken about the situation of Uyghurs in China. He said that he has not been as outspoken primarily because the human rights situation in Kashmir and Citizenship Amendment Act were problems much larger in scale. He said that the second reason was that China has been a great friend of Pakistan and had helped Pakistan through their toughest time with the economic crisis, so that "the way we deal with China is that when we talk about things, we talk about privately. We do not talk about things with China in public right now because they are very sensitive. That's how they deal with issues."[368]
In July 2020, Xi Jinping met with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to express Beijing's "full support" for the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, saying that "China and Palestine are good brothers, good friends and good partners". Abbas then voiced support for China's "legitimate position on Hong Kong, Xinjiang and other matters concerning China's core interests."[369]
After Palestinian ambassador to China Fariz Mehdawi [ar] visited Xinjiang in March 2021, he remarked on Chinese state media that he was impressed by the region's infrastructure and upkeep of mosques,[370] saying "if you have to calculate it all, it's something like 2,000 inhabitants for one mosque. This ratio, we don't have it in our country. It's not available anywhere."[371] RFA journalist Shohret Hoshur wrote in response that Mehdawi was neglecting the harsh reality of locals with whom he had met and who had no ability to speak the truth under the watch of officials, adding that his true motivation seemed to be a shared anti-US agenda with China.[372]
On 4 February 2019, Russian Foreign MinisterSergey Lavrov said he was not aware of reports about political re-education camps in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, though he had seen the US actively raising the issue.[373]
In July 2019, Russia signed the letter supporting China at the UN Human Rights Council.[20][374]
On 9 October 2019, Lavrov said that "China has repeatedly given explanations concerning the accusations that you have mentioned probably citing our Western colleagues. We have no reason to take any steps other than the procedures that exist at the UN that I mentioned, such as at the Human Rights Council and its Universal Periodic Reviews."[375][376]
In February 2019, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman defended China's use of the camps, saying "China has the right to carry out anti-terrorism and de-extremisation work for its national security."[378][379][380]
Saudi Arabia was among the 24 countries (excluding China) that backed China's position at the UN Human Rights Council in July 2019, and again at the UN General Assembly in October 2020.[20][374][345]
On 6 November 2018 during the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review of China, Switzerland called on China to close down its detention camps in Xinjiang, to grant the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights unrestricted access to Xinjiang, and to allow an independent UN investigation of the detention camps.[381]
On 26 November 2019, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs called on the Chinese government to address the concerns raised by many states and to allow the UN unhindered access to the region.[381][382]
In December 2019, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates defended China's actions in Xinjiang days after the US condemnation, stating that it is a "blatant interference by the US in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of China." The statement concluded that "Syria emphasizes the right of China to preserve its sovereignty, people, territorial integrity, and security and protect the security and property of the state and individuals."[383]
On 2 October 2018 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Wu, used the MOFA's official Twitter account to send out a Radio Free Asia article titled "Xinjiang Authorities Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees to Jails Throughout China" and stated that, "relocation of Uyghurs to re-education camps around China warrants the world's attention."[384]
On 5 July 2019, Joseph Wu, again on Twitter, sent out a BBC News article titled "China Muslims: Xinjiang schools used to separate children from families" and called on China to "Close the camps! Send the children home!"[385]
On 18 November 2019, the MOFA's official Twitter sent out a New York Times article titled "'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims" saying, "This chilling NYTimes expose on the mass detention of Muslims by China is a must-read! Leaked internal documents tell the truth about the crackdown on ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, as well as the 'ruthless & extraordinary campaign' run by senior Communist Party officials."[386]
In February 2019, after Turkish media had picked up rumors of Uyghur musician Abdurehim Heyit dying in detention, the Spokesperson for the Turkish Foreign Ministry denounced China for "violating the fundamental human rights of Uyghur Turks and other Muslim communities in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region."[387][388] In July 2019, Turkish journalists from Milliyet and Aydınlık interviewed Heyit in Ürümqi who denied that Uyghurs had problems in China.[389][390]
In July 2019, Chinese state media reported that when Turkish President Erdoğan visited China, he said, "It is a fact that the people of all ethnicities in Xinjiang are leading a happy life amid China's development and prosperity."[391] Turkish officials then claimed the paraphrase was mistranslated by the Turkish side, saying it should rather have read "hopes the peoples of China's Xinjiang live happily in peace and prosperity".[392] Erdoğan also said that some people were seeking to "abuse" the Xinjiang crisis to jeopardize the "Turkish–Chinese relationship".[393][394][395] Some Uyghurs in Turkey have expressed concerns that they may face deportation back to China.[396][397]
On 3 July 2018, at a U.K. Parliamentary roundtable, the Rights Practice helped to organize a Parliamentary Round-table on increased repression and forced assimilation in Xinjiang. Rahima Mahmut, an Uyghur singer and human rights activist, gave a personal testimony about the violations suffered by the Uyghur community. Dr. Adrian Zenz, European School of Culture and Theology, (Germany), outlined the evidence of a large scale and sophisticated political re-education network designed to detain people for long periods and which the Chinese government officially denies.[398]
On 16 December 2020, the U.K. said there was credible, growing, and troubling evidence of forced labor among Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Nigel Adams, Minister of State for Asia told Parliament, "Evidence of forced Uyghur labor within Xinjiang, and in other parts of China, is credible, it is growing and deeply troubling to the UK government." Adams said firms had a duty to ensure their supply chains were free of forced labor.[399]
On 12 January 2021, the Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, announced if British businesses fail to ensure their supply chains are free of slave labour could face fines. Raab appeared to be targeting China's mistreatment of internees in Xinjiang, saying it was Britain's "moral duty" to respond to the "far-reaching" evidence of human rights abuses being perpetrated in Xinjiang.[400]
On 23 April, a group of MPs led by Sir Iain Duncan Smith passed a motion declaring the mass detention of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang province a genocide. The United Kingdom is the fourth country in the world to make such action. In response, the Chinese Embassy in London said "The unwarranted accusation by a handful of British MPs that there is 'genocide' in Xinjiang is the most preposterous lie of the century..."[401]
Call for boycott of products from China's Xinjiang province, New York, 2020. The US officially recognized the Chinese government's treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang as a genocide.
On 3 April 2018, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio and Representative Chris Smith sent a letter urging Ambassador to China Terry Branstad to launch an investigation into the reported mass detention of Uyghurs in political re-education camps in Xinjiang.[402][403]
On 26 July 2018, Vice President of the United States Mike Pence raised the re-education camps issue at Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom. He said that "Sadly, as we speak as well, Beijing is holding hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions, of Uyghur Muslims in so-called 're-education camps', where they're forced to endure around-the-clock political indoctrination and to denounce their religious beliefs and their cultural identity as the goal."[404][405][406]
On 26 July 2018, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, an independent agency of the U.S. government which monitors human rights and rule of law developments in the People's Republic of China, released a report that said as many as a million people are or have been detained in what are being called "political re-education" centers, the largest mass incarceration of an ethnic minority population in the world today.[407] On 27 July 2018, The U.S. Embassy & Consulate in China released Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom Statement on China, which mentioned the detention of hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions, of Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minority groups in "political re-education camps", and called the Chinese government to release immediately all those arbitrarily detained.[408]
On 28 August 2018, U.S. senator Marco Rubio and 16 other members of Congress urged the United States to impose sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act against Chinese officials who are responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[409] In a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, they called for the sanctions on Chen Quanguo who is the current Communist Party Secretary of the Xinjiang (the highest post in an administrative unit of China) and six other Chinese officials and two businesses that make surveillance equipment in Xinjiang.[410][411][412][413]
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo criticized Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for his refusal to condemn the Chinese government's repressions against the Uyghurs.[414]
On 3 May 2019, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randall Schriver condemns the detention of Uyghurs as concentration camps.[3][378][415]
On 11 September 2019, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act.[416][417] On 3 December 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a stronger version of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act by a vote of 407 to 1.[418][419] The bill was signed into law on 17 June 2020.[420]
On 8 January 2020, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China released its annual report, which stated that Chinese government actions in Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity.[421][422]
In June 2020, Trump's former national security adviser John Bolton claimed that President Donald Trump told Chinese leader Xi Jinping that China's decision to detain Uyghurs in re-education camps was "exactly the right thing to do".[423]
On 14 September 2020, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security blocked imports to the United States of products from four entities in Xinjiang: all products made with labor from the Lop County No. 4 Vocational Skills Education and Training Center; hair products made in the Lop County Hair Product Industrial Park; apparel produced by Yili Zhuowan Garment Manufacturing Co., Ltd. and Baoding LYSZD Trade and Business Co., Ltd; and cotton produced and processed by Xinjiang Junggar Cotton and Linen Co., Ltd.[183][184]
On 22 September 2020, the United States House of Representatives passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.[428]
On 19 January 2021, US Secretary of StateMike Pompeo designated China's treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide, making the United States the first country in the world to make such a designation. China responded a day later by sanctioning US officials in the outgoing Trump administration, including Pompeo, for their criticisms of China's treatment of the Uyghurs.[429]
On 9 July 2021 The US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 14 entities, that are based in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and have enabled Beijing's campaign of repression, mass detention, and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regions of China (XUAR), where the PRC continues to commit genocide and crimes against humanity, to the Entity List. The Entity List is a tool utilized by BIS to restrict the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations.[430]
Responses from China
The Chinese government officially legalized re-education camps in Xinjiang in October 2018.[431] Prior to that, when international media had asked about the re-education camps, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that they have not heard of this situation.[432]
On 12 August 2018, a Chinese state-run tabloid, Global Times, defended the crackdown in Xinjiang after a U.N. anti-discrimination committee raised concerns over China's treatment of Uyghurs. According to the Global Times, China prevented Xinjiang from becoming 'China's Syria' or 'China's Libya', and local authorities' policies saved countless lives and avoided a 'great tragedy'.[433][434]
On 13 August 2018, at a UN meeting in Geneva, the delegation from China told the United Nations Human Rights Committee that "There is no such thing as re-education centers in Xinjiang and it is completely untrue that China put 1 million Uyghurs into re-education camps".[435][436][437] A Chinese delegation said that "Xinjiang citizens, including the Uyghurs, enjoy equal freedom and rights." They said that "Some minor offenders of religious extremism or separatism have been taken to 'vocational education' and employment training centers with a view to assisting in their rehabilitation".[438]
On 14 August 2018, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said "anti-China forces had made false accusations against China for political purposes and a few foreign media outlets misrepresented the committee's discussions and were smearing China's anti-terror and crime-fighting measures in Xinjiang" after a UN human rights committee raised concern over reported mass detentions of ethnic Uyghurs.[439][440]
On 21 August 2018, Liu Xiaoming, the Ambassador of China to the United Kingdom, wrote an article in response to a Financial Times report entitled "Crackdown in Xinjiang: Where have all the people gone?".[441] Liu's response said: "The education and training measures taken by the local government of Xinjiang have not only effectively prevented the infiltration of religious extremism and helped those lost in extremist ideas to find their way back, but also provided them with employment training in order to build a better life."[442]
On 10 September 2018, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang condemned a report about the re-education camps issued by Human Rights Watch. He said: "This organisation has always been full of prejudice and distorting facts about China." Geng also added that: "Xinjiang is enjoying overall social stability, sound economic development and harmonious co-existence of different ethnic groups. The series of measures implemented in Xinjiang are meant to improve stability, development, solidarity and people's livelihood, crack down on ethnic separatist activities and violent and terrorist crimes, safeguard national security, and protect people's life and property."[443][444]
On 11 September 2018, China called for UN human rights chief Michelle Bachelet to "respect its sovereignty", after she urged China to allow monitors into Xinjiang and expressed concern about the situation there.[445] Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said: "China urges the U.N. human rights high commissioner and office to scrupulously abide by the mission and principles of the U.N. charter, respect China's sovereignty, fairly and objectively carry out its duties, and not listen to one-sided information".[446][445][447]
On 16 October 2018, a CCTV prime-time program aired a 15-minute episode on what was termed as Xinjiang's 'Vocational Skills Educational Training Centers', featuring the Muslim internees. Sinologist Manya Koetse documented that it received a mixture of supportive and critical responses on the Sina Weibo social media platform.[448]
In March 2019, against the background of the US considering imposing sanctions against Chen Quanguo, who is the region's most senior Communist Party official, Xinjiang governor Shohrat Zakir refuted international claims of concentration camps and re-education camps, instead comparing the institutions to boarding schools.[415]
On 18 March 2019, the Chinese government released a white paper about the counter-terrorism, de-radicalization in Xinjiang. The white paper claims "A country under the rule of law, China respects and protects human rights in accordance with the principles of its Constitution." The white paper also argues that Xinjiang has not had violent terrorist cases for more than two consecutive years, extremist penetration has been effectively curbed, and social security has improved significantly.[449]
In July 2019, the Chinese government released another white paper that claims "The Uygur people adopted Islam not of their own volition ... but had it forced upon them by religious wars and the ruling class."[450]
In November 2019, the Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom responded to questions about newly leaked documents on Xinjiang by calling the documents "fake news".[451]
On 6 December 2019, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying accused the US of hypocrisy on human rights issues relating to allegations of torture at Guantanamo Bay detention camp.[452][453]
In September 2020, amid condemnation from Western countries, Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping acclaimed the success of his policies in Xinjiang in a 2-day conference expected to set the country's policy for the next years.[454] The Chinese government published a white paper defending its "vocational training centers", claiming that the regional government organised 'employment-oriented training' and labour skills for 1.29 million workers a year from 2014 to 2019.[455]
On 7 January 2021, the US Chinese embassy published a tweet that said: "The minds of (Uighur) women in Xinjiang were emancipated and gender equality and reproductive health were promoted, making them no longer baby-making machines," which drew sharp criticism from human rights groups as well as Sam Brownback, the US envoy on international religious freedom.[456] Subsequently, the tweet was deleted and Twitter locked the embassy's account.[457]
In March 2021, following sanctions imposed on several Chinese officials by the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, the Chinese government responded with sanctions on several individuals and groups that had criticized China over the camps, including five European Parliament members (among them Reinhard Butikofer, the head of the European Parliament's delegation to China), German scholar Adrian Zenz, and the non-profit Alliance of Democracies Foundation.[324][458]
In June 2021, ProPublica and The New York Times documented a Chinese government-backed propaganda campaign on Twitter and YouTube involving more than 5000 videos analysed. They showed Uyghurs in Xinjiang denying abuses and scolding foreign officials and multinational corporations who had questioned China's human rights record in the province. Some of the videos' accounts were removed on YouTube as part of the company's efforts to combat spam and influence operations.[201]
In October 2022, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute documented a number of CCP-backed Uyghur influencers in Xinjiang posting propaganda videos on Chinese and Western social media which pushed back against abuse allegations. Some of the influencers' accounts were suspended on Twitter for alleged inauthenticity.[459]
Response from dissidents
On 10 August 2018, about 47 Chinese intellectuals and others issued an appeal against what they describe as "shocking human rights atrocities perpetrated in Xinjiang".[460]
In December 2019, during the anti-government protests in Hong Kong, a mixed crowd of young and elderly people, numbering around 1,000 and dressed in black and wearing masks to shield their identities, held up signs reading "Free Uyghur, Free Hong Kong" and "Fake 'autonomy' in China results in genocide". They rallied calmly, waving Uyghur flags and posters. The local riot police pepper sprayed demonstrators to disperse the crowd.[461]
^Also called the Xinjiang re-education camps,[7][8] and informally called Xinjiang concentration camps.[9][10][11]
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